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CIVIL PROCEDURE

The Appealability of an Order Compelling Arbitration

In Horsey v. Horsey,1 the Court of Appeals held that a trial court's
order compelling arbitration was a final appealable judgment because
it denied all relief sought and terminated the action. 2 In so holding,
the court read the case law expansively and clarified the circumstances
orders compelling arbitration apunder which courts will consider
3
judgments.
final
as
pealable
1. The Case.-Leonilla and Elmer Horsey were married in 19544
and divorced on September 26, 1974.5 Their divorce decree incorporated a separation agreement providing for spousal support.6 One
provision of the agreement required Mr. Horsey to pay Mrs. Horsey
$350 per month for the first five years and $300 per month thereafter. 7 The agreement, mistakenly referring to these payments as "alimony,"' provided that the payments should be reduced if Mrs. Horsey
obtained employment after eleven years.9 If at that time the parties
were unable to agree on a fair reduction, the agreement specified that
1. 329 Md. 392, 620 A.2d 305 (1993).
2. Id. at 403, 620 A.2d at 311.
3. This Note will primarily discuss arbitration determinations under the Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1965 Md. Laws 231, § 2 (effective June 1, 1965) (codified at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 7, §§ 1-23 (1968) (subsequently revised and codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to -227 (1989))).
4. SeeJoint Record Extract at 42.
5. Horsey, 329 Md. at 396, 620 A.2d at 307.
6. Id. Because the separation agreement was executed prior to 1976, the current
Code provisions regarding judicial modification of spousal support did not apply. See MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 8-103(b)&(c), 8-105(a)(1)&(2) (1991).
7. Horsey, 329 Md. at 395, 620 A.2d at 307. Mrs. Horsey had no income or resources
of her own at the time of separation. Id.
8. Technical alimony is payable under a judicial decree and terminates upon (1) the
death of either spouse, (2) the remarriage of the spouse receiving the payments, or (3) the
reconciliation of the parties. Id. at 410, 620 A.2d at 314-15. While the agreement provided
that Mr. Horsey's obligation to make payments would end upon Mrs. Horsey's death or
remarriage, it did not indicate that the payments would terminate upon Mr. Horsey's
death. Because the spousal support was not to end upon the death of Mr. Horsey, it constituted contractual spousal support rather than alimony. Id. at 411, 620 A.2d at 315; see also
Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. 204, 207 n.2, 428 A.2d 469, 472 n.2 (1988); Mendelson v.
Mendelson, 75 Md. App. 486, 501, 541 A.2d 1331, 1338 (1988).
9. Horsey, 329 Md. at 395, 620 A.2d at 307. The agreement provided:
If at any time after eleven (11) years from the date of signing the agreement, the
wife secures employment or receives income from any other source, the parties
If on the
shall attempt to agree on a fair reduction in the alimony payments ....
matter of any reduction.., in alimony payments the parties are unable to reach

1994]

CMvL PROCEDURE

619

they would submit the matter to arbitration.' 0 No specific arbitration
provisions were set forth in the agreement."
Mr. Horsey made monthly payments until August 1988.12 At that
time he ceased making the payments, asserting that Mrs. Horsey had
become employed and that she had breached the agreement by failing to notify him of that employment.1 3 On January 12, 1989, Mr.
Horsey filed a Petition of Contempt in the Circuit Court for Kent
County alleging breach of the separation agreement.14 After Mrs.
Horsey responded with a complaint seeking specific performance of
the agreement, Mr. Horsey asked the court to treat his petition as a
counterclaim.' 5 Neither party initiated arbitration or sought to compel arbitration prior to or during the court proceedings.' 6 At trial,
counsel for both parties stated that the arbitration provision had been
waived. 7 Despite the parties' concessions, the trial court found that
both parties had failed to comply with the agreement's prerequisites
to obtaining judicial relief.' The trial court ordered the parties to
attempt to negotiate a fair reduction in monthly payments and to submit the matter to arbitration if the negotiation failed. 9
Mrs. Horsey appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to order arbitration and its failure to award her relief.20 The court dismissed her appeal on the
ground that the trial court had not rendered a final appealable judgagreement, the matter shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions hereinafter set forth.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 397, 620 A.2d at 308.
13. Id. at 396, 620 A.2d at 308. Mrs. Horsey was employed as a secretary for the Kent
County Board of Education as of June 24, 1974. Id., 620 A.2d at 307.
14. Id. at 397, 620 A.2d at 308.
15. Id. at 398, 620 A. 2d at 308.
16. Id., 620 A.2d at 309.
17. Id.
18. Joint Record Extract at 150. The trial court stated:
[E]ach party has unilaterally interpreted the portions of [the provision] they find
suitable to them, and both have failed to make a good faith effort to carry out the
intent of their own Agreement. In such circumstances, both law ... and equity,
require the Court to compel them to fulfill the terms of their Agreement.
Id.
19. Horsey, 329 Md. at 400, 620 A.2d at 310. The trial judge may have believed his
order was interlocutory and nonappealable. He wrote: "If they fail to agree within [90
days], the matter shall be submitted to [the arbitrator whose] decision shall constitute a
binding determination of this Court on the parties, subject to appeal rights, as in all matters." Joint Record Extract at 151.
20. Brief of Appellant at 3.
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Mrs. Horsey then petitioned for and obtained a writ of certiorari from the Court of Appeals.22
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act.-In 1965, the General
Assembly enacted the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA),23
which substantially adopted the major provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) .24 In adopting the Act, the General Assembly repu5
diated the common law's hostility toward agreements to arbitrate
and embraced the modem trend toward recognizing and encouraging voluntary written agreements to arbitrate. 6 An order compelling
arbitration was not included among the orders that were appealable
under the MUAA, 27 and in 1972, the Court of Appeals determined in
21. Horsey, 329 Md. at 401, 620 A.2d at 310. The intermediate court believed the trial
court's order did not substantially determine the rights of the parties. Horsey v. Horsey,
No. 90-1095, slip op. at 4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 18, 1990) (per curiam), rev'd, 329 Md.
392, 620 A.2d 305 (1993); see also Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 616, 440 A.2d 388, 390
(1982) ("Finality for the purposes of appeal requires settlement of the rights of the parties."); Fred W. Allnutt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 289 Md. 35, 40, 421 A.2d
1360, 1363 (1980) ("In general, the cases hold that a judgment or order of a court is
appealable if it is so final as to deny the appellant the means of further prosecuting or
defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceedings.").
22. Horsey, 329 Md. at 401, 620 A.2d at 310.
23. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 1965 Md. Laws 231, § 2 (effective June 1,
1965) (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, §§ 1-23 (1968) (subsequently revised and codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC., §§ 3-201 to -227 (1989))).
24. UNIF. ARBrrRATiON AcT (1955).

25. The promise to arbitrate a future dispute was revokable at common law. See generally Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 H. &J. 408 (1825);James M. Mullen, Arbitration Under
Mayland Law, 2 MD. L. REv. 326 (1938). In 1974, however, the Court of Special Appeals
indicated that the common law doctrine had been abrogated by statute, Bel Pre Medical
Ctr. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320 A.2d 558, 565 (1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975), and in 1988, the Court of Appeals held
that common law agreements to arbitrate future disputes were enforceable. Anne Arundel
County v. Fraternal Order of Anne Arundel Detention Officers, 313 Md. 98, 110, 543 A.2d
841, 847 (1988).
26. Parties to disputes frequently favor arbitration over litigation for its relatively low
cost, speed, relaxed rules of discovery and evidence, privacy, and when faced with complex
issues, arbitrator expertise. Thejudicial system frequently favors arbitration as well. See 67
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASS'N TRANSACrIONs 251 (1962) (stating that "the arbitral process
combines finality of decision with speed, moderate expense and flexibility... in solving a
problem"); see also Bel Pre Medical Ctr., 21 Md. App. at 320, 320 A.2d at 565 (stating that,
because the "prime purpose of [the Act] is to discourage litigation and to foster voluntary
resolution of disputes," suits to compel arbitration are to be viewed as "favored" actions).
27. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, § 18 (1968). It stated:
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under Section 2;
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Maietta v. Greenfield2" that an order compelling arbitration was a nonappealable, interlocutory judgment.2 9
In Maietta, the court considered a subcontractor's appeal from an
order of the circuit court compelling arbitration to resolve a contract
dispute with a general contractor. 30 Affirming the chancellor's finding that there was a contract to arbitrate, the court held that, even if
the chancellor had erred in his determination, the order to arbitrate
was a nonappealable, interlocutory order.3" Examining the legislative
intent associated with the enactment of the MUAA, the court inferred
that the General Assembly limited the categories of appealable orders
to encourage arbitration. 31
As part of the adoption of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article in 1973," 3 Article 7 of the MUAA, which listed the appealable
orders, 34 was repealed in toto and replaced with sections 3-201 to 234.3' Because the MUAA as reenacted does not contain a list of appealable orders, appeals from orders concerning arbitrability determi(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under Section
2(b);
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this article.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from
orders orjudgments in a civil action.
Id. With the appropriate substitution of "article" for the UAA's reference to the "act" at
§ 19(a) (6), the MUAA repeated verbatim the UAA text. See UNIF. ARITRATION Acr
§ 19(a)(6) (1955).
28. 267 Md. 287, 297 A.2d 244 (1972).
29. Id. at 293, 297 A.2d at 247-48.
30. Id. at 288-89, 297 A.2d at 245-46.
31. Id. at 293, 297 A.2d at 247-48; cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, § 18 (1968).
32. Maietta, 267 Md. at 291, 297 A.2d at 246. The court referred to Arizona and California, two states that had adopted a statute similar to the UAA. The courts in those states
held that an order compelling arbitration was an interlocutory, nonappealable order. Id.
at 292-93, 297 A.2d at 247 (citations omitted). The Maietta court agreed that the appeal of
an interlocutory order must await the final judgment of a court confirming or denying the
arbitrator's award. See id. at 293, 297 A.2d at 247. Quoting the California court with approval, the court stated that "'ifat the very threshold of the proceeding the defaulting party could
appeal and thereby indefinitely delay the matter of arbitration,the object of the law and thepurpose of
the written agreement would be entirely defeated.'" Id. (quotingJardine, Matheson & Co., Ltd. v.
Pacific Orient Co., 280 P. 697, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929)).
33. See Acts of the 1st Special Session of 1973, ch. 2, § 1 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. (1974)). See generally William H. Adkins, Code Revision in Maryland: The
Courts and JudicialProceedings Article, 34 MD. L. REv. 7 (1974) (providing an examination
and analysis of the provisions of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article on a title-bytitle basis).
34. See supra note 27.
35. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 2-201 to -234 (1974).
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nations are governed by section 12-30136 or 12-303," 7 which govern
appeals from final judgments and interlocutory orders.3 8
In Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Construction Co.,3 9 the court first applied the applicable provisions of the new Code. A building owner
sought a declaratory judgment that the arbitration of a dispute between himself and an architect be consolidated with another arbitration proceeding he was undergoing with a general contractor. 40 The
trial court denied the petition and the owner appealed. 4 ' Noting that
the MUAA did not expressly deny the right to appeal a final judgment, the Court of Appeals determined that the sole question was
36. Section 12-301 states in part:
Except as provided in § 12-302, a party may appeal from a final judgment
entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists
from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though
imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended.
Mo. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 12-301 (1974).
37. Section 12-303 stated in relevant part:
A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by
a circuit court in a civil case:
(c) An order:
(9) Granting an application to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-207 of this
article.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-303 (1974). The most recent revision of section 12303 retains this interlocutory appeal provision from an order granting a stay of arbitration.
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 12-303(3) (ix) (1989).
38. Prior to 1974, the common law did not allow the appeal of a final judgment made
by a court in the exercise of its special or limited jurisdiction, unless expressly granted by
statute. See, e.g., Simpler v. State ex. rel. Boyd, 223 Md. 456, 460-61, 165 A.2d 464, 466
(1960). The Revisor's Note explained the change in the law governing appeals, making
explicit reference to Article 7, § 18:
No change is intended in the general rules as to appealability, with one exception. That exception is contained in the second sentence [of section 12-301], permitting an appeal from a decision made in the exercise of original special,
limited, statutory jurisdiction.
The present case law is to the contrary ... [and] constitutes something of a
trap .... When legislators create [special] jurisdiction, they often may not realize
that no appeal will be permitted.
...
It seems more reasonable to let the broad general language include appeals in such cases unless the legislature expressly decides to deny them. This
approach will eliminate the necessity of deciding whether a given jurisdiction is
common law or special, limited and statutory ....
It will also permit the repeal of
numerous special appeal provisions, such as Article 7, § 18 ....
Revisor's Note to MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 12-301 (1974).
39. 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981).
40. Id. at 39, 437 A.2d at 211.
41. Id.
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42
whether the order was a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.
Because the order "denied all relief" and "completely terminated the
action" in the trial court, the court held that the trial court's order
dismissing the petition to 43
consolidate arbitration proceedings was a
judgment.
final appealable

b. FederalArbitration Act.-In 1988, Congress amended the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 4 4 It added section 16 to the Act to
45
provide statutory control of appeals of arbitrability determinations.
Although this section takes a decidedly proarbitration stance,4 6 section 16(a) (3) does permit an appeal "from a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to [the] tide."4 7 In construing the
meaning of "final" as used in this section, the Supreme Court has provided the following definition: "one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg42. Id. at 42, 437 A.2d at 212.
43. Id.
44. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. IV 1993). The
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs arbitration agreements in contracts involving interstate commerce. See id.
45. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019(a),
102 Stat. 4670 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. IV 1989)). The FAA
provides:
§ 16. Appeals
(a) An appeal may be taken from(1) an order(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section-4 of this title to order arbitration to
proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel
arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award,
or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction
against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this tile.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title 28, an appeal may
not be taken from an interlocutory order(1) granting a stay of any action under section 3 of this title;
(2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title;
(3) compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or
(4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is subject to this title.
9 U.S.C. § 16 (Supp. IV 1989).
46. Section 16 permits immediate appeal from an interlocutory order that does not
favor arbitration, but does not permit an immediate appeal if the order favors arbitration.
See supra note 45.
47. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).
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ment."4" In cases where the only issue before the district court was
whether a dispute was subject to arbitration, the Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that an order compelling arbitration is a final appealable judgment.49 In "embedded"
proceedings-where a party seeks some relief other than an order
compelling or prohibiting arbitration-the Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have dismissed appeals
from orders compelling arbitration for lack of a final appealable
50
judgment.
c. Other States.-The determination of whether an order
compelling arbitration is a final appealable judgment depends, in
great measure, upon a court's understanding of "final." The finality
of court orders for purposes of appeal is defined by common law, statute, or rules of practice. If an order compelling arbitration satisfies a
state's definition of final, an appeal may be taken. 51 Because courts
differ in the meaning of "final," and even where they substantially
48. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); cf 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts
of appeal... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States. ...').
49. See S+L+H S.p.A. v. Miller-St. Nazianz, Inc., 988 F.2d 1518, 1522 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that an order granting arbitration is final when arbitration is the only claim for
relief); Delta Financial Corp. v. Paul D. Comanduras & Assocs., 973 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir.
1992) (holding that, where a plaintiff's sole claim was an order to compel arbitration, the
trial court's order to compel arbitration was a final appealable order); Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. v. Mancino, No. 91-3213, 1991 WL 270809, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 1991)
(holding that, because plaintiffs sued for the specific remedy of an order compelling arbitration, the trial court reached a final appealable decision); Stedor Enter., Ltd. v. Armtex,
Inc., 947 F.2d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that, in a proceeding where the sole issue
was the arbitrability of the dispute, the trial court's order compelling arbitration was a final
appealable decision).
50. Usually, the party seeks some relief that reaches the merits of the allegedly arbitrable dispute. Compare the cases at supra note 49 with Humphrey v. Prudential Securities,
Inc., 4 F.3d 313, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (concluding that an order compelling arbitration
in an embedded action is appealable neither as a final judgment nor as an interlocutory
order); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
an order compelling arbitration in an embedded action is not immediately appealable);
West of England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. American Marine Corp., 981 F.2d 749, 751
(5th Cir. 1993) (holding that, where an independent action to compel arbitration was
consolidated with other actions, orders compelling arbitration and staying litigation were
interlocutory and not final); McDermott Int'l v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 981 F.2d 744, 745
(5th Cir.) (holding that, where a case includes other claims for relief, an order compelling
arbitration does not end litigation on the merits, but is only interlocutory), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2442 (1993); Perera v. Siegel Trading Co., 951 F.2d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an arbitration order in an embedded proceeding "in no way resolves the merits of the
claims" and is an unappealable interlocutory decision).
51. Where an appeal is denied, the party objecting to the order frequently must await
the trial court's confirmation of the arbitration award. See Maietta v. Greenfeld, 267 Md.
287, 293-94, 297 A.2d 244, 247-48 (1972) (stating that the order directing the parties to
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agree, differ in their application of the term, the relevant case law
varies widely.
State courts have employed varying criteria to determine whether
an order compelling arbitration is a final appealable judgment.
Courts have relied in whole or in part upon whether the order (1)
terminated a separate and distinct proceeding,5" (2) terminated a special proceeding,5 3 (3) passed on the merits of the case,5 4 (4) granted
the sole relief sought in the action,5 5 (5) affected a substantial right
and, in effect, determined the action, 6 or (6) virtually put the party
arbitrate can be appealed after the chancellor confirms or denies the arbitrator's
decision).
52. See, e.g., Dewart v. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co., 95 A.2d 381 (Conn. 1953)
("One of the tests to determine whether an order is final so as to permit an appeal is to
ascertain whether it terminates a separate and distinct proceeding."); Daginella v. Foremost Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 709, 712 (Conn. 1985) (holding that a court order directing parties
to proceed to arbitration was not a separate and distinct proceeding and was therefore not
appealable); Harris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 283 So. 2d 147, 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973) (concluding that the order "did not finally terminate the action or any part
thereof").
53. See, e.g., Jardine, Matheson & Co. v. Pacific Orient Co., 280 P. 697, 699 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1929) (holding that the trial court's order did not fall within the scope of the Civil
Procedure Code's section authorizing appeal from a final order in a "special proceeding of
a civil nature"); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Griesenbeck, 234 N.E.2d
456, 457 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that an order directing arbitration was a final order in a
special proceeding and was appealable); Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 143 N.E. 779
(N.Y. 1924) (finding that an order requiring parties to proceed to arbitrate under an arbitration agreement represents the end of one special proceeding and that such an order is a
final judgment); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 169 N.E. 386, 388 (N.Y. 1929)
(holding that an order to arbitrate a controversy is one that finally determines a special
proceeding and, because it is not part of arbitration, is subject to direct review), appeal
dismissed, 282 U.S. 808 (1930); In re Application of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 241 N.Y.S.2d
589, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (recognizing that an order denying a motion for a stay of
arbitration was appealable under a civil practice rule that stated, in part, that arbitration is
a "special proceeding").
54. See, e.g., Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 736 P.2d 55, 59 (Haw. 1987) (holding an
order was final because it assumed arbitration would result in payment of money by lessors
to lessees and provided criminal sanctions if lessors failed to make payments); Cajun Elec.
Power Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 334 So. 2d 554, 555 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (applying a Louisiana statute that renders ajudgment that determines the merits in whole or in
part a "final judgment"); Bellaire City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Paxton, 391 N.E.2d 1021, 1025
(Ohio 1979) (remarking that all of the issues had not been disposed of before the trial
court); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Callaway, 597 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding
that the order did not dispose of all the issues and was only the first step in the ultimate
disposition of the dispute).
55. See Machine Prods. Co. v. Prairie Local Lodge, 94 So. 2d 344, 346 (Miss. 1957)
(finding that the decree "partook of the nature of a final decree," since once arbitration
was accomplished, all of the relief prayed for would have been granted).
56. See, e.g., Daginella,495 A.2d at 713 (holding that a court order directing parties to
proceed to arbitration did not determine the rights of the parties and therefore was not
appealable); School Comm. of Agawam v. Agawam Educ. Ass'n, 359 N.E.2d 956, 957 (Mass.
1977) (stating that the denial of a request to stay arbitration was not an act finally adjudi-
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out of court.57 Other courts have frequently relied upon a state stat-

ute or rule of practice
as a major factor in determining appealability
58
as a final judgment.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Horsey, the Court of Appeals held
that an order compelling arbitration, which denied all of the relief
sought and terminated the action in the trial court, was a final appealable judgment.59 The court supported its holding by pointing to
Maryland case law declaring trial court orders to be final appealable
judgments when they effectively put the plaintiffs out of court.6" Emcating the parties' rights and that final adjudication would occur when the court acted
after the arbitration proceeding had ended); In re Application of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
241 N.Y.S.2d at 597 (recognizing that an order denying a motion for a stay of arbitration
was appealable under a civil practice rule that stated, in part, that an appeal may be taken
from an order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding); Systems Constr.,
Inc. v. Worthington Forest, Ltd., 345 N.E.2d 428, 430 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (holding that
an order to arbitrate is a final appealable order because "it in effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment"); Wagner v. Columbia Hosp. Dist., 485 P.2d 421, 427-28 (Or.
1971) (holding that an order under an Oregon statute stating that an order affecting a
substantial right, and in effect determining the action so as to prevent ajudgment in plaintiffs favor, would be deemed to be a "judgment" for the purpose of appeal); State Dep't of
Human Resources v. Williams, 505 P.2d 936, 938-39 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that an
order that affects a "substantial right" and "in effect determines the action or suit so as to
prevent a judgment or decree" is appealable under an Oregon statute).
57. See, e.g., Milberry v. Board of Educ., 354 A.2d 559, 561 n.1 (Pa. 1976) (holding an
order that compelled a grievance to be submitted to arbitration, but retained the case on
the docket until arbitration was complete, was a final order because it virtually put the
party out of court in the action it sought to litigate); Board of Educ. v. Philadelphia Fed'n
of Teachers, 346 A.2d 35, 37 n.2 (Pa. 1975) (holding an order that directed arbitration,
but did not dismiss the complaint, was a final order because it terminated the action between the parties and virtually put the party out of court in the action it sought to litigate).
58. See Bethke v. Polyco, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that
an order was not appealable when no statute or rule authorized appeal); cf Brennan v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 453 A.2d 356, 357 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (holding
that an order directing arbitration pursuant to a common-law arbitration agreement is not
appealable, although arbitration agreements under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act are
appealable by statute), rev'd on other grounds, 574 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1982).
59. Horsey, 329 Md. at 403, 620 A.2d at 311.
60. Id. at 401, 620 A.2d at 310; seeWilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85, 548 A.2d 837, 839
(1988) (holding that an order of a circuit court dismissing a plaintiff's complaint for lack
of venue may be "a final judgment without an adjudication ... on the merits"); Doehring v.
Wagner, 311 Md. 272, 275, 533 A.2d 1300, 1301-02 (1987) (finding that an unqualified
ruling of the trial court that "put the plaintiffs out of court, denying them the means of
further prosecuting the matter," was a final appealable judgment); Walbert v. Walbert, 310
Md. 657, 661, 531 A.2d 291, 293 (1987) (holding that an order that denied plaintiff "the
means of further prosecuting the case at the trial level" was a final appealable order);
Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 307 Md. 216, 221, 513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986)
("[A]n order granting a motion to dismiss or strike the plaintiff's entire initial pleading is
final and appealable."); Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 412,
504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986) ("[A] n unqualified order granting a motion to dismiss or strike
the plaintiffs initial pleading, thereby having the effect of putting the parties out of court,
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phasizing its decision in Litton Bionetics,61 the court repeated two key
phrases from its opinion: an order compelling arbitration is a final
appealable judgment when it has "denied all of the relief sought" and
has "completely terminated the action" in the trial court.6 2 The court
concluded that, because the trial court's order dismissed Mr. Horsey's
Petition of Contempt/counterclaim and directed Mr. and Mrs. Horsey
to submit their dispute to arbitration, the order terminated the matter
63
before the trial court, and thus, was a final appealable judgment.
is a final appealable order."); Concannon v. State Roads Comm'n, 230 Md. 118, 125, 186
A.2d 220, 224-25 (1962) (stating that an order that determines the principal claim of the
plaintiffs and deprives them of the means to enforce the right that they assert is a final
appealable order).
61. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
62. Horsey, 329 Md. at 403, 620 A.2d at 311 (quoting Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen
Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 42, 437 A.2d 208, 212 (1981)). The Horsey court also cited numerous cases in which a trial court order, "terminating the action in that court and remanding
the parties to another tribunal for resolution of their dispute, [was] final and appealable."
Id. at 404, 620 A.2d at 311; see Wilde, 314 Md. at 86-87, 548 A.2d at 840 (holding that the
dismissal of a negligence action for lack of venue is a final appealable judgment); Carroll v.
Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 306 Md. 515, 520, 510 A.2d 540, 542 (1986) (holding
that a circuit court's order denying a tenant's demand for a jury trial and remanding the
case to district court was a final appealable judgment); Eastern Stainless Steel v. Nicholson,
306 Md. 492, 501, 510 A.2d 248, 252 (1986) (holding that a circuit court's remand to the
Workers' Compensation Commission as required by statute is a final appealable judgment); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 296 Md. 46,
59 n.8, 459 A.2d 205, 213 n.8 (1983) (holding that the order of an administrative agency's
appeal board, remanding the case to a hearing officer, was not a final appealable judgment
because the order neither determined the rights of the parties nor terminated the administrative proceeding); Brown v. Baer, 291 Md. 377, 385, 435 A.2d 96, 100 (1981) (holding
that an order of the circuit court remanding the case to the county liquor board was a final
appealable judgment); Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 6, 432 A.2d 1319, 1323 (1981) (holding
that a circuit court's order remanding the proceeding to the board of zoning appeals was a
final appealable order); Department of Pub. Safety v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 544, 419 A.2d
1052, 1057 (1980) (holding that an order of a circuit court, acting as an appellate court for
an administrative appeal, that remands the case to an administrative agency, is a final appealable judgment).
63. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 405-06, 620 A.2d at 312. The court declared that its holding
was in agreement with other decisions determining that "a trial court's order, terminating
the action in that court and remanding the parties to another tribunal for resolution of
their dispute, is final and appealable." Id. at 403-04, 620 A.2d at 311. The court concluded
by citing federal and other state courts, acting under similar statutory provisions, that have
held that an order compelling arbitration was a final appealable judgment. Id. at 404-05,
620 A.2d at 312. Of the seven federal cases cited, only one occurred after the 1988 addition of § 16 to the FAA. See supra note 45. In International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. United Screw & Bolt Corp., 941 F.2d 466, 472 (6th
Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit based its decision upon Goodall-Sanford v. United Textile
Workers of Am., 353 U.S. 550 (1957), which held that, because the right to arbitration
enforced under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), was "not merely
a step in judicial enforcement of a claim nor auxiliary to a main proceeding, but the full
relief sought," the court's decree was a final appealable judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Id. at 551. Compare Goodall-Sanford with cases at supra note 49.
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Two other aspects of the decision, while not holdings of first impression, also merit attention. First, the court affirmed its holding in
NSC Contractorsv. Borders,' declaring that, when neither party has invoked its right to arbitration and instead has sought to resolve an arbitrable matter through litigation, the right to arbitrate those matters is
waived. 6" Second, the court stressed that spousal support required by
an agreement is not alimony when it does not terminate upon the
death of the supporting spouse or, alternatively, is not subject to judicial modification.6 6
4. Analysis.-In Horsey, the Court of Appeals attempted to resolve the ambiguity left by the 1974 revision of the Code regarding the
appealability of certain arbitrability determinations. In Litton Bionetics,
the court recognized that the purpose of the revision, which deleted
the Article 7, section 18 provisions limiting the appeal of arbitration
determinations, 6 7 was to eliminate "the rule requiring express statutory authorization for appeals from judgments entered in actions
where the court was exercising a special statutory jurisdiction."6"
While the revision did not change the law as to the appealability of
final judgments, it did eliminate the MUAA's statutory exceptions to
the final judgment rule. Thus, although appeal from an interlocutory
order staying arbitration was preserved,6 9 the revision eliminated the
statutory distinction between orders compelling arbitration and or64. 317 Md. 394, 564 A.2d 408 (1989).
65. Horsey, 329 Md. at 406, 620 A.2d at 313; see NSC Contractors, 317 Md. at 402, 564
A.2d at 412; see also CharlesJ. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, 294 Md. 443, 448,
450 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982).
66. Horsey, 329 Md. at 417, 620 A.2d at 318. Citing the provisions of the separation
agreement, case law holding that trial courts lack the authority to modify payments of pre1976 spousal support agreements, and the unenforceable "agreement to agree" that remained as a result of the waiver of arbitration, the court declined to use its equitable powers to modify the agreement and enforce specific performance. See id. at 420, 620 A.2d at
319. Judge McAuliffe, however, believed the court could modify the agreement under
contract law. He wrote:
[A] Ithough the provision for spousal support was not technical alimony and therefore could not be adjusted by a chancellor in the exercise of equitable powers, the
parties intended to provide for modification under the same criteria that would
be used if it were technical alimony, with the single exception that the adjustment, if indeed any was required by the changed circumstances, could only be
downward. These are the criteria that an arbitrator would have applied, and if
arbitration were waived would guide a court.
Id. at 423, 620 A.2d at 321 (McAuliffe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
68. Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 41, 437 A.2d 208, 212 (1981);
see also supra notes 36-38.
69. See Mo. CODE ANN., Ors. &JuD. PROC. § 12-303(c)(9) (1974).
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ders denying arbitration.7 ° This distinction-found in the UAA and
in the 1988 revision of the FAA-reflected the principle that arbitration was to be a favored means of dispute resolution. 7 1 By eliminating
the section 18 provisions, the General Assembly inadvertently undermined a significant principle that had guided the appealability of
prior arbitrability determinations. The Horsey court had little choice
but to resolve this unintentional ambiguity by referring to the law governing appeals of final judgments. Nevertheless, by failing to address
the former statutory distinction, the Horsey court did not do justice to
prior Maryland case law and neglected the opportunity to analyze the
policy judgments that underlie the final judgment rule and the
MUAA's role as a favored means of dispute resolution.
Until Horsey, Maryland appellate courts had not directly considered the appealability under the revised Code of an order compelling
arbitration as a final judgment.7 2 Thus, although the Horsey opinion
suggests otherwise, the case did in effect present an issue of first impression. Furthermore, Litton Bionetics did not, as the court indicated
in Horsey, require the court's expansive holding.7 3 The Litton Bionetics
court merely held that the dismissal of a petition seeking to consoli70. See supra notes 27, 36.
71. See supra notes 26, 32, 44-47 and accompanying text.
72. In Anne Arundel County v. Fraternal Order of Anne Arundel Detention Officers,
313 Md. 98, 543 A.2d 841 (1988), the Court of Appeals considered the appeal of an order
compelling arbitration with a union, but it did not consider the question of the order's
appealability as a finaljudgment. Unlike Horsey, the only issue before the circuit court in.
Anne Arundel Detention Officers was whether the dispute was subject to arbitration. See id. at
100, 543 A.2d at 842. In addition, because the collective bargaining agreement between
the county and the union did not expressly state that the MUAA applied, the arbitration
provision only could be enforced as a matter of common law. Id. at 104-05, 543 A.2d at
PROC. § 3-206(b). Finding that the refusal to enforce
844; cf. MD. CODE ANN., C-rs. &Jut.
arbitration agreements in the absence of express statutory provisions was no longer tenable, the court held that "agreements to arbitrate future disputes are generally valid and
enforceable under Maryland common law." Anne Arundel Detention Officers, 313 Md. at 110,
543 A.2d at 847; see also District Moving & Storage Co. v. Gardiner & Gardiner, Inc., 63 Md.

App. 96, 492 A.2d 319 (1985) (considering the appeal of an order staying the claims of the
plaintiff and ordering arbitration), aftfd, 306 Md. 286, 508 A.2d 487 (1986).
The remaining appellate court decisions after Litton Bionetics most frequently have

concerned the appealability of orders denying or dismissing petitions that sought to compel arbitration. See Regina Constr. Corp. v. Envirmech Contracting Corp., 80 Md. App.
662, 672, 565 A.2d 693, 698 (1989) (holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss a

subcontractor's suit against a general contractor-the functional equivalent of an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration-was appealable as a final judgment or a collateral
order); McCormick Constr. Co. v. 9690 Deerco Rd. Ltd. Partnership, 79 Md. App. 177, 182,
556 A.2d 292, 295 (1988) (holding that an order staying a mechanic's lien action, requiring arbitration, and retaining jurisdiction was not appealable as a final judgment or as an
interlocutory order).
73. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 403-04, 620 A.2d at 310-11.
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date two arbitration proceedings was a final appealable order."' A legitimate reading of the decision could infer that the holding was
limited to consolidation determinations or, alternatively, that some
distinction remained between orders compelling and denying arbitration. Moreover, while it might be clearer that an order dismissing a
petition to consolidate arbitration denies all relief and terminates the
action," it is not so obvious that an order compelling arbitration does
the same.7 6 The former denies all benefits of arbitration and ends the
action; the latter provides the bargained-for relief and, at worst,
merely postpones litigation.
In addition, in the cases cited by the Horsey court, a trial court's
order was deemed a final appealable judgment when it effectively put
the plaintiff out of court. 7 7 In Horsey, Mr. Horsey, who initiated the
action, became the defendant due to some procedural maneuvering.7 8 From a strictly formalistic perspective, the trial court's order
did not dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff, Mrs. Horsey, but rather
the counterclaim of the defendant, Mr. Horsey. The court declined
to adopt this formalistic approach, however, and treated Mr. Horsey's
Petition for Contempt as the underlying cause of action that was dismissed by the trial court.79 Still, while the court characterized Mr.
Horsey as having been denied the relief sought, Mrs. Horsey actually
appealed. 0
In the absence of any statutory provisions governing the appealability of such an arbitrability determination, the Court of Appeals determined appealability under the final judgment rule. l One
approach that the court did not discuss would have been to deem a
final arbitration award alone to be a final appealable judgment.8 2
Thus, until an arbitrator made an award, an order compelling arbitra74. Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 42,437 A.2d 208, 212 (1981).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84 (discussing the benefits of delaying the
appeal of an order compelling arbitration until confirmation or denial of an arbitrator's
award); cf supra text accompanying notes 44-50 (describing the approach of the FAA).
77. See supra note 60.

78. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
79. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 406, 620 A.2d at 312.
80. See supra text accompanying note 20. In her brief, Mrs. Horsey claimed that the
trial court's order "awarded none of the relief prayed ... and left her with no means of
further pursuing her claim." Brief of Appellant at 28. Mr. Horsey, on the other hand,
stated that the order "merely enforce [d] the modification provisions agreed to by the parties." Brief of Appellee at 24.
81. See supra note 36.

82. Adopting this approach would have produced the same practical result as the holding in Maietta. See Marietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 293, 297 A.2d 244, 247 (1972)
(holding that an order to arbitrate is a nonappealable interlocutory order).
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tion would be considered interlocutory. After an award, a dissatisfied
party would then be able to attack the earlier arbitrability determination.8 3 Arguably, this approach would not have violated the final judgment rule and would have more correctly implemented the legislative
intent to favor arbitration over litigation.8 4 Instead, the court simply
chose to look to the case law governing the final appealability ofjudicial orders and decrees.8 5 By adopting this stance, the court opted to
resolve the tension between the policies underlying arbitration and
the final judgment rule in favor of the latter. Unfortunately, it did so
without any discussion of the merits of extending the final judgment
rule to orders compelling arbitration. Presumably, despite the favored status of arbitration in the law, the court felt it could not ignore
the clear language of the statute governing the final appeal of judgments to create an exception for orders compelling arbitration.
Horsey highlighted those circumstances under which a court order will be considered a final appealable order. Whenever an order
effectively ends the action before the court, puts the parties out of
court, and leaves nothing to be done but to enter the judgment, the
order will be deemed final.8 6 Despite these instructions, however, it
may be difficult at times to determine whether a trial court's order is
interlocutory or a final judgment.8 7 Even if the trial court characterizes the order as interlocutory, it may be final in the eyes of the Court
83. This approach preserves the possibility of reaching an amicable resolution, promotes speedy resolution of disputes at reduced expense, and removes cases from crowded
dockets. Even if the trial court errs in ordering arbitration, the process still yields benefits.
A party can appeal the arbitrator's award and the arbitration process itself prepares both
parties for trial. Finally, this rule is easier to apply than the rule applied by the Court of
Appeals. The court simply looks to whether an arbitrator's award has been made. This
option is still available to dissatisfied parties who petition the court under MD. CODE ANN.,
CTs. & JuD. PROC. § 3-224. See Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md.
652, 657, 547 A.2d 1048, 1050 (1988) (allowing an appellant, after challenging the arbitration panel's jurisdiction, participating in arbitration, and receiving an arbitration award, to
petition the circuit court to vacate the award on the grounds that there was no agreement
to arbitrate).
On the other hand, some considerations support recognition of the order as a final
appealable judgment. It permits the appellate court to make the arbitrability determination speedily and efficiently before proceeding to arbitration on the merits and prevents a
useless and costly arbitration proceeding if the order before it is reversed on appeal after
an arbitrator's award.
84. See Marietta, 267 Md. at 291, 297 A.2d at 246.
85. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
86. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 401, 620 A.2d at 310.
87. Seesupra notes 19, 21. In addition, an order, on occasion, may be neither interlocutory nor final. See McCormick Constr. Co. v. 9690 Deerco Rd. Ltd. Partnership, 79 Md.
App. 177, 556 A.2d 292 (1989) (holding that an order staying a mechanic's lien action,
requiring arbitration, and retaining jurisdiction was not appealable as a final judgment or
an interlocutory order).
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of Appeals."8 Moreover, determining whether an order is interlocutory or final is critical, because if a party waits until an arbitration
award to appeal and has judged incorrectly, the failure to appeal the
order in a timely fashion will be deemed a waiver. 9 Attempting to
raise the issue on appeal from an arbitration award will be considered
an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment.9"
5. Conclusion.-Because agreements to arbitrate future disputes
are common in many types of contracts, the Horsey decision provided
guidance to Maryland courts and practitioners in many different areas
of the law. When an order compelling arbitration denies all relief
sought and completely terminates the action in that court, it is a final
appealable judgment. It remains to be seen whether the practical effects of this decision will undermine the MUAA's purpose to encourage arbitration over litigation. If it does, the legislature may
consider adding statutory appeal provisions to the MUAA to restore
arbitration to a favored status in the law.
JAMES

B.

M.

CONNOLLY

ExercisingJurisdictionover the District of Columbia

In Hansford v. District of Columbia,1 the Court of Appeals held that
a Maryland circuit court could exercise jurisdiction over the District of
Columbia when the District was sued for alleged negligent activities
on a federal enclave located within Maryland. 2 The court determined
that the cession of exclusive jurisdiction by the State of Maryland to
the federal government in no way restricted the ability of Maryland
courts to exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising on federal enclaves
inside the state.3
The court also found that Maryland had rejected the common
law rule of venue that required that municipal corporations be sued
in their own courts.4 The court concluded that the General Assembly
intended the current general venue statute to apply to municipal cor88. See supra notes 19-21.
89. See Horsey, 329 Md. at 406, 620 A.2d at 313.
90. See id.; see also Houghton v. County Comm'rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 504
A.2d 1145 (1986) (applying this rule harshly to parties who erred in judging the time of
finality).
1. 329 Md. 112, 617 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993).
2. Id. at 129-30, 617 A.2d at 1065.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1062.
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porations. 5 Accordingly, the court held that the District of Columbia
and other foreign municipal corporations are subject to the same
venue rules as any private corporation.6 This case marks the first time
that the District of Columbia has ever been held subject to suit in a
Maryland or other state court.7
1. The Case.-In June 1987, Carl S. Richardson escaped from
the Oak Hill Youth Center (Oak Hill), a juvenile detention facility
located near Laurel, Maryland.' Oak Hill is situated on a federal enclave and operated by the District of Columbia.' After Richardson's
escape and before his recapture, he killed Thomas T. Hansford, Jr., in
Prince George's County, Maryland.1 0 Richardson was convicted of felony murder in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on August 3, 1988.11
On August 15, 1988, the decedent's parents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against the District of Columbia, the Superintendent of Oak Hill, Neil Ollivierra, and
Richardson. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the District and Ollivierra
negligently operated the juvenile facility, as evidenced by their failure
to prevent Richardson's escape and inability to recapture him in a
timely manner.1 " The plaintiffs further alleged that a District policy
permitted escaped prisoners to remain at large and that this policy
violated the decedent's civil rights."
In its motion to dismiss, the District argued that, under Maryland
law, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the District of Columbia,
5. Id. at 123, 617 A.2d at 1062.
6. Id.
7. Cf District of Columbia v. Coleman, 196 S.E.2d 926, 927 (Va. 1973) (per curiam)
(dismissing a negligence claim against the District of Columbia without reaching the question of whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the matter). Moreover, the District has
been held to suit only once in a federal court outside of the District. See United States v.
District of Columbia, 596 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D. Md. 1984) (resolving a dispute between the
federal government and the District of Columbia as to ownership of hospital property in
Maryland), affd, 788 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1986).
8. Hansford. 329 Md. at 115, 617 A.2d at 1058.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that one of every three escapees from Oak Hill was permitted to remain at large. Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1981), arguing that the District's delay in capturing escaped prisoners violated the
decedent's civil rights by depriving him of his life without due process of law. Hansford,
329 Md. at 115, 617 A.2d at 1058.
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a foreign municipal corporation." Relying entirely on the venue rule
enunciated in Phillips v. Mayor of Baltimore,6 the circuit court dismissed the action and held that "a municipal corporation could not
be sued, in [a] transitory action, outside of the jurisdiction in which it
is located." 7
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the District offered an
additional reason for affirming the circuit court's dismissal: that the
cession of exclusive jurisdiction by the State of Maryland over the federal enclave upon which Oak Hill rests limited the authority of Maryland courts to resolve disputes arising from activities on that land."8
Although Maryland expressly reserved jurisdiction over lands ceded to
the United States before 1943,'" the District argued that section 14102 of the State Government Article made this reservation inapplica15. Id. at 116-17, 617 A.2d at 1059. The District of Columbia is a distinct government
entity not comparable to the States. Although it exercises many government functions
typically performed by states, see Chewning v. District of Columbia, 119 F.2d 459, 461 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 639 (1941) (noting that the District maintains a National Guard,
regulates insurance, and licenses automobiles), the District is not a "state" within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, Committee of Blind Vendors v. District of Columbia, 695
F. Supp. 1234, 1241 n.6 (D.D.C. 1988), and citizens of the District are not citizens of a
state. Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445, 445 (1805). Ultimately, Congress has the
authority "[t]o exercise exclusive [l]egislation" for all purposes over the District. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
To relieve itself of the burden of legislating day-to-day local matters, Congress has
declared the District of Columbia to be a municipal corporation:
(a) The District is created a government by the name of the "District of Columbia," by which name it is constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes,
and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States....
(b) The District of Columbia shall remain and continue a body corporate as provided in subsection (a) of this section. Said corporation shall continue to be
charged with all the duties, obligations, responsibilities, and liabilities, and to be
vested with all of the powers, rights, privileges, immunities, and assets, respectively, imposed upon and vested in said corporation or the Mayor.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-102(a)-(b) (1992). Courts have consistently treated the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation. See, e.g., Dornman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d
159, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Moreover, the District's sovereign immunity derives from its own common law, not from
the United States. See Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 861 (D.C. 1973) (concluding that the District was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Federal Torts
Claims Act).
16. 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902 (1909).
17. Hansford,329 Md. at 118, 617 A.2d at 1059. Concluding that more factual development was necessary to determine whether Ollivierra was entitled to governmental immunity, the circuit court did not dismiss the action against him. Id.
18. See Hansford v. District of Columbia, 84 Md. App. 301, 305, 578 A.2d 844, 846
(1990), reo'd, 329 Md. 112, 617 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993).
19. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ble to Oak Hill and other lands ceded between 1906 and 1943.20 The
Court of Special Appeals agreed and held that a Maryland court could
not exercise jurisdiction over the District of Columbia because the
District's alleged tortious conduct occurred on a federal enclave over
21
which exclusive jurisdiction had been ceded to the United States.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and unanimously reversed
the holdings of both lower courts.2 2
2. Legal Background.a. Jurisdiction.--TheCourt of Appeals has consistently held
that the General Assembly's intent in enacting Maryland's long arm
statute was to expand the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the
limits of due process.24 Courts have distinguished between specific
and general personal jurisdiction. 25 If general jurisdiction is present,
a defendant may be subjected to suit on any claim in the forum state,
even claims that do not arise out of, or are unrelated to, the defendant's contacts with the forum state.2 6 Specific jurisdiction, on the
other hand, gives rise to jurisdiction only for claims arising from a
defendant's jurisdictional contacts with the forum state. 27 Section 620. Hansford, 329 Md. at 119, 617 A.2d at 1060. Oak Hill was acquired by the United
States government in 1923. Hansford, 84 Md. App. at 305, 578 A.2d at 846.
21. Hansford, 84 Md. App. at 308-09, 578 A.2d at 847-48. The Court of Special Appeals
did not address the circuit court's dismissal based on venue.
22. Hansford, 329 Md. at 135-36, 617 A.2d at 1068.
23. Maryland's long arm statute provides:
(a) Basis ofpersonaljurisdiction.-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction as to
any cause of action over a person domiciled in, served with process in, organized
under the laws of, or who maintains his principal place of business in the State.
(b) Exercise ofjurisdictionon other basis.-This section does not limit any other basis
of personal jurisdiction of a court of the State.
MD. CODE ANN., CmS. &JUD. PROC. § 6-102 (1989).

24. See Camelback Ski Corp. v. Behning, 307 Md. 270, 274, 513 A.2d 874, 876 (1986),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988) (holding that personal jurisdiction can be extended "to the
limits allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution"). Accord Androutsos v. Fairfax Hosp., 323 Md. 634, 594 A.2d 574 (1991);
Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); Krashes v. White, 275 Md. 549, 341 A.2d
798 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.15 (1985); Behning,
312 Md. at 337-38, 539 A.2d at 1111.
26. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-49 (1952) (holding
that a state may adjudicate a claim against a corporate defendant that did not arise from
the defendant's contacts with the state).
27. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (holding that
an Arizona company's single contact of mailing an insurance contract to a California resident was sufficient to support jurisdiction over a lawsuit arising directly from that contact).
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103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
provides for the
28
exercise of both specific and general jurisdiction.
Section 6-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article extends the jurisdiction of Maryland courts specifically to persons and
entities on federal enclaves. 29 When the United States acquired Oak
Hill, however, chapter 743, section 2, of the Maryland Sessions Laws of
1906 ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over newly acquired federal lands:
28. Section 6-103 provides:
(a) Condition.-Ifjurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he
may be sued only on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this
section.
(b) In generaL-A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
directly or by an agent:
(1) Transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in
the State;
(2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or manufactured products in
the State;
(3) Causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State;
(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or
omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed
in the State;
(5) Has an interest in, uses, or possesses real property in the State; or
(6) Contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk,
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed
within the State at the time the contract is made, unless the parties otherwise
provide in writing.
MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 6-103 (1989).
Subsections (b) (1)-(3) and (5)-(6) provide for personal jurisdiction over defendants
based on claims arising solely from defendants' purposeful contacts with the state, i.e.,
specific jurisdiction. Subsection (b) (4), in comparison, provides for jurisdiction over defendants based on any claim filed in a Maryland court, regardless of whether the claim
arose from the defendants' purposeful contacts with Maryland.
29. Section 6-101 provides:
(a) For the purposes of personal jurisdiction, venue, and service of process, the
following terms have the meanings indicated:
(b) "County" includes any federal enclave, reservation, or land within the geographical limits of the county.
(c) "Resident" includes a person residing on a federal enclave, reservation, or
land in the State or a county.
(d) "State" includes any federal enclave, reservation, or land within the geographical limits of the State.
(e) Legislative intent.-It is the intention of the General Assembly to extend the
personal jurisdiction and venue of courts of the State and the power to serve
process of those courts to any person on federal enclaves, reservations, or lands
within the State to the fullest extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 6-101 (1989).
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[E]xclusive jurisdiction in and over any land so acquired by
the United States shall be and the same is hereby ceded to
the United States for all purposes except the service upon
such sites of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this
State, but the jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no longer
than the said United States shall own such lands.3 0
In 1943, the General Assembly limited any cession ofjurisdiction over
federal enclaves to concurrent jurisdiction. 3 ' The federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over "persons" and "transactions" at the
Oak Hill enclave and other lands acquired before 1943, however, was
specifically retained. 2
In Lowe v. Lowe,33 the Court of Appeals addressed the precise
question at issue in Hansford-whether a Maryland court could exercise jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of a transaction occurring on an "exclusive" federal enclave.3 4 Lowe involved a divorce
action filed by residents of a federal enclave located in Cecil County,
Maryland. 5 The court held that the Lowes, as residents of a federal
enclave, were not Maryland residents and hence Maryland courts
lacked jurisdiction over their divorce action.3 6 The court determined
that Maryland's cession of exclusive jurisdiction over federal enclaves
"transfer[red] to the federal government exclusive dominion and jurisdiction thereover for all purposes."3 7 The court explained that federal enclave residents, as evidenced by their inability to exercise
30. 1906 Md. Laws 743.
31. Section 14-102 of the State Government Article provides that:
(a) In generaL-With respect to land that the United States or any of its units
leases or otherwise holds in the State, the State reserves jurisdiction and authority
over the land and over persons, property, and transactions on the land to the
fullest extent that is permitted by the United States Constitution and that is not
inconsistent with the governmental purpose for which the land is held.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 14-102(a) (1993).
32. Section 14-102(b) provides in pertinent part:
Previous grants.-This section does not affect the jurisdiction and authority of the
State over land or persons, property, and transactions on land that the United
States or its unit has acquired on or before May 31, 1943 to the extent that the
State ceded jurisdiction under:
•.. (4) Chapter 743, §§ 2 and 3, of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1906 ....
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 14-102(b) (1993).

33. 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729 (1926), overruled by Hansford v. District of Columbia, 329
Md. 112, 617 A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2997 (1993).
34. Id. at 597-98, 133 A. at 731-32.
35. Id. at 597, 133 A. at 731.
36. Id. at 600-01, 133 A. at 733.
37. Id. at 599, 133 A. at 732. The Lowe court noted that the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over lands acquired with the consent of the State of Maryland was based on
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution. Id. at 600, 133 A. at 732.
This section of the Constitution authorizes Congress
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political and civil rights under Maryland law, 38 were not "inhabitants
of the state. ' 39 Rather, they resided in a "federal territory" over which
the United States had exclusive authority and jurisdiction.4"
Subsequent to Lowe, however, the Supreme Court, in Howard v.
Commissioners ofLouisville,4 1 determined that the traditional view of the
federal enclave as "a state within a state" had changed.4" Further, in
Evans v. Cornman,4 3 the Supreme Court held that residents of a federal enclave in Maryland were residents of the state and could not be
[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District... as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the
Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over
all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.17. Maryland ceded to the United States jurisdiction for all
purposes "except the service upon [federal enclaves] of all civil and criminal process" of
Maryland courts. Lowe, 150 Md. at 594, 133 A. at 730 (quoting 1906 Md. Laws 743). The
Lowe court determined that the purpose of this reservation was to prevent federal enclaves
from "becoming a place of refuge for criminals or service-dodgers." Id. at 596, 133 A. at
731.
38. See Lowe, 150 Md. at 598, 133 A. at 735. The court noted that "persons residing
upon [federal enclaves] are not residents of the State of Maryland for the purpose of exercising the right of franchise, for taxation purposes, or for school purposes .... " Id. at 60001, 133 A. at 733.
39. Id. at 598, 133 A. at 732. The court noted that other courts that had considered the
relationship of an "exclusive" federal enclave to the state in which it was located had, "with
practical unanimity, held that the power of exclusive legislation carries with it exclusive
jurisdiction, and in many cases [had] treated the cession as accomplishing a thorough separation of the land and its inhabitants from the state." Id.
40. Id. at 600, 133 A. at 733.
41. 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
42. Id. at 627. At issue in Howard was the annexation of an "exclusive" federal enclave
by the City of Louisville, Kentucky. Id. at 626. The Petitioners argued that the federal
enclave, because exclusive jurisdiction over it had been ceded to the federal government,
was no longer part of the State of Kentucky. Id. In response to this argument, the Howard
Court stated:
When the United States, with the consent of Kentucky, acquired the property ....
the property did not cease to be a part of Kentucky. The geographical structure
of Kentucky remained the same.... A state may conform its municipal structures
to its own plan, so long as the state does not interfere with the exercise ofjurisdiction within the federal area by the United States. Kentucky's consent to this acquisition gave the United States power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within
the area. A change of municipal boundaries did not interfere in the least with the
jurisdiction of the United States within the area or with its use or disposition of
the property. The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent
the state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so
long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the Federal Government. The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction, not fiction, to which
we must give heed.
Id. at 626-27.
43. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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denied the right to vote in Maryland elections." In fact, the Evans
Court expressly stated that federal enclave residents "are subject to
the process andjurisdiction of [Maryland] courts; they themselves can
resort to those courts in divorce [actions] .

...""

In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,4 6 the Supreme Court further
delineated the power of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over lands
in which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction. The Gulf
Offshore Court held that a state court could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action arising in a federal territory.4 7
At issue in Gulf Offshore was whether the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), which reserved exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the outer continental shelf, precluded a state court from exercising jurisdiction over a personal injury claim sustained by an oilman
working on the shelf.4" The Court determined that there is "[n] othing
inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a territory [to] preclude[ ] a state court from entertaining a... suit concerning events
occurring in [a] territory... governed by federal law."4 9 The Court
concluded that, absent a clear Congressional intent to confine jurisdiction to federal courts, state courts are presumed to have concurrent jurisdiction over a cause of action arising within a federal
territory. 5°
The Court then examined the petitioner's contention that Congress had intended for OCSLA51 to preclude state court jurisdiction
over actions arising on the outer continental shelf.52 The Court
found that Congress intended the OCSLA to be a restriction on state
44. Id. at 425-26.
45. Id. at 424.
46. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
47. Id. at 484.
48. Id. at 475.
49. Id. at 481; see also Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 424 (1970) (holding that residents of an "exclusive" federal enclave are "subject to the process and jurisdiction of state
courts ... ."); Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68, 72 (1917) (holding that a
state court had jurisdiction to hear a personal injury suit against a corporation doing business on a federal enclave within Kentucky).
50. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 477-78. The Court stated that Congress could rebut the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction "by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable
implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court [sic]
jurisdiction and federal interests." Id. at 478.
51. The portion of OCSIA at issue in Gulf Offshore provided that:
[A] doption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted
as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any
purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom.
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (3).
52. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481-82.
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sovereignty only, not on state court jurisdiction.5" The Court reasoned that the petitioner's argument had "confuse [d] the political jurisdiction of a State with its judicial jurisdiction." 54 Thus, because
Congress was silent on the issue of55judicial jurisdiction, the claim was
held properly filed in state court.
b. Venue.-Although the question of whether a municipal
corporation can be sued in another state would appear to be one of
jurisdiction, the few courts that have addressed the issue have based
their decisions on the rule of venue.5 6 At common law, absent an
express statutory provision to the contrary, 7 an action could not be
brought against a municipal corporation outside the county where it
was situated. 5 ' The rationale behind this special rule for municipal
corporations was that actions against municipalities are inherently local and not transitory.59 Consequently, they must be brought in the
county where the municipality is located.60
53. Id. at 482.
54. Id ("The language of the provision [of OCSLA] refers to 'any interest in orjurisdiction over' real property, minerals, and revenues, not over causes of action.") (emphasis
added).
55. Id. at 484.
56. See, e.g., Parks Co. v. City of Decatur, 138 F. 550, 553 (6th Cir. 1905) (holding that a
Kentucky court was an improper venue for an action against an Illinois municipal corporation); O'Toole v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 804, 809 (D. Del. 1952) (holding that Delaware was not the "proper venue" for a wrongful death action against the District of
Columbia), affd on other grounds,206 F.2d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1953); National Shawmut Bank
v. City of Waterville, 189 N.E. 92, 94 (Mass. 1934) (analyzing suit against municipality in
terms of venue).
57. The right to sue or obtain jurisdiction and venue over a municipal corporation
must be provided by the state legislature. See Markham v. City of Newport News, 184 F.
Supp. 659, 661 (E.D. Va. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 292 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1961).
58. See Williams v. City of Lake City, 62 So. 2d 732, 734 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) ("Under
the common law no action could be brought against a municipal corporation outside the
county where it was situated .... ."). See generally 17 MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 49.15 (3d ed. 1982).
59. The Supreme Court of Alabama described the difference between local and transitory actions as follows: "A local action is one which could only have arisen in the particular
locality where it did arise, for example, where the subject matter is real estate. A transitory
action is one which could have arisen anywhere, such as an action on a contract." Ex Parte
City of Birmingham, 507 So. 2d 471, 473 (Ala. 1987).
60. See Williams, 62 So. 2d at 734 ("[A]ctions against municipal corporations are inherently local and ... they must be sued in the county in which they are located."). The
majority of courts have held that municipal corporations cannot be held to suit outside of
their own courts. See, e.g., Cullman County v. Blount County, 49 So. 315 (Ala. 1909) ("As a
general rule all suits against a county must be brought in the courts of the defendant
county."); Mayor of Nashville v. Webb, 85 S.W. 404, 405 (Tenn. 1905) ("[A]ctions against
municipal corporations are inherently local . . . . They must be sued where they are
found."). See generally 17 MCQUILLEN, supra note 58, § 49.15.
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In Mayor of Baltimore v. Meredith'sFord &Jarrettsville Turnpike Co.,61

the Court of Appeals recognized an exception to the special venue
rule for municipal corporations. In Turnpike, the plaintiff sued Baltimore City for trespass in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County after
a dam the City maintained caused flooding on the plaintiffs Baltimore County turnpike.6 2 The Turnpike court was faced with two conflicting but well-established common law rules of venue: (1) that
actions against municipalities are inherently local, 6" and (2) that actions involving real estate are also local and must be brought in the
county where the land lies.64 The court relied upon the latter rule of
venue in holding that the action was properly brought in Baltimore
County.6 5 In so holding, it noted that the rule pertaining to real estate actions was well-settled at common law6 6 and had never excepted
municipal corporations.6 7 The court reasoned that applying the special venue rule to local actions in this context "would result in
[preventing] municipalities ....
which have no Courts[,] from suing or
being sued at all ...."'
Three years later in Phillips v. Baltimore,69 however, the Court of
Appeals applied the special venue rule for municipalities in a transitory action against Baltimore City.7 ° The court acknowledged the
general rule that local actions must be brought in the jurisdiction
where the cause of action arose, 71 but held that, in the absence of a
61. 104 Md. 351, 65 A. 35 (1906).
62. Id. at 354-55, 65 A. at 35.
63. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
64. See Turnpike, 104 Md. at 356, 65 A. at 35-36. "It has always been the settled law in
England, that actions for injuries to real property should be brought in the county where
the injuries occurred." Id. at 358, 65 A. at 36. This rule of venue was adopted by the Court
of Appeals in Patterson v. Wilson, 6 G. & J. 499 (Md. 1834). In Patterson, the court explained that the rationale behind the venue rule pertaining to local actions was that actions should be brought "before ajury of the vicinage,who are presumed to be acquainted
with the subject-matter to which the controversy relates, and therefore more competent to
decide it than a jury of strangers." Id. at 500.
65. Turnpike, 104 Md. at 359, 65 A. at 36-37.
66. Id., 65 A. at 36.
67. Id. at 357, 65 A. at 36 ("We have been referred to no decision in this State, that
holds that a municipal corporation should not be bound by the rules of law, which are
applicable to other litigants ..
68. Id.
69. 110 Md. 431, 72 A. 902 (1909).
70. Id. at 436, 72 A. at 904.
71. Id. The court stated:
Accepting as settled, and as properly settled, that in this State the rule requiring local actions to be brought in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose,
applies as well to public municipal corporations, as to all other corporations, we
have only to inquire whether public municipal corporations can in this State be
sued outside of their own Courts, upon transitory causes of action.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:618

statute modifying it, the special venue rule for municipal corporations
applied to transitory causes of action.72 The court then examined the
Maryland venue statute pertaining to suits against corporations 7 3 to
determine whether the General Assembly had changed the special
venue rule.7 ' The court concluded that the legislature did not intend
the venue statute, which did not specify municipal corporations, to
eliminate the special venue rule.75
In making this determination, the court stressed the great inconvenience to public business that would follow if municipal corporations could be sued in foreign jurisdictions. 76 To avoid this result, the
court concluded that, "under the established rules of legislative interpretation," an exception for municipal corporations based on public
policy grounds must be read into the venue statute. 77 This inconvenience argument, however, has not been uniformly accepted. In Eck v.
State Tax Commissioners,71 for example, the Court of Appeals held the
Phillips venue rule inapplicable to suits brought against public
officials.7 9

Id.
72. See id. ("It is not, and cannot be, pretended, that at common law [municipalities]
could be [sued in foreign courts for transitory actions], so that we need only to inquire
whether the common law rule has been changed . . . by any statute of Maryland.").
73. The venue statute provided, in pertinent part, that:
[e]very corporation of this State may be sued in any county, or in the City of
Baltimore, as the case may be, where its principal office is located, or where it
regularly transacts business or exercises its franchises, or in any local action,
where the subject-matter thereof lies, and process may be served as is hereinabove
provided against such corporation ....
Id. at 437, 72 A. at 905 (citing 1908 MD. LAws 240).
74. Id. at 436-38, 72 A. at 904-05.
75. Id. at 437-38, 72 A. at 905.
76. Id. at 440, 72 A. at 906. The court stated that:
[t]he magnitude and importance of the functions of municipal government are
constantly increasing with the growth of population, and of the various and complex agencies employed in cities and towns in the public service, and these functions require the constant presence and watchfulness of those charged with their
direction and management. To permit these great public duties to be hindered
or delayed in their performance, in order that individuals or private corporations
might more conveniently collect their private debts, would be to pervert the great
object of the creation of municipal corporations.
Id.
77. Id.
78. 204 Md. 245, 103 A.2d 850 (1953).
79. See id. at 253-54, 103 A.2d at 855 (holding that public officials were covered under
the general venue statute and that suit could be brought against them wherever they could
be reached).
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The Court's Reasoning.-

a. Jurisdiction.-In its analysis of jurisdiction, the Hansford
court emphasized the separate concepts of a court's personal jurisdiction, a court's authority to resolve disputes arising outside its jurisdiction, and a state government's executive, legislative, and
administrative authority.80 The court first noted that section 6-101 of
the state's long arm statute treats federal enclaves in the state as part
of Maryland."1 Because the action against the District of Columbia
arose out of its activities within Maryland, the Hansford court had no
difficulty concluding that the circuit court could exercise personal ju82
risdiction over it.

The court next considered whether Maryland's cession of exclusive jurisdiction limited the circuit court's exercise ofjurisdiction over
disputes arising on the federal enclave.8" The court concluded that
section 14-102(b) of the State Government Article did not restrict in
any manner the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Maryland courts.8 4
It determined, rather, that the State Government Article "deals entirely with the governing authority of the State of Maryland," not with
the jurisdiction of Maryland courts.8 5 Accordingly, the court found
nothing in the State Government Article that limited the traditional
authority of Maryland courts to resolve disputes between litigants over
whom personal jurisdiction had been acquired.8 6 The court determined instead that section 14-102(b) restricted only the applicability
of state law and state governmental authority over federal enclaves
ceded prior to 1943.8" Thus, the court concluded that the Court of
Special Appeals had "'confuse[d] the political jurisdiction of [Maryland] with its judicial jurisdiction."'88

80. See Hansford, 329 Md. at 127, 617 A.2d at 1064.
81. Id.; see supra note 23 (quoting the state's long arm statute).
82. Hansford, 329 Md. at 127-28, 617 A.2d at 1064. The court noted that the District
was subject to personal jurisdiction under four provisions of the long arm statute: "[t]he
District of Columbia was served with process in the State of Maryland, [§ 6-102(a)] ... ;
[t]he District transacts business and performs work or service in the State, § 6-103(b) (1);
the District allegedly caused tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in the State,
§ 6-103(b) (3); the District uses real property in the State, § 6-103(b)(5)." Id. at 128 n.7,
617 A.2d at 1064 n.7.
83. Id. at 128, 617 A.2d at 1064-65.
84. Id. at 129, 617 A.2d at 1065.
85. Id.
86. Id.

87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 482 (1981)). The
court interpreted the State Government Article as restricting Maryland's political jurisdiction only: "Section 14-102(b) simply purports to restrict the applicability of Maryland law
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The Hansford decision also overruled the Lowe holding that prohibited Maryland courts from exercising jurisdiction over transactions
arising on federal enclaves.8 9 In so doing, the court recognized that
subsequent Supreme Court rulings had rendered obsolete the traditional "state within a state" relationship between federal enclaves and
the states in which they are located.9 ° The court concluded that the
new relationship, as stated explicitly in Evans, makes federal enclave
residents "'subject to the process and jurisdiction of state courts
'",91

b. Venue.-The Hansford court also addressed the circuit
court's reliance on Phillips in determining that Maryland was an improper venue for the action against the District of Columbia.9" The
court undermined the significance of Phillips by pointing out that,
prior to Phillips, it had, in Turnpike, expressly rejected the special
venue rule that a municipal corporation could be sued only in its own
courts.9" The court also stressed its statement in Turnpike that, in determining proper venue, a municipal corporation "should be treated
like any other litigant."9 4 In addition, the court noted the Eck court's
refusal to apply the special venue rule "to suits against public officials
relating to the performance of their official duties."9 5 Moreover, the
court stated that there have been a number of Maryland cases in
which, without discussion, a municipality has been subject to suit
outside its borders, implying that courts were simply ignoring the Phillips holding.9 6
In addition, the court pointed to two reasons why the Phillipsdecision was inapplicable to the District of Columbia.9" First, the court
asserted that the Phillipsvenue rule applied strictly to actions brought
and Maryland executive and administrative governmental authority over federal enclaves
ceded prior to 1943." Id.
89. Id. at 133, 617 A.2d at 1067.
90. Id.; see supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
91. Hansord, 329 Md. at 133, 617 A.2d at 1067 (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S.
419, 424 (1970)).
92. Id. at 121, 617 A.2d at 1061.
93. See id. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1062.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 123, 617 A.2d at 1062.
96. Id. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1062. In support of this proposition, the court cited only to
Alexander v. Montgomery County, 87 Md. App. 275, 589 A.2d 563 (1991), where a
worker's compensation claim against Montgomery County was appealed to the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County. Hansford, 329 Md. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1062.
97. Id. at 122-23, 617 A.2d at 1061-62.
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against Maryland municipalities.9" Applying the rule to foreign municipal corporations, the court reasoned, would grant the District and
other foreign municipalities the "unique privilege" of immunity from
suit in Maryland.99 Finding "no sound reason" to distinguish between
public and private corporations, the court held that foreign municipal
corporations are to be subjected to the same venue rules as those governing private corporations. 0 ° Second, the court noted that the
venue statute construed by the Phillips court had been replaced. 0 1
The court held that the broader language employed in the modem
venue statute 0 2 -specifically the term "defendant"-applied to municipal corporations.10 3 Accordingly, the court held that the venue
analysis of Phillips was inapplicable to the modem venue statute. 0 4
4.

Analysis.-

a. Jurisdiction.-InHansford, the Court of Appeals held that
the District of Columbia could be sued in Maryland for its activities on
federal land located in Maryland, effectively rectifying the jurisdictional errors made by the Court of Special Appeals. Moreover, each
of the court's jurisdictional rulings was well-grounded in sound statutory interpretation and ascertainable legislative intent.
The court's determination that the General Assembly intended,
in enacting section 6-101, to extend personal jurisdiction to persons
and entities on federal enclaves is incontrovertible. 0 5 Even in the
statute ceding exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, Maryland retained the right to serve process on federal enclaves. 10 6 Reservation of
the state's right to serve process was the precursor to the state's long
arm jurisdiction over activities on federal enclaves. 0 7 In addition, the
98. See id. at 122, 617 A-2d at 1061 ("The rule that was applied in Phillips [was] that a
Maryland municipality, sued in a Maryland court in a transitory action, should be sued
where it is situated.").
99. Id., 617 A.2d at 1062.
100. Id. at 123, 617 A.2d 1062. The court stated that the District of Columbia was, in the
context of this case, a "nonresident corporate defendant." Id. at 122, 617 A.2d at 1061.
101. Id. at 123, 617 A.2d at 1062.
102. The modem general venue statute provides, in pertinent part, that "a civil action
shall be brought in a county where the defendant resides, carries on a regular business, is
employed, or habitually engages in a vocation." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 6-201
(1989).
103. Hansford, 329 Md. at 123, 617 A.2d at 1062.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
106. See Hansford, 329 Md. at 129, 617 A.2d at 1065; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
107. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has explained that when
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court based its holding on principles of specific jurisdiction. 0 8 Thus,
it can be limited to granting jurisdiction only in cases in which the
claim against the District arises from the District's contacts inside
Maryland. 10 9
The court's determination that the statutes ceding exclusive jurisdiction over federal lands did not restrict the subject-matter jurisdiction of Maryland courts over those lands also was well supported.
These statutes appear in the State Government Article, which delineates the roles of the legislative and executive branches of the state
government, but makes no mention of the state judiciary. The court's
conclusion that the State Government Article is applicable only to the
legislative and executive powers of the state, and not to the judicial
power of the state courts, 1 ' was perfectly logical.
The court's conclusion that Lowe was inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court precedent also was correct. In Howard, the Court
contravened the central premise of Lowe by indicating that federal enclaves are not entirely distinct from the state in which they are located. 1 Then, in Evans, the Court specifically held that federal
enclave residents were subject to the jurisdiction of state courts.1 "' Finally, the Gu/f Offshore Court extended state court jurisdiction to fedon lands over which the United States
eral causes of actions arising
13
has exclusive jurisdiction.'
the state has retained the right to serve process on foreign corporations as well as
on others within the [federal enclave] and has the power to say what shall constitute such service, it follows that any act which may be legally taken as an acceptance of service elsewhere within the state may be so taken within the [federal
enclave]. This necessarily means that the doing of business by a foreign corporation within the [enclave] has the same effect, so far as submitting itself to the local
jurisdiction for the service of process is concerned, as doing business elsewhere in
the state.
Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F.2d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
108. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
109. See Hansford, 329 Md. at 127-28, 617 A.2d at 1064. In its brief, the District argued
that recognizing jurisdiction in this case would mean that the District could be sued in
Maryland for virtually any injury. It attempted to warn the court about the
broad implications of petitioner's theory that the District can be sued in the Maryland courts because its governmental operations on federal land give it a permanent "presence" in Maryland for jurisdictional purposes. That presence would
apparently allow plaintiffs to sue the District in Maryland courts for injuries which
have no relationship to the District's Maryland operations, presumably including injuries
which occur outside Maryland, in the District or elsewhere.
Brief of Respondent at 11 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
110. See Hansford, 329 Md. at 129, 617 A.2d at 1065.
111. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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b. Venue.-In concluding that the special venue rule for municipal corporations had been rejected, the Hansford court misconstrued its prior holdings in Turnpike and Phillips. Moreover, the
court's determination that the special venue rule was limited to intrastate municipalities was inconsistent with the common law. In holding
that foreign municipal corporations are subject to the same venue
rules as private corporations, the Hansford court made a decision
more properly suited for the General Assembly.
The special venue rule for municipal corporations was not, as the
court stated, rejected in Turnpike. In Turnpike,"1 4 the court, confronted with two well-established but conflicting rules of venue, simply
carved out a "local actions" exception to the rule that municipalities
cannot be sued outside of their jurisdictions.11 5 The necessity of this
exception was illustrated in the Turnpike case itself, where strict adherence to the special venue rule would have immunized Baltimore City
from suit for its destruction of land in another jurisdiction. 1 6 As the
court later recognized in Phillips, Turnpike left "undetermined whether
. . . a [municipal] corporation can be sued in Courts other than those

of its own territorial limits, upon a transitory cause of action. "117
Moreover, the subsequent decision in Phillips to apply the special
venue rule in a transitory action against a municipality 1 8 has been
vindicated by the fact that after eighty-four years not one domestic or
foreign municipality has been held to suit outside of its county in
Maryland. 119
114. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
115. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Meredith's Ford & Jarrettsville Turnpike Co., 104 Md.
351, 357, 65 A. 35, 36 (1906). The Hansford court interpreted Turnpike as eliminating all
distinctions between a "municipal corporation... [and] any other litigant," Hansford, 329
Md. at 124, 617 A.2d at 1062, but the Turnpike holding was limited to the "class of cases"
involving local actions. Turnpike, 104 Md. at 357, 65 A. at 36.
116. See Turnpike, 104 Md. at 357, 65 A. at 36.
117. Phillips v. Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 435, 72 A. 902, 904 (1909).
118. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
119. The Hansford court cited only Alexander v. Montgomery County, 87 Md. App. 275,
589 A.2d 563 (1991), in support of its proposition that a municipal corporation had been
subjected to suit outside its county since Phillips. This case involved an appeal from an
order of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Id. Cases involving workers' compensation have special rules of venue that take into account the interests of injured workers in
having their claims litigated close to home. Howell v. Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard,
Inc., 190 Md. 704, 711, 59 A.2d 680, 682-83 (1948). For example, § 9-738 of the Labor and
Employment Article provides, in pertinent part, that " It] o take an appeal, a person shall file
an order of appeal with the circuit court: (1) that has jurisdiction over that person...." MD.
CODE ANN., LA. & EMPL. § 9-738 (1991) (emphasis added).
Interestingly, the General Assembly has enacted venue provisions specifically aimed at
municipal corporations. For instance, in workers' compensation litigation, § 9-724 of the
Labor and Employment Article provides, in pertinent part, that:
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The Hansford court also misinterpreted the special venue rule as
applying strictly to intrastate municipalities. Although the Phillips
court applied the special venue rule in an action involving a Maryland
municipality, 2 ' the rule at common law was not limited by state
boundaries. 2 ' The special venue rule recognized the common law
view "that municipalities are localized ...and have no legal presence
outside the county of their location."122 The few jurisdictions that
have held foreign municipal corporations to suit have either not ap-

(a) Governmental agency defined.-In this section, "governmental agency"
includes:
(1) a county,
(2) a county board of education;
(3) a statutory bicounty agency; and
(4) an incorporated municipality.
(b) Election by covered employee.-Except as provided in subsection (c) of this
section, a covered employee may elect to have a hearing on a claim of the covered
employee held in:
(2) the county where the covered employee resided when the.., injury
.. .allegedly occurred ....
(c) Governmental agency employer.-Unless the covered employee objects, if
the employer is a governmental agency, the [Workers' Compensation] Commission shall conduct a hearing in the county in which the governmental agency is
located ....
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-724 (1991).
As demonstrated in § 9-724, the General Assembly was aware that municipal corporations could not be sued outside their borders; otherwise it would not have provided a
specific exception for injured employees. Furthermore, the General Assembly was aware
of the special venue rule and could easily have amended the general venue statute to specify municipal corporations. Thus, contrary to the court's assertion, Maryland courts have
not ignored the special venue rule enunciated in Phillips.
120. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Parks Co. v. City of Decatur, 138 F. 550 (6th Cir. 1905) (holding that a
Kentucky court did not have venue over an Illinois municipal defendant); O'Toole v.
United States, 106 F. Supp. 804 (D. Del. 1952) (holding that a Delaware court was not the
proper venue for an action against the District of Columbia), affd on other grounds, 206 F.2d
912, 918 (3rd Cir. 1953); Eastern Union Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 178 A.
864, 865 (Del. Super. Ct. 1937) ("The law seems to be quite well settled that a municipal
corporation is liable to suit only in the State of its creation."), overruled by City of Wilmington v. Spencer, 391 A.2d 199 (Del. 1978). In addition to the few cases that have dealt with
the venue question as it pertains to foreign municipal corporations are the many instances
in which such actions are dismissed at the trial level for improper venue or lack of personal
jurisdiction. Apparently, trial courts had consistently applied the Phillipsspecial venue rule
in dismissing actions filed against the District of Columbia in Maryland. See Brief of Respondent at 31,
122. National Shawmut Bank v. City of Waterville, 189 N.E. 92, 94 (Mass. 1934).
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plied the common law rule 23 or have determined that the actions
1 24
undertaken by the municipal corporation were not local in nature.
In interpreting the modern general venue statute as including
municipal corporations, the court deviated from its holding in Phillips
that municipal corporations could not be sued outside their borders
absent clear legislative guidance. 125 Neither the current general
27
venue statute12 6 nor the specific venue statute at issue in Hansford
refer specifically to municipal corporations, and the court recently reaffirmed the proposition that general statutes should be construed as
not applying to municipal corporations. 21 Significantly, the General
Assembly has never amended the venue statutes to include municipal
corporations, although it has modified other judicial holdings pertain19
ing to suits against municipal corporations.
5. Conclusion-In Hansford v. District of Columbia, the Court of
Appeals held the District of Columbia to suit for its alleged tortious
conduct inside Maryland. Hansford marks the first time in which the
District of Columbia has been held to suit in any state court.
Although the court's determinations regarding jurisdiction were well
supported, its disregard of the special venue rule for municipalities

123. See id. (concluding that the special venue rule for municipal corporations was never
adopted in the Massachusetts common law).
124. See, e.g., Harman v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 234 N.Y.S. 196, 199-200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1929) (holding that since the municipality was not carrying out 'local' governmental functions, the special venue rule did not apply). But see Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 559
P.2d 1148, 1151 (Kan. 1977) (judicially abolishing the special venue rule for municipal
corporations).
125. See Phillips v. Mayor of Baltimore, 110 Md. 431, 437-40, 72 A. 902, 905-06 (1909).
The Phillips court noted the overriding public policy behind the special venue rule and
held that "under the established rules of legislative interpretation," municipal corporations
should, absent an express statutory directive, be excepted from the general provisions of
the state venue statute. Id. at 437-38, 72 A. at 905.
126. See supra note 102.
127. The specific venue statute provides, in pertinent part, that tort actions based on
negligence may be brought in the county "[w] here the cause of action arose .... " MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 6-202(8) (1989).
128. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 385-86, 539 A.2d 1130, 1133
(1988).
129. For instance, the Court of Appeals held for over 125 years that wages of municipal
employees could not be attached. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Comptroller of the Treasury,
292 Md. 293, 298-99, 439 A.2d 1095, 1098 (1982). In response to Comptroller,"[t]heGeneral
Assembly got the message and responded promptly... [by] enact[ing] ... § 15-607 of the
Commercial Law Article," which effectively reversed the court's decision. Hooper,312 Md.
at 382, 539 A.2d at 1132-33.
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was without adequate legal basis and should have been left to the decision of the General Assembly.
DAVID

W.

FISCHER

II.

A.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Lessons on Modifying Demand Notes

In Jenkins v. Karlton,1 the Court of Appeals held that (1) parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a note that clearly states
that it is due on demand;' (2) a letter sent by a payee indicating that
no demand will be made for at least a year from the date of the note
does not, under section 3-119 of the Commercial Law Article,3 modify
the note's due date;4 and (3) the statute of limitations for an acknowledgement accrues from the date of the acknowledgement even when
it mentions a future due date.5 In so holding, the court continued its
strict application of the parol evidence rule and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) as adopted by Maryland. 6 The court also discussed an approach for modifying the terms of promissory notes.7
The outcome of the case was not unusual, but the court's analysis of
the case under section 3-119 and its attempt to clarify section 3-119's
terms were peculiar and confusing.
1. The Case.-On February 21, 1985,Jenkins executed a promissory note to Karlton, the payee, in the amount of $15,000.8 The note
stated that it was payable "on demand." 9 Although the parties had a
business relationship, Karlton loaned Jenkins the money afterJenkins
indicated he was having personal financial troubles."0 At the time of
the loan, Karlton told Jenkins, "Pay me back when you can. It appears
to me that you're going to have a good future with us. You should be
able to make money. Pay me back when you can. " "
As a result of a phone conversation in which Jenkins expressed
concern regarding his ability to repay the loan,"2 Karlton sentJenkins
a letter, dated June 14, 1985, which stated:
1. 329 Md. 510, 620 A.2d 894 (1993).
2. Id. at 525-26, 620 A.2d at 902.
3. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-119 (1992).
4. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 529, 620 A.2d at 904.
5. Id. at 531-32, 620 A.2d at 904-05.
6. Maryland adopted the U.C.C. in 1963. Id. at 517, 620 A.2d at 898. Title 3 of the
Commercial Law Article applies to negotiable instruments. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I
§ 3-119 (1992).
7. See Jenkins, 329 Md. at 532 n.8, 620 A.2d at 905 n.8.
8. Id. at 514, 620 A.2d at 896.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 515, 620 A.2d at 896.
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We have agreed that even though the note is a demand note,
no demand would be made for at least one year from the
time that I lent you the money. Therefore, you can be assured that no demand will be made earlier than February 15,
1986, and I would be willing to extend it three months bewould get you through the tax season, if it
yond that, which
3
1
will help you.

On July 7, 1988, Karlton made a demand for payment on the
note. 4 After Jenkins denied owing Karlton any money,' 5 Karlton
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on September 26,
17
1988.16 The trial court granted Jenkins's motion for judgment
based on his argument that, since Karlton filed suit more than three
years after the note was executed, the suit was barred by the statute of
limitations.'" In granting Jenkins's motion, the trial court found that
neither the surrounding circumstances of the loan nor the June 14,
1985, letter took the note out of the general rule that a cause of action
for recovery on a demand note accrues on the date the note was
executed. 9
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. 2' Referring to the conversation between Jenkins and Karlton and the June 14, 1985 letter,
the court reasoned that the purpose and circumstances of the transaction brought the note within an exception to the general rule that a
cause of action on a demand note accrues immediately. 21 The Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded to the Court of Special Appeals
with instructions to reinstate the judgment of the circuit court.22

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 515 n.1, 620 A.2d 896 n.1.
16. Id. at 515, 620 A.2d at 897.
17. Id. at 515 n.2, 620 A.2d at 897 n.2. The court explained that Jenkins's motion to
dismiss was really a motion for judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519 because testimony had been presented. Id.
18. Id. at 515, 620 A.2d at 897.
19. Id. at 516, 620 A.2d at 897; see also Karlton v. Jenkins, 86 Md. App. 556, 558, 587

A.2d 580, 581 (1991) (stating that "a note payable on demand is payable immediately,
without demand" and limitations "begin to run on the day of execution of such an instrument") (citation omitted), rev'd,Jenkins v. Karlton, 329 Md. 510, 620 A.2d 894 (1993).
20. Karlton, 86 Md. App. at 559, 587 A.2d at 581.
21. Id. at 558-59, 587 A.2d at 581 (citing Fells Point Sav. Inst. v. Weedon, 18 Md. 320
(1862); Blick v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 102 A. 1022 (1917)).
22. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
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2. Legal Background.a. Demand Notes and Parol Evidence.--Consistentwith generally accepted principles of commercial and contract law, Maryland law
23
holds that a demand note is payable immediately, without demand.
As a result, the statute of limitations begins to run when the note is
issued. 24 This common
law rule was codified in 1963 when Maryland
25
adopted the U.C.C.
Maryland courts long ago recognized exceptions to this rule. 26 In
Fells PointSavings Institution v. Weedon,27 the Court of Appeals held that
the statute of limitations on a certificate of deposit that was due on
demand did not begin to run until a condition that the certificate first
be returned was met.28 Similarly, in Blick v. Cockins,29 the court refused to find that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations because the note contained allowances for requesting additional collateral and other provisions that indicated it was to mature in
the future. ° The court held that the general rule concerning due
23. Continental Oil Co. v. Horsey, 177 Md. 383, 385, 9 A.2d 607, 608 (1939).
24. Id. at 386, 9 A.2d at 608; Young v. Mayne Realty Co., 48 Md. App. 662, 666, 429
A.2d 296, 298 (1981). See generallyJ.A. Bock, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins
to Run Against Notes Payable on Demand, 71 A.L.R.2d 284, 287-95 (1957) (setting out the
generally accepted law that demand notes are due on the date of issue).
25. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 517, 620 A.2d at 898. Section 3-122 provides in part: "(1) A
cause of action against a maker or an acceptor accrues (a) In the case of a time instrument
on the day after maturity; (b) In the case of a demand instrument upon its date, or if no
date is stated, on the date of issue." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-122(1) (1992). In
order for § 3-122 to apply, the note must be a negotiable instrument as defined by § 3-104,
which provides in part:
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this tide must
(a) Be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) Contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money...
(c) Be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) Be payable to order or to bearer.
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(c) A "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a bank of receipt
of money with an engagement to repay it;
(d) A "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
Id. § 3-104.
26. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text; see also Bock, supra note 24, at 309
(discussing exceptions to the general rule of when demand notes are due).
27. 18 Md. 320 (1862).
28. Id. at 326.
29. 131 Md. 625, 102 A. 1022 (1917).
30. Id. at 631, 102 A. at 1024. The Blick court stated:
[T]he terms of the note, which was given for a loan, are wholly inconsistent with
the theory that it was intended to become due and payable from the time of its
delivery. It provides for the contingency of its maturity occurring at some future
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dates of demand notes does not apply "when a different intention of
the parties is apparent from the terms of the instrument or the purpose and circumstances of the transaction."3 1 Since the note at issue
was due upon either actual demand or default by a party, the court
found that a cause of action would not accrue until one of those conditions had occurred.3 2 Prior to Jenkins, however, no Maryland court
had invoked Weedon or Blick to alter the due date of a demand note.
Other states have found it necessary to consider the parties' intentions to determine when a note is due.3 3 In McRae v. Smith, 4 for
example, the Georgia Court of Appeals refused to apply the rule that
a loan made without a due date is due on its date of execution, even
when the parties agreed that the maker was to pay the plaintiff back
"when [he] could do so and within a reasonable time."3 5 Instead, it
held that the statute of limitations would not begin to run until demand was made.3 6
In making exceptions regarding when demand notes become
due, courts often consider whether parol evidence can be admitted to
interpret or modify the usual terms of a demand note. 7 The parol
evidence rule states that prior or contemporaneous evidence cannot
be admitted to vary the terms of a clear and unambiguous writing that
was a complete integration of the agreement and was meant to serve

Id.

period as a result of the maker's failure to furnish additional securities when desired by the payee. It requires a rebate of interest in the event of the payment of
the note prior to its maturity. These provisions, and that relating to the substitution of other collateral from time to time by mutual consent, clearly indicate the
purpose of the parties that the note should not become due on delivery ....
31. Id. at 630, 102 A. at 1024.
32. See id.
33. See McRae v. Smith, 282 S.E.2d 676, 677 (Ga. App. 1981) (holding that where the
defendant was to repay a loan from the plaintiff "when he could do so and within a reasonable time," the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date of the demand);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Krebs, 190 So. 2d 857 (Miss. 1966) (holding that an
actual demand is required to begin the running of limitations only when it is clear from
language that the parties themselves so intended); Richman v. Kauffman, 48 A.D.2d 988
(N.Y. App. Div. 1975) (holding that language in the note making a demand possible only
after an expressed condition was met took the note out of the limitations period); DiBattista v. Butera, 244 A.2d 857, 859 (R.I. 1968) (recognizing that when it is clear that the
parties intended demand to be a condition precedent to an obligation to pay, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until demand is made).
34. 282 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. App. 1981).
35. Id. at 677.
36. Id.
37. See Foreman v. Melrod, 257 Md. 435, 442, 263 A.2d 559, 562 (1970) (noting that
parol evidence may not be admitted to alter the due date of a promissory note); DiBattista,
244 A.2d at 859 (admitting parol evidence to show that a demand note was not due until a
formal demand was made).
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as the final intention of the parties.
Maryland courts have strictly
adhered to the parol evidence rule when interpreting contracts.3 9 In
applying the rule to negotiable instruments, the court has stated that
"[p]arol evidence ... is not admissible to vary the time of payment expressed in a promissory note or to contradict other provisions in the
note ....

b. The Effect of Separate Writings on Negotiable Instruments:
UC.C. Section 3-119.-Under common law, all writings that are part of
the same transaction must be read together as a single agreement.4"
Section 3-119 of the Commercial Law Article applies this rule to negotiable instruments by stating that a separate writing can affect or modify an instrument if it is "part of the same transaction."42 In cases
involving promissory notes, such writings are usually documents like
mortgages or collateral security agreements from which the notes
stem.4 3 Courts have defined "same transaction" to mean "so proximate in time as to grow out of, elucidate and explain the quality and
character of the transaction, or an occurrence within such time as
would reasonably make it a part of the transaction." 4
In most situations in which courts have applied section 3-119 of
the U.C.C., the writings additional to the note have served a common
transactional purpose.45 In some instances the separate writings have
38. Crothers v. National Bank, 158 Md. 587, 595-96, 149 A. 270, 274 (1930).
39. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 492 A.2d 1306
(1985). The Daniels court held that an action brought by a car dealership against two
brothers to recover on a sales contract was valid against both brothers even though one
brother had been told he was only guaranteeing the loan. See id. at 262, 492 A.2d at 131011. The court concluded that the writing was clear because he signed the loan on a line
that said "buyer." Id.
40. Foreman, 257 Md. at 442, 263 A.2d at 562.
41. Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co., 664 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Mo. App. 1983); Sanden
v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404, 408 (N.D. 1972); Kemmler Memorial Found. v. 691/733 E.
Dublin-Granville Rd. Co., 584 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1992); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I
§ 3-119 cmt. 3 (1992).
42. Section 3-119 provides in pertinent part: "As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by
any other written agreement executed as a part of the same transaction ....
A separate
agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I
§ 3-119(1)-(2) (1992).
43. Id. § 3-119 cmt. 1. "The separate writing is most commonly an agreement creating
or providing for a security interest such as a mortgage, chattel mortgage, conditional sale
or pledge." Id.
44. Elsberry Equip. Co. v. Short, 211 N.E.2d 463, 468 (I11.App. 1965); see also Sanden,
201 N.W.2d at 408 (adopting the definition set out in Elsbeny); 5 RONALD ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-119:4 (1984).
45. See Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 71 (5th Cir. 1987) (resolving a
dispute over the amount of interest on a promissory note by looking at the mortgage,
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preceded the note,46 but in most, they are executed at the same
time. 4 ' However, writings executed contemporaneously with a promissory note are not necessarily a part of the same transaction, especially when the note and writing do not refer to one another.4 8
Furthermore, the separate writing should not contradict the terms of
the note.4 9
c. Acknowledgements.-An acknowledgement of a debt revives the remedy of a creditor when the statute of limitations has
run."0 It can be an express promise to pay an existing debt, a promise
to pay once a condition has been performed, or an acknowledgement
of the debt from which a promise to pay can be inferred.5 1 The acknowledgement must be a "clear, distinct, and unqualified admission. "52
In Maryland, unlike in other states, while an
acknowledgement of the debt must be unqualified, it can remove the
statute of limitations bar even if accompanied by a refusal to pay."3 An
security agreement, and bill of sale executed the same day); Elsberry Equip. Co., 211 N.E.2d
at 463, 469-70 (finding a note executed subsequent to contracts to be part of the same
transaction because the note was dependent upon events described in the contracts); Sanden, 201 N.W.2d at 408 (using a separate document to interpret a promissory note executed one month later because it was part of the same plan for financing the sale of a
store); Kemmler Memorial Found., 584 N.E.2d at 696-98 (using a mortgage and other documents executed at the same time as a promissory note to interpret the significance of the
term "partner" appearing next to the signature on the note).
46. See Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.v.Professional Men's Ass'n, 409 F.2d 600, 603
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding a contract that preceded a note and security agreement to be part
of the same transaction), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Sanden, 201 N.W.2d at 408;
Elsbery Equip. Co., 211 N.E.2d at 469-70.
47. See KuceL 813 F.2d at 71; Geyer v. First Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp., 434 S.W.2d 301, 302-03
(Ark. 1968) (holding that a deed of trust on a house and a promissory note executed the
same day are part of the same transaction); Kemmler Memorial Found., 584 N.E.2d at 696-98.
48. Texas Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(holding that the maker of a note could not argue that the intent of an oil royalties contract was to satisfy the debt on a note when the contract did not refer to the note, even
though the contract was executed the same day as the note); see also ANDERSON, supra note
44, § 3-119:7.
49. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-119 cmt. 3 (1992).
50. Potterton v. Ryland Group, Inc., 289 Md. 371, 375, 424 A.2d 761, 763 (1981);
Doughty v. Bayne, 222 Md. 361, 364, 160 A.2d 609, 611 (1960).
51. Potterton, 289 Md. at 375, 424 A.2d at 763.
52. Doughty, 222 Md. at 365, 160 A.2d at 611.
53. See Brosius Dev. Corp. v. City of Hagerstown, 237 Md. 374, 378-80, 206 A.2d 571,
573-74 (1965) (holding that the defendant made an acknowledgement that removed the
bar when he said that an unanticipated bill was more than his company could afford to
pay, but that he would try to pay it in the future); Doughty, 222 Md. at 366-67, 160 A.2d at
612 (holding that the limitations bar was removed when, in conversation with the creditor,
the defendant recalled the debt but refused to pay); see also Ronald M. Naditch, Note,
Sufficient Acknowledgment of Indebtedness to Remove Bar of Statute of Limitations, 21 MD. L. REv.
166, 168-69 (1961).
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acknowleedgment can occur after the statute of limitations has run,54
or before limitations run, in which case the acknowledgement tolls
the statute of limitations and establishes a new date from which it will
run.

55

3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Jenkins, the court found the validity
of Karlton's claim for relief dependent upon when the statute of limitations began to run on the demand note. 56 By invoking the parol
evidence rule to exclude evidence of the conversations between Jenkins and Karlton, and by dismissing Karlton's argument that the June
1985 letter was an acknowledgement, the court concluded that
Karlton's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.5 7
The court began its analysis by finding that the loan under discussion was clearly a negotiable instrument to which the U.C.C., as
adopted by Maryland, applied. 58 As the court explained, a demand
note under section 3-108 is one that is "'payable at sight or on presentation' or one 'in which no time for payment is stated."' 59 Under60 section 3-122, a cause of action accrues on the date of such notes.
The court first rejected Karlton's argument that the case fit into
the exception established in Blick.6 1 In Blick, the court found the
terms of the note to indicate that the parties did not intend a cause of
action to accrue until conditions had been met.6 2 In Jenkins, the
Court of Special Appeals agreed with Karlton and held that action on
the note was not barred by the statute of limitations. 63 In reversing,
the Court of Appeals reasoned that because bringing Karlton's note
54. SeeJames v. Thurn, 265 Md. 501, 505, 290 A.2d 490, 492 (1972); Doughty, 222 Md. at
364-65, 160 A.2d at 611; Nardo v. Favazza, 206 Md. 122, 128, 110 A.2d 676, 679 (1955).
55. Potterton, 289 Md. at 378, 424 A.2d at 765; see also Brosius Dev. Corp., 237 Md. at 380,
206 A.2d at 574 (reasoning that the court need not find when the cause of action accrued
because an acknowledgement was made within three years of the suit).
56. See Jenkins, 329 Md. at 513, 620 A.2d at 896.
57. Id. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
58. Id. at 517-19, 620 A.2d at 898-99. The court reviewed § 3-104, see supra note 25,
which lists the necessary elements of a negotiable instrument, and § 3-112, which pertains
to additional terms that do not affect negotiability. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 520, 620 A.2d at
899. It rejected Karlton's argument that the note's sum was rendered uncertain by allowing for collection of attorney fees. Id. at 519-20, 620 A.2d at 899. The court stated that
such provisions will not make a demand note due at a later time. Id. at 524-25, 620 A.2d at
901.
59. Id. at 518, 620 A.2d at 898 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-108 (1992)).
60. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-122 (1992); see also supra note 25 (outlining
the pertinent parts of the statute).
61. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 521-26, 620 A.2d at 900-02; see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing Blick).
62. Blick v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 631, 102 A. 1022, 1024 (1917).
63. See Karlton v. Jenkins, 86 Md. App. 556, 559, 587 A.2d 580, 581 (1991).
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within the exception of Blick required examining the "purpose and
circumstances" surrounding the note, Karlton's claim must be evaluated under the parol evidence rule.6 4 Following the objective law of
contracts, 65 the court found that, because the note was "clear and unambiguous" on its face, parol evidence concerning the conversations
were not admissible
between Karlton and Jenkins regarding the note
66
to modify the terms of the original agreement.
The court drew a parallel to Harris& Harrisv. Tabley 7 to support
its position that the note was facially unambiguous. 6 1 In Harris& Harris, the payee was barred from recovery by the statute of limitations
because the note, which stated no time for payment, was found to be a
demand note and therefore due at the time of issue.6 9 While there
was evidence that neither party intended the note to be due on demand,70 the Harris & Harriscourt held that a note without a due date
is not facially ambiguous, but a "straight" demand note about which
parol evidence as to the parties' intentions cannot be admitted. 7 ' The
Jenkins court did not consider the two cases cited by Karlton in which
courts allowed extrinsic evidence to alter the usual rule regarding demand notes.7 2
The Jenkins court then turned to the significance of the letter of
June 14, 1985, which, four months after Jenkins executed the note,
confirmed the parties' understanding that Karlton would not demand
payment for at least one year.73 In considering its relevancy, the court
noted section 3-119's allowance of separate written agreements modifying or affecting the negotiable instrument if they are executed as

64. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 523, 620 A.2d at 900-01. To demonstrate the applicability of the
parol evidence rule in this context, the court cited U.C.C. § 1-103 and Official Comment 1,
which recognizes "the continued applicability to commercial contracts of all supplemental
bodies of law except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act." Jenkins, 329 Md. at
523, 609 A.2d at 900-01 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1).
65. Id. at 525, 620 A.2d at 901.
66. Id. at 526, 620 A.2d at 902.
67. 348 S.E.2d 241 (Va. 1986). Jenkins brought this case to the court's attention. Brief
for Petitioner at 8.
68. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 524, 620 A.2d at 901.
69. Harris & Haris,348 S.E.2d at 243.
70. Id. at 242-43.
71. Id. at 243.
72. See Brief for Respondent at 7-8; see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text
(discussing McRae v. Smith, 282 S.E.2d 676 (Ga. App. 1981) and DiBattista v. Butera, 244
A.2d 857 (R.I. 1968), cited by Respondent).
73. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 526, 620 A.2d at 902.
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part of the same transaction. It then, for the first time, proceeded to
define the phrase "part of the same transaction" for the purposes of
section 3-119.

7
1

The court began by identifying a number of cases from other
states in which section 3-119 had been used to interpret promissory
notes. 76 Courts have found documents to form part of the same transaction as a promissory note in a variety of circumstances including
when the documents do not refer to one another, 77 were not executed at the same time,78 or neither refer to one another nor were
executed at the same time. 79 The court then concluded that
the note and the separate written agreement are part of the
same transaction even when they have not been executed together, if the transaction cannot be understood without interpreting them together. .

.

. To be a part of the same

transaction, the separate written agreement, whether or not
it was executed at the same time, earlier than, or subsequent
to the note, must be substantially relevant to understanding
the transaction out of which the note arose.8 0
Thus, the court adopted a holistic approach that focuses on relevancy
rather than the technicalities of the timing of the documents or
whether they refer to each other.8" The court cautioned, however,
that the writing cannot contradict the note because "the mere existence of a separate written agreement, arguably affecting or modifying
74. Id. Karlton did not use § 3-119 to support any of his arguments, but Jenkins asserted that under § 3-119, the letter could not vary the terms of the original note because it
was not part of the same transaction. Brief for Petitioner at 6-7.
75. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 526-29, 620 A.2d at 902-03. The court had applied the provision
in Foreman v. Melrod, 257 Md. 435, 263 A.2d 559 (1970). In Foreman, the court excluded
parol evidence to vary the terms of a note because the parol evidence, which arguably
would have released the maker from liability, contradicted a collateral security agreement
that the court found to be part of the same transaction. Id. at 445, 263 A.2d at 564. The
note and security agreement at issue in the case were executed at the same time and the
note referred to the security agreement. Id. at 438, 263 A.2d at 560. Other than Foreman,
Jenkins was the court's first consideration of § 3-119.
76. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 527-28, 620 A.2d at 903 (citations omitted).
77. See Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Professional Men's Ass'n, Inc., 409 F.2d
600, 603 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust
Co., 664 S.W.2d 530, 533, 535 (Mo. App. 1983).
78. See Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.2d at 603; Elsberry Equip. Co. v. Short,
211 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Il. App. 1965); Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404, 408 (N.D. 1972).
79. See Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.2d at 603.
80. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 528, 620 A.2d at 903.
81. To make this point clear, the court cited Texas Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519
S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), a case in which documents were executed at the same
time, but were not found to be part of the same transaction. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 528, 620
A.2d at 903.
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the note, is not sufficient [to find them part of the same transaction]
"82 Therefore, if there is a contradiction between the separate
documents, "the note may be held to stand on its own feet and not be
affected by the contradiction.""5 As a result, the court held that the
test is whether the separate writing was "intended to and, in fact, did
modify the note."8 4
Applying this definition to the facts of the case, the court held
that while the June letter "clearly affect[ed] the note[,] ... it [did] not
purport to modify the terms and conditions of the note."8 5 The court
reasoned that because the language of the letter reiterated that the
original note was a demand note, 6 it confirmed the terms of the original note as well as Karlton's agreement to forgo demand for a period
of time.8 7
Finally, the court addressed Karlton's argument that the letter
was an acknowledgement "of an unconditional promise by Jenkins to
pay his pre-existing debt to Karlton if demand was made after February 15, 1986," and that therefore, the statute of limitations did not
begin to run until February 15, 1986.88 The court recognized that
"[a]n acknowledgement sufficient to remove the bar of limitations
need not expressly admit the debt, it need only be consistent with the
existence of the debt." 9 The court also recognized that an acknowledgement that occurs prior to the running of the statute of limitations
"both tolls the running of limitations and establishes the date of the
acknowledgment as the date from which the statute will ... run."9" It
nevertheless rejected Karlton's argument,9 1 refusing to recognize February 15, 1986, as the date on which the statute of limitations would
begin to run.92 The court also refused to recognize the date of the
letter-June 14, 1985-as the date on which the statute of limitations
would begin to run,9" adding that even if it found the June 14, 1985
letter to be an acknowledgement, the suit would be barred because
82. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 529, 620 A.2d at 903.
83. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW I § 3-119 cmt. 3 (1992).
84. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 529, 620 A.2d at 904.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 530, 620 A.2d at 904.
88. Id. at 530-32, 620 A.2d at 904-05; see Brief for Respondent at 10-13.
89. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 531, 620 A.2d at 904.
90. Id., 620 A.2d at 905.
91. Id. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
92. Id.
93, Id. at 531-32, 620 A.2d at 905.
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the statute of limitations would have expired on June 14, 1988, well
94
before September 26, 1988, the date on which Karlton filed suit.
4. Analysis.-In Jenkins, the court organized its analysis around
the two pieces of extrinsic evidence related to the note: the conversation between Karlton and Jenkins and the follow-up letter ofJune 14,
1985. The court invoked the parol evidence rule to exclude evidence
of the conversation and analyzed the letter under section 3-119 and
the theory of acknowledgement.
Consistent with Maryland law, the court barred admission of parol evidence to vary the terms of the note because it found that the
discussion during which Karlton said "pay me back when you can"
contradicted the written terms of the note, which clearly stated it was
payable on demand.9 5 In its analysis of the admissibility of evidence of
the conversation, the court also clarified the circumstances under
which a note may be excepted from the general rule that a note payable on demand is due on execution. In a footnote, the court cited
cases in which other courts have considered the intentions of the parties when interpreting terms of notes. 96 It found that only when the
express language of a note is contradictory so as to destroy the negotiability of the note, have courts admitted extrinsic evidence as to the
parties' intentions."
Moreover, the court suggested that its decisions in Weedon and
Blick were based on similar reasoning.9" It interpreted those decisions
to mean that an instrument may be excepted from the general rule
when it is contradictory on its face or expresses an intention that the
promissory note not be due on demand.9 9 In both Weedon and Blick,
94. Id. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
95. Id. at 514, 620 A.2d at 896.
96. Id. at 522 n.6, 620 A.2d at 900 n.6.
97. Id. In such cases, courts have found that the note was to be paid within a "reasonable time" of demand and, therefore, a cause of action accrues at the time of demand, not
execution. Id.
98. See id. at 521, 620 A.2d at 899; see also supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text
(discussing Weedon and Blick).
99. In Blick, the express terms of the note were "wholly inconsistent with the theory
that it was intended to become due and payable from the time of its delivery." Jenkins, 329
Md. at 521, 620 A.2d at 899 (citing Blick v. Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 630-31, 102 A. 1022, 1024

(1917)).
The Court of Special Appeals, however, cited language in Blick indicating that consideration of the parties' intentions apparent from the "purposes and circumstances of the
transaction" is applicable. Karlton v. Jenkins, 86 Md. App. 556, 558, 587 A.2d 580, 581
(1991) (citing Blick, 131 Md. at 630, 102 A. at 1024). This use of Blick ignored the larger
context in which the exception in Blick was created and the fact that an unambiguous
writing existed in Jenkins.
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the written instruments contained contradictions. 0 0 In contrast,
Karlton's demand note was clear on its face. 10 '
Likewise, in recent cases in which courts have declared demand
notes not due on execution, the writings were ambiguous."0 2 In both
McRae and DiBattista, for example, no clear writing existed.10 3 These
cases can be contrasted with Harris & Harris,in which a note that had
no due date was held to be a demand note due when issued because
the face of the note did not contain a contradiction.'0 4 The Harris&
Harriscourt strictly applied section 3-108 of the U.C.C., which states
that a note without a due date is due on execution.1 0 5 In evaluating
Karlton's claim, the Jenkins court found the facts of the case to resemble those of Harris & Harrisrather than the cases in which an exception was allowed. 0 6
The court's selection of cases and reading of Weedon and Blick
stemmed from its strong preference for deciding the case based on a
strict application of the parol evidence rule and the U.C.C.10 7 Its re-

versal of the Court of Special Appeals was an opportunity to affirm the
importance of adhering to the U.C.C.'0°
100. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Weedon and Buck).
101. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 525-26, 620 A.2d at 902.
102. See McRae v. Smith, 282 S.E.2d 676, 677 (Ga. App. 1981) (holding that a loan made
by oral agreement with the understanding that it would be paid in a reasonable time "when
he could do so" is due on actual demand); Richman v. Kauffman, 48 A.D.2d 988 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1975) (holding that a demand note containing conditional language was not due until
the condition was met); DiBattista v. Butera, 244 A.2d 857, 859 (R.I. 1968) (holding that a
written instrument that says it is "to be paid at any time," is due on actual demand).
103. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
104. Harris & Harris v. Tabler, 348 S.E.2d 241 (Va. 1986); see supra notes 67-71 and
accompanying text (discussing Harris & Harris).
105. Harris & Haris, 348 S.E.2d at 243.
106. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 524, 620 A.2d at 901.
107. The Official Comment to § 3-118, entitled "Ambiguous terms and rules of construction," states:
The purpose of this section is to protect holders and to encourage the free circulation of negotiable paper by stating rules of law which will preclude a resort to
parol evidence for any purpose except reformation of the instrument. Except as
to such reformation, these rules cannot be varied by any proof that any party
intended the contrary.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-118 cmt. 1 (1992).
108. The court cited § 1-102 of the Commercial Law Article, which explains that the
purpose of the U.C.C. is "[t] o simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions" and "[t]o make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." Jenkins, 329
Md. at 518, 620 A.2d at 898 (quoting Mo. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 1-102(2) (a) (1992)).
According to the court, the U.C.C.'s purpose is "to create a guide for commercial transactions under which businessmen may predict with confidence the results of their dealings."
Jenkins, 329 Md. at 518, 620 A.2d at 898 (citing In re Automated Bookbinding Serv., Inc.,
471 F.2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972).
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The court's decision that the June 1985 letter did not modify the
original note was based on a peculiar application of section 3-119 of
the Commercial Law Article.1" 9 An examination of the section 3-119
cases cited by the court reveals that the types of writings commonly
analyzed under section 3-119 are qualitatively different from those
presented in Jenkins. They involve multifaceted, complex transactions
of sales of goods or land in which the note plays one of several
parts.'1 0 In these cases, the separate writings have an independent
purpose apart from any effect they may have on the promissory
note.1' The court's analysis in Jenkins of a letter that was written four
months after the note for the sole purpose (arguably) of clarifying it
stands out as unusual.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that section 3-119 applies to
subsequent writings. While the Jenkins court stated that documents
can be executed "subsequent" to the note under section 3-119,12 this
conclusion is not born out by the language of the Code.' 1 ' Moreover,
none of the eleven cases the court cited to demonstrate the application of section 3-119 involved a separate writing executed after the
note. 1 4
The court saw in Jenkins an opportunity to define the meaning of
"same transaction" in section 3-119. Ironically, its discussion and application of section 3-119 are somewhat confusing. Although the
court stated that a separate document is part of the same transaction
as the note "if the transaction cannot be understood without interpreting them together" and that the separate writing "must be substantially relevant to understanding the transaction out of which the
109. See Jenkins, 329 Md. at 526, 620 A.2d at 902.
110. See supra notes 44-50.
111. See id.
112. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 528, 620 A.2d at 903 ("To be a part of the same transaction, the
separate written agreement [may be] executed at the same time, earlier than, or subsequent to the note ....
).
113. See supra note 42 (quoting § 3-119).
114. Six of the cases involved writings executed at the same time as the note. See Kucel
v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1987); Geyer v. First Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp.,
434 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1968); Foreman v. Melrod, 257 Md. 435, 263 A.2d 559 (1970); Kemmler Memorial Found. v. 691/733 E. Dublin-Granville Rd. Co., 584 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio
1992); Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co., 664 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1983); Texas Export
Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). Five involved separate writings executed prior to the note. See Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Professional
Men's Ass'n, 409 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1969); Hauser v. Western Group Nurseries, Inc., 767 F.
Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Elsberry Equip. Co. v. Short, 211 N.E.2d 463 (Il. App. 1965);
Sanden v. Hanson, 201 N.W.2d 404 (N.D. 1972); McPherson v. Longview United Pentecostal Church, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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note arose, " ' it did not apply those rules in the case." 6 Instead, it
applied a narrower test dependent upon whether the letter "intended
to and, in fact, did modify the note."1 " 7 The court concluded that
while Karlton's letter "clearly affect[ed] the note," it did not modify
it."1 ' Thus, it appears that the court refused to declare the letter part
of the same transaction solely because it did not "modify" the note.
Thus, the test that emerged from Jenkins is unclear and uninstructive. The court did not, for example, identify a method for determining whether an instrument has been modified. In fact, it left its
distinction between a separate writing that affects a note and one that
modifies a note wholly unexplained. All that is clear from the court's
discussion is that the separate writing cannot contradict the note and
still be part of the same transaction and that the time of the writing's
execution and whether it refers to the note may be immaterial. 9
The court's test is also tautological. If documents are part of the
same transaction, then according to section 3-119, they may modify or
affect the instrument. 20 The decision as to whether a document
modifies a note therefore should follow the decision regarding
whether it formed part of the same transaction. By defining "same
transaction" by whether the separate writing modifies the note, the
Jenkins court did little to clarify the term.
The court actually came very close to granting Karlton relief. It
could simply have ignored the letter under the parol evidence rule.
Instead, it entertained a discussion of it under section 3-119-an unusual method by which to analyze such evidence and one that justifiably
could have been omitted. Furthermore, based on the court's indication that the documents must be mutually dependent,1 21 the court
could have ruled that the letter was not part of the same transaction
because the note stood on its own. It instead declared that the letter
affected the note.1 22 The court nevertheless refused to award relief
1 23
because it saw a contradiction between the letter and the note.
115. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 528, 620 A.2d at 903.
116. While Karlton's letter would fail under both of these standards, the court did not
evaluate the letter in this sense.
117. Id. at 529, 620 A.2d at 904.
118. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
120. See supra note 42 (quoting § 3-119).
121. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 528, 620 A.2d at 903.
122. Id. at 529, 620 A.2d at 904.
123. If the court had found the letter a part of the same transaction, the note as affected
by the letter would have contradicted the original terms of the note. The court then could
have followed the exception established in Blick and admitted parol evidence as to when
the parties' intended the note to be due. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. The
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Whether documents contradict one another, however, has not been
the focus of other analyses under section 3-119 and is not entirely relevant to complex transactions to which section 3-119 have been applied.12 4 As the court in Reese v. First Missouri Bank & Trust Co.125
pointed out, courts must "harmonize" documents that are part of the
126
same transaction, not preclude them as the Jenkins court did.
The court's treatment of Karlton's acknowledgement argument
evidences its view that acknowledgement is not a theory under which
relief should be sought in this context. The court traditionally has
taken a relatively liberal view toward acknowledgements, 12 7 and it
seemed in this case to accept the letter as an acknowledgement of
debt by Jenkins.' 2' Thus, it would not have been inconceivable for
the court to have adopted Karlton's claim that the acknowledgement
established as a new due date the future date expressed in the letter.
Instead, it rejected the argument simply as a "new wrinkle" in the use
of acknowledgements that it would not accept. 12 9 In so ruling, the
court emphasized that Karlton was attempting to use acknowledgement theory to confirm an obligation "under the originalnote."'
The
court presumably found it inappropriate under an acknowledgement
theory to invoke a due date expressed in a different document, i.e.,
13 1
the letter, when no subsequent contract was alleged.
Finally, it is worth noting that the last footnote of the decision
indicates that the court would have preferred to treat the letter as a
novation-a substitute for the note 1 32 -or as a modification of the
note, changing it to one due at a definite time under section 3-

court's concern with contradiction was based on the statement in the Official Comment to
§ 3-119 that if there is an "outright" contradiction between the documents, the note may
stand on its own. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 3-119 cmt. 3 (1992).
124. See Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co., 664 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1983); Kemmler
Memorial Found. v. 691/733 E. Dublin-Granville Rd. Co., 584 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1992).
125. 664 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. 1983).
126. Id. at 535 (finding that although the note was clear on its face, other writings involved in the transaction rendered it ambiguous).
127. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
128. See Jenkins, 329 Md. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
129. Id. at 531, 620 A.2d at 905.
130. Id. at 532, 620 A.2d at 905.
131. See id.
132. A novation is a new contract made with the intent to replace a contract already in
existence. "It 'contains four essential requisites: (1) A previous valid obligation; (2) the
agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the validity of such new contract, and
(4) the extinguishment of the old contract, by the substitution of the new one." I.W.
Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 5, 344 A.2d 65, 70 (1975) (citations omitted).
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109(1)(d) of the Commercial Law Article. 13 3 While the court expressed no view on the outcome of the case if suit had been brought
on the letter under a theory of novation or modification, it indicated
that similar cases should be brought under those theories in the
13 4
future.
5. Conclusion.-Jenkins presented a relatively straightforward
case. Karlton brought suit on a demand note more than three years
after it was issued. Because it was clear on its face, evidence could not
be admitted to alter it, so Karlton's claim was barred by the statute of
limitations. The court, however, clarified Maryland law on several issues. In refusing to extend the statute of limitations, it rejected three
different arguments: (1) that the note should be excepted from the
general rule regarding due dates of demand notes, (2) that the letter
could modify the due date under section 3-119, and (3) that an enhanced view of the letter as an acknowledgement should be applied to
delay the due date.
In addition, some of the court's discussion was instructive for
practitioners. First, the court stressed that the exception to the rule
that demand notes are due upon issue is a narrow one and only applies when the note's due date is ambiguous. Second, it affirmed that
the statute of limitations runs from the date of the acknowledgement
and not from any expressed due date it may contain. Finally, the
court suggested that while subsequent writings that arguably affect a
note should not be used to reinterpret a note clear on its face, they
may be viewed as a modification or a novation.
It is not clear what lessons can be derived from the court's analysis under section 3-119. By applying it to a situation that is not typical
of its use, the court broadened the statute into something like a parol
evidence rule for subsequent writings. The court's test for whether a
separate writing is part of the same transaction, however, was not particularly helpful. Jenkins was not the best case from which to develop a
same transaction test because it did not involve the numerous and
complex documents usually under evaluation when section 3-119 is
implicated.
JESSICA

L.

DRANGEL

133. Jenkins, 329 Md. at 532 n.8, 620 A.2d at 905 n.8. Section 3-109 provides in pertinent
part: "(1) An instrument is payable at a definite time if by its terms it is payable: (a) On or
before a stated date or at a fixed period after a stated date .... " MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
I § 3-109 (1992).
134. See Jenkins, 329 Md. at 531 n.8, 620 A.2d at 905 n.8.

III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Upholding the Constitutionality of Maryland'sDrug-FreeSchool Zone
Statute

In Dawson v. State,1 the Court of Appeals rejected a substantive
due process challenge to the Maryland drug-free school zone statute,
which makes it a felony to manufacture, distribute, or possess with
intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1000 feet
of an elementary or secondary school. 2 Applying a rational basis test,
the court held that the statute is rationally related to the General Assembly's legitimate interest in protecting children from the ravages of
drugs, even when applied to drug transactions that take place outside
the presence of children.' The Dawson decision, which focuses on the
intent of the General Assembly and on decisions from other jurisdictions,4 indicates that the Maryland drug-free school zone statute is immune from all future constitutional challenges.
1. The Case.-On September 6, 1990, Sergeant French, Corporal Taylor, and Deputy Galbreath of the Harford County Sheriffs Department were conducting a covert drug investigation in Aberdeen.'
While driving along East Belair Avenue in an unmarked car, the officers observed a group of people congregated near a wall that paralleled the road.6 As they passed, a male sitting on the wall motioned to
the car.7 Corporal Taylor made a U-turn and stopped the car across
8
from where the man sat.

The man crossed the street and approached the unmarked car.9
After a brief discussion, he produced a clear plastic packet containing
a quarter-gram of cocaine from a Newport cigarette pack. a° In return,
Corporal Taylor handed him twenty-five dollars.1" The seller, who declined to give his name, told Taylor that he always sat on the wall and
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
at 114.
8.
9.
10.
11.

329 Md. 275, 619 A.2d 111 (1993).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D (1992).

Dawson, 329 Md. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117.
Id. at 285-90, 619 A.2d at 116-18.
Id. at 279, 619 A.2d at 113.
Id.
Id. The man was identified at trial as Stacey Eugene Dawson. Id. at 282, 619 A.2d
Id. at 279, 619 A.2d at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that Taylor should look for him if he wanted more cocaine."2 At trial,
Taylor and French testified that the transaction, which occurred
within 1000 feet of Halls Cross Elementary School, lasted about sixty
seconds.1 3 Although the transaction took place in an unlit area, both
officers also testified that they did not have any trouble seeing the
seller. 14
After leaving the scene, Corporal Taylor met with Officer Osborn, a uniformed officer with the Aberdeen Police Department.15
Taylor provided Osborn with a description of the seller 6 and the location of the sale.' 7 Within minutes, Osborn and another officer arrived
at the scene of the transaction. 18 Upon seeing the police approach,
the majority of the group congregated near the wall dispersed. 9 Two
men remained, however; one of them matched Taylor's description of
the seller.2 " At Officer Osborn's request, the man identified himself
as Stacey Eugene Dawson. 2 Officer Osborn testified that he neither
23
searched 22 nor arrested Dawson that evening.
The Harford County Grand Jury subsequently indicted Dawson
for distribution of cocaine and distribution of cocaine within 1000
feet of an elementary school.2 4 Dawson was tried by a jury and convicted on both counts in the Harford County Circuit Court.25 He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but the Court of Appeals
issued a writ of certiorari before the Court of Special Appeals could
26
hear the case.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114.
Id. at 280, 619 A.2d at 113.

16. Taylor described the seller as a 5'7" tall, 175 pound black male wearing acid washed
jeans, a white T-shirt, and a red baseball cap with the word "Oklahoma" written on it in
white. In addition, Taylor told Osborn that the cocaine came from a Newport cigarette
package. Appellant's Brief at 4 n.2.
17. Dawson, 329 Md. at 280, 619 A.2d at 113.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

22. Appellant's Brief at 5. Dawson, on the other hand, testified that Officer Osborn
searched him. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 5. Although Dawson admitted witnessing the transaction in question, he denied possessing the Newport cigarette pack and selling cocaine to the three men in the car.
Id. at 6. Officer Osborn testified that his fellow officers arrested the second man, who was
found in possession of a Newport cigarette pack, for possession of a controlled dangerous
substance. Id.at 5.
24. See Dawson, 329 Md. at 280, 619 A.2d at 113.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 278, 619 A.2d at 113.
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Legal Background.-

a. The Maryland Drug-FreeSchool Zone Statute.-The Maryland
drug-free school zone statute makes it an additional and separate felony from other narcotics offenses to manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within
1000 feet of an elementary or secondary school. 7 Section 286D was
modeled after the New Jersey drug-free school zone statute, 28 which
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D(a) (1) (1992). The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) A person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or possesses with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of § 286(a) (1) of
this subheading or who conspires to commit any of these offenses, is guilty of a
felony if the offense occurred:
(1) In, on, or within 1,000 feet of any real property owned by or leased
to any elementary school, secondary school, or school board, and used
for elementary or secondary education, as defined under § 1-101 of the
Education Article, regardless of whether:
(i) School was in session at the time of the offense; or
(ii) The real property was being used for other purposes besides school
purposes at the time of the offense; or
(2) On a school vehicle as, defined under § 11-154 of the Transportation Article.
(b) (1) A person who violates the provisions of this section, on conviction,
shall be subject to the following penalties:
(i) For a first offense, imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of
not more than $20,000 or both; or
(ii) For a second or subsequent offense, imprisonment for not less than 5 or
more than 40 years or a fine of not more than $40,000 or both. It is
mandatory for the court to impose a minimum sentence of 5 years, which
may not be suspended, and a person is not eligible for parole during that
period, except in accordance with Article 31B § 11 of the Code.
(2) A sentence imposed under this subsection shall be served consecutively
to any other sentence imposed.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a conviction arising under
this section may not merge with a conviction for a violation of § 286 or 286C of
this subheading.
Id. § 286D(a)-(c).
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 1993). The NewJersey statute provides in relevant
part:
Any person who violates subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5, [the general narcotics
statute], by distributing dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while on any school
property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary
or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property
...is guilty of a crime of the third degree and shall, except as provided in N.J.S.
2C:35-12, be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment.
Id. Unlike the Maryland statute, the NewJersey statute provides for an affirmative defense
if (1) the prohibited conduct took place in a private residence, (2) no people seventeen or
younger were present, and (3) the prohibited conduct did not involve distributing or possessing with intent to distribute drugs for profit. Id. The defendant has the burden of
establishing this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; see also SENATE JUDICIAL
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itself was modeled after the Federal Schoolyard Statute.29 The Maryland statute was enacted "to seal off drug dealers from their potential
demand, in this case elementary and secondary school students ...
[and] to establish . . . the psychological mind set of a clean
3 °
environment."
To assure a "clean environment," the General Assembly included
in the statute stringent enforcement provisions. For example, violation of the statute does not depend on whether the offense took place
during school hours.3 1 Moreover, a conviction under the statute may
not be merged with a conviction under section 286, the general narcotics statute, 32 or section 286C, which makes it a felony to hire, solicit, engage, or use a minor to manufacture, distribute, or deliver any
controlled dangerous substance in quantities sufficient to indicate an
intent to distribute. 3 In addition, courts must impose sentences for
the violation of 286D consecutive to any other sentences.3 4 Finally,
the legislative history of the statute indicates that offenders cannot
assert lack of knowledge regarding their proximity to a school as a
defense.3 5
b. The Constitutionality of Drug-Free School Zone Statutes.--Due
process challenges to the federal schoolyard statute have been rejected by every federal court addressing such challenges. 3 6 Most de-

fendants challenging the schoolyard statute have argued that it
1989, BILL ANALYSIS S.B. 289 (1989)
(on file at the office of the Maryland Law Review) (stating that the bill was based on the
New Jersey statute).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 860 (1993). The federal schoolyard statute states in relevant part:
Any person who violates section 841 (a) (1) of this title or section 856 of this
title [the general narcotics statutes] by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary,
vocational, or secondary school or a public or private college or university, or a
playground, or within 100 feet of a public or private youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is ... subject to (1) twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841 (b) of this title; and (2) at least twice any term
of supervised release authorized by section 841 (b) of this title for a first offense
PROCEEDINGS COMM., REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF

Id.
30. ControlledDangerousSubstances DistributionOn or NearSchool Property-Penalties,1989:
Hearings on S.B. 289 Before the SenateJudicial Proceedings Comm. (1989) (testimony of Sen.
Larry Young).
31. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 286D(a)(1)(i).
32. Id. § 286.
33. Id. § 286C.
34. See id. § 286D(b) (2) (c).
35. SENATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS COMM., FLOOR REPORT S.B. 289 (1989).
36. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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violates the Due Process Clause by creating an irrebuttable presumption that all drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school are harmful
to children. 7 Defendants have claimed that this presumption is not
rationally related to the government's interest in protecting children
from the dangers of drugs because not all drug transactions within
1000 feet of a school harm children.3 8 While such arguments appear
to implicate procedural due process concerns in that defendants are
not allowed to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that no children were harmed by their particular drug transaction, 39 the argument actually represents a substantive challenge to the statute because
the presumption that drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school
are harmful to children was established by Congress as a matter of
law.4" As such, any challenge to the presumption is a challenge to the
substantive choice made by Congress that all such transactions are
harmful to children, whether children are present or not. In other
words, this challenge to the statute is a substantive one, attacking the
rationality of the legislative presumption."
37. See United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's argument that the federal schoolyard statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that is not
rationally related to government's interest in protecting children); United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's argument that the federal schoolyard statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that all drug transactions within a school
zone are dangerous to children); United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting defendant's argument that the federal schoolyard statute offends the Due Process
Clause by creating an irrebuttable presumption that every drug transaction within 1000
feet of a school has detrimental effects on schoolchildren), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068
(1986); United States v. Dixon, 619 F. Supp. 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting defendant's
argument that the federal schoolyard statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that is
not rationally related to Congress's purpose); United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting defendant's claim that the federal schoolyard statute's irrebuttable presumption that all drug transactions near a school are harmful to children was
irrational as applied to the defendant because the defendant's drug transaction took place
outside the presence of school children).
38. See cases cited supra note 37.
39. See Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 (rejecting the claim that the defendant should be
allowed to rebut the presumption); Nieves, 608 F. Supp. at 1149 (rejecting the claim that a
defendant's due process rights were violated because he was not permitted to introduce
evidence that his drug transaction had no effect on children).
40. See Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 (emphasizing that the presumption that drug transactions near schools harm children and thus are deserving of more punishment is one already decided by Congress as a matter of law); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215,
1221 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that Congress has already decided, as a matter of law, that defendants involved in drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school are deserving of greater
punishment), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987).
41. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has characterized the challenges raised
in Agilar, see supra note 37, and Holland, see supra note 40, as challenges to the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d at 1422, 1432 (5th
Cir. 1991). As Justice Scalia reasoned in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989),
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Under the Due Process Clause, courts apply a rational basis test to
economic and social legislation that does not infringe on a fundamental right.4 2 Courts have unanimously rejected due process challenges
to the federal schoolyard statute, determining that "[t] he presumption
that narcotics sales in the vicinity of ...[a] school endanger the students and thus should be subject to stiffer penalties is substantially
related to Congress's interest in [protecting children].'4

The courts

have noted that while all drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school
may not harm children, it is sufficient that the schoolyard statute represents a rational means of reducing the availability of drugs to
schoolchildren.4
irrebuttable presumptions express the substantive policies of the states. Id. at 120. Thus,
"[t]he assertion that the state has created an 'irrebuttable presumption' . . . [is] nothing
more than an assertion that the substance of the state law should be rejected." 2 RONALD
D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 17.6, at 642 (1986).
While the irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been raised as a challenge under the
Due Process Clause, a few commentators have suggested that the doctrine actually presents
an equal protection challenge. See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the
EmergingIrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine,7 IND. L. REv. 644 (1974);John M. Phillips, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449 (1975). Some of the federal
schoolyard cases support this position. For example, defendants have argued in several
cases that schoolyard statutes create an irrebuttable and irrational presumption that all
drug transactions near a school harm children. See Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740; Holland, 810
F.2d at 1220. As the Holland court reasoned, if defendants, in asserting this argument, are
referring to Congress's decision to punish more severely those who engage in drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school than those who engage in drug transactions outside the
school zone, then their argument "issimply a restatement of [the] equal protection argument." Holland,810 F.2d at 1221. In this context, the use of the irrebuttable presumption
is challenged on the basis of the classifications created by the statute.
42. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (holding that "the guaranty of due process.., demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained").
When fundamental rights are involved, the Court applies strict scrutiny and will only
uphold such legislation if it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In Nieves, the
transaction that led to the defendants' arrest occurred two blocks from school property at
4,p.m. Id. No children were alleged to have been present during the transaction. Id.
Nieves argued that, in light of such facts, the presumption that children were harmed was
irrational. Id.; see also United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the schoolyard statute is constitutional because the presumption that drug transactions near schools harm children is rationally related to Congress's goal of protecting children); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 741 (holding that the schoolyard statute does not violate due
process); Agilar,779 F.2d at 125-26 (holding that it is rational for Congress, in its efforts to
protect children, to increase penalties for those who sell drugs near schools).
44. See Crew, 916 F.2d at 983 (holding that the applicability of the schoolyard statute
does not depend on the presence of children); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 741 (holding that
since the statute is a rational means of reducing children's exposure to drugs, it is irrelevant that, in some cases, children are not injured by the transaction); Agilar, 779 F.2d at
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State courts likewise have rejected substantive due process challenges to drug-free school zone statutes similar to section 286D. In
State v. Rodriguez,4 the Superior Court of New Jersey summarily rejected a substantive due process challenge to the New Jersey drug-free
school zone statute. 46 The court noted that because "a 'fundamental
right' is not involved . . .the legislation will withstand a substantive

due process attack since it reasonably relates to a legitimate legislative
purpose."4 7 Other state courts have entertained due process challenges based on the irrebuttable presumption argument asserted in
the federal courts. 4' Like the federal courts, state courts have determined that implicit in the drug-free school zone statutes "is the legislative finding, as a matter of substance and not of presumption, that
such transactions are the cause of harm to children."49 Holding that
drug-free school zone statutes need only bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest,50 state courts have upheld these
statutes as a rational means to protect children.5 1 As the Virginia
Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Bums, "[there is no] question that [the legislature's] conclusion [that drug transactions occur125-26 (holding that whether or not each drug transaction within 1000 feet of a school
harms children, proscribing drugs within the school zone is a rational means of reducing
children's access to drugs).
45. 542 A.2d 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
46. Id. at 970.
47. Id.
48. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989) (rejecting defendant's argument that the
Utah drug-free school zone statute violated due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that children will be harmed by drug transactions near schools); Commonwealth
v. Burns, 395 S.E.2d 456 (Va. 1990) (reversing the trial court's holding that the Virginia
drug-free school zone statute violated due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption
that all drug transactions within 1000 feet of a school harm children); State v. Hermann,
474 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting defendant's argument that the Wisconsin
drug-free school zone statute violated due process by establishing an irrational, irrebuttable presumption that drug transactions near schools have a special detrimental effect on
children).
49. Burns, 395 S.E.2d at 459.
50. See State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279, 284 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the Florida drugfree school zone statute must only satisfy a rationality test); Hermann, 474 N.W.2d at 912
(declaring that due process only requires that the means chosen by the legislature bear a
reasonable and rational relationship to the purpose of the statute).
51. See Moore, 782 P.2d at 502 (holding that the Utah drug-free school zone statute does
not violate due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that children will be
harmed by drug transactions near schools); Bums, 395 S.E.2d at 459 (holding that the
Virginia drug-free school zone statute is rationally related to the state's interest in protecting children, even when the statute is applied to transactions that take place when children
are not present); Hermann, 474 N.W.2d at 912 (holding that the Wisconsin drug-free
school zone statute, which enhances penalties for those convicted of drug transactions
near school grounds, bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the deterrence of
such activities).
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ring near a school pose a threat of harm to children regardless of
whether children are present] is rationally related to the Commonwealth's interest in protecting children from such threatened
harm."5 2
3. The Court's Reasoning.-On appeal, Dawson challenged the
constitutionality of section 286D, asserting that it violated the Due
Process Clauses of both the United States Constitution5 3 and the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 4 Dawson argued that "there is no
real and substantial relationship between the General Assembly's objective of protecting schoolchildren and [section] 286D's imposition of
criminal liability without regard to the actual presence of children." 5

52. Burns, 395 S.E.2d at 459.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Dawson, 329 Md. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114-15.
54. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states, in relevant part: "no man
ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or
outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. CONST. art. XXIV;
see Dawson, 329 Md. at 282, 619 A.2d at 14-15.
Dawson also asserted on appeal that the State's evidence was insufficient to sustain his
distribution convictions. Id. at 281, 619 A.2d at 114. He argued that the area where the
transaction occurred was poorly lit, that the seller was wearing a hat, that the transaction
was of brief duration and that 12 to 15 other people left the scene when Officer Osborn
arrived. Id. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114. According to Dawson, "the existence of these factors
together with the extraordinary nine months between the incident and the officers' in
court identification of [him] render[ed] the identification inherently suspect and virtually
unbelievable." Appellant's Brief at 12.
Maryland courts use the test established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), to
evaluate sufficiency of evidence claims. See Colvin v. State, 299 Md. 88, 109, 472 A.2d 953,
964, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984). In Jackson, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction must be ... whether the record evidence could reasonably
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not
require a court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (citation omitted). Applying the Jackson test, the Dawson court
focused on the testimony of Sergeant French and Corporal Taylor and noted that both
Taylor and French positively identified Dawson as the man who sold them drugs. Dawson,
329 Md. at 282, 619 A.2d at 114. The court also considered Officer Osborn's testimony
that Dawson met the description that Taylor provided and that Dawson was sitting in the
exact spot where Taylor told him to look. Id. After reviewing this evidence, the court
concluded that "when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State... there
was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that Dawson was the person who sold
Taylor the cocaine." Id.
55. Dawson, 329 Md. at 282-83, 619 A.2d at 115.
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In reviewing Dawson's challenge, the court noted that the requirements of due process are satisfied when a statute, as an exercise
of the State's police power, "'bears a real and substantial relation to
the public health, morals, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this
state."' 56 The court determined that the Maryland drug-free school
zone statute would be constitutional if a substantial relationship existed between the provisions and the purpose of the statute. 5 7 Examining the language and legislative history of the drug-free school zone
statute, the court concluded that the General Assembly enacted section 286D as a "preventative measure designed to assure the safety of
all drug dealing near school
schoolchildren [by] . . . eliminat[ing]
58

grounds on a 24-hour basis."
The court found that the application of section 286D "to all transactions within the 1000 foot perimeter," regardless of whether
"[s]chool was in session at the time of the offense,"5 9 is substantially
related to the General Assembly's goal of protecting schoolchildren.6 °
Recognizing that the hours during which schoolchildren congregate
near schools cannot be predicted6 1 and that areas known as drug markets attract drug dealers and purchasers all day long,6 2 the court con56. Id. at 283, 619 A.2d at 115 (quoting Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230,
236, 335 A.2d 679, 683 (1975)). In Maryland, this test is used to determine the constitutionality of statutes that do not infringe upon fundamental interests under the Due Process
Clauses of both the Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Westchester
West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 454, 348 A.2d 856, 860
(1975). Under this test, anyone challenging the constitutionality of a statute enacted
under the State's police powers has the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of
constitutionality by affirmatively establishing the statute's invalidity. Edgewood Nursing
Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 427, 384 A.2d 748, 751 (1978). This burden is especially
heavy when challenging criminal statutes because, as the Dawson court recognized, the
General Assembly has broad authority to criminalize certain activities. Dawson, 329 Md. at
283, 619 A.2d at 115; see also Greenwald v. State, 221 Md. 235, 240, 155 A.2d 894, 897
(1960) (reaffirming that the legislature has the power to define criminal offenses and to
proscribe criminal penalties, the only limitation being constitutional rights and privileges).
Finally, the Court of Appeals has announced that it will not review the wisdom of legislative
enactments unless they are not supported by any considerations relating to the public welfare. See Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. SAV-A-LOT, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 106, 311 A.2d 242,
244 (1973).
57. Dawson, 329 Md. at 284, 619 A.2d at 116.
58. Id. at 285, 619 A.2d at 116. The court found that the General Assembly, in creating
a 24-hour drug-free school zone, sought to decrease children's use of drugs and to insulate
children from the direct and indirect effects of drug dealing. Id.
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D(a) (1) (i) (1992).
60. Dawson, 329 Md. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117.
61. Id. at 286, 619 A.2d at 116. The court noted that children often take part in extracurricular activities, sporting events, and social activities that take place at school after
school hours. I&
62. Id. Refusing to read the statute narrowly, the court reasoned that the statute's goal
of protecting children would not be realized if the protection of the statute ended at the
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cluded that the statute's creation of twenty-four hour drug-free school
zones "bore a rational relationship to the achievement of the State's
legitimate goal of protecting children," 6 and thus satisfied the requirements of due process. 64
To support its decision, the court noted that federal courts reviewing the federal schoolyard statute have upheld the application of
the statute to drug transactions occurring outside the presence of children.6" The court also emphasized that every court reviewing similar
drug-free school zone statutes has declared them constitutional. 6
4. Analysis.-The constitutionality of the Maryland drug-free
school zone statute presented a case of first impression. 7 By holding
that the statute is rationally related to the General Assembly's goal of
protecting children from drugs,6 8 the court effectively rendered futile
not only similar due process challenges, but virtually any future constitutional challenge to the statute.
The Dawson decision was amply supported by case law from federal and state courts.6 9 As Judge Chasanow noted in the opinion,
every court that has reviewed statutes creating twenty-four-hour drugfree school zones has found that they are rationally related to the legitimate goal of protecting children from the dangers associated with
drugs and drug dealing.7 ° In light of the unanimous precedent from
other jurisdictions, Maryland's legitimate interiest in the protection of
children, 7 1 the General Assembly's clear intent to create twenty-fourclose of the schoolday. See id. at 288, 619 A.2d at 117-18 (citing United States v. Crew, 916
F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court cited United States v. Agilar, 612 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
United States v. Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Dixon, 619 F.
Supp. 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); and United States v. Cunningham, 615 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
66. Dawson, 329 Md. at 288, 619 A.2d at 118 ("[O]ur research has indicated that every
court reviewing drug-free school zone statutes has found them to be constitutional." ).
The court cited both federal and state cases including, United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d
39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 348 (1991); United States v. Rowe, 911 F.2d 50 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Holland, 810
F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057 (1987); State v. Rodriguez, 542 A.2d 966
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Commonwealth
v. Bums, 395 S.E.2d 456 (Va. 1990).
67. See Dawson, 329 Md. at 278, 619 A.2d at 113.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 43-44, 51 and accompanying text.
70. Dawson, 329 Md. at 288, 619 A.2d at 118.
71. Dawson agreed that the state has a valid interest in shielding children from the evils
of drugs and drug dealing. Id. at 282, 619 A.2d at 115.
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hour drug-free school zones, 72 and the heavy burden placed on any
person raising a substantive due process challenge to a criminal statute, 75 it would have been highly unlikely for the Dawson court to have
reached a contrary conclusion. While Dawson is important because it
precludes future substantive due process challenges to section 286D,
other issues also are worthy of discussion.
Defendants in other jurisdictions have argued that drug-free
school zone statutes violate the Due Process Clause by failing to require that defendants have knowledge of the fact that they are within
1000 feet of a school when the drug transaction takes place. 74 In rejecting this challenge, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
noted that while "'criminal offenses requiring no mens rea 75 have a
"generally disfavored status"' . . . Congress can dispense with this re-

quirement. 76 In the context of the federal drug-free school zone statute, courts have unanimously rejected this due process challenge,
emphasizing that the intent of Congress not to include a mens rea requirement in the statute was clear 77 and that the schoolyard statute

72. See id. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 42 and 56.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the argument that the federal schoolyard statute violates due process because it does not require
the defendant to have knowledge of the fact that a school is within 1000 feet of the drug
transaction); United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215, 1222-24 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting the
contention that the federal schoolyard statute violates due process by not requiring the
defendants to have knowledge of their proximity to a school), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1057
(1987); State v. Burch, 545 So. 2d 279, 283-84 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1989) (rejecting the claim
that the Florida schoolyard statute violates due process by not requiring the government to
prove an intent to sell drugs at a location within 1000 feet of a school).
75. The mens rea is the element of a crime relating to the defendant's mental state.
The state of mind required for a particular crime varies. A statute may require knowledge
or intent on the part of the defendant, or it may not require any particular state of mind.
See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 831-35 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing
the concept of mens rea).
76. See United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)). In Liparota, the Supreme Court held that the government had to prove that the defendant knew that his acquisition of food stamps was in a
manner unauthorized by the statute. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433.
77. See Holland, 810 F.2d at 1223 (reasoning that "Congress' heightened interest in
protecting children from both the indirect and direct perils of drug trafficking amply supports its decision not to require a showing of mens rea of the proximity of a school"); Cross,
900 F.2d at 69 (stating that the intent of Congress not to expressly require a mens rea is
clear); Falu, 776 F. Supp. at 50 (finding that a requirement that a defendant know that he
is within a school zone would undercut the unambiguous legislative design to dispense
with an intent requirement); Burch, 545 So. 2d at 283 (finding that requiring a dealer to
know that a transaction is within 1000 feet of a school would undermine the clear intent of
Congress to create a statute which did not require knowledge of the proximity of a school).
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does not criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.78 In light of the
federal precedent and the General Assembly's clear intent to create
an offense that does not require defendants to have knowledge of
their proximity to a school,7 9 it is highly probable that Maryland
courts would reject such a mens rea challenge.
Defendants also have asserted equal protection challenges to
drug-free school zone statutes, arguing that the statutes are both underinclusive and overinclusive and therefore violative of the right to
equal protection.80 Because drug-free school zone statutes do not affect fundamental interests nor implicate suspect classes, courts have
applied the rational basis test to this claim 8" and have upheld drugfree school zone statutes after finding that the statutes are rationally
78. See Holland, 810 F.2d at 1223 (stating that the drug-free school zone statute
criminalizes a type of conduct that reasonable people know is subject to strict regulation);
Cross, 900 F.2d at 69 (noting that since the statute only applies to people who have violated
the general federal narcotics statute, which requires the defendant to knowingly or intentionally distribute drugs, the statute does not criminalize otherwise innocent activity); Falu,
776 F.2d at 50 (highlighting that the federal drug-free school zone statute does not
criminalize otherwise legal conduct since the statute incorporates the general narcotics
statute, which contains a mens rea requirement).
79. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Crew, 916 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting defendant's
argument that the federal schoolyard statute is underinclusive because it does not apply to
all locations where children congregate and overinclusive because it applies to transactions
among adults); United States v. Thornton, 901 F.2d 738, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
defendant's assertion that the federal schoolyard statute is both underinclusive, because
transactions taking place outside the school zones may harm children, and overinclusive,
because transactions within the school zones may not involve children at all).
81. In United States v. Dixon, 619 F. Supp. 1399 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the defendant argued
that "strict scrutiny must be applied to criminal statutes that affect 'vital liberty interests.'"
Id. at 1401. The defendant relied on Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in which
the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a statute which denied appellate counsel to
]
indigent defendants. Rejecting the defendant's claim, the Dixon court reasoned that "[t he
statute challenged (in Douglas] was subjected to strict scrutiny because, by denying the indigent defendants the right to appellate counsel, it impaired a fundamental right." Dixon,
619 F. Supp. at 1401. Reasoning that the federal schoolyard statute impairs no fundamental right, the Dixon court applied the rational basis test. Id. The approach taken by the
Dixon court is consistent with the approach taken by all courts addressing due process and
equal protection challenges to criminal statutes. See supra notes 43-44, 50 and accompanying text; infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
Justice Marshall once stated, "I find it hard to understand why a statute which sends a
man to prison... should be tested under the same minimal standards of rationality that we
apply to statutes regulating who can sell eyeglasses or who can own pharmacies." Marshall
v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting). Several commentators also have criticized the courts for failing to deal adequately with the underlying constitutional issues involved in criminal legislation. See generally Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of
the CriminalLaw, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 401 (1958); Thomas L. Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the CriminalLaw and the Modern Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 344 (1977); Herbert L. Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Law Revisited: A Pleafor a
New Look at "SubstantiveDue Process," 44 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 490 (1970-71).
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related to the legitimate government interest in protecting children. 2
Some defendants have argued that courts should subject the federal
drug-free school zone statute to strict scrutiny because it has a disparate impact on members of racial minorities and thus implicates suspect classes."3 The courts that have addressed this challenge have
unanimously rejected the claim, holding that because there is no
proof of a racially discriminatory purpose, 4 "[i] t is .

.

. sufficient for

equal protection purposes that the statute... bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.""
In treating criminal legislation in the same manner that they treat ordinary economic
legislation, the courts have all but ignored the fundamental liberty interests of defendants.
Such oversight is surprising
because of the obvious concern of the Constitution to safeguard the use of the
method of the criminal law-especially ... on the procedural side-and the concern of the courts themselves . . . to give vitality to the procedural guarantees.
What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first place?
Hart, supra, at 431. A strong argument can be made that there should not only be procedural safeguards, but also greater substantive restraints on the ability of the government to
criminalize certain conduct. A criminal statute that strips individuals of their fundamental
right to liberty should be subject to a test more stringent than the rational basis test. While
some commentators have suggested reevaluating the current tests applied to criminal legislation, see supra, Hindes, at 378; supra, Packer, at 490, it appears extremely unlikely that the
courts will change their approach to criminal legislation any time soon.
82. See Crew, 916 F.2d at 984 (rejecting an equal protection challenge because increasing the penalties for selling drugs near schools is rationally related to the legitimate government interest in protecting children); Thornton, 901 F.2d at 740 (rejecting an equal
protection challenge under the rational basis test); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 503-04
(Utah 1989) (applying the rational basis test in rejecting an equal protection challenge).
83. See supra note 81; see also United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1985)
(summarily dismissing an argument that more minorities live within 1000 feet of schools
than do nonminorities and that therefore the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause
because of an alleged disproportionate impact on racial minorities); United States v.
Nieves, 608 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (rejecting the argument that the federal
schoolyard statute should be subjected to strict scrutiny because the statute's enhanced
penalties have a greater impact on racial minorities who represent a higher percentage of
the population in densely populated urban areas where the number of schools is greater
than in suburban and rural areas).
84. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the
establishment of an equal protection claim attacking a facially neutral law requires the
showing of a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 240. Under the rule in Washington,
a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of the
government to pursue, is [not] invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Id. at 242.
85. Dixon, 619 F. Supp. at 1401; see also Agilar, 779 F.2d at 126; Nieves, 608 F. Supp. at
1150.
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Like the federal courts, Maryland courts would likely apply a rational basis test to either of the above equal protection challenges.8 6
Because in Maryland the rational basis test for equal protection is the
same as the rational basis test for due process,87 the holding in Dawson
dictates the rejection of either of these equal protection challenges. 8
One further issue worth noting hinges on a question of statutory
interpretation. Section 286D, like the federal schoolyard statute and
the NewJersey drug-free school zone statute, makes it a crime to "possess[ ] with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance ...
within 1,000 feet of any real property... used for elementary or secondary education."89 This provision raises the issue of whether the
statute applies to persons who, while possessing drugs within 1000 feet
of a school, clearly intend to distribute them at a location outside the
school zone.9" The courts are split on this question. A few federal
district courts, looking at the language and legislative history of the
federal schoolyard statute, have held that the government must prove
an intent to distribute the drugs at a location within 1000 feet of a

86. See Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981).
In Waldron, the Court of Appeals held that the equal protection concepts in the Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights generally mean the same thing and apply in
the same manner; "[i]f ...neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right or interest is
implicated, then the traditional equal protection analysis calls forth ... the 'rational basis
test.'" Id. at 706-07, 426 A.2d at 942.
87. Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 422, 474 A.2d 191, 206 (1984).
88. The Dawson court found that the statute is rationally related to the General Assembly's goal of protecting children. Dawson, 329 Md. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117. Consequently,
Maryland courts will be compelled to hold that the statute passes the equal protection
rational basis test if faced with such a challenge.
89. MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D(a). For the text of the federal and New Jersey
statutes, see supra notes 28, 29.
90. See United States v. Roberts, 735 F. Supp. 537, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (determining
that the federal schoolyard statute did not apply to a defendant who was caught while
boarding a train in Pennsylvania Station in New York City); United States v. Liranzo, 729 F.
Supp. 1012, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the federal schoolyard statute did not apply to a defendant who was arrested in the Port Authority bus terminal in New York City,
which is within 1000 feet of a school); State v. Ivory, 592 A.2d 205, 211 (NJ. 1991) (holding
that New Jersey's drug-free school zone statute applied to a defendant who was arrested
while riding his bike through a public park that contained athletic fields leased and used
by a school).
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school." l At least one federal appellate court92 and a few state
courts, 3 however, have reached the opposite conclusion.
In construing section 286D, Maryland courts will look to both the
language and purpose of the statute." They will endeavor to "seek
out ...the ends to be accomplished [and] the evils to be redressed by
[section 286D] .- The language of section 286D indicates a legislative
intent to apply the statute to anyone who commits the offense of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance
within 1000 feet of a school.9" In addition, as the Dawson court noted,
the legislative history of section 286D indicates an intent to create
91. In Roberts, see supra note 90, the court first looked at the plain meaning of the
statute. Roberts, 735 F. Supp. at 539. After deeming the language of the statute ambiguous,
the court analyzed Congress's intent. Id. at 540. The Roberts court found that Congress
enacted the statute to deter drug distribution around schools and not to establish drugfree zones around schools. Id. The ascertainment of this legislative intent along with the
court's adherence to the rule of lenity, which dictates that an ambiguity in a statute be
resolved in favor of the defendant, led the court to conclude that the statute only applies to
those defendants who intend to distribute drugs within the 1000 foot school zone. I. at
543; see also United States v. Coates, 739 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
federal schoolyard statute does not apply to those who are caught possessing drugs within
1000 feet of a school but intend to distribute the drugs elsewhere); Liranzo, 729 F. Supp. at
1012 (holding that the federal statute only reaches those who intend to distribute narcotics
at a location within 1000 feet of a school).
92. See United States v. Wake, 948 F.2d 1422 (5th Cir. 1991). In Wake, the Fifth Circuit
stated: "we construe the statute to proscribe possession, within 1,000 feet of a school, of a
quantity sufficient to indicate intent to distribute (felony possession)." Id. at 1430. In
reaching its decision, the court looked to the language and the purpose of the federal
schoolyard statute, id. at 1430-32, and ultimately concluded that Congress passed the
schoolyard statute to create drug-free zones around schools. Id. at 1433.
93. See Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 601 N.E.2d 470, 471 (Mass. 1992) (holding that
the drug-free school zone statute applied to a defendant possessing drugs within a school
zone even if the defendant intended to distribute the drugs elsewhere); Ivory, 592 A.2d at
209 (holding that since the statute does not require a showing of an intent to distribute at
a particular location, it is irrelevant whether the defendant intended to distribute the
drugs at a location within 1000 feet of a school).
94. See Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349
(1990) (stating that while courts always begin the process of statutory construction by focusing on the language of the statute itself, the court's ultimate goal is to seek out the
legislative purpose, and this can be done by examining the legislative history of the statute
if the language is in some way ambiguous).
95. Id.
96. Section 286D states: "A person who.., possesses with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of § 286(a) .. .is guilty of a felony if the offense
occurred.., within 1,000 feet of... [a] school." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286D(a)(1)(1)
(1992) (emphasis added). This language, which differs from the language in both the
federal schoolyard statute and the NewJersey statute, see supra notes 28, 29, suggests that if
a defendant is found guilty of the offense of possession with intent to distribute and the
defendant is within 1000 feet of a school, the defendant is guilty of violating § 286D.
Under such a construction, a defendant's intent to distribute the drugs elsewhere is
irrelevant.
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drug-free zones around schools.9 7 These two factors suggest that
Maryland courts would construe section 286D to apply to those defendants who possess, within a school zone, quantities of drugs indicating an intent to distribute, even if it is clear that the defendant does
not intend to distribute the drugs within 1000 feet of a school. This
conclusion is bolstered by the New Jersey Supreme Court's construction of the NewJersey statute, which served as the model for the Maryland statute. In State v. Ivory,9 8 the New Jersey court held that the
statute applied to a defendant who possessed, within a school zone,
quantities of drugs indicating an intent to distribute even though he
clearly intended to distribute the drugs at a location outside the
school zone. 99
If the Court of Appeals construes section 286D to apply to those
defendants who clearly do not intend to distribute drugs within 1000
feet of a school, the application of section 286D may lead to undesirable results. As at least one federal district court has recognized,
To posit liability [when it is clear that a defendant had no
intent to distribute drugs within 1000 feet of a school] would
be to mandate charging a schoolhouse count every time defendants on trains, or any other means of transportation,
speed by a school on their way to a narcotics sale. 0 0
Applying section 286D in such situations ultimately might subvert its
purpose. The New Jersey Superior Court's decision in State v. Ogar is
illustrative. 0 1 In Ogar, the police had a tip that the defendant was
dealing drugs, and they set up surveillance.'0 2 When the defendant
left his location, the police followed him for two miles before stopping
him in front of a school.' 3 The defendant was charged and convicted
under the NewJersey schoolyard statute, and the NewJersey Supreme
97. Dawson, 329 Md. at 287, 619 A.2d at 117.
98. 592 A.2d 205(N.J. 1991).
99. Id. at 211. In State v. Ivory, the NewJersey Supreme Court upheld the application of
NewJersey's drug-free school zone statute to a defendant who was arrested while riding his
bike through a park that contained athletic fields used by schools. Id. The court stated:
The first step in determining whether [the NewJersey drug-free school zone
statute] has been violated is to see whether [New Jersey's general drug statute
proscribing possession with intent to distribute] has been violated. The latter provision does not necessitate that one be shown to intend to distribute within any
specific area ....
After the elements of that offense have been established, one
need only take out the tape measure to see if the [drug-free school zone statute]
has been violated.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See United States v. Coates, 739 F. Supp. 146, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
551 A.2d 1037 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
Id. at 1039.
Id.
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Court upheld the conviction.1" 4 Maryland courts should exercise caution before reaching a similar result. The enhanced penalties provided under the school zone statute create an incentive for police
departments to wait to arrest known drug dealers until they come
within 1000 feet of a school. The desire of police departments to exact stiffer penalties may subvert the intent of the legislature to protect
children from drugs and the violence associated with drug dealing.10 5
5. Conclusion.-In Dawson, the court precluded further substantive due process challenges to the Maryland drug-free school zone
statute by holding that the statute is rationally related to the General
Assembly's goal of protecting children from the direct and indirect
effects of drugs and drug dealing. The decision is not only notable for
this conclusion, but is also important because it indicates the Court of
Appeals's willingness to follow, in this area of the law, precedent established in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the broad language of the
Dawson opinion suggests that, in all probability, the court will reject
any constitutional challenge to the statute.
JAMIE

B.

M.

ALTER

Prohibition of Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges

In Tyler v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor
could not use peremptory challenges2 to exclude a person from jury
service because of that person's gender. In so holding, the court relied on state constitutional law' to justify extending the Supreme
Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky,4 which prohibits racially motivated peremptory challenges.
1. The Case.-On the afternoon of December 4, 1990, Jerry Samuel Tyler and Gerald Wynn Eiland encountered James Stanley Bias
104. Id. at 1042.
105. See State v. Regan, 564 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (Altenbern, J.,
concurring) (arguing that drug-free school zone statutes may induce police departments,
seeking to subject drug dealers to stiffer penalties, to conduct undercover operations in
school zones, potentially putting children at risk).
1. 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
2. "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
3. Tyler, 330 Md. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653; see also infra notes 14, 76-83 and accompanying text.
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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III at a mall.5 Tyler argued with Bias, and either Tyler or Eiland shot
Bias shortly afterwards. 6 At trial, the State used sixteen of its twenty
peremptory challenges to strike women from the jury pool.7 In attempting to explain why his use of peremptory challenges was not racially motivated, the prosecutor said that he simply wanted "more
men" on the jury.' The jury that was eventually seated convicted Eiland of second-degree murder and Tyler-the apparent triggermanof first-degree murder.9 Both defendants appealed their convictions,
arguing that the State used its peremptory challenges unconstitutionally to exclude women from the jury solely on the basis of gender."
Tyler also argued that the State's use of peremptory challenges was
racially discriminatory.11
The Court of Special Appeals upheld both convictions and declined to extend the Batson principle to gender. 2 The court also rejected Tyler's argument-based squarely on Batson-that the State's
challenges were racially motivated. 1" Reversing the intermediate
court's decision, the Court of Appeals held that Maryland constitutional law prohibits the State from discriminating on the basis of gender in the use of peremptory challenges. 4 The court remanded both

5. Eiland v. State, 92 Md. App. 56, 64, 607 A.2d 42, 46 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Tyler v.
State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
6. Id. at 64-66, 607 A.2d at 4647. James "Jay" Bias III was the younger brother of
former University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias. Id. at 62, 607 A.2d at 45. Len Bias
died of a cocaine overdose hours after being picked by the Boston Celtics in the National
Basketball Association's annual draft in 1986. Jon Jeter, Convictions in Jay Bias Homicide
Reversed, WASH. PosT, Apr. 28, 1993, at Al. The two brothers died in the same emergency
room. Id.
7. Eiland,92 Md. App. at 86, 607 A.2d at 57. Eleven were black women. Id. at 94, 607
A.2d at 61. The Court of Special Appeals conceded that the State had exercised its challenges against women at a rate 50% greater than random selection would predict, establishing an obvious pattern of gender discrimination. Id. at 87, 607 A.2d at 58. The record
did not disclose the makeup of the jury that was finally seated, but a newspaper account
indicated it included eight women and four men. Enrique J. Gonzales, Jurors Convict 2 in
Bias Murder, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 1991, at BI.
8. See Tyler, 330 Md. at 268, 623 A.2d at 652 ("As a general theory of the State's case,
the State wanted more men on this case, and wanted older as opposed to younger....").
9. Eiland 92 Md. App. at 62, 607 A.2d at 45. Both men were also convicted of handgun charges. Id., 607 A.2d at 45-46.
10. Id., 607 A.2d at 46.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 90-91, 607 A.2d at 59.
13. See id. at 96-97, 607 A.2d at 62. "A variety of non-racial reasons were given for [the
State's] strikes. The most frequently recurring reason was that the challenged jurors were
female." Id. at 96, 607 A.2d at 62.
14. Tyler, 330 Md. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653.
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cases, directing the trial court to vacate the judgments and to grant
new trials.'2. Legal Background.-At common law, women were excluded
from jury service because of the "defect of sex"-prpter defectus sexus. 16
Women gained the right to serve on juries in stages. First, in 1946, the
Supreme Court held that women could not be excluded from federal
juries sitting in states where women were eligible for jury service
under local law.1 7 States, however, still could exclude women from
juries" and, in 1948, fifteen did.' 9 Finally, in 1975, the Court held
that the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement 20 could
not be satisfied if women were systematically excluded as jurors.2 1 In
Tyler, the Court of Appeals addressed the next issue in this progression: whether prosecutors may exercise peremptory challenges to ex22
clude women systematically from service on a petit jury.

a. The History and Expansion of Batson.-Peremptory challenges have long been a prominent part of the American judicial sys15. Tyler, 330 Md. at 271, 623 A.2d at 653. At retrial, Jerry Tyler was convicted of firstdegree murder on March 23, 1994. Jon Jeter, Man Convicted Again in Bias Slaying, WASH.
Posr, Mar. 24, 1994, at B3. There were six women and six men on his jury. Jim Keary, Bias
Killer Convicted; Second Juy Finds Tyler First-DegreeMurderer,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at
CIO.
Gerald Eiland was acquitted on December 9, 1993. Eugene L. Meyer, DriverFound Not
Guilty in Bias Slaying Retrial Verdict Blasted by Irctim's Parents,WASH. Posr, Dec. 10, 1993, at
C1. Eiland'sjury was comprised of nine women and three men. Eugene L. Meyer, Retrial
Starts in Bias Slaying, WASH. PosT, Dec. 8, 1993, at D3.
16. 3 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1321-22 (William D. Lewis ed., 1922). Juries made up entirely of women were empaneled only when
the issue was whether or not a woman was pregnant. Id. at 1322.
17. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1946). The Court noted that men
and women "are not fungible" and that a "distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded"
from jury service. Id at 193, 194. "[I]f the shoe were on the other foot, who would claim
that a jury was truly representative of the community if all men were intentionally and
systematically excluded from the panel?" Id. at 193.
18. See id. at 190-91.
19. Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror,9 HAlv. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 61 n.6 (1986).
20. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . .trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
This right has been interpreted as requiring a jury venire that represents a fair cross-section of the community. See generally Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-28 (1975) (reviewing fair-cross-section cases).
21. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531. Before Taylor, a woman would not be selected for service in
Louisiana unless she filed a written declaration of her desire to serve. Id. at 523. Taylor
overruled Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), in which the Court upheld ajury selection
system virtually identical to Louisiana's. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533-37; see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a statute granting women an automatic exemption from jury service if they requested it).
22. Tyler, 330 Md. at 263, 623 A.2d at 649.
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tern. 23 Although they are not an enumerated constitutional right,2 4
they are viewed as an excellent means of assuring the selection of a
qualified and unbiased jury.2 5 They "eliminate extremes of partiality
on both sides, [and] assure the parties that the jurors before whom
they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before
them, and not otherwise. "26
The right of parties to exercise their peremptory challenges is not
unlimited. In Strauder v. West Virginia,17 the Supreme Court acknowledged for the first time that trying a black defendant before a jury
from which blacks have been purposefully excluded denies the defendant his right to equal protection.2" It, however, explicidy sanc29
tioned the right of states to exclude women.
The Court dealt specifically with the issue of discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama."° There, an all-white jury
convicted a black defendant of rape after the State struck all six black
potential jurors."1 In this situation, the Court held that a prosecutor
violates the Equal Protection Clause only when "in case after case,
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be," he removes blacks peremptorily "with
the result that no [blacks] ever serve on petit juries."3 2 Thus, Swain
placed a harsh burden on defendants by requiring that they show not
only that the prosecution excluded all potential jurors of a particular
race at their trials, but also that it consistently had done the same in
past trials.33
23. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-19 (1965) (reviewing the historical
credentials of the peremptory challenge system).
24. Id. at 219.
25. See id. (noting the "long and widely held belief that the peremptory challenge is a
necessary part of trial by jury").
26. Id.
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
28. Id. at 305, 309. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
29. See Strauder,100 U.S. at 310 ("[A state] may confine the selection [ofjurorsl to males
30. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
31. Id. at 210. The jury was also all-male because Alabama law at the time only allowed
"male citizens . . . over 21 who are reputed to be honest ... and are esteemed for their
integrity" to be eligible for jury duty. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). Alabama was one of
three states still excluding women in the early 1960s. Weisbrod, supra note 19, at 61 n.7.
32. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
33. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 n.17 (1986) (noting that state courts
have found the burden "most difficult" and sometimes "insurmountable"); Stanley v. State,
313 Md. 50, 56, 542 A.2d 1267, 1269 (1988) ("For more than twenty years, Swain essentially
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The Court eased the burden on defendants in Batson v. Kentucky.3 4 Under Batson, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
can be established "solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial."5 After the defendant establishes his prima facie case, 6 the burden shifts to the
State to give a racially neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.3 7 The explanation need not "rise to the level justifying" challenges for cause, 8 but the State cannot effectively rebut by "stating
merely that [it] challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or [its] intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to
the defendant because of their shared race." 9 Similarly, a simple denial of discriminatory motive or affirmation of good faith by the prosecutor does not constitute effective rebuttal.4 ° Recognizing that the
use of discriminatory peremptory challenges harms defendants and
excluded venirepersons, undermines public confidence in the judicial
system, and stimulates community prejudices,4 1 the Court announced
that ajuror's fitness depends on "an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a
trial."

42

Since Batson, the Supreme Court has steadily extended the scope
of its holding. It has held that states cannot exclude black jurors on
the basis of race in the trial of a white defendant; 43 that states cannot
44
peremptorily challenge potential jurors on the basis of ethnicity;
that private litigants in a civil action cannot exercise peremptory chalforeclosed . . . the establishment of a violation of the equal protection clause given an
apparently racially motivated exercise of a prosecutor's peremptory challenges.").
34. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
36. To do so, the defendant must show that he belongs to a "cognizable racial group"
and that the prosecutor has removed members of defendant's race from the venire peremptorily. Id. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), effectively eliminated this requirement. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
37. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79, 97.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 98. This part of the holding undermines Swain's "presumption in any particular case.., that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965).
41. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87-88.
42. Id. at 87.
43. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a white defendant could object
to the State's use of seven peremptory challenges against blacks).
44. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons for striking two Hispanic venirepersons when
he stated he doubted their ability to defer to the official translation of Spanish testimony).
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lenges in a racially discriminatory manner;4 5 and that criminal defendants cannot exercise peremptory challenges based solely on race.4 6
b. Batson in Maryland.-The Court of Appeals examined
the impact of Batson on Maryland procedure in Stanley v. State.47 In
Maryland, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the State used peremptory challenges discriminatorily.4" In order
to effectively rebut the defendant's claim, the State must articulate a
reason that is not only racially neutral, but "related to the case to be
tried, clear and reasonably specific, and legitimate."4 9 In addition, the
Stanley court held that "[anyviolation requires a new50trial;" "the State
will not be allowed 'one free discriminatory strike.'"
Applying these principles, the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction in Tolbert v. State5 ' because the State had not articulated racially
neutral reasons for challenging four black women. 52 It declined, however, to reach the question of whether Batson extends to gender-based
peremptory challenges.5 3
c. Conflict Among the Courts.-Many state courts and several
federal Courts of Appeals have examined the issue of gender-based
peremptory challenges. The decisions and their rationales have not
been uniform.
45. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (holding that because
the use of peremptory challenges in a civil suit is a form of state action, civil parties cannot
use them discriminatorily).
46. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that a criminal defendant's
use of peremptory challenges constitutes state action and thus cannot be exercised on the
basis of race).
47. 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988).
48. Id. at 71, 542 A.2d 1277. Defendants Stanley and Trice both established prima facie
cases of racially based use of peremptory challenges. In Stanley's case, the State used 80%
of its peremptories to exclude blacks, who made up less than 25% of the venire, although
they constituted roughly 50% of the forum county's population. Id. at 65, 72, 542 A.2d at
1274, 1278. The court emphasized that only two of the excluded blacks spoke during voir
dire and that their answers did not make either a "clear choice" for challenge. Id. at 73,
542 A.2d at 1278. In Trice's case, the State struck the only black venire person. Id. at 8182, 542 A.2d at 1281. The court held that "total elimination establishes a prima facie case
requiring explanations from the prosecution." Id. at 85, 542 A.2d at 1284.
49. Id. at 78, 542 A.2d at 1280.
50. Id. at 93, 542 A.2d at 1288.
51. 315 Md. 13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989).
52. Id. at 23, 553 A.2d at 232. The prosecutor indicated he was trying to strike "young
women," yet one of the black women he struck was 38 and the other was 54. Id. at 23, 553
A.2d at 232. Two women in their twenties were seated, the alternate juror was a 24-year-old
female, and the prosecutor struck only the youngest female on the panel, a 23-year-old. Id.
at 22, 553 A.2d at 232.
53. Id. at 23 n.7, 553 A.2d at 232 n.7.
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In United States v. Hamilton,5 4 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected the argument that gender discrimination in the use of
peremptory challenges violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.55 It held that gender, not race, motivated the State's challenges in the case" and declined to extend Batson to women. 7 The
Seventh Circuit has also limited Batson to race.5" In United States v.
Nichols, it held that the government's explanation for striking three
black women was racially neutral and that the court did not have to
consider gender.5 9 The Fifth Circuit also has ruled that Batson does
not extend to women.' It declared in 1993 that "striking women ...
for the sole reason of their sex is nigh pointless because it cannot
succeed except in isolated cases" in eliminating women from juries.6 1
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has extended Batson to
gender. In United States v. De Gross,6" the court held that in order for
gender discrimination to be constitutionally permissible, it must be
"substantially related to the achievement of important governmental
objectives. "63 The use of peremptory strikes constitutes an important
54. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
55. Id. Hamilton illustrates the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes on black
women. Black women are at the greatest risk of exclusion from jury service because gen-

der is a tolerated pretext for racial discrimination. The government used seven of its eight
peremptory challenges to strike blacks in the case. Id. at 1041. Six of those struck were
black women. Id. at 1043 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
In his dissent, Judge Murnaghan dismissed the argument that the State struck the
women because of their age, finding it "completely wanting in rationality or validity because only black women were struck while no white women were." Id. (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the disproportionate striking of black women in Tyler, see supra note 7.
56. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1041.
57. See id. at 1042 ("[T]here is no evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court would
apply normal equal protection principles to the unique situation involving peremptory
challenges.").
58. United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989
(1992).
59. Id. at 1262.
60. United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the trial
court's refusal to dismiss two female jurors peremptorily challenged by the defendant was
reversible error).
61. Id.

62. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
63. Id. at 1439. The Supreme Court first articulated the heightened scrutiny test for
quasi-suspect classifications such as gender in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In
Craig, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited the sale of 3.2% alcohol
beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18. The Court stated that
in order to withstand constitutional challenge, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 197. The Court modified the test slightly in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), in which it held that the policy of a state-supported
university limiting enrollment to women violated the Equal Protection Clause. In Hogan,
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governmental objective because it is necessary to assure the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury.64 According to the court, striking potential jurors for gender alone can be based only on "the false
assumption that members of certain groups are unable to consider
impartially the case against a member or a nonmember of their
group. "65 Thus, the court concluded that such a strike does not aid in
achieving an impartial jury and is not rationally related to that end.6 6
Several state courts have employed state constitutional provisions
regarding gender discrimination to expand Batson's scope. Five states
have relied either partially or wholly on their state constitutions to
67
extend Batson protections to gender-based peremptory challenges.
Other state courts have held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal Constitution prohibits such challenges. 6
Five states have declined to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges. Two of those states held that they would not extend Batson to gender until the highest state court or the United
States Supreme Court ruled on the issue.6" The others limited Batson
to its facts and held it applicable only to claims alleging race discrimination. 70 Three other states have considered the issue but have left it
undecided.7 1
the Court held that proponents of gender classifications must meet the burden of "showing at least that the classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.'" Id. at 724 (citations omitted).
The test for racial classifications is stricter. In order to survive a challenge based on
the Equal Protection Clause, a racial classification "must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary ... to the accomplishment' of [its] legitimate
purpose." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (citations omitted) (holding that
child custody decisions cannot take into consideration the effects of racial prejudice).
64. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Di Donato v. Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Levinson, 795
P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 568 N.E.2d 1148 (Mass. 1991); State v.
Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1991); State v. Burch,
830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
68. See, e.g., People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1990); City of Mandan v.
Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993).
69. See Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
315 (1991); Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
70. State v. Morgan, 553 So. 2d 1012 (La. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 558 So. 2d 600
(La. 1990); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867
(R.I. 1987).
71. People v. Mitchell, 593 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), vacated in part, affd in part,
614 N.E.2d 1213 (Ill. 1993); State v. Pullen, 843 S.W.2d 360 (Mo. 1992) (en banc), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 200 (1993); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied,
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Tyler, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Maryland constitutional law prohibits the State from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on the basis of
gender. 72 In so holding, it first examined the Batson Court's application of strict scrutiny in judging allegations of illegal racial discrimination in jury selection. 7' Noting that the Supreme Court had not yet
extended the Batson rationale to gender discrimination, the court
turned to a consideration of state law.7 4
Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal
protection clause, the court has interpreted Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights 75 as applying "'in like manner and to the same extent as
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. "'76 Consequently, Supreme Court decisions regarding the Fourteenth Amendment provide virtually direct authority to the Maryland courts in
interpreting the equal protection component of Article 24. 77 In addition, the court pointed to Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA),78 which mandates "'equality of rights under the law and
render[s] state-sanctioned sex-based classifications suspect."' 79 The
court held that state action encouraging gender-based classifications
without substantial justification violates the ERA just as similar racebased classifications violate the Fourteenth Amendment.80 In other
words, in Maryland, "'gender-based classifications are suspect and are
subject to strict scrutiny."'8 1 Article 24, in combination with the ERA,
extends the Batson holding to include gender."2 Thus, the court held
72. Tyler, 330 Md. at 266, 623 A.2d at 651.
73. Id. at 263-64, 623 A.2d at 649-50.
74. Id. at 264, 623 A.2d at 650.
75. Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights states: "[N]o man ought to be taken or
imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of
his peers, or by the Law of the land." MD. CONST. DECL. Or RTs. art. 24.
76. Tyler, 330 Md. at 264, 623 A.2d at 650 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md.
683, 704, 426 A.2d 929, 941 (1981)).
77. Id. at 265, 623 A.2d at 650.
78. The Equal Rights Amendment appears in Article 46 of the Declaration of Rights
and provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of
sex." MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.

79. Tyler, 330 Md. at 265, 623 A.2d at 650 (quoting State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc.,
315 Md. 254, 269, 554 A.2d 366, 374, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 266, 623 A.2d at 651 (quoting Briscoe v. Prince George's County Health
Dep't, 323 Md. 439, 452 n.7, 593 A.2d 1109, 1115 n.7 (1991)). Maryland scrutinizes gender-based discrimination more closely than the Supreme Court. See supra note 63 (describing the analysis the Supreme Court uses on race-based and gender-based classifications).
82. Tyler, 330 Md. at 270, 623 A.2d at 653.
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that the State may not exercise peremptory challenges at trial in a way
that discriminates against women. 3
The court did not remand the case to permit the State to rebut
the defendants' prima facie case of gender discrimination. 4 Instead,
it found that since the State already had admitted using its peremptories to secure more male jurors, it essentially had admitted to striking
women "simply because of their sex."8 5 Thus, it had forfeited the opportunity to explain its use of the peremptory challenges on a genderneutral basis.8 6
In a brief dissent, Judges McAuliffe, Rodowsky and Karwacki argued that the Court of Special Appeals properly decided the case.8 7
The intermediate court attempted to reconcile the broad sweep of the
Equal Protection Clause with the Supreme Court's "repeated protestations" that peremptory challenges retained their peremptory nature,
even after the expansion of the Batson line of cases. 88 The lower court
was not "persuaded that the glare of equal protection should properly
focus upon the use of peremptory challenges in the context of a single
case."89 It took a conservative view of Batson and held that the Swain
standard of systematic bias shown over the course of many cases was
the appropriate standard for reviewing gender bias injury selection. 90
83. Id. at 263, 623 A.2d at 649. The Court of Appeals could have based its opinion
solely on state statutory law. Section 8-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
provides that a "citizen may not be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror... on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." MD. CODE ANN.,
CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 8-103 (1989) (emphasis added). The court might also have ruled on
§ 8-210(d), which states that "[n]o person or class of person may be disqualified, excused,
or exempted from service as ajuror except under this section or § 8-209." MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 8-210 (1989) (exempting military personnel and persons 70 years old
or older who have requested an exemption from service). Maryland courts have used this
statute's unambiguous language to prohibit disqualifications based on the potential juror's
beliefs or group membership. SeeKing v. State, 287 Md. 530, 414 A.2d 909 (1980) (holding
that a juror's belief that a marijuana law should be changed did not disqualify him from
jury service); Hopkins v. State, 24 Md. App. 53, 329 A.2d 738 (1974) (holding that a potential juror's status as a police officer did not demonstrate bias that required disqualification). The plain meaning of the statute similarly could be read to prohibit the exclusion of
any cognizable group, such as women, from petit juries.
84. Tyler, 330 Md. at 271, 623 A.2d at 653. The court has remanded to allow prosecutors to explain their use of peremptory challenges against black venirepersons. See State v.
Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991) (holding that the State never had the chance
to rebut the defendant's prima facie case of racial discrimination in jury selection).
85. Tyler, 330 Md. at 268, 623 A.2d at 652.
86. Id. at 271, 623 A.2d at 653.
87. Id. at 272, 623 A.2d at 654 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
88. Eiland v. State, 92 Md. App. 56, 88, 607 A.2d 42, 58 (1992), rev'd sub nom. Tyler v.
State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993).
89. Id. at 91, 607 A.2d at 59-60.
90. Id., 607 A.2d at 60.
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It insisted that Batson had never been a part of Maryland state law and
found no "Maryland law that [the facts of the case] could violate."9 1
4. Analysis.-In Batson, the Court did not indicate whether its
holding applied to groups other than blacks.9 2 Its focus, rather, was
on eliminating invidious discrimination against blacks and their historical exclusion from jury service. 93 Nothing in Batson, however, restricts its ruling to suspect classes or groups that receive strict scrutiny
analysis. Consequently, its protections arguably extend to other
groups that have suffered invidious discrimination. In Tyler, the Court
of Appeals decided that the ERA's mandate that gender classifications
be strictly scrutinized placed gender within the orbit of Batson.94 Because, like blacks, women historically have been the victims of invidious discrimination,9 5 the court's decision is defensible.
Even if Batson's reach is restricted to suspect classifications, Maryland's ERA case law would require that in Maryland, at least, gender
fall under the rationale of Batson.an Prior to Tyler, the Court of Ap91. Id. at 94, 607 A.2d at 61.
92. Courts declining to extend Batson to gender have given great weight to this fact.
See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[Ifthe Supreme
Court... had desired, it could have.., prohibited the exercise of the challenges on the
basis of race, gender, age or other group classification."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990);
Hannan v. Commonwealth, 774 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (stressing that Batson
"discusses the equal protection safeguards only in terms of racial discrimination"). But see
United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("We believe
that there is no more significance to that language than the fact that the case involved
peremptory strikes against black venirepersons. Batson's rationale applies equally well to
gender-based peremptory strikes.").
The Batson Court's statement that "the State's privilege to strike individual jurors
through peremptory challenges ... is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection
Clause," Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986), indicates that the Batson holding is not
limited to race alone and should logically extend to any class covered by the Equal Protection Clause.
93. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87.
94. Tyler, 330 Md. at 266, 623 A.2d at 653.
95. The Supreme Court has discussed at length the history of sexual discrimination:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage.... As a result of notions [that a woman's role was as wife
and mother], our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped
distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century
the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names .... And although blacks
were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that right...
until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (citations omitted).
96. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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peals declared that any state-backed distinction between men and women must be "narrowly tailored and precisely limited" in order to
achieve a compelling government interest.9 7 The use of impartial juries is one such interest, but challenges explainable only on the basis
of gender are not substantially related to achieving that end. They are
based solely on the impermissible assumption that women are partial.98 In Tyler, the defense established by a preponderance of the evidence that the State had used peremptory challenges to exclude
women from the jury solely because of their gender. 99
The State, on the other hand, argued that gender-based peremptory challenges are acceptable because women are not, as a rule, tried
in front of all-male juries.1 0 This argument ignores the principle that
even one discriminatory strike is erroneous and implies that gender
discrimination is not objectionable unless women are entirely eliminated from juries. On the contrary, any discriminatory use of peremptories "contaminate [s] ...public confidence in ajudicial process
that condones systematic, blatant gander discrimination in the selection of juries. ' 101
The Court of Special Appeals indicated that the use of peremptory challenges more likely reflects trial strategy than systematic oppression."' The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed any notion
that the State could proffer a gender-neutral reason for peremptorily
striking women after admitting an intention to get more men on the
jury. In fact, the court castigated the prosecutor for his trial tactics:
"From his own mouth, it is patent that his attempts to exclude women
were simply that he believed that he had a better chance to obtain
97. State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 296, 554 A.2d 366, 387, cert. denied,

493 U.S. 816 (1989).
98. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86, 89 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
that potential jurors will not be excluded based on a false assumption that they are unqualified or partial); see also Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 ("[W]hat differentiates sex from... nonsuspect statuses . . . and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that [gender]
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.").
99. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
100. Brief of Respondent at 14.
101. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739, 748 (N.D. 1993). The court also asserted
that ignoring the rationale of Batson in claims of gender discrimination in peremptory
challenges "would make that conduct not only systematic, but also systemic." Id.
102. Eiland v. State, 92 Md. App. 56, 91-92, 607 A.2d 42, 60 (1992) (stating that "today's
target group may be tomorrow's favored group with random interchangeability"), revd sub
noma.
Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993). Similarly, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly reasoned that "if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, it is
a willing participant in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our
system of justice-our citizens' confidence in it." Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348,
2354 (1992).
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guilty verdicts from a jury composed of men (preferably older men)
than one composed of women (particularly young women)."t°3
Thus, it is possible that, as a result of Tyler, every strike of a female
venireperson will be claimed to be suspect. Parties might also argue
that the court prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to exclude
men and women. 10 4 As the number of Batson inquiries increases, the
nature and purpose of peremptory challenges may be constructively
eliminated. The attack on the peremptory challenge in Maryland already has been particularly potent; state law has prohibited its use to
exclude not only blacks and women, but also Hispanics' 015 and
10 6
whites.

Even the United States Supreme Court has not escaped the issue;
it will decide this Term whether the Equal Protection Clause covers
gender-based challenges. It recently heard arguments on the issue in
JE.B. v. T.B. 0 7 Although the Court might hold that Batson extends to
gender, four Supreme Court Justices have expressed concern about
the extension of Batson and the consequent erosion of peremptory
challenges. 108
103. Tyler, 330 Md. at 271, 623 A.2d at 653.
104. Although the Tyler court only discussed women, the ERA has been used to strike
down laws discriminating against men. See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900
(1977) (holding that a father is no longer primarily responsible for the support of his
minor children); Coleman v. State, 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977) (holding a
statute making it a crime for a man to desert his wife unconstitutional).
105. Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992) (holding that the removal of the
only Hispanic in the jury venire established a prima facie case of discrimination).
106. Gilchrist v. State, 97 Md. App. 55, 627 A.2d 44 (1993) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause prevents defendants from exercising peremptory challenges to exclude
white venirepersons).
107. 606 So. 2d 156, 156-57 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals ruled against the petitioner, who asserted that the
State improperly used its peremptory strikes to exclude men from the jury in a paternity
suit. Id. The State managed to seat 12 women after using 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes
against men. Court Considers ProhibitingJury Selection Based on Sex, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1993, at A4. Petitioner struck 10 women and the last man in the venire. Id. The jurors
found thatJ.E.B. was the father of T.B.'s child, and the court ordered him to pay child
support. Id.
108. In 1991,Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia dissented in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), which extended peremptory challenges to civil
litigants. Scalia wrote a separate dissent indicating he would hold that sex is an appropriate basis for the use of a peremptory challenge. Id. at 2095-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor has written elsewhere that a peremptory strike would violate Batson "only if
the prosecutor struck a juror because of the juror's race." Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct.
1859, 1874 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S.
940, 942 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) ("Outside the uniquely
sensitive area of race the ordinary rule that a prosecutor may strike a juror without giving
any reason applies."). Justice Thomas's concurrence in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992), also advised against using the Constitution to limit the discretionary use of
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5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals has made clear in Tyler
that selecting jurors in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner is a compelling state interest, far more compelling than winning a case with
suspect or questionable trial tactics. Like several other states and at
least one federal circuit court, the court extended Batson to gender.
Because the Tyler decision was based on well-settled Maryland law, its
prohibition against gender-based peremptory challenges should withstand attack, regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on the
issue.09
JESSICA COLLINS

C. Discriminationin the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges: Proving
Ethnic Identity of Excluded Jurors
In Mejia v. State,1 the Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant successfully presented, under the authority of Batson v. Kentucky, ' a prima facie challenge against the prosecutor's use of a
peremptory strike to exclude the only Hispanic venireperson from the
jury in his trial.' The court held that the defendant, alleging a discriminatory motive behind the strike, did not need to present substantive evidence that the excluded venireperson was the only member of
a cognizable group because the record reflected an agreement between the parties as to this fact.4 The court also held that the prosecuperemptory challenges. Thomas warned, "Next will come the question of whether defendants may exercise peremptories on the basis of sex." Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., concurring).
109. The Supreme Court decided JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. on April 19, 1994, after
the writing of this case note. In a 6-3 decision, which cited Tyler, the Court extended Batson
to gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 1994 WL 132232 (U.S.), *2 & n.1. The Court
held, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, that gender-based peremptory challenges violate
the Equal Protection Clause "particularly where... the discrimination serves to ratify and
perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men
and women." Id. at *2. The Court also stressed that the decision does not "imply the
elimination of all peremptory challenges." Id. at *7.
Five justices joined the opinion of the Court, including Justice O'Connor, who also
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, writing a separate
opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissented in two opinions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the biological and experimental differences between
men and women make gender-based peremptory challenges "not the sort of derogatory
and invidious act" that race-based peremptories are. Id. at *14. Justice Scalia wrote that
there was no denial of equal protection nor was there any injury to the defendant. Id. at
*15.
1. 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. See Mejia, 328 Md. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
4. Id.
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tor's effective elimination of an entire ethnic group from the jury5 was
enough to constitute the defendant's prima facie case and shift the
burden to the State to offer a neutral, nondiscriminatory explanation
for its strike.6 In so holding, the court eased the burden on defendants in raising Batson objections and limited the required litigation
over such objections to matters in dispute.
1. The Case.--On January 7, 1991, jury voir dire began in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County in the trial of Ivan Antonio
Mejia, a man of Hispanic background charged with rape and related
sexual offenses. 7 Early in the voir dire proceedings, when the defendant's counsel noted his failure to submit a question regarding whether
any venirepersons spoke Spanish,' the trial judge agreed to ask
whether the venirepersons would be prejudiced by the defendant's
need for an interpreter.9 Later in the proceedings, when a venireperson named Peter Estrada answered a question regarding legal training, 10 the defendant's counsel noted for the record that Estrada
appeared to be the only Hispanic venireperson.1 1 Still later, the judge
again asked the venirepersons whether they were prejudiced by the
defendant's need for an interpreter and also whether they spoke
Spanish. 2 Estrada responded that he spoke Spanish."
5. Id.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 539-41, 616 A.2d at 364-65.
Id. at 525-26, 616 A.2d at 357.
Id. at 526, 616 A.2d at 357.
Id., 616 A.2d at 357-58.
Id., 616 A.2d at 358.
Id. The dialogue was as follows:
[Defendant's Counsel]: As far as I can tell, I noticed that that is the onlyjuror
with a[n] Hispanic background. I wanted to note that for the record in terms of
jury strikes later that Mr. Estrada, as far as I can tell, is the only juror with an
Hispanic background.
THE COURT: You noticed that?
[Defendant's Counsel]: I don't know what will come of it, but Ijust wanted to
mention it.

Id.

12. Id. at 527, 616 A.2d at 358. The judge referred to the situation as the "Hispanic
problem." Id.
13. Id. The record reads: "THE COURT: Does anyone here speak and understand
Spanish? Mr. Estrada?" Id. The Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the record. It
operated under the assumption that because no prospective juror affirmatively stated that
he or she spoke or understood Spanish, that none in fact did. Mejia v. State, 90 Md. App.
31, 45, 599 A.2d 1207, 1214 (1992), rev'd, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992). On appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the State did not object to the defendant's proffer that Estrada stood in response to the trial judge's question and that the judge acknowledged his
affirmative response by calling his name. Mejia, 328 Md. at 527 n.2, 616 A.2d at 358 n.2.
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During the empaneling of the jury, the State peremptorily struck
Estrada.1 4 The defendant's counsel immediately requested a bench
conference and objected to the strike as discriminatory' 5 under Batson
v. Kentucky, 6 noting that Estrada appeared to be the only Hispanic
venireperson in the fifty-person panel.17 Thejudge overruled the objection without any further inquiry and without asking for a response
from the State."8 The trial proceeded, and the defendant was convicted of attempted rape in the second degree and a second degree
sexual offense.' 9
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the defendant again
argued that the State's peremptory strike was based on the venireperson's ethnicity.2 ° Ruling that the defendant had not established a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson, the court
affirmed the conviction. 2 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
consider what proof a criminal defendant must produce to make a
Batson objection alleging unlawful discrimination.2 2
2. Legal Background.-For more than a century, the Supreme
Court has dedicated itself to the elimination of racial discrimination
in jury selection. The first such case was Strauder v. West Virginia23 in
1879, in which the Court struck down, under the Equal Protection
Clause of the recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment,2 4 a West Virginia statute allowing only white males to serve as jurors.2 5 The Court
held that denying otherwise qualified black individuals the right to
"participate in the administration of the law"26 constituted "a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to
14. Meiia, 328 Md. at 527, 616 A.2d at 358.
15. Id. at 528, 616 A.2d at 358-59.
16. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
17. Mejia, 328 Md. at 528, 616 A.2d at 359. The defendant's counsel also noted that
the defendant was Hispanic and his alleged rape victim was white. Id., 616 A.2d at 358-59.
18. Id., 616 A.2d at 359.
19. Id. at 525, 616 A.2d at 357.
20. See Mejia v. State, 90 Md. App. 31, 34, 599 A.2d 1207, 1209, rev'd, 328 Md. 522, 616
A.2d 356 (1992).
21. Id. at 40, 599 A.2d at 1211.
22. Mejia, 328 Md. at 525, 616 A.2d at 357.
23. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The case concerned the murder conviction of a black man
who was indicted by an all-white grand jury and convicted by an all-whitejury. Id. at 304-05.
24. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment, which was enacted in 1868, reads
in relevant part, "No State shall .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
25. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
26. Id. at 308.
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race that equal justice which the law aims to secure
individuals of2the
7
others."
to all
In 1965, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time a racial
discrimination challenge to a prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes
in Swain v. Alabama.2" The Swain Court recognized that purposeful
discrimination against blacks injury selection violated the Equal Protection Clause, 29 but held that a criminal defendant could not object
to a prosecutor's peremptory strikes with evidence from his trial
alone."0 Rather, the Court determined that a defendant must show 31a
cases,
pattern of discriminatory peremptory strikes over a number of
32
bear.
to
defendants
criminal
an extremely tough burden for
This "crippling burden of proof' 33 imposed on criminal defendants was substantially reduced by the Court's 1986 holding in Batson v.
Kentucky.3 a Reaffirming that a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
35
strikes is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,
the Batson Court held that a defendant could raise a prima facie challenge against a prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory strikes
with evidence of strikes solely from the defendant's trial.3 6 The Batson
Court held that in order to establish such a prima facie showing, the
defense must first show that the defendant is a member of a cogniza-

27. Id. Under authority of the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), the Court
stated that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to secure the rights of the
recently emancipated black race. Strauder,100 U.S. at 306-07. Thus, the StrauderCourt's
holding was limited to the protection of blacks. Id. at 310 ("Any State action that denies
[legal protection of life, liberty, or property] to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution."). In fact, the Court expressly stated that a state was still free to confine jury selection to "males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons
having educational qualifications." Id.
28. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
29. Id. at 203-04.
30. Id. at 221 ("[WIe cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a
denial of equal protection of the laws.").
31. Id. at 227 ("[T]he defendant must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time."). The Court
reasoned that in light of the valued and historic purpose of peremptory strikes, the prosecution was entitled to a presumption that it used its strikes to obtain a fair and impartial
jury. Id. at 222. This presumption could not be overcome from evidence of strikes in any
single case. Id.
32. In Swain, even a showing that no black person had served on a petit jury in the
county for approximately 15 years was insufficient to prove the prosecution's pattern of
discriminatory peremptory strikes because the defendant did not prove with particularity
the precise circumstances of how prosecutors were responsible for striking black venirepersons from the jury panels. Id. at 226.
33. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
34. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35. Id. at 89.
36. Id. at 96.
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ble racial group and that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to
remove members of the defendant's race from the venire.1 7 The defendant must then show that the facts and circumstances give rise to
an inference that the prosecution used its strikes to exclude individual
venirepersons solely on account of their race."8 At this point, the trial
judge makes a determination as to whether the defendant has made
the requisite prima facie showing. 9 If so, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the
venirepersons in question.4" The trial judge then determines whether
the defendant successfully established purposeful discrimination by
the prosecution. 4
Since the 1986 holding, the Batson doctrine has been subject to
significant expansion. Although Swain and Batson involved challenges
by black defendants, courts have applied the doctrine to a broad array
of racial and ethnic groups.4 2 Courts are split on whether Batson
should apply to gender-based classifications.4" The Supreme Court
added to the doctrine's expansion in the 1990s. In Powers v. Ohio,4 4
the Court held that an individual presenting a Batson objection need
not show that he and the excluded jurors are of the same race.4" Fur37. Id.
38. Id. The Court also stated that "the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to
which there can be little dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection
practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
39. Id. at 96-97.
40. Id. at 97. The Court noted that the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's claim
by merely stating that the venirepersons were challenged based on the assumption that
jurors would be partial to members of their own race. Id. Nor may the rebuttal merely
consist of a general denial of a discriminatory motive or a general affirmance of the prosecutor's good faith in selecting jurors. Id. at 98. Rather, the prosecutor must "articulate a
neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Id.
41. Id. at 98.
42. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (assuming, but not holding,
that Batson applied to Hispanics); Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1989)
(whites); United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988) (Italian Americans); United
States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987) (Native Americans); Commonwealth v.
Gagnon, 449 N.E.2d 686 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (French Canadians).
43. Since the Mejia holding, the Court of Appeals extended the Batson holding to women in Tyler v. State, 330 Md. 261, 623 A.2d 648 (1993). For an in-depth discussion of
Tyler and the split among state and federal courts on the extension of Batson to encompass
gender-based classifications, see Jessica Collins, Note, Prohibition of Gender-BasedPeremptmy
Challenges, Developments in Maryland Law, 1992-93, 53 MD. L. REv. 683 (1994).
44. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
45. Id. at 415. The defendant, a white man charged with aggravated murder and other
offenses, objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to exclude seven black
venirepersons. Id. at 403. In upholding the defendant's claim, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from peremptorily striking any otherwise
qualified venireperson solely on account of race. Id. at 409. A defendant raising a Batson
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thermore, although Batson was limited to alleged discrimination by
criminal prosecutors, subsequent cases have extended the prohibition
against discriminatory use of peremptory strikes to litigants in civil
suits 4 6 and to criminal defendants.4 7 Thus, no parties in either civil or
criminal trials may discriminate on the basis of race in the use of peremptory strikes, and any party may raise a Batson-type objection.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In holding that Mejia successfully
presented a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the
Court of Appeals addressed the question of the proof required to establish that a defendant and excluded venirepersons are of cognizable
ethnic groups. Although the Court of Special Appeals spent considerable effort exploring what "Hispanic" means,4" whether the defendant
and stricken venireperson were shown to be Hispanic,4 9 and whether
the rest of the venire panel were shown not to be Hispanic,5 0 the
Court of Appeals recognized simply that Hispanics are clearly a cogni-

objection has standing as a third party to assert the equal protection rights of such excluded venirepersons. Id. at 415. Thus, the Court focused on the violation of the equal
protection rights of the excluded juror, not of the defendant. See id. at 409-10.
46. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). In addition to
holding, as did the Powers Court, see supra note 45, that race-based peremptory strikes violate the equal protection rights of prospective jurors, Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080, and that
the party contesting an opponent's use of peremptory strikes may raise the constitutional
claim on behalf of the excluded venireperson, id. at 2087, the Edmonson Court held that a
private litigant's exercise of peremptory strikes in effect constitutes state action because it
concerns the exercise of a right having its source in state law. Id. at 2082-83 (citing Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). Thus, the court determined that a
private party can be described in all fairness as a state actor. Id. at 2083. The private
litigant exercising peremptory strikes makes extensive use of state procedures with the
.overt, significant assistance of state officials." Id. at 2084 (quoting Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)). Furthermore, the exercise of peremptory strikes involves a traditional function of the government, since the strike is used to
select a jury, an entity that is essentially a governmental body. Id. at 2085.
47. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). The Court held that a defendant's
exercise of peremptory strikes constitutes state action for the reasons discussed in Edmonson, see supra note 46, even though the defendant stands in opposition to the government.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-57. The defendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial are not
violated because "it is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to
discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race." Id. at 2358.
48. Mejia v. State, 90 Md. App. 31, 43-44, 599 A.2d 1207, 1213, rev'd, 328 Md. 522, 616
A.2d 356 (1992).
49. Id. at 44-45, 599 A.2d at 1213-14. The court properly noted, however, that under
Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), it was not essential that Mejia show that he was
Hispanic because it is no longer required that the defendant and the excluded juror be of
the same race. Mejia, 90 Md. App. at 45, 599 A.2d at 1214. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Powers).
50. Mejia, 90 Md. App. at 46-47, 599 A.2d at 1214-15.
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zable group 51 and refused to address the substantive evidence regarding the individuals' ethnicity. It stated that whether an individual is a
member of a cognizable group is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of the circumstances,5 2 but was convinced from the
record that the stricken venireperson was Hispanic and that he was
the only Hispanic on the venire. 53 The defendant's counsel had specifically noted for the record that the stricken venireperson was the
only venireperson with a Hispanic background,5 4 and the State did
not object to the defense's observation or make any observation of its
own.

55

According to the Mejia court, it is not determinative whether the
individuals are shown by substantive evidence to be members of a cognizable ethnic group.5 6 Rather, the common belief of the parties and
the trial court is enough to support this element of the required
prima facie showing.57 Moreover, the moving party's claim that an

individual is a member of such a group may be inferred from such
factors as visual observations, surnames, or language.5 8 If there is disagreement, the opposing party is required to respond accordingly.5 9 If
it fails to do so, the opposing party may be deemed to be in
60
agreement.

51. Mejia, 328 Md. at 530, 537, 616 A.2d at 359-60, 363 (citing Hernandez v. New York,
111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)).
52. Id. at 534, 616 A.2d at 361.
53. Id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
54. Id. at 537, 616 A.2d at 363; see supra note 11.
55. Mejia, 328 Md. at 538, 616 A.2d at 363-64.
56. Id. at 534, 616 A.2d at 362 ("Group membership is not always proven by specific
and tangible evidence.").
57. See id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364 ("We conclude that, where, as here, neither the State
nor the court expressed any disagreement with the petitioner's proffer of the preliminary
fact that a venireperson was the only Hispanic in the venire, a prima facie showing of that
fact was made."). The Mejia court also noted that considerations of judicial economy require that courts not conduct full evidentiary hearings on questions of race which may not
be in dispute. Id. at 538, 616 A.2d at 364; see also Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d
1267 (1988) (not requiring evidence of the race of excluded venirepersons when the parties were in agreement as to their race). But see United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992) (rejecting the defendant's Batson objection because the defendant did not sufficiently establish the Hispanic identity of the
stricken venirepersons).
58. Mejia, 328 Md. at 535, 616 A.2d at 362. The moving party should state with particularity the bases for its conclusion, giving the opposing party an opportunity to make similar
observations and respond to the movant's contention. Id. at 535 n.8, 616 A.2d 362 n.8.
59. Id. at 536, 616 A.2d at 362.
60. Id. at 535-36, 616 A.2d at 362. Without a response, the moving party may assume
that the nonmovant is in agreement, and the movant may therefore forego the offer of
additional proof. Id. The court analogized this situation to the more general evidentiary
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Having determined that the parties were in agreement as to the
stricken venireperson's ethnic background in Mjia, the court held
that the defendant had made a prima facie showing of "that fact." 61 It
further held that when, as in Mefia, the record reveals that the prosecutor struck the only venireperson of a particular cognizable group,
the defendant's burden of making a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is automatically satisfied.6 2 The court noted
that, in such cases, the prosecution has effectively excluded an entire
racial or ethnic group with just one strike.6 3
The only remaining issue the Mejia court faced was determining
the appropriate remedy. Rather than simply granting the defendant a
new trial, the court remanded the case to give the State an opportunity to offer a neutral explanation for its strike.64 Since the trial judge
rejected the defendant's Batson objection without requiring a response from the State,6 5 fairness dictated that the State be permitted
to respond before the trial court considered whether to grant a new

rule concerning an admission by silence. Id. at 536-37, 616 A.2d at 363. The requirements
of such a "tacit admission" are as follows:
(1) the party heard and understood the other person's statement; (2) at the time,
the party had an opportunity to respond; (3) under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the party's position, who disagreed with the statement would have
voiced that disagreement.
Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 242, 596 A.2d 1024, 1043 (1991) (quoting 6 LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801(4).3 (1987)).
61. Mejia, 328 Md. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365. The exact procedure on remand was described in
Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988). Mjia, 328 Md. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365.
The Stanley court granted a limited remand to permit the State an opportunity to present a
race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strikes. Stanley, 313 Md. at 92, 542 A.2d at
1287. Its description of the procedure was as follows:
[T]he State is to present, if it can, honest, neutral, nonracial reasons for the challenges of each black potential juror who was stricken. Any reasons presented
must be legitimate, clear and reasonably specific, as general assertions of assumed
group bias or broad denials of discriminatory motives will be insufficient to overcome the defendant's prima facie cases. The reasons must be tailored to the
particular facts of the case that was tried and related to the individual traits of the
jurors. The defendant will be afforded the opportunity to rebut any explanations
put forth by the prosecutor and to expose any justification that on its face may
appear racially neutral, but is in reality a sham or pretext. The trial court must
then articulate a clear ruling detailing the basis on which it was made, and explaining whether the established prima facie case of purposeful discrimination
has been overcome by the State.
Id., 542 A.2d at 1287-88. If the trial court is not satisfied with the State's explanations, a
new trial should be granted on all charges. Id. at 92-93, 542 A.2d at 1288.
65. Id. at 528, 616 A.2d at 359.
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trial. 66 Recognizing, however, that nearly two years had passed since
the trial,67 the court stated that, if the circumstances of the voir dire
proceedings could not be reconstructed adequately, the trial judge
may order a new trial.'
4. Analysis.-In Mejia, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of what proof of ethnic identity is required to satisfy a criminal
defendant's prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination by the
prosecution in exercising its peremptory strikes.6 9 In upholding
Mejia's conviction, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to hold that a
prima facie showing requires a defendant to prove each component of
the prima facie case.7 ° Specifically, the intermediate appellate court
stated that "[w]hen a party is allocated the burden of establishing a
prima facie case as to a proposition, establishing the necessary set of
predicate facts involves more than simply proclaiming those facts."7"
Thus, the Court of Special Appeals felt compelled to define the meaning of "Hispanic" and comb the record for proof that Mejia and Es72
trada were Hispanic and that the rest of the venire was not Hispanic.
Although Mejia did no more than proclaim that Estrada was the
only Hispanic on the venire, the Court of Appeals deemed his proclamation a sufficient showing because neither the prosecution nor the
court objected to it.7 3 Because the defense was not put on notice by
the prosecutor or trial judge that the ethnic identity of Estrada or the
rest of the venire was in dispute, the defense reasonably assumed that
it was not in question and did not present an offer of proof.74 Had
the State objected to the defense's characterization of Estrada's ethnic
identity, the defense would have been required to offer the basis for
66. Id. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365.
67. Id. at 540-41, 616 A.2d at 365. The court noted that the Stanley court had granted
the hearing after a lapse of about two years and, in State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d
629 (1991), the court had done so after more than six years. Mejia, 328 Md. at 540, 616
A.2d at 365.
68. Mejia, 328 Md. at 541, 616 A.2d at 365.
69. Id. at 525, 616 A.2d at 357. Because the right to make a Batsontype objection has
now been extended to a criminal prosecutor and civil litigants, see supra notes 46-47 and

accompanying text, the Mejia holding will presumably apply in these contexts as well.
70. Mejia v. State, 90 Md. App. 31, 34-37, 599 A.2d 1207, 1208-10, rev'd, 328 Md. 522,
616 A.2d 356 (1992). The court relied heavily on the wording of prior Maryland Batson
cases stating that, in raising a Batson objection, the defendant has the burden of proving
the existence of purposeful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 37,
599 A.2d at 1210 (citing Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988); State v.
Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1991)).
71. Id. at 34, 599 A.2d at 1208.
72. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
73. Mejia, 328 Md. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
74. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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its beliefs. 75 Recognizing that what is not said in the course of litigation may be as important as what is said when judging the totality of
the circumstances, 7 6 the court held that, under the circumstances,
77
Mejia's proclamation constituted a sufficient offer of proof.
Prior to Mefia, courts had recognized that a prima facie showing
of discrimination was made when a prosecutor used peremptories to
exclude from a jury all of the members of a given ethnic or racial
group, 78 even if there was only one member of the group on the
panel.79 If, however, there were several Hispanics in the venire, and
only one was struck, a reviewing court would probably defer to the
finding of the trial judge. Although the Court of Appeals has stated
that each and every peremptory strike is subject to Batson review8 and
that the final makeup of the jury is irrelevant,"' it is equally well established that whether a prima facie showing has been made is a question
of fact for the trial judge, to whom great discretion is afforded.8 2 If
Mejia's counsel had not stated that Estrada appeared to be the only
Hispanic on the venire, the court may not have found the parties to
have been in agreement regarding the issue and may have been more
likely to defer to the judgment of the trial judge, who rejected the
defendant's argument."'
The court's holding in Mjia will limit the evidence required during a Batson objection to matters truly in dispute and dispense with
argument where issues, such as a venireperson's race or ethnicity, are
not in controversy. This limitation is appropriate for reasons of judicial economy. If the court had adopted the State's argument, future
trial courts may have been forced to require the defense to give an
75. Id.

76. See Meia, 328 Md. at 538, 616 A.2d at 363-64 ("Just as what the prosecutor may say
or ask during voir dire may be relevant, in the totality of the circumstances, to determining
the prosecutor's motive in exercising peremptories, what the prosecutor does not say in
the face of an assertion of fact is quite important on the question of the adequacy of the
petitioner's Batson showing.").
77. Id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
78. Id. at 539-40, 616 A.2d at 364; see Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 85-87, 542 A.2d 1267,
1284-85 (1988) (citing cases).
79. See Stanley, 313 Md. at 84-85, 542 A.2d at 1283-84 (citing cases).
80. Id. at 93, 542 A.2d at 1288 ("A new trial will be mandated if any one of the peremptory challenges.. . was exercised with a discriminatory purpose .... ."); Tolbert v. State, 315
Md. 13, 22, 553 A.2d 228, 232 (1989).
81. Tolbert 315 Md. at 22, 553 A.2d at 232.
82. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) ("We have confidence that trial
judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances
concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of
discrimination .... ').
83. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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explanation of a venireperson's race or ethnicity every time it raised a
Batson objection, even if the race or ethnicity of the excluded
venireperson was obvious and the state was in complete agreement.
Given the overwhelming expansion of Batson-to include all parties in
both criminal and civil trials, to encompass a broad array of racial or
ethnic groups, and to no longer require that stricken jurors and the
defendant be of the same race or ethnicity 84 -the amount of time and
resources wasted in litigating these uncontested issues could be
extraordinary.
The Mejia decision, however, is not without potential flaws. By
permitting the defendant to satisfy his prima facie showing without
any substantive evidence of ethnic identity, the court risks incorrect
identification when parties wrongly believe that stricken jurors are
members of a certain group. A venireperson's physical appearance
and name might lead one to conclude erroneously that the person is
of a certain race or ethnicity, when in fact he is not. If the opposing
party or the court states nothing in response, a Batson objection might
be sustained when there is no basis in fact for the objection. Given
the broad array of racial and ethnic groups to which Batson has been
held to apply, the possibility of such an occurrence is not remote.
The Mejia court's choice of remedy, a limited remand to allow
the State to present its neutral, nondiscriminatory explanations, was
proper and in accord with prior Maryland Batson cases.85 In the past,
the Court of Appeals has allowed new trials in Batson cases only when
the State had been permitted an opportunity to present neutral explanations for its strikes and the court was not satisfied with its explanations.8 6 It is indeed possible in Me/ia that the prosecution could have
offered an acceptable neutral, nondiscriminatory explanation had it
been given the chance, 7 and granting a new trial without affording
84. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991); Stanley v. State, 313
Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988); Trice v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988) (companion case to Stanley).
86. See, e.g., Chew v. State, 317 Md. 233, 562 A.2d 1270 (1989); Tolbert v. State, 315 Md.
13, 553 A.2d 228 (1989).
87. The Meia case presented a situation much like that in Hernandez v. New York, 111
S. Ct. 1859 (1991), in which an Hispanic defendant objected to the prosecution's strikes of
two Hispanic venirepersons. Id. at 1864. The prosecutor stated that he struck the individuals because he felt that they might not be able to follow the interpreter. Id. The defendant
claimed that the Spanish-speaking ability bore a close relationship to ethnicity, and the
strikes therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1866. The trial judge rejected
the defendant's argument, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that the prosecutor explained that the specific responses and the demeanor of the venirepersons, when
asked if they could defer to the official translation, caused him to doubt their ability to
defer. Id. at 1867. Because this explanation did not rely purely on the ability to speak a
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the State such an opportunity might grant the defendant a windfall to
which he is not entitled. Mejia might still have his new trial, but as the
court recognized, this determination properly should be left to the
trial judge."8
5. Conclusion.-In holding that the defendant in Mejia successfully presented a prima facie Batson objection, 9 the Court of Appeals
eased the requirements that a defendant must meet to show the racial
or ethnic identity of a stricken venireperson. By refusing to require
the defendant to present tangible proof of race or ethnicity when the
opposing party seems to be in agreement on the point, the court limited the evidence that must be presented during Batson cases strictly to
matters in dispute. The court appropriately noted that if the State
disagrees with the defense's assertion of a juror's race or ethnicity, it
must state its disagreement for the record in order to require an offer
of proof by the defense. Given the recent expansion of the Batson
doctrine, the decision is also desirable for reasons of judicial
economy.
CHARLES

J. KRESSLEIN

D. Due Process Rights of Inmates Improperly Denied Parole
In Patuxent Institution Board of Review v. Hancock,1 the Court of
Appeals held that an inmate, who had been placed on parole but not
yet released from confinement, could not have his release denied on
the basis of conduct that he had no notice could be grounds for revocation.2 In so holding, the court made the technical award of parole,
rather than the actual release, a key event in the parole process. It
concluded that inmates who have been awarded parole enjoy a liberty
interest worthy of due process protection even before they are released from confinement.
1. The Case.-In January 1977, Clarence J. Hancock was delivered into the custody of the Division of Corrections for a sentence of
language, the Court accepted the explanation as race-neutral. Id. The Court further
stated that the mere fact that a basis for peremptory strikes has a disproportionate impact
on a certain racial or ethnic group does not necessarily show discriminatory intent, see id. at
1867-68, and that deference should be given to trial judges. Id. at 1868-69.
88. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
89. See Mejia, 328 Md. at 539, 616 A.2d at 364.
1. 329 Md. 556, 620 A.2d 917 (1993).
2. Id. at 589, 620 A.2d at 933.
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life imprisonment plus thirty-five years.3 In April 1977, he was classified as a "defective delinquent"4 and transferred to the Patuxent Institution.5 He was approved there for accompanied day leave in 1984,
and in 1985 he began participating in work-release and school-release
programs.6 In 1987, the Patuxent Institution Board of Review
(Board) recommended Hancock for parole. 7 He was not released because the Governor refused to approve his parole' as required by a
1982 statute. 9 In 1990, the Board returned Hancock to the general
prison population because his "behavior had become 'unbefitting [of]
continued participation in the program and services' of Patuxent
Institution."'"
On June 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals held that the 1982 statute
requiring gubernatorial approval for parole could not be applied
against inmates at the Patuxent Institution who committed offenses
prior to the effective date of the statute.1 1 Relying on this decision,
Hancock filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Balti12
more City challenging the Governor's refusal to approve his parole.
3. Id. at 562, 620 A.2d at 920. Hancock was convicted of breaking into the home of a
female acquaintance with the intention of tying up her three children and raping her
when she arrived home. He had bound only one of the children when the intended victim
arrived. Hancock then bound and gagged her. When the victim removed her gag and
began screaming, Hancock beat her with a hammer, and she later died. Hearing the victim's cries, her 11-year-old son came to her aid. Hancock struck the child 27 or 28 times,
inflicting permanent brain damage. Id. at 597, 620 A.2d at 937.
4. "Defective delinquent" was a statutory term used to describe individuals with a "propensity toward criminal activity" who had either an "intellectual deficiency" or an "emotional imbalance" so as to require confinement and treatment. Id. at 562 n.2, 620 A.2d at
920 n.2. The statute that created the "defective delinquent" classification was repealed in
1977, but Hancock remained at the Patuxent Institution as an "eligible person." An "eligible person" is one who (1) is convicted of a crime, (2) has "an intellectual deficiency or
emotional imbalance," (3) is likely to respond favorably to the Patuxent Institution's treatment programs, (4) can be better rehabilitated at the Patuxent Institution than through
other incarceration, and (5) meets the eligibility criteria established by the Secretary of
(1) (1990).
Public Safety and Correctional Services. See id.; MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 1 (f)
5. The Maryland General Assembly created the Patuxent Institution in 1951 "to provide efficient and adequate programs and services for treatment with the goal of rehabilitation of eligible persons." MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 2(b) (1990).
6. Hancock, 329 Md. at 562-63, 620 A.2d at 920.
7. See id. at 563, 620 A.2d at 920.
8. Id., 620 A.2d at 921.
9. See id. The statute provided that "[a]n eligible person who is serving a term of life
imprisonment shall only be paroled with the approval of the Governor." Id. at 563 n.5, 620
A.2d at 920 n.5 (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 11(b)(2) (1983)). Currently, this language is contained in article 31B, § 11 (b)(3) (1990).
10. Id. at 564, 620 A.2d at 921.
11. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 672, 574 A.2d 898, 916, cert. denied sub nom.
Henneberry v. Sutton, 498 U.S. 950 (1990).
12. Hancock, 329 Md. at 564, 620 A.2d at 921.
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The court agreed that the 1982 statute could not be applied against
Hancock and ordered the Board to parole Hancock on or before August 10, 1990.13 It also ruled, however, that the Board need not release Hancock if it commenced procedures to revoke his parole
before August 10, 1990.14
Pursuant to the court's order, the Board issued Hancock an Order of Parole for the period between August 8, 1990 and August 2,
1991.1' General Condition #3 of the parole order provided that "[t]he
parolee shall not commit any act which would be a violation of any
Federal, State Law or Municipal ordinance; and shall conform to all
rules of conduct imposed upon him by the Patuxent Institution or
authorized representative. '"6 At the same time, the Board served
Hancock a Preliminary Hearing Notice and a Request for Parole Revocation Warrant alleging violations of General Condition #3.17 The basis of the alleged violation was Hancock's refusal to participate fully in
treatment and counseling sessions during the preceding year."8
At Hancock's preliminary hearing, the Board found probable
cause to believe that he had violated the terms of his parole and ordered him detained at the Patuxent Institution pending a formal parole revocation hearing. 9 At the formal hearing, the Board found
that Hancock had "'failed to comply with the instructions"' of his
therapist and revoked his parole.2"
Hancock appealed the Board's decision to the Circuit Court for
Howard County, which affirmed." In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that Hancock's due process rights were violated when the Board revoked his parole for breaking a parole condition of which he lacked notice.2 2 The Board filed a
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, along with a motion to
13. Id. at 565, 620 A.2d at 921.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 566, 588, 620 A.2d at 922, 933.
16. Id., 620 A.2d at 922.
17. Id. at 566-67, 620 A.2d at 922.
18. Id. at 567, 620 A.2d at 922.
19. Id.
20. Id. Dr. Farrell, an institutional psychologist who conducted group therapy with
Hancock, testified at the formal revocation hearing that Hancock became "evasive and
general" in response to questions and had not progressed as far as expected. Id. Based on
his observations, Dr. Farrell recommended against releasing Hancock into the community.
Id.
21. Id. at 567-68, 620 A.2d at 922-23.
22. Id. at 568, 620 A.2d at 923.
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stay effectuation of Hancock's release. 3 The Court of Appeals
24
granted both the petition and the motion.
2.

Legal Background.-Parole is a matter of legislative grace and

not a constitutional right.2 5 A state is under no obligation to establish

a parole system, nor does the mere creation of one give rise to a protectable interest in the possibility of parole. 26 Inmates can, however,
acquire a reasonable entitlement to parole and a protectable liberty
interest therein if the wording of a state's parole statute creates an
expectancy of release 27 or if the inmate actually has been placed on
parole.2 8
a. Liberty Interest Conferred by Parole Statute: The Greenholtz/
Allen Standard.-In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,29 the Supreme Court held that the Nebraska parole
statute created a protectable liberty interest because it created a presumption of release.3 ° In support of its holding, the Court pointed to
the statute's statement that the Board of Parole shall grant parole unless it finds one or more statutory considerations present.3 ' Similarly,
in Board of Pardons v. Allen,"2 the Court found a protectable liberty
interest under a Montana statute that stated that the State Board of
Pardons shall release an inmate on parole when the board concludes
there will be no detriment to the prisoner or the community.3 3 In so
holding, the Court distinguished between two types of parole board
discretion. When a parole board has broad discretion in determining
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Alston v. Robinson, 791 F. Supp. 569,
583 (D. Md. 1992); Belch v. Raymond, 196 Md. 649, 650, 75 A.2d 96, 97 (1950).
26. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987);Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S.
14, 19 (1981); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11.
27. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 381; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.
28. Morrisseyv. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("[T]he liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination
inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee ...
29. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
30. See id. at 12.
31. Id. at 12-13.
32. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
33. Id. at 381. Compareid. (relying on the parole statute's mandatory language in finding a protectable liberty interest in parole) and Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12 (holding that the
mandatory language of the parole statute created a presumption of release) with Van
Curen v. Jago, 641 F.2d 411, 414-15 (6th Cir.) (holding that no liberty interest was conferred by an Ohio statute that stated that the parole board may parole inmates if five statutory considerations exist), rev'd on other grounds, 454 U.S. 14, 21 (1981).
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whether prescribed considerations exist and whether the board
should grant parole in light of those considerations, no liberty interest
is conferred because the subjective nature of the proceedings does
not create any presumption or reasonable expectation of release.34
On the other hand, when a parole statute gives a board discretion in
determining the existence of prescribed conditions, but mandates the
board's decision upon a finding of those conditions, the statute confers a protectable liberty interest in receiving parole. 5
In Maryland, the parole eligibility of inmates housed at the Patuxent Institution is determined by the Patuxent Institution Board of Review.3 6 If the Board determines that an eligible inmate will not pose
an unreasonable risk to society and that parole will assist in the inmate's rehabilitation, the Board may grant parole.3 7 The Maryland
Parole Commission, which determines parole eligibility for the general prison population, similarly has an exclusive power to authorize
parole.3" Although the Maryland Regulations set out the general criteria that the Parole Commission considers when deciding whether to
grant parole, 39 the Commission is not bound by any language mandating a particular decision based on those criteria.40 Federal Courts and
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals have explicitly held that the
Maryland parole statute does not create a protectable liberty interest
because it gives the Parole Commission unfettered discretion.4 1 Prior
34. Allen, 482 U.S. at 375-76.
35. Id.
36. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 11(b) (1990).
37. Id. In 1989, the General Assembly amended article 31B, § 11, eliminating
mandatory language that stated that the Board shall approve parole if prisoners satisfy the
statutory considerations. Section 11 now states that the Board may grant parole when inmates satisfy the statutory considerations. Id. The change, which, under a Greenholtz analysis, eliminated any liberty interest in parole, has withstood a *challenge in federal court
claiming it constituted an ex post facto application of law. See Alston v. Robinson, 791 F.
Supp. 569, 592 (D. Md. 1992).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-504 (1990).
39. The Maryland Parole Commission considers 12 sources of information and uses
eight criteria in determining whether to grant parole. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 12, § 08.01.18A.
40. In setting out the Parole Commission's operating procedures and criteria, both the
Code and Regulations explicitly affirm that the Parole Commission enjoys exclusive power
to decide such matters. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-504 (1990); MD. REcs. CODE tit. 12,
§ 08.01.18A.
41. Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir. 1988) ("ITihe Maryland parole
statute does not create a legitimate expectation of parole release."); Braxton v. Josey, 567 F.
Supp. 1479, 1481 (D. Md. 1983) (providing that the use of a parole guideline did not limit
the parole board's discretion so as to create a protectable liberty interest); Simms v. State,
65 Md. App. 685, 689-90, 501 A.2d 1338, 1341 (1986) (holding that the Parole Commission, in the exercise of its discretion, may choose to follow or ignore particular items set
out as general parole criteria).
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to Hancock, the courts had not specifically addressed the issue of
whether inmates at the Patuxent Institution have a statutorily conferred liberty interest, but the statute's nonmandatory language and
explicit vesting of discretion in the Board made it unlikely that they
would so hold under the Greenholtzi Allen standard.
b. Liberty Interest Conferred by Actual Release: The Morrissey
Standard.-In Morrissey v. Brewer,42 the Supreme Court held that,
although the existence of a state parole system does not confer a liberty interest upon the state's inmates, a prisoner's expectation of parole becomes a protectable interest once the inmate actually is
released.4 3 The due process afforded in connection with such a liberty interest depends not merely on whether the benefit is a right or a
privilege, but on the extent to which the individual will suffer grievous
loss as a result of its denial." Though parole is not the unconditional
freedom that the general populace enjoys, it is nonetheless valuable
enough to fall within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.4"
Consistent with its view that parolees possess a liberty interest because depriving them of the conditional freedom they have already
enjoyed would result in a grievous loss, the Supreme Court held in
Jago v. Van Curen46 that prisoners who are merely awaiting release may
be denied parole without any form of due process.4 7 In Jago, the
Court created a distinction between parole revocation, where the state
seeks to remove a parolee from his already effectuated conditional
release, and parole rescission, where the state refuses to release inmates whose parole has been approved but not effectuated.4" The
Court acknowledged that inmates suffer a loss when their approved
parole is rescinded, but held that the approval of parole is a mutually
explicit understanding between the inmate and the state that does not
49
create a liberty interest.
42. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
43. See id. at 482; see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ("There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty
one has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.").
44. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
45. Id. at 482. The Morrissey Court noted several grievous losses that parolees may suffer upon revocation of their parole, including the loss of the right to be gainfully employed, the loss of the right to associate freely with family and friends, and losses
occasioned by the parolee's reliance upon the state's implicit promise that parole will be
revoked only upon the violation of a parole condition. Id.
46. 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 21.
48. See id. at 17.
49. Id. at 17-20. Though mutually explicit understandings can create a property interest,
see, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (holding that a nontenured profes-
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c. The Process Due.-In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court held
that states that confer liberty interests by virtue of their parole statutes
satisfy the requirements of due process by affording inmates who are
being considered for parole an opportunity to be heard at an informal interview hearing.5 ° In the event of a decision against parole, the
parole board must also inform the inmate of the reasons for the
denial."1
When a state wishes to revoke a parole that has been effectuated,
the parolee has a right to a much more extensive process. Under Morrissey, the state must give the parolee written notice of the claimed
parole violations, disclose the evidence against him, afford him an opportunity to be heard by a neutral and detached body such as the
traditional parole board, and permit him to appear in person, offer
witnesses and documentary evidence, and confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.5" The state also must provide the parolee with a
statement of the evidence it relied on if it decides to revoke the parole.5" Most importantly, parole revocation must be based on a "willful or knowing violation of a condition of the parole."5 4
d. Remedy.-In Gluckstern v. Sutton,5 5 the Court of Appeals
held that a statutory amendment requiring gubernatorial approval for
parole of inmates serving fifteen-year sentences could not be applied
against inmates at the Patuxent Institution who committed their offenses prior to 1982.56 In Gluckstern, the trial court ordered the Board
to conduct a new parole hearing and consider only the facts and evidence in existence at the time the inmate's parole was improperly denied.5 7 In the event the Board approved parole based on this
sor at a public university was entitled to a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a contract of
10 years, since the parties had a mutual understanding that job security attached after 7
years), they cannot create a liberty interest in parole release. SeeJago, 454 U.S. at 20.
50. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15
(1979).
51. Id.

52. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). The right of confrontation may be
denied upon a showing of good cause. Id. Though the Supreme Court did not mandate
parole revocation hearings until 1972, hearings have long been a requirement for parole
revocation in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 101 (1951).
53. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
54. Id. at 482 (noting that the state implicitly promises not to revoke parole unless the
parolee violates a parole condition); see also Bergstein v. State, 322 Md. 506, 516, 588 A.2d
779, 784 (1991).
55. 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898 (1990).
56. Id. at 672, 574 A.2d at 916 (holding that retroactive application of the 1982 statute
was an ex post facto application of law because it adversely affected inmates' prospects for
parole).
57. Id. at 646, 574 A.2d at 904.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:667

evidence, the Patuxent Institution could then seek revocation of parole based on the inmate's conduct after the date of the original improper denial of parole."8 As long as the Patuxent Institution applied
for revocation immediately after the ordered hearing, it was not obligated to physically release the inmate until completion of the revocation proceedings.5 9 Because neither party questioned the propriety of
the relief on appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of
whether this procedure was an appropriate remedy for an improper
denial of parole.6 °
3. The Court'sReasoning.-In Hancock, the Court began by examining when, if ever, Hancock acquired a liberty interest in parole.
Stressing the deference normally given the Maryland Parole Commission and the Patuxent Institution Board of Review,6" the Court impliedly rejected any argument that inmates acquire a liberty interest
by virtue of the Maryland parole statute.6" The court also determined
that Hancock did not acquire a protectable interest when the Board
recommended his parole in 1987.63 Because the 1987 recommendation did not physically effectuate parole, the court held that Hancock
had no right to the due process protection afforded actual parolees,
even though the only obstacle to his release turned out to be invalid as
applied to Patuxent Institution inmates who committed their offenses
prior to 1982.64 The court did, however, find the conferral of a liberty
interest in the Board's compliance with the Baltimore City Circuit
Court's 1990 order to grant parole, even though Hancock was not released and received a parole revocation warrant at the same time.65
Having established that Hancock's 1990 parole order conferred
on him a protectable liberty interest, the court next discussed the process that he was due. Although the Board complied with the hearing
requirements announced in Morrissey,66 the court found the revoca58. Id. at 647, 574 A.2d at 904.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Hancock, 329 Md. at 573-74, 620 A.2d at 926 (noting that although the Parole Commission ordinarily has exclusive discretionary power to authorize parole, the Board of Review has that power with regard to prisoners at the Patuxent Institution).
62. See id.
63. Id. at 584, 620 A.2d at 931.
64. Id. Hancock arguably realized at the time of his parole recommendation that
Maryland law required gubernatorial approval. Thus, Hancock could not have justifiably
relied on a presumption that the Board's recommendation would translate into an order
of parole. Id. The Board's recommendation merely gave Hancock a hope of eventual
release, which does not constitute a liberty interest. Id.
65. Id. at 584-85, 620 A.2d at 931.
66. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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tion of Hancock's parole unconstitutional based on the principles of
notice.6 7 Hancock received his Order of Parole on August 8, 1990,
the same day he received his parole revocation warrant. Thus, Hancock's revocation was based on violations of parole conditions of
which he was not aware until the day he was served with the revocation
warrant.68 Furthermore, the alleged parole violation occurred in the
year prior to issuance of the Order of Parole.6 9 The court held that
Hancock's parole could not be revoked constitutionally for misconduct that occurred before he was placed on parole or before he received notice that the conduct was proscribed. 70 Because the Board
had violated Hancock's due process fights with regard to notice, the
1990 revocation of his parole was unconstitutional.71
The court determined that the appropriate remedy was effectuation of the parole ordered on August 8, 1990.72 It also held, however,

that while Hancock could not have his parole revoked for noncriminal misconduct that occurred before August 8, 1990, the Board was
free to determine whether he had violated the law or its institutional
equivalent after he received the Order of Parole.73 In the event that
the Board found evidence of such misconduct, the Board need not
74
release Hancock until resolution of the revocation procedures.
Judge McAuliffe, writing for the dissent, opined that Hancock
had violated two implicit conditions of his parole of which he had
adequate notice. 75 The dissent found implicit parole conditions in
the requirement that parolees do not pose an unreasonable risk to
society and the limitation on the Board's jurisdiction to prisoners con67. Hancock, 329 Md. at 589, 620 A.2d at 933.
68. See id. The court indicated that Hancock had at least constructive notice that his
parole could be revoked if he committed a criminal offense or its institutional equivalent.
Id. at 590, 620 A.2d at 934. If the Board had revoked Hancock's parole because he committed a crime before the receipt of the revocation warrant, revocation would have been
proper. The court did not believe, however, that Hancock reasonably should have known
that active participation in his treatment program was a condition of his parole. See id. at
590 & n.18, 620 A.2d at 934 & n.18.
69. See id. at 589, 620 A.2d at 933.
70. Id. at 576-77, 589, 620 A.2d at 927, 933.
71. See id. at 589, 620 A.2d at 933.
72. Id. at 592, 620 A.2d at 935. An appropriate remedy at the trial level, according to
the court, would have been an order for a new parole hearing in which the Board would
consider all the relevant facts known at the time of the improper denial of Hancock's
parole. Id. at 582, 620 A.2d at 930 ("The trial court in this case did not order a new parole
hearing even though it probably could have-much had changed since 1987 ... and the
Board undoubtedly perceived the respondent as no longer eligible for parole . . .
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 596, 620 A.2d at 937.
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fined at the Patuxent Institution. 76 Hancock's failure to respond to
treatment concerning his brutal offenses made him a safety risk, and
the dissent believed that Hancock surely understood that safety risks
could not remain on parole. 77 Further, Hancock ostensibly understood that he could not be paroled by the Board or remain on parole
under the Board's auspices unless he remained under the Board's jurisdiction. 7' His behavioral problems and subsequent transfer to the
general prison population in 1990 effectively eliminated the Board's
power to parole him. According to the dissent, the behavior that precipitated the transfer therefore violated a known condition of his
parole.79
4. Analysis.-In holding that Hancock's liberty interest vested
upon his 1990 receipt of an Order of Parole, the Court of Appeals
made form, rather than substance, the basis of due process protection. The general rule that effectuation of parole gives rise to a protectable liberty interest is based not on the act of granting parole, but
on the nature of the conditional freedom and the effect of revocation
of that freedom.8 0 The order of the Baltimore City Circuit Court,
which the Court of Appeals relied on in deciding that the parole order it mandated conferred a protectable liberty interest, explicitly provided that the Board could deny Hancock's release if it undertook
parole revocation measures at the time it issued the parole order.8 1
Thus, Hancock was never assured of parole and enjoyed none of the
benefits of freedom common to ordinary parolees. Hancock's position, rather, was similar to that of an inmate facing rescission of parole-his expectation of release was based on a mutually explicit
understanding with the Board that he would be released if it determined that he had not violated any parole conditions.8 2 The circum76. Id.
77. Id. ("These are conditions so basic and fundamental that any reasonable person
would be aware of such conditions.").
78. See id. at 596, 599, 620 A.2d at 937-38.

79. See id. at 599, 620 A.2d at 938.
80. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)
(distinguishing between parolees actually enjoying the benefits of conditional liberty and
inmates who "are confined and thus subject to all of the necessary restraints that inhere in
prison"); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
81. See Hancock, 329 Md. at 565, 620 A.2d at 921.
82. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. If the court based Hancock's liberty
interest on his expectation of release rather than on the grievous loss he would suffer upon
revocation, see, e.g., Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12, a more appropriate time for the liberty interest to attach might have been at the time of the trial court's order, which marked the
beginning of Hancock's expectation of release. At the time of the trial court's order, the
Board had two options: (1) release Hancock on parole, or (2) begin revocation proceed-
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stances surrounding Hancock's parole order made his expectation of
release and potential for grievous loss far different from that of the
ordinary parolee. A constitutional test is relevant only in cases where
the test is an accurate barometer of the underlying constitutional imperatives. 8 3 Hancock's situation was so far removed from that of the
normal parolee that the application of the Morrissey rationale was inappropriate. The underlying premise of Morrissey, that the effectuation
of parole is the key question because parolees on release stand to incur grievous loss if their liberty is curtailed, 4 simply was not the case
in Hancock.
Moreover, the net effect of this decision may be a loss of due process rights by inmates who are improperly denied parole. The court
spoke approvingly, for example, of a remedy giving an inmate who
had suffered a wrongful denial of parole the right to a new parole
hearing in which the parole authority could consider all the pertinent
facts in determining anew the efficacy of parole. 5 Although dicta,
this statement may lead to new parole hearings for inmates wrongfully
denied their award of parole. In effect, the case may mean that inmates improperly denied parole will have the right only to a parole
hearing, instead of a parole revocation hearing.
An inmate has far fewer due process rights in a parole hearing
than does a parolee facing revocation of his parole. The Maryland
Parole Commission and the Patuxent Institution Board of Review
have unlimited discretion to approve or deny parole,8 6 but to revoke a
ings. At that point, Hancock had a chance of release without further inquiry. When Hancock received the Order of Parole, his expectation of release actually diminished because
the simultaneous delivery of revocation papers alerted him that the Board was seeking to
avoid releasing him. If the liberty interest attached in this manner, however, it would be an
interest in release rather than in the maintenance of conditional freedom, and Hancock
would be entitled to the limited process required in Greenholtz, see supra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text, rather than the expanded protection mandated in Morrissey. See supra
notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
83. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842 (1993) (stating that outcome determination is a defective test for prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel cases when it
ceases to answer accurately the underlying issue of whether the trial outcome was unfair or
unreliable).
84. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. The Morrissey test is grounded in the
rights of parolees to enjoy gainful employment and limited freedom of movement and
association. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Nowhere did the Morrissey Court indicate that the
piece of paper granting parole has any significance in a due process inquiry other than its
tendency to signify that the parolee had been enjoying the conditional liberties that the
state seeks to revoke. Because he was never physically released pursuant to the parole
order, Hancock never enjoyed any freedom of association or movement or the right to
hold a job.
85. Hancock, 329 Md. at 582, 620 A.2d at 930; see also supra note 72.
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 11 (1990); art. 41, § 4-504 (1990).
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parole, the relevant authority must point to particular conduct that
violated an explicit provision in the parole order.17 Inmates who are
being considered for parole have no right to a formal hearing,8 8 but
parolees facing revocation have a right of confrontation at a formal
hearing.8 9 Thus, an inmate who suffers from an unconstitutional denial of parole in the future may be treated simply as a prisoner with a
right to parole consideration, rather than as a parolee facing revocation of his conditional freedom.
5. Conclusion.-In Hancock, the Court of Appeals held that the
technical effectuation of parole gives rise to a protectable liberty interest even before a prisoner is released. The decision may be less helpful to inmates than apparent, however, because the court also
suggested that an appropriate remedy for an unconstitutional denial
of parole before release is another parole hearing. Thus, inmates who
are improperly denied parole before release may face the parole
board as ordinary prisoners, who are afforded only limited due process protection, instead of as parolees, who enjoy much more expansive due process rights.
JOHN

F.

O'CONNOR

E. Striking Down Maryland's Cross Burning Statute
In State v. Sheldon,' the Court of Appeals held that Maryland's
cross burning statute2 unduly encroached upon the First Amendment
right to free speech 3 by regulating conduct for the purpose of suppressing the expression of a viewpoint disfavored by the state. 4 In its
evaluation of the statute, the court observed that the legislature's purpose in restricting cross burnings was to abate racial strife, rather than
to contribute to the lessening of arson and fires, as the State initially
claimed.' The court determined that such selective regulation of expressive conduct, based on disagreement with its message, contra87. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. While inmates denied parole at a parole hearing might
have a right to an explanation of why they were denied parole, Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15-16
(not deciding on whether an explanation is required), parole authorities do not have to
specifically articulate the evidence upon which it made its discretionary determination. Id.
88. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
89. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
1. 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753 (1993).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A (1992).
3. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech .. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
4. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
5. Id. at 55-56, 629 A.2d at 759.
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venes the First Amendment.6 According to the court, fostering racial
harmony, however worthwhile a political objective, cannot be pursued
by suppressing messages endemic
to constitutionally protected con7
duct such as cross burning.
1. The Case.-In Sheldon, the court adjudicated two separate
prosecutions under Maryland's cross burning law. The first involved
Brandon Forrest Sheldon, who burned a cross on the property of a
black family in Prince George's County on October 17, 1991.8 The
second involved Thomas Eugene Cole, who burned a cross on stateowned property in the same county on March 29, 1992.9 The two
defendants were indicted under Maryland's cross burning statute,
which provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons to burn or
cause to be burned any cross or other religious symbol upon
any private or public property within this State without the
express consent of the owner of such property and without
first giving notice to the fire department which services the
area in which such burning is to take place. Any person or
persons who violates the provisions of this section shall, upon
conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer punishment for a period not to exceed 3 years or shall be fined
an amount not to exceed $5,000 or shall suffer both such
fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.10
Neither Cole nor Sheldon notified the area fire department or obtained the permission of the property owner prior to burning their
respective crosses."
On October 26, 1992, defendants Sheldon and Cole challenged
their indictments in a joint hearing before the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County.1 2 They argued that the statute was unconstitutional on five separate grounds: (1) that it violated the free speech
provision of the First Amendment on its face, (2) that, as applied, it
violated the free speech provision, (3) that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, (4) that it was unconstitution3
ally vague, and (5) that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.1
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
Id. at 63, 629 A.2d at 763.
Id. at 49, 629 A.2d at 755.
Id., 629 A.2d at 756.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A (1992).
Sheldon, 332 Md. at 49, 629 A.2d at 755-56.
Id., 629 A.2d at 756.
Id. at 49-50, 629 A.2d at 756.
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The circuit court first held that although the burning of a cross
denotes conduct as opposed to actual speech, the act is sufficiently
expressive to qualify for First Amendment protection.1 4 Second, the
court held that Maryland's cross burning law was sufficiently related to
the suppression of free expression to warrant strict judicial scrutiny. 5
Finally, the court determined that the statute could not withstand
strict scrutiny1 6 and that it fell within no doctrinal exceptions which

would exempt it from rigorous First Amendment examination. 17 Accordingly, the circuit court struck down the statute as unconstitutional
and granted the defendants' motions to dismiss their indictments. 8
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari before intermediate appellate review" and unanimously affirmed the decision of the circuit
court.

20

2. Legal Background.-Three widely recognized First Amendment principles directed the Court of Appeals's decision in Sheldon:
(1) expressive conduct may constitute speech for First Amendment
purposes, 21 (2) the government may not regulate conduct for the purpose of stifling certain messages, 2 2 and (3) any such regulation must
be excised by the courts. 2 3 With respect to the first principle, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that certain expressive conduct is
encompassed by the First Amendment.2 4 In 1931, the Court struck
down a phrase in a California statute that forbade the expression of
"'opposition to organized government"' by displaying "'any flag,
badge, banner, or device."' 2' 5 The Court reasoned that the California
statute was aimed at suppressing the free communication of political
views and, therefore, could not be upheld as a regulation of noncom14. State v. Sheldon, Nos. 92-0081A & 92-0817X, slip op. at 5-6 (Cir. Ct. P.G. County
Nov. 24, 1992).
15. Id., slip op. at 9.
16. Id., slip op. at 9-12.
17. Id., slip op. at 12-15.
18. Id., slip op. at 15.
19. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 50, 629 A.2d at 756.
20. Id. at 64, 629 A.2d at 763.
21. See id. at 51, 629 A.2d at 736.
22. See id. at 53, 629 A.2d at 757.
23. See id.
24. See, e.g., Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the burning of a flag
in a political demonstration constituted expressive conduct subject to First Amendment
protection); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam) (holding that the
display of a flag bearing a peace symbol conveyed a message of disapproval with U.S. involvement in Vietnam and, thus, implicated First Amendment free speech rights).
25. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 403.a (West 1919) (repealed 1933)).
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municative conduct.2 6 In Spence v. Washington,27 the Court again construed conduct as speech in a case involving a Washington State
"improper use" statute that prohibited the display of flags with extraneous material such as peace symbols.2 1 In Spence, the Court reviewed
the prosecution of a peace activist for hanging a flag bearing a peace
symbol out of a window in his residence. 29 Acknowledging that the
flag display was meant to express opposition to United States' military
involvement in Vietnam and that no compelling state interest could
justify the prohibition of such displays, the Court found the statute
"unconstitutional as applied to appellant's activity."3 ° The Court
equated the flag display with protected speech, explaining that its
"message was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours
31
of the First Amendment."
In Texas v. Johnson,3 2 the Supreme Court again affirmed the principle that the First Amendment encompasses communicative conduct.
In Johnson, the Court held that the burning of an American flag on
public property as part of a political rally expressed an unmistakable
ideological message of disapproval with government policy. 33 Finding
the absence of a compelling state interest that justified the banning of
flag burning and the suppression of the inherent political message, 4
the Court affirmed a state court finding that the statute, as applied in
Johnson, was unconstitutional. 35 As the opinion noted, the First
Amendment's "protection does not end at the spoken or written
word.... Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signias does the combination of letters found in
fies this Nation
36
'America."'
The second First Amendment principle noted in Sheldon provides
that government cannot regulate conduct for the purpose of suppressing ideological messages, but may incidentally regulate speech.3 7
In United States v. O'Brien,38 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of an activist who burned his official military draft card to express op26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 369-70.
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
See id. at 407.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 414.
Id.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Id. at 411.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 419.
Id. at 404-05.
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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position to the Vietnam War. 39 The Court found the statute at issue
in the case, which forbade the mutilation of, or tampering with, official military draft cards, necessary to the government's efforts to administer the Selective Service System.4" Thus, the Court upheld the
statute as only incidentally regulating speech.4 1 The Court, explaining that conduct involving speech is not always immune from prosecution, stated, "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."4 2
Despite the seeming inconsistency between the O'Brien Court's
upholding of the conviction of an activist for burning a draft card in
protest and the Johnson Court's invalidating the conviction of an activist for burning a flag in protest, the two holdings may be reconciled
by reference to the government interests underlying the statutes at
issue in each case. The statute in O'Brien was enacted to facilitate the
procurement and proper identification of military personnel during
war by punishing anyone "who forge[d], alter[ed], knowingly destroy[ed], knowingly mutilate [d], or in any manner change [d] any such
[draft] certificate."4 3 Thus, the law advanced genuine government interests through "clearly valid prohibitions against the alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse of [draft] certificates."4 4 The Court
reasoned that the statute's nonsuppressive intent was evident in its
common proscription of both expressive and nonexpressive tampering with official draft cards.4 5 Further, the Court found the statute's
sweep to be proper because it was limited to conduct that frustrated
the government's acknowledged compelling interest in preventing
draft fraud.4 6 By contrast, the Johnson Court found the flag burning
statute at issue to have been aimed at the suppression of antigovern-

39. Id. at 369.
40. See id. at 382.
41. See id. at 377. At least one legal scholar has questioned the Court's claim that the
law under which the defendant in O'Brien was prosecuted was unrelated to the suppression
of expression. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITuTIoNAL LAw § 12-6, at 825 (2d
ed. 1988) ("[T]he publicly visible evidence quite clearly shows that the amendment would

not have been enacted but for the purpose of suppressing dissent.").
42. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
43. 50 U.S.C.S. app. § 462(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1988).
44. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 379.

45. See id. at 375 (noting that the statute "does not distinguish between public and
private destruction, and it does not punish any destruction engaged in for the purpose of
expressing views").
46. See id. at 381 (finding that the statute was the only way to "assure the continuing
availability of issued Selective Service certificates").
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723

ment expression-a goal the Court found clearly to be constitution47
ally improper.

The principle that government cannot regulate conduct in order
to suppress ideological messages was recently affirmed in RA. V. v. City
of St. Paul.48 Reviewing the conviction of a cross-burner pursuant to a
statute criminalizing cross burning and the display of symbols known
to "arouse [ ] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender . . . "' the Supreme Court unani-

mously struck down the statute, but splintered five to four over the
rationale. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stressed that nothing
in the First Amendment licenses government to selectively censor only
hate messages disfavored by the state.5" Reaffirming Johnson's reasoning, he wrote:
[N] onverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the
action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses-so
that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in
violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is
not.5"
The concurring Justices, while agreeing that the St. Paul ordinance
could not stand, rejected the majority's willingness to extend First
52
Amendment protection to hateful conduct such as cross burning.
Rather, they reasoned that the statute should be struck down because,
although it legitimately punished certain activity, "it also criminalizes

47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 (1989) (finding that Texas was improperly
attempting to "foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to
it").
48. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
49. St. Paul, Minn., Code § 292.02 (1990). The statute provided in full:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id.
50. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545 ("[G]overnment may not regulate use based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed.").
51. Id. at 2544.
52. Id. at 2564 (Stevens,J., concurring) ("[T]he Court today.., applies the prohibition
on content-based regulation to speech that the Court had until today considered wholly
'unprotected' by the First Amendment-namely, fighting words. This new absolutism in
the prohibition of content-based regulations severely contorts the fabric of settled First
Amendment law.").
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that-however repugnant-is
a substantial amount of expression
53
Amendment."
First
the
by
shielded
The essential principle of law that emerges from the O'Brien-Johnson-R.A. V line of cases is that the government may not proscribe some
expressive conduct and permit other, when the distinction is made on
context or viewpoint. Thus, any government regulation of unspoken
conduct must apply with equal force to both expressive and nonexpressive conduct. If a law purports to ban cross burning for the sake
of reducing the incidence of unwanted fires, it must also ban other
types of burnings that are devoid of ideological symbolism. Otherwise, government impermissibly engages in content-based regulation
of expressive conduct.
The Court has affirmed content-based regulations of speech,
however, when such regulations could be justified by a substantial government interest and the regulation allowed ample avenues for the
expression of the regulated communication.5 4 Under the "secondary
effects doctrine,"5 5 regulations of speech are permitted if they are limited as to the time, place, and manner in which such speech can occur.56 Such regulations target the secondary effects of the regulated
speech rather than the actual content and are therefore considered
content-neutral.5 7
The third First Amendment principle that informed the Sheldon
decision is that any regulation aimed at stifling viewpoints must be
excised by the courts. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."5 8 As even the
"'viewpoint discrimination is
Justices in the RA.V. minority 5 agreed,
9
form.'
purest
its
in
censorship
53. Id. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
54. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
55. Id. at 47.
56. See id. at 46-47.
57. See id. at 47. The Renton Court determined that a zoning ordinance that limited the
permissible locations of pornographic movie houses constituted a permissible time, place,
and manner regulation. Id. at 46. While acknowledging that the regulation treated pornographic movie houses differently from nonpornographic ones (i.e., that it was contentbased), the Court nonetheless allowed the statute to stand on the ground that the regulation was aimed at curbing the deleterious secondary effects of pornography on the municipality. Id. at 47.
58. Texas v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
59. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2568 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting

Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-Noting that the Supreme Court has
extended First Amendment protection to a variety of expressive conduct, the Sheldon court began by examining whether cross burning
constitutes speech for First Amendment purposes.' The court observed that the Supreme Court has extended speech status to conduct
that is intended to convey a specific message likely to be understood
by those witnessing the conduct.6 1 The court also noted that cross
burning is a well known symbol of the Ku Klux Klan's ideal of white
supremacy.6 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that cross burning is
sufficiently expressive to constitute speech.6"
The court next considered whether the First Amendment protects the racist message inherent in cross burning from regulation by
Maryland's cross burning statute. 64 According to the court, the statute would offend the First Amendment if the government's purpose
in its drafting was related to the suppression of the ideological
message inherent in cross burning. 6 Thus, the court deemed the
controlling inquiry to be whether the government's purpose in specifically singling out cross burning was to suppress disfavored speech or
whether the statute was content neutral.6 6
In its assessment of the content-neutrality of Maryland's cross
burning statute, the Sheldon court examined the legislative deliberations attendant to the statute's enactment. 67 The court observed that
the deliberations focused on advancing racial harmony through the
regulation of cross burning and not on the constitutionally benign
purpose of reducing the incidence of arson, as was initially asserted by
the State.68 The court also observed that the cross burning statute
added "little in scope to the pre-existing scheme for fire protection."6 9
It stated that "the statute [did] not protect property owners.., from
unwanted fires anymore than the law already protected those groups
before the statute's enactment."7" Consequently, the court found that
the General Assembly intended the statute to suppress speech rather
60. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 50, 629 A.2d at 756.
61. Id. at 51, 629 A.2d at 756.
62. Id., 629 A.2d at 757.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 52-53, 629 A.2d at 757.
65. See id. at 56-57, 629 A.2d. at 758-59 (finding that such statutes are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny and that they rarely withstand such scrutiny).
66. Id. at 53-55, 629 A.2d 758-59.
67. Id at 56-57, 629 A.2d at 759-60.
68. Id. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760.
69. Id. at 56, 629 A.2d at 759.
70. Id.
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than prevent fires. 7t Based on this determination, the court held the
statute to constitute a content-based regulation of speech.7 2
Next, in accordance with RA.V's prohibition of regulations of
expressive conduct based on content or viewpoint, 73 the court explained that content-based regulations of speech are presumed to violate the First Amendment, with few and narrow exceptions. 74 The
first such exception applies " [w] hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable." 75 Citing RKA.V, the court explained that the
state may constitutionally forbid the most "lascivious forms of obscenity... because lasciviousness is the very reason obscenity is proscribable in the first place.",76 That is, content discrimination may
permissibly single out speech presenting a heightened version of the
harm that is the basis for the category of proscribable speech. The
court did not apply this exception to the cross burning statute, however, reasoning that if the state maintained that it was proscribing the
most inciteful of constitutionally proscribable "fighting words," it
would be "committing the ... mistake...

[of] selecting only certain

socially charged words for prosecution."7 7
The second exception, which the State urged the court to apply,
applies to statutes whose purpose is not to suppress speech but to curtail its secondary effects. 78 By aiming only at the "'secondary effects'
of the targeted speech," this type of regulation can be "'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' 79 The court
rejected the State's argument that the cross burning statute was aimed
at reducing the secondary effects, or the fire hazards, associated with
the burning of religious symbols, however. 80 Supporting its determination that the statute was enacted for the purpose of suppressing the
disfavored message inherent in cross burning, the court again cited
71. Id. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760.
72. Id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 51.
74. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760; see R.AN. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2545 (1992) ("[The prohibition against content discrimination] applies differently in the
context of proscribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech.").
75. RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2545. Proscribable categories of speech include obscenity, defamation, and fighting words. Sheldon, 322 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760.
76. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760.
77. Id. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761; see RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547 (stating that the state may
not proscribe a subset of totally proscribable speech for a reason related to the "official
suppression of ideas").
78. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
79. Id. at 58, 629 A.2d at 760 (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
80. Id. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
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the statute's legislative history and its negligible contribution to existing arson laws.8"
The State also urged the application of R.A.V.'s third exception
to the presumption against the constitutionality of content-based regulations of speech on the ground that Maryland's cross burning statute involved no official suppression of ideas.8 2 The third exception
applies when the speech at issue is within the few, entirely proscribable categories of speech, such as fighting words, obscenity, and defamation."3 With respect to these narrow categories, the state may
regulate speech on the basis of content if there is no "realistic possibility that suppression of ideas is afoot."8 4 For example, a state could
proscribe obscene movies featuring blue-eyed participants, since obscenity is proscribable and the selective "blue-eyed" proscription is unrelated to the suppression of ideas.8 5 Stressing that this exception
applies only when entirely proscribable speech is at issue, the court
rejected the State's plea on the ground that the State had failed to
make the argument that cross burning constitutes entirely proscribable speech,8 6 e.g., fighting words.
Having ruled out the possibility that any of RA. V's three exceptions to the constitutional presumption against content-based statutes
applied to Maryland's cross burning statute, the court proceeded to
subject the statute to strict scrutiny.8 7 Under strict scrutiny, a state
must show that its regulation is "necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and [that it is] narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 8 Applying the first prong of the test, the Sheldon court acknowledged that the
State's asserted interest in protecting society from bias-motivated
threats was compelling.8 9 The court concluded, however, that the
statute did not satisfy the second prong because "it [could not] be
81. Id. The court further noted that few fires are known to be the result of burning
crosses. Id. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762.
82. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762.
83. See id. Initially formulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942),
the fighting words doctrine holds that there is no First Amendment protection for words
"which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace." Id. at 572. The viability of the doctrine, however, is uncertain, as it has never been
re-affirmed by the Court. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (remaining
silent as to whether the fighting words doctrine remains an exception to the prohibition
on the regulation of speech).
84. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 59, 629 A.2d at 761 (quoting RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547).

85. See PA.V, 112 S.Ct. at 2547.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762.
88. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
89. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62-63, 629 A.2d at 762-63 (noting the State's interest in
"promot[ing] social harmony").
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deemed necessary to the state's effort to foster racial and religious
accord."9 ° Consequently, the court pronounced the statute
unconstitutional."
4. Analysis.a. Cross Burning: Constitutional Expression or Fighting
Words?-Although the State never claimed that cross burning constitutes unprotected speech (i.e., fighting words), it nonetheless attempted to invoke RA. V's secondary effects exception, which applies
only to content-based and suppressive regulations of unprotected
speech.9 2 In advancing the internally inconsistent argument that the
statute was both content-neutral and subject to the secondary effects
doctrine, 3 the State revealed its misunderstanding of First Amendment jurisprudence, its anxiety to avert the fate met by the City in
RA. V, and implicitly, its view that the statute was, in fact, suppressive.
If the State had defended the statute more arduously as a fire prevention measure and not conceded its intent to suppress,9 4 the court
might have applied a standard less stringent than the strict scrutiny
test.9" Like other statutes that have withstood constitutional chal90. Id. at 63, 629 A.2d at 763 (emphasis added). The court stated that "the Constitution does not allow the unnecessary trammeling of free expression even for the noblest of
purposes." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
93. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the secondary effects
doctrine).
94. See Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629 A.2d at 762; see also Brief of Appellant at 12 (stating
that the State did not dispute that the statute regulated expressive speech or that the statute discriminated between expressive speech on the basis of its content).
95. The court could have applied one of two less strenuous standards. The more lenient of the two was set forth in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and applies to
statutes that are unrelated to the suppression of expression. Under this low level of scrutiny, the regulation must be within the constitutional power of the state, the government
interest furthered by the regulation must be substantial, and the incidental restriction on
speech must not be greater than necessary. Id. at 377. To apply this test, the Sheldon court
could have construed the cross burning statute simply as regulating fire hazards, an area of
acknowledged government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech.
A more plausible alternative standard that the Sheldon court might have applied was
set forth in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Renton test
applies to statutes that are suppressive but content-neutral and requires that they bejustifiable without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Id. at 48. That is, their
existence must be justified by noncensorial purposes. Id. As the Sheldon court noted, such
regulations "typically seek[ ] only to subject the speaker to . . . 'reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions.'. . . [T]ime, place, and manner restrictions are valid if 'they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [if] they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.'" Sheldon, 332 Md. at 54, 629
A.2d at 758 (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
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lenges, Maryland's cross burning statute, by merely requiring that the
local fire department be notified and that cross burnings not be
trespassory, limited its regulation of cross burnings to "manner" and
"place."9 6 Under Maryland's statute, cross burnings legally could take
place in a variety of settings, provided that cross burners complied
with the law's modest restrictions. As such, the Maryland statute
avoided the type of wholesale proscription of cross burning that was
adjudged overbroad in R.A. V 9 Thus, as written, the statute did not
directly regulate the speech element of cross burning; its sweep was
tailored strictly to the act itself.
Because the State instead argued that the statute fit into one of
the three exceptions allowing regulation of unprotected speech, the
Sheldon court took the opportunity to look closely at the standards announced in ILA. V, and in so doing, determined that the statute was a
"means of obstructing the message inherent in cross burning."9 " The
court's determination that the statute was content-based was inevitable, given the substantial legislative record evincing its suppressive
purpose. 99 Moreover, it is plain that the legislature would not have
enacted a fire prevention law covering only cross burnings if not for a
strong objection to the message inherent in cross burnings. As the
Sheldon court observed, few destructive fires are the result of cross
burnings.1 °°
It is peculiar, however, that the court chose even to discuss the
inapposite R.A.V framework and to justify its holding largely in terms
of RA.V's inapplicable guidelines.1 ' One can only surmise that the
(1984)). "Narrowly tailored," however, does not "mean that [the regulations] need be the
least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the government's interests." Id. Thus,
the court could have found that, although the Maryland legislature opted for a rather
intrusive means of asserting its authority in the sphere of fire prevention, the statute did
not eliminate all opportunities for cross burners to manifest their bigotry. As such, the
statute would seem to satisfy the requirements of Renton.
96. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 49.
97. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
98. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 57, 629 A.2d at 760.
99. See supra text accompanying note 68.
100. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762.
101. The court's apparent confusion over the applicability of R.A.V.'s three exceptions
to content-based regulations of unprotected speech seems to have resulted from a misinterpretation of the following passage from the R.A.V. majority opinion: "The contentbased discrimination reflected in the St. Paul ordinance comes within neither any of the
specific exceptions to the First Amendment prohibition we discussed earlier, nor within a
more general exception for content discriminationthat does not threaten censorship of ideas." R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548 (1992) (emphasis added). This statement should
be considered in conjunction with the majority's earlier statement that "to validate such
selectivity (where totally proscribablespeech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify
any particular 'neutral' basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there
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court felt obliged to pay heed to R.A. V because the State made it an
issue.
b. The Unavailingness of the Secondary Effects Doctrine.-In rejecting the State's argument for the application of the secondary effects doctrine, °2 the Sheldon court again stressed its rationale for
finding the statute content-based-the clearly suppressive intent of
the legislature and the statute's telling duplication of Maryland's already substantial scheme of laws against arson and trespass. 10 3 The
court also distinguished the Maryland statute from the statute in Renton, which, despite its different treatment of pornographic and
nonpornographic movie houses, was upheld by the Supreme Court on
the ground that the legislature that drafted it had "content-neutral"
intentions.'0 4 In Renton, the focus of Washington State's legislature
was on sparing the community from the deleterious effects known to
result from pornographic movie houses, such as lower property values
and contractionary effects on the local economy. 10 5 The Renton Court
therefore concluded that the purpose of the Renton ordinance was
not to censor pornographic films, but to curtail their potential harmful effects on the locality.10 6 The Court stressed that pornographic
movie houses could still operate, but only outside the main
community.

1 7
0

Drawing from Renton, the Sheldon court could have construed the
Maryland statute as a zoning mechanism whereby cross burnings were
restricted for reasons other than their inherent speech element, i.e.,
fire safety. This approach would have required the court to ignore the
legislature's clearly suppressive motivation in enacting the statute and
also to forsake precedent; the R.A. V Court forbade any selective reguis no realisticpossibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." Id. at 2547 (emphasis added).
Since the State in Sheldon never claimed, let alone established, that the racist speech inherent in cross burning was totally proscribable speech, and since the Maryland statute's legislative history clearly evidenced its suppressiveness, R.A.V.'s exceptions were unavailing to
the State.
102. The State's argument was inconsistent with its hypothesis as to the motivation of
the statute. The State maintained that the statute was content-neutral in urging the application of the secondary effects doctrine, which applies only to suppressive and contentbased regulations of speech. See Brief of Appellant at 20-21.
103. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 60, 629 A.2d at 761.
104. See id. at 61, 629 A.2d at 762 ("The uniqueness of adult theatres, in the Court's
view, justified the selective treatment of them.").
105. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) ("[T]he Renton
ordinance is 'narrowly tailored' to affect only that category of theaters shown to produce
the unwanted secondary effects.").
106. Id. at 48.
107. See id. at 53 (finding that an area of 520 acres remained open to such theaters).
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lation of conduct on account of its inherent speech element.10 8 In
the wake of R.A. V., legislatures cannot regulate even a sub-group of an
area of legitimate government interest, such as fire safety, if the purpose motivating the regulation is to suppress ideological messages.
Thus, the Sheldon court was obliged to examine the legislative record
to ascertain the intent of the statute and to excise any impermissible
bias it discovered in the regulation.
In at least one important respect, however, Maryland's regulation, more clearly than the statute in Renton, could have been justified
without reference to the speech element inherent in cross burning. It
is well acknowledged that government has a right-and perhaps a
duty-to regulate fire hazards.10 9 Until Renton, no right had been recognized for governments to fashion zoning guidelines on the basis of
the speech content of movie houses. Since fire hazards are legitimately regulable and since the statute did not ban cross burnings altogether, the statute could have been justified without reference to the
speech element inherent in cross burning. Thus, the court might
have analyzed it as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. The
Court of Appeals, however, looked beyond the statute's ostensibly
neutral construction and determined that a desire to suppress disfavored speech was the actual motivation for its enactment.
5. Conclusion.-The Sheldon court's essential holding-that regulations of expressive conduct motivated by a desire to squelch disfavored messages offend the First Amendment-is consistent with the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the First Amendment. Any regulation of expressive conduct must be justified by a substantial governmental interest or, when entirely proscribable speech is at issue, must
be aimed strictly at curtailing the secondary effects associated with
such speech. In either case, regulations of conduct must be unrelated
to the suppression of ideas.
The Maryland statute ultimately failed constitutional muster because, in specifically singling out cross burnings instead of a larger
subset of fire hazards, the statute's sweep had no legitimate relationship to the asserted government interest. Thus, the statute was underinclusive: it was tailored strictly to the disfavored expressive conduct,
not to other types of outdoor burnings whose regulation might have

108. See supra text accompanying note 51.
109. See generally Sheldon, 332 Md. at 54-55, 629 A.2d at 759 (discussing the State's original contention that it enacted the cross burning statute to protect its citizens from the
hazards of unwanted fires).
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been justified by safety considerations and without reference to
speech.
FERNANDO

I. Ruiz

IV. COrR
A.

crs

The Exercise of Bad Faith in a Land Sale Contract

In Leet v. Totah,1 the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a
remedies limitation clause in a private real estate contract despite evidence of bad faith.' Finding for the vendor, the court ruled that his
attempt to extract a purchase price far in excess of the contract price,
his subsequent conveyance of the property to his children, and his
persistence in default resulting in the expiration of the vendee loan
commitment did not negate the remedies limitation clause. 3 The
court considered none of these actions sufficiently unconscionable or
contrary to public policy to warrant judicial intervention into the parties' private agreement. 4 Although the court's decision was well
grounded in the case law and meant to reinforce the power of private
parties to fashion legally enforceable agreements, the court's permissive stance in the face of clear evidence of bad faith may undermine
its intentions by generating a reluctance to enter into private
agreements.
1. The Case.-On December 28, 1984, vendor Harry M. Leet
and purchaser Sami Totah, a real estate developer, entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of approximately 417 acres of farmland
in Montgomery County.5 Totah paid a deposit of $100,000.6
The December 1984 contract contained several important provisions. First, it required Totah to formulate a plan of development for
the property subject to approval by public authorities. 7 Second, while
the final contract price would depend on the number of lots actually
approved, the parties established a minimum purchase price of $14
million.8 This figure was based on the projected approval of approximately 1500 lots under the then applicable zoning status at the property.9 Third, Totah was given four years from December 31, 1984,
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

329 Md. 645, 620 A.2d 1372 (1993).
See id. at 666, 620 A.2d at 1382.
See id. at 660-62, 620 A.2d at 1379-80.
See id.
Id. at 648-49, 620 A.2d at 1373.
Id. at 649, 620 A.2d at 1373.
Id., 620 A.2d at 1374.
See id. at 650, 620 A.2d at 1374.
Id. During the period of the contract, the zoning status of the property was R-200.

The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, however, was developing
recommendations for a new master plan for the Germantown area of Montgomery County.
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extendable at the vendor's option, to obtain all the necessary approvals for development, and up to nine years from the date of settlement
of the first approved lots to settle on the entire property.1 0 Finally, a
preliminary plan was to be submitted to the public authorities within
180 days from the contract date.1"
The December 1984 contract contained two clauses that played a
direct role in the instant case. Under the conditions of the title warranty clause, Leet agreed to take no further actions which would affect
the title to the property in any way.1 2 The contract also contained a
remedies limitation clause designed to govern possible defaults.1 3 It
provided that if Totah breached the contract, Leet would return the
balance of the deposit plus interest and the contract would terminate.1 4 Likewise, if Leet were to default in any way including a failure
to settle, Totah had the option of either (1) collecting his deposit plus
Id. at 651, 620 A.2d at 1375. Under its final draft, issued in September 1988, the Commission recommended a continuation of the R-200 zoning on the property, but further recommended that the property be developed as a planned development floating zone, or PD-2.
Id. at 652, 620 A.2d at 1375. The master plan was approved by the Montgomery County
Council, sitting as the District Council, in June 1989. Id. at 652-53, 620 A.2d at 1375.
Totah, in fact, applied for a PD-2 zoning reclassification in August 1989. Id. After filing
suit in December 1989, Totah continued to work towards rezoning the property. Id. at 654
n.5, 620 A.2d at 1376 n.5. His request was finally approved by the Montgomery County
Council, sitting as District Council, on September 25, 1990. Id.
10. See id. at 649, 620 A.2d at 1374.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 650, 620 A.2d at 1374. As quoted by the court, the provisions of the title
warranty clause were as follows:
[T]he Seller and Agent are hereby expressly released from all liability for damages
by reason of any defect in the title, except due to act or omission of Seller subsequent to date of this Contract. From the date of acceptance of the conditions of
the contract by Purchaser, Seller shall take no action ... which will result in any
additional change to the Title or any additional encumbrance, easement, restriction, covenant, or condition on the property without the prior written consent of
Purchaser.
Id.
13. See id. at 650-51, 620 A.2d at 1374. As quoted by the court, the provisions of the
remedies limitation clause were as follows:
If Purchaser shall default under this Contract of Sale, the balance of the
Good Faith Deposit and accrued interest thereon, shall be paid to Seller,... this
Contract of Sale shall terminate and the parties hereto shall be released from
further liability or obligation to the other.
If Seller shall default under this Contract of Sale, including failure to make
full settlement pursuant to the terms hereof, Purchaser, at its option, may (i)
direct that the balance of the deposit with interest thereon be paid to Purchaser,
the Contract terminated and each party relieved of further liability or obligation
to the other, or (ii) seek relief in the courts to require specific performance.
Seller shall not be liable for money damages for any default hereunder.
Id.
14. Id.
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interest and terminating the contract, or (2) seeking specific performance through the courts. 15 The remedies limitation clause specifically
not be liable for money damages for any
provided that Leet "shall
6
default hereunder."'
On April 17, 1985, a month and a half before the deadline for the
preliminary plan, Leet and Totah met and agreed that the maximum
yield from the property would be far less than the 1500 lots originally
considered.' 7 At this point, they made several changes to the contract, including reducing the projected lot yield to 1024 lots.', Accordingly, the parties reduced the minimum purchase price to $10
million.1 9 They also extended the deadline for obtaining all approvals
by one year,2" and Totah paid $50,000 in cash to obtain an option to
extend the deadline an additional year.2 ' Finally, the parties agreed
to extend the date for submission of the preliminary plan to December 31, 1987.22
Meanwhile, after Totah had completed a title examination and
while the contract was still in effect, Leet negotiated two separate conveyances of interests in the property to his children.2 3 He*conveyed
the interests as gifts to maximize his annual gift tax exclusion as part
of his estate planning.2 4 Leet testified that in making the gifts, he
"simply forgot" his contractual obligations under the title warranty
clause.

25

In mid-December 1987, the Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Commission still had not issued its master zoning plan for
the property. This plan would have a direct affect on Totah's development scheme for the property. 26 Aware of the impending deadline
for submission of the preliminary plan, Totah wrote Leet requesting
an extension. 27 Leet responded that he would grant Totah's request
in exchange for certain changes in the contract, including an increase
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 651, 620 A.2d at 1374.
See id., 620 A.2d at 1375.
Id
Id.
Id.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 654, 620 A.2d at 1376. The two deeds were conveyed on December 31,
1986, and January 14, 1987. Id. These conveyances later formed the basis for one of

Totah's claims for damages. See infra text accompanying notes 86-90.
24. Leet, 329 Md. at 654, 620 A.2d at 1376.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 652, 620 A.2d at 1375; see also supra note 9.

27. Leet, 329 Md. at 652, 620 A.2d at 1375.
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in the minimum purchase price to $16 million.2" Refusing to accept
this offer, Totah was forced to prepare the plan in an expeditious
manner, but nonetheless succeeded in submitting the plan before the
deadline. 9
Two years later, on December 8, 1989, Totah exercised his option
to extend the deadline for approvals until December 31, 1990.0
Then, on December 19, 1989, Totah wrote to Leet calling for settlement on the entire property to be held on December 27, 1989.1
Totah anticipated paying the minimum purchase price of $10 million. 2 In a reply through counsel, Leet alleged that Totah had failed
to satisfy several conditions of the contract. 3 He threatened to cancel
34
the contract unless Totah agreed to adjust the price equitably.
When Leet failed to appear at settlement,
Totah filed suit in the Cir35
cuit Court for Montgomery County.

Count I of Totah's complaint alleged that Leet breached the contract when he failed to convey the property after Totah had called for
settlement.3 6 Totah requested relief in the form of $100 million in
damages and specific performance from Leet and his children. s7 In
Count II of the complaint, Totah alleged breach of the title warranty
clause by virtue of Leet's conveyances to his children and requested
damages and specific performance from Leet alone.3 8

28. Id This request later formed the basis of one of Totah's claims of unconscionability and bad faith. See infra text accompanying notes 91-101, 115.
29. Leet, 329 Md. at 652, 620 A.2d at 1375.
30. See id at 653, 620 A.2d at 1375. This extension was made while Totah was still
awaiting a ruling on his application for rezoning. See supra note 9.
31. Leet, 329 Md. at 653, 620 A.2d at 1375.
32. Id. Totah enclosed calculations with his letter attempting to demonstrate that the
maximum number of living units, whether under the applicable R-200 zoning or under the
proposed PD-2 zoning, would produce a purchase price, after cost of living adjustments,
below the $10 million purchase price. Id., 620 A.2d at 1375-76.
33. See id., 620 A.2d at 1376.
34. See id. The reply letter stated, "Mr. and Mrs. Leet hereby cancel the contract unless
you notify us forthwith that you will agree to adjust the price equitably." Id.
35. See id. at 654, 620 A.2d at 1376.
36. See id. at 655, 620 A.2d at 1376.
37. See id. Totah's complaint contained seven counts. Count III, alleging intentional
interference with contractual relations, was determined in favor of Leet on motion for
judgment at the close of the case. Count IV, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by the
Lees, was similarly disposed of. Neither of these judgments were cross-appealed by Totah.
Count V, based on quantum meruit, and Count VI, based on unjust enrichment, were
claimed against the Leets and not their children. Count VII, based on promissory estoppel, claimed damages against the Leets and specific performance against the Leets and
their children. Id. at 655 n.6, 620 A.2d at 1376 n.6.
38. See id
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At a hearing on pretrial motions, Totah urged that a pretrial ruling on the applicability of the remedies limitation clause was "essential" in order to ascertain the feasibility of a damage argument.3 9 The
court accepted his argument and held that "the damage waiver does
not apply... [t]o any count."40 Relying on this ruling as an endorsement of his strategy to seek damages, Totah withdrew his prayer for
specific performance.4 1
At trial, Totah sought to prevent Leet from mentioning the remedies limitation clause in his opening statement. 42 The judge allowed
Leet to argue the clause's effect, though he reiterated his commitment to instructing the jurors about the invalidity and inapplicability
of the clause to the case.4 3 At the conclusion of Leet's opening statement, Totah objected to Leet's reference to the remedies limitation
clause and requested an immediate instruction to the jury that the
clause had been ruled inapplicable.4 4 After hearing arguments on
both sides, the judge instructed the jury that "the provision ...stating
that the seller shall not be liable for money damages for any default
hereunder was void as a matter of law" and that they should "not consider that as a part of the contract." 45 The judge gave a similar instruction at the conclusion of the evidence.4 6 Subsequently, the jury
returned a verdict on Count I in favor of Totah for $15 million.4 7 This
figure represented the market value of the property at the time of
settlement, less the contract price. 4" Because the jury found that the
damages under Count I fully compensated Totah, it did not return a
verdict on Count

11.

49

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari.50
39. Id., 620 A.2d at 1377. Totah argued that "ifI know that I am faced with a contract
that gives me no damages whatsoever under the circumstances of this case, I ought to know
that at the beginning of trial, not the end." I&
40. See id. at 655-56, 620 A.2d at 1377.
41. See id. at 656 n.7, 620 A.2d at 1377 n.7.
42. See id. Totah requested "that [defense counsel] be precluded during opening argument to the jury from describing this 'you can't get any damages' clause and starting to get
the jury confused about something that you have already ruled on." Id.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 657, 620 A.2d at 1377. The objectionable reference in the opening statement
was Leet's statement that "the key to getting the right answer in this case (is to] find it in the
contract." Id.
45. Id., 620 A.2d at 1378.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 645, 620 A.2d at 1372.
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2. Legal Background.-Traditionally, courts have recognized a
strong public interest in permitting private individuals to structure legally enforceable agreements unhindered by a court of law. 5 1 Consequently, contractual clauses denying liability or limiting remedies
generally have been upheld by the Maryland judiciary. 52 As the Court
of Special Appeals stated in Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co.,53 "some courts
have designated contract provisions [denying liability] as exculpatory,
others as a limitation of liability, and still others label it as a liquidated
damages clause. Regardless of the nomenclature, courts have uniformly upheld these contract clauses."54
While the law treats contractual provisions denying or limiting
remedies in essentially the same manner, there is a conceptual difference between the two. Clauses denying liability, or exculpatory
clauses, generally relieve a party of liability for negligence.5 5 While
generally upheld, these clauses will not insulate a party from liability
56
for the more extreme forms of negligence or intentional conduct.
On the other hand, remedy limitation clauses explicitly define or limit
the remedy that can be sought for breach of contract. 57 In particular,
51. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena,
282 Md. 588, 606, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228-29 (1978) ("This reluctance on the part of the
judiciary to nullify contractual agreements... also serves to protect the public interest in
having individuals exercise broad powers to structure their own affairs by making legally
enforceable promises, a concept which lies at the heart of the freedom of contract principle."). Rather than risk frustrating the parties' intent through judicial interference, the
courts have preferred to defer to the legislature. See United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S.
457, 462 (1950) ("Nor should such an agreement of parties be frustrated by judicial 'interpretation' of contracts. If parties competent to decide for themselves are to be deprived of
the privilege of making such anticipatory provisions for the settlement of disputes, this
deprivation should come from the legislative branch.").
52. See, e.g., Maryland-Natl, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978); Schrier v. Beltway
Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 533 A.2d 1316 (1987); Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539,
514 A.2d 485 (1986); Winterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972).
53. 73 Md. App. 281, 533 A.2d 1316 (1987).
54. Id. at 287, 533 A.2d at 1319.
55. See Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 539, 514 A.2d at 485 (upholding an exculpatory provision relieving parachuting school from liability from negligence); Winterstein, 16 Md. App.
at 143, 293 A.2d at 828 (upholding an exculpatory provision relieving negligence liability
in the drag racing business).
56. See Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 543, 514 A.2d at 488 ("A waiver of a right to sue.., is
ineffective to shift the risk of a party's own wilful, wanton, reckless, or gross conduct.");
Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 136, 293 A.2d at 824-25 ("[E]xculpatory agreements otherwise
valid are not construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence-wilful, wanton,
reckless or gross. Nor do they encompass any conduct which constitutes an intentional
tort.").

57. See United States v. Moorman, 388 U.S. 457, 463 (1950) (upholding a noncontestability provision); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l
Arena, 282 Md. 588, 615, 386 A.2d 1216, 1224 (1978) (upholding a contractual provision
stipulating extrajudicial modes of dispute resolution); Schrier,73 Md. App. at 299, 533 A.2d
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these clauses are upheld in circumstances in which damage calculations are difficult, as long as the provision does not act as a penalty for
breach.5"
While courts generally enforce both exculpatory clauses and remedy limitation clauses, there are several circumstances in which they
have refused to do so. First, courts have refused to uphold provisions
that are deemed to run contrary to public policy. 9 Maryland courts
have long accepted that "considerations of public policy are deemed
paramount to private rights and where conflict between the two exists,
private interests must yield to the public good."6" Unfortunately, the
term public policy has defied concise definition. 61 The Court of Appeals has declared that "[n] o exact definition of public policy has ever
been given or can be found ....
[P]ublic policy.., at best is but a
shifting and variable notion appealed to only when no other argument is available, and which, if relied on today, may be utterly repudiated tomorrow."6 2
Because of the nebulous nature of the public policy concept,
courts have been hesitant to use it as the basis for invalidating contractual provisions.6" In Winterstein v. Wilcom,64 the Court of Special Appeals held that "[i] n the absence of legislation to the contrary, the law,
by the great weight of authority, is that there is ordinarily no public
policy which prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit
at 1324 (upholding a liquidated damage clause stipulating the damages that could be
recovered).
58. See Schrier, 73 Md. App. at 291, 533 A.2d at 1320-21 (recognizing the difficulties of
calculating damages in the context of burglar alarm contracts).
59. See Maryland-Nat'l, 282 Md. at 605, 386 A.2d at 1228.
60. Id.
61. In Maiyland-National, the Court of Appeals quoted what it considered to be "the
classical formulation of the public policy doctrine-that to which we adhere in Maryland":
Public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public
good, which may be termed, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the law, or
public policy in relation to the administration of the law.
Id. (quoting Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L. Cas. 1, 196 (1853)). The court in MarylandNationallater conceded that this definition was a "relatively indeterminate description." Id.
62. Kenneweg v. Allegany County Comm'rs, 102 Md. 119, 125, 62 A. 249, 251 (1905).
63. See Mayland-Nat' 282 Md. at 606, 386 A.2d at 1228.
Fearing the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy
principle would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations, Maryland courts have been hesitant to strike down voluntary bargains on
public policy grounds, doing so only in those cases where the challenged agreement is patently offensive to the public good, that is, where 'the common sense of
the entire community would ... pronounce it' invalid.
Id. (citation omitted).
64. 16 Md. App. 130, 293 A.2d 821 (1972).
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.".. .65 Thus, legislation can offer a concrete formulation of public
policy.66 When the legislature has explicitly prohibited a contractual
clause, usually in response to ajudicial decision upholding such a provision, the courts are willing to nullify contracts on public policy
grounds. 6 7 In the end, what is required is a judicial balancing of public and private interests, bearing in mind the law's traditional protec6
tion of private expectations and its disdain of unjust enrichment.
While courts are disinclined to annul a private agreement on
public policy grounds, there are exceptions to this general rule.6 9
One widely recognized exception is the bargaining disadvantage exception. 70 The Winterstein court held that "[w]hen one party is at such
an obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of the
contract is to put him at the mercy of the [other] ...

,

the agreement is

void as against public policy."7 1 In determining if a bargaining disadvantage exists, courts examine the situation surrounding formation of
the contract for factors such as coercion and business experience.7 2
65. Id, at 135, 293 A.2d at 824. The only state in which an exculpatory clause has been
found invalid on public policy grounds is New Hampshire. See Eastern Ave. Corp. v.

Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 480, 180 A.2d 486, 488 (1962) (commenting on the weight given
public policy considerations in New Hampshire).
66. See also United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
67. SeeWinterstein v. Wilcom, 16 Md. App. 130, 134-35, 293 A.2d 821, 824 (1972) ("[Iun
some states, subsequent to a judicial decision upholding such claims, the legislature had
enacted statutes invalidating some types of exculpatory clauses ....

In the absence of

legislation to the contrary, the law, by the great weight of authority, is that there is ordinarily no public policy which prevents the parties from contracting as they see fit .... ."). In
Maryland, landlord and tenant agreements are the only realm in which the legislature has
expressly prohibited any form of exculpatory clauses. See id. at 135, 293 A.2d at 824; see also
MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, § 40 (1992).
68. See Maryland-Nat'l Park & Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md.
588, 607, 386 A.2d 1216, 1229 (1978). In Maryland-National,the Court of Appeals noted
four factors to be considered in a court's balancing of public and private interests.
Factors weighing against enforcement of a contractual term for reasons of public
policy include: a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation and
judicial decisions; b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy; c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which
it was deliberate; d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct
and the challenged term.
Id. at 607 n.8, 386 A.2d at 1229 n.8.
69. See Boucher v. Riner, 68 Md. App. 539, 548-49, 514 A.2d 485, 490 (1986).
70. See Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 135-36, 293 A.2d at 824.
71. Id.

72. Bargaining disadvantage is to be assessed at the time of contract formation. See
Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 548-49, 514 A.2d at 490 ("[S] uch an agreement will be invalid if the
relationship of the parties is such that one party is at an obvious disadvantage in bargaining
at the time the contract is entered so that the effect of the contract is to put him at the
mercy of the other's negligence."); see also Flow Indus., Inc. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F.
Supp. 527, 531 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the difference in the sizes of two companies
does not alone suggest a bargaining disadvantage); Schrier v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md.
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A second exception to the court's reluctance to invalidate contract clauses on public policy grounds involves transactions affected
with the public interest. 73 Such transactions typically exhibit one or
more characteristics of a six factor test that Maryland courts have
adopted. 74 The six characteristics are: (1) the type of business generally is thought suitable for public regulation; (2) the party seeking
relief from liability is performing a service of great importance to the
public, often a matter of necessity to some members of the public; (3)
the party presents himself as willing to perform the service for any
member of the public, or at least those members meeting certain established criteria; (4) the party seeking relief from liability possesses a
decisive bargaining advantage due to the essential nature of its service
and due to the economic setting; (5) through an exercise of superior
bargaining power, the party presents the public with a standardized
contract of adhesion and makes no provision whereby a purchaser
may obtain protection against negligence; and (6) as a result of the
transaction, the person or property of the buyer is placed under the
seller's control and subjected to the risk and carelessness of the
seller.75 Maryland courts have held burglar alarm contracts, parachuting contracts, and drag racing contracts to be contracts not affected
76
with a public interest.
The second circumstance under which courts are willing to annul
exculpatory and remedies limitation clauses involves a finding of unconscionability." Section 2-302 of the Commercial Law Article states
App. 281, 297, 533 A.2d 1316, 1324 (1987) (finding no bargaining disadvantage in the
relationship between an alarm company and its client); Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 130, 293
A.2d at 821 (upholding an exculpatory agreement in a drag racing speedway contract).
In assessing bargaining disadvantage, courts look for evidence of some type of compulsion. See Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 550, 514 A.2d at 491 ("Boucher was under no compulsion

to make a parachute jump, and he did so merely because he wanted to do so. He was not
at a bargaining disadvantage."); Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 138, 293 A.2d at 825 ("Winterstein was under no compulsion, economic or otherwise, to race his car.").
73. In Winterstein, the Court of Special Appeals cited public utilities, common carriers,
innkeepers, and public warehousemen as examples of businesses affected with the public
interest. See Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 136, 293 A.2d at 824.
74. The Court of Special Appeals adopted the six part test in Winterstein from a leading
decision of the Supreme Court of California. See id. at 136-37, 293 A.2d at 825 (citing
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963)).
75. Id.

76. See Schrier, 73 Md. App. at 296-97, 533 A.2d at 1323; Boucher, 68 Md. App. at 551, 514
A.2d at 491; Winterstein, 16 Md. App. at 138, 293 A.2d at 825-26.
77. See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 244 N.E.2d 685, 687 (N.Y. 1968)
("[C]ontractual limitations upon remedies are generally to be enforced unless unconscionable."); Schrier, 73 Md. App. 281, 533 A.2d 1316 (refusing to find that an exculpatory clause
in a burglar alarm contract was unconscionable).
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the Maryland policy of unconscionability. 7' The first official comment
to section 2-302 explains that
[t]he basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract .... The principle is one
of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and
not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.7 9
Thus, in assessing unconscionability, courts generally look for evidence of business experience and evidence of bargaining disadvantage at the time of contract formation.
A third legal doctrine that can operate to invalidate exculpatory
and remedies limitation clauses is bad faith. Maryland courts have
made it clear that bad faith can encompass a wide variety of conduct
under a contract8s0 "[B]ad faith is not limited to 'malice, fraud or the
like."'8 1 In business transactions, Maryland courts have held "good

faith to be that ordinarily exhibited by a seller who is unable to perform through no fault or fraud of his own, while bad faith is that
shown by a seller who refuses to perform when able to do so. "82 In
fact, in cases involving a fiduciary duty, Maryland courts have held that
bad faith acts as a bar to enforcement of an exculpatory provision.8 3
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Reversing the decision of the circuit
court, the Court of Appeals held in Leet that the remedies limitation

Id.

78. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw I § 2-302 (1992). The section reads in full:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination.

79. Id. at cmt. 1.8.
80. See Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co., 279 Md. 597, 603, 369 A.2d 1048, 1052
(1977) (noting that a refusal to perform when one has the ability to do so may constitute
bad faith); Charles County Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 311 A.2d 27
(1973) (holding that the failure to execute the requisite FCC document was bad faith).
81. Beard v. S/E Joint Venture, 321 Md. 126, 140, 581 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1990).
82. Charles County BroadcastingCo., 270 Md. at 326, 311 A.2d at 31.
83. See Sullivan v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479,'496, 295 A.2d 482, 491 (1972) (holding that
evidence of bad faith would subject a trustee to liability despite an exculpatory provision).

CONTRACTS

1994]

743

clause in the contract between Totah and Leet barred any award of
money damages.8 4 In reaching its decision, the court condensed
Totah's arguments for invalidating the clause into three substantive
points and proceeded to systematically refute each one.8 5
First, the court rejected Totah's argument for damages based on
Leet's alleged breach of the title warranty clause.8 6 Totah argued that
since the title warranty clause dealt specifically with breaches related
to the quality of title, it governed Leet's conveyance of the property to
his children to the exclusion of the more general remedies limitation
clause. 87 Totah asserted that since the title warranty clause provided
no protection against damage claims, he was justified in recovering
monetary relief.88 In rejecting this argument, the court looked to the
lower court's verdict, which was based on Count I, alleging breach of
contract through failure to settle, rather than on Count II, alleging
breach of the title warranty clause.8 9 The court reasoned that a decision on whether the title warranty clause applied to Totah's alleged
breach of title could not prevent the remedies limitation clause from
applying to a breach under Count I for failure to settle. 90
Next, the court addressed Totah's argument characterizing Leet's
conduct as unconscionable.9" In making his argument, Totah principally relied on the language found in Maryland-NationalCapitalPark &
Planning Commission v. Washington National Arena:92 "[U] nless clearly
prohibited by statute, contractual limitations on judicial remedies will
be enforced, absent a positive showing of fraud, misrepresentation,
overreaching, or other unconscionable conduct on the part of the party seeking
enforcement."93 In refuting Totah's unconscionability argument, the
court looked to the situation surrounding the formation of the contract. 9 4 The court emphasized that the remedies limitation clause was
the product of arms length bargaining between sophisticated busi84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Leet, 329 Md. at 666, 620 A.2d at 1382.

Id at 658, 620 A.2d at 1378.
1I
See id, at 658-59, 620 A.2d at 1378.
1I

89. Id. at 659, 620 A.2d at 1378.
90. See id&, 620 A.2d at 1378-79. The court further stated that since no verdict was
returned on Count II, there was no fact finding on whether Leet had substantially
breached the title warranty clause. Id. Therefore, there was never any determination
whether, had the two parties gone to settlement, the Leets could have produced good title
as they claimed. The breach could have been cured in time for closing through the cooperation of the children. Id.
91. Id., 620 A.2d at 1379.
92. 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978).
93. Id. at 611, 386 A.2d at 1231 (emphasis added).
94. See Leet, 329 Md. at 660-61, 620 A.2d at 1379.
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nessmen.9 5 Furthermore, in limiting the remedies for breaches by
either party, the clause exhibited mutuality and supported an inference of a permissible business purpose. 6 The need for a remedies
limitation clause was 7 further supported by the speculative nature of
9
the real estate deal.
After examining the circumstances of formation, the court examined the remedies clause itself for evidence of unconscionability.9"
Citing the Code, the court divined the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine to be the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise,
not the disturbance of risk allocation that took into account the bargaining power of the parties. 99 The court then concluded that the
remedies clause demonstrated neither oppression nor unfair surprise.' 0 0 Further, the court cited a passage from Maryland-National
which demonstrated the reluctance of thejudiciary to nullify contracts
on highly elusive public policy grounds.' t The court did not address
Totah's allegations of bad faith.
Totah's third argument focused on the effect Leet's conveyance
to his children had on the remedies limitation clause.10 2 Totah argued that the conveyance rendered the remedy of specific performance called for under the remedies limitation clause impossible and
thus made the clause inapplicable." 3 The court, however, found that
because Totah remained the bona fide purchaser of the property de95. Id. at 660, 620 A.2d at 1379.
96. Id. at 660-61, 620 A.2d at 1379. The element of mutuality was met by the provisions
within the remedies limitation clause that dealt with defaults by either party. See supra note
13.
97. Leet, 329 Md. at 661, 620 A.2d at 1379. Courts tend to look more favorably upon
remedies limitation clauses in situations where damages are difficult to calculate at the
time of contract formation. See note 58 and accompanying text.
98. Leet, 329 Md. at 661, 620 A.2d at 1380.
99. Id. See also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
100. Leet, 329 Md. at 661, 620 A.2d at 1380.
101. See id. at 662, 620 A.2d at 1380. The quoted passage from Maryland-Nationalwas:
Fearing the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy
principle would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations, Maryland courts have been hesitant to strike down voluntary bargains on
public policy grounds, doing so only in those cases where the challenged agreement is patently offensive to the public good, that is, where 'the common sense of
the entire community would . . . pronounce it' invalid. This reluctance on the
part of the judiciary to nullify contractual arrangements on public policy grounds
also serves to protect the public interest in having individuals exercise broad powers to structure their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises, a concept which lies at the heart of the freedom of contract principle.
Maryland-Nat'l, 282 Md. at 606, 386 A.2d at 1228-29 (citations omitted).
102. Leet, 329 Md. at 662, 620 A.2d at 1380.
103. Id.
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spite Leet's conveyance, specific performance under the contract was
still possible.1" 4 The court cited an extensive line of Maryland cases
upholding the claims of bona fide purchasers to subsequent grantees. 10 5 The court also found that the expiration of Totah's loan commitment did
not prevent the court from fashioning an equitable
106
remedy.
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's ruling that the remedies
limitation clause was not unconscionable was consistent with established Maryland law. 10 7 The court correctly emphasized that the contract was the result of an arm's-length deal between two sophisticated
businessmen who negotiated for a permissible business purpose.10 8 It
104. See id. at 663, 620 A.2d at 1380-81.
105. 1& at 664, 620 A.2d at 1381. Maryland courts have adhered to a consistent interpretation of the bona fide purchaser doctrine. Under this doctrine, one who purchases real
property with actual knowledge of prior claims to that property is not protected as the
bona fide purchaser. See Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 343, 196 A.2d 893, 896
(1964) ('And it is well settled that one who purchases real property, with actual knowledge
of prior equities, is not protected as a bona fide purchaser, but such a purchaser takes the
property subject to the known equities.. . ."). In Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225
Md. 433, 171 A.2d 736 (1961), the court stated that "[t]he general rule is that a purchaser
of real estate takes subject to outstanding equitable interests in the property, which are
enforceable against him to the same extent they are enforceable against the vendor, where
the purchaser is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser." Id. at 450, 171 A.2d
at 743.
Maryland also imposes a duty to investigate upon the subsequent purchaser. See Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 257, 72 A.2d 697, 699 (1950) (-[A] purchaser cannot fail to
investigate when the propriety of the investigation is naturally suggested by circumstances
known to him; and if he neglects to make such inquiry, he will be held guilty of bad faith
and must suffer from his neglect."). Maryland courts have further held that constructive
notice will bar a subsequent purchaser's claim. See Fertitta v. Bayshore Dev. Corp., 266 Md.
59, 73, 291 A.2d 662, 669 (1972) ("That which is sufficient to excite inquiry is notice of
such facts as would lead an ordinarily prudent man to make an examination."); Lewis v.
Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 162, 383 A.2d 676, 680 (1978) ('Even constructive notice of prior
unrecorded equities will preclude the grantee from being a bona fide purchaser. .. ").
106. See Lee, 329 Md. at 665, 620 A.2d at 1381. Courts have endorsed the power of a
court of equity to fashion remedies according to the exigencies of the particular case. See
Castle v. Cohen, 840 F.2d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1988) ("While a court at law usually issues an
unconditional judgment, a court of equity may, in its discretion, condition its decree on
some performance by the plaintiff.").
In closing, the court made a final procedural ruling in favor of Leet. Leet, 329 Md. at
666, 620 A.2d at 1382. Totah maintained that Leet had failed to preserve his claim on
appeal by neglecting to make any post-charge exception to the instruction to the jury to
ignore the remedies limitation clause. Id. The court dismissed Totah's argument, noting
that the issue of the applicability of the clause had been fully argued twice by both parties.
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 39-46. Under these unique circumstances, the court
reasoned that Leet's claim had been preserved. Leet, 329 Md. at 666, 620 A.2d at 1382.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
108. See Leet, 329 Md. at 660, 620 A.2d at 1379; see also Flow Indus., Inc. v. Fields Constr.
Co., 683 F. Supp. 527, 531 (D. Md. 1988) ('Because the transactions here involved are
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would be difficult to characterize the terms of a land contract as an
unfair surprise to a real estate developer, particularly considering that
the instrument was drafted at Totah's own office. 09a Furthermore, the
remedies limitation clause exhibited mutuality by defining and limiting remedies for both the seller and the purchaser in the event of a
breach.' 0 The court also correctly indicated that, due to the complicated nature of the real estate deal, computing damages in the event
of a breach would be difficult.1 1 ' This factor is one that is frequently
considered in support of a remedies limitation clause.
The court's endorsement of the remedies limitation clause reaffirmed its commitment to a judicially prudent stance toward private
contracts. The decision assured private parties that, absent evidence
of unconscionability, the instruments they negotiate will be legally enforceable. The court refused to reallocate the risk as defined by the
parties through a redefinition of their agreement and eschewed the
imposition of its own judgment on the fairness and providence of the
contract terms.
The court's holding that specific performance remained available
to Totah despite Leet's subsequent conveyance to his children was
also consistent with established Maryland precedent." 2 The children,
as subsequent purchasers, had an affirmative duty to investigate the
title; they were not bona fide purchasers."' Thus, the court correctly
concluded that Leet's conveyance did not preclude the remedy of specific performance." 4
The court failed, however, to address Totah's allegations of bad
faith, an omission that may have significant ramifications on the use of
private contracts. As quoted by the court, Totah's bad faith claims
were based on Leet's "'(1) attempting to extract from Totah sums
vastly in excess of the contract price; (2) deliberately disabling himself
from conveying the Property by unauthorized conveyances to his children; and (3) persisting in his default for such a protracted period of
time that Totah's ability to perform expired together with a loan comcommercial ones involving business entities, the clauses are presumptively valid."); Schrier
v. Beltway Alarm Co., 73 Md. App. 281, 294-95, 533 A.2d 1316, 1322-23 (1987) (assessing
the business nature of the relationship between a burglar alarm company and its client).
109. See Leet, 329 Md. at 660, 620 A.2d at 1379.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 661, 620 A.2d at 1379; see also Schrier, 73 Md. App. at 291, 533 A.2d at 1320
(recognizing the difficulty in computing damages as a factor to be considered).
112. Leet, 329 Md. at 663-64, 620 A.2d at 1380-81; see supra note 105.
113. See supra note 105.
114. See Leet, 329 Md. at 663, 620 A.2d at 1380-81.
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mitment that simply could not be renewed.'""1 5 The court did not
address Totah's first allegation of bad faith at all and merely addressed the second two in a circuitous manner so as to benefit Leet.
For example, instead of focusing on Leet's attempt to convey the
property as evidence of his bad faith, the court emphasized only that
his actions did not infringe upon Totah's bona fide purchaser status.1 16 Similarly, the court stressed that the circuit court could redress
the predicament Totah was placed in as a result of Leet's protracted
default, rather than focusing
on the fact that Leet intentionally cre17
ated that predicament.
Had the court confronted the issue of bad faith, it would have
had to recognize the abundant evidence of Leet's bad faith in the
record. Maryland courts have endorsed the notion that "'the vendor
acts in bad faith [when] .. .having title he refuses to convey, or dis-

ables himself from conveying."'1 1 " Further, bad faith has been described as "'that shown by a seller who refuses to perform when able
to do so.""" Leet was well able to perform, but persisted in making
extreme demands on Totah.1 2 ° In fact, Leet's acquisitive and self-serving behavior was the foremost cause of the contract breakdown.1 2 '
Prior to Leet, the Court of Appeals held that the exercise of bad
faith by a party to a contract may estop enforcement of a remedies
limitation clause or exculpatory provisions when the parties share a
fiduciary relationship. 22 A recent decision of the court suggested extending the applicability of the bad faith doctrine beyond fiduciary
relationships.1 2 Moreover, Maryland courts have recognized the bad
faith doctrine in the context of business relationships1 24 and consist115. Id. at 660, 620 A.2d at 1379.
116. See id. at 663, 620 A.2d at 1380-81.
117. See id. at 665, 620 A.2d at 1381-82.
118. Hupp v. George R. Rembold Bldg. Co., 279 Md. 597, 602, 369 A.2d 1048, 1051
(1977) (quoting Hammond v. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374, 387 (1870)).
119. I. at 603, 369 A.2d at 1052 (quoting Homer v. Beasley, 105 Md. 193, 198, 65 A.
820, 822 (1907)).
120. See supra notes 23-25, 28, 33-35 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. See Sullivan v. Mosner, 266 Md. 479, 496, 295 A.2d 482, 491 (1972) (holding that an
exculpatory provision did not protect a trustee from liability for acts "committed in bad
faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference").
123. See Beard v. S/E Joint Venture, 321 Md. 126, 140, 581 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1990)
(extending bad faith from the limitations of "fraud, malice, and the like" in the context of
a real estate transaction).
124. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text; see also Beard, 321 Md. at 126, 581
A.2d at 1275 (recognizing bad faith in the context of a real estate negotiation); Charles
County Broadcasting Co. v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 334, 311 A.2d 27, 35 (1973) (recognizing
bad faith in the context of a contract to sell a radio station).
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ently have held that exculpatory clauses afford no protection from liability for intentional or reckless acts. 25 In Leet, the court nevertheless
refused to extend the bad faith doctrine to encompass remedies limitation clauses. Perhaps the court was reluctant to impose behavioral
guidelines on sophisticated parties to business transactions, but by refusing to confront the issue of the exercise of bad faith in connection
with remedies limitation clauses, the court significantly altered the relationship between vendors and purchasers in land sale contracts.
Remedies limitation clauses tend to favor vendors, particularly in
the context of land sale transactions. 126 By permitting bad faith conduct to exist legally under a remedies limitation clause, the court
granted even more of an advantage to vendors under such contracts.
Vendors are now free to engage in harmful and opportunistic behavior without fear of invalidating remedies limitation clauses. In so allowing, the court, while attempting to reaffirm its commitment to the
principles of freedom of contract, may actually have undermined the
utility of that freedom. As a result of the Leet decision, parties may
hesitate to enter into contracts under which a party can engage in bad
faith behavior without repercussion.
5. Conclusion.-In Leet, the Court of Appeals upheld a remedies
limitation clause in a private real estate contract. In so ruling, the
court fortified the power of private parties to make legally enforceable
contracts absent strong showings of contravening public policy or unconscionability concerns. The court's diffident position towards interfering in private contracts was justified considering the potentially
calamitous effects judicial interference might have on private negotiations of contracts. However, by avoiding an opportunity to extend the
bad faith doctrine to include actions committed under a contractual
obligation limiting remedies, the court may have unwittingly included
an "Achilles heel" in its attempt to encourage freedom of contract.
The court's validation of rather questionable conduct under a real
estate contract may ultimately deter parties from entering into agreements under which they cannot obtain ajudicial remedy for bad faith
conduct.
DOROTHY

C.

ALEVIZATOS

125. See supra note 56.
126. See Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30

UCLA L. Rv. 898, 913 (1983) ("'A liquidated damages provision in a land sale contract is
usually to the advantage of the vendor.'") (quoting Fabian v. Sather, 316 N.W.2d 10, 13
(Minn. 1982)).
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CRIMINAL LAW

Intent and Claim of Right as Elements of Robbery in Maryland

In Jupiter v. State,' the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
"whether forcibly taking from a licensed seller of alcoholic beverages
beer that the seller intended to sell to legally eligible members of the
public constitutes robbery where full payment is made."' The court
held that such circumstances evidence a felonious intent and do not
afford the defendant a claim of right.3 In so holding, the court abrogated the claim of right defense to robbery when the transaction
would have been illegal even if consensual.4 The court's holding was
consistent with Maryland decisions construing felonious intent, the
common law of felonious intent, and sound public policy.
1. The Case.--Parched from a day's duck hunting, John Mitchell
Jupiter entered Captain John's Crab House and Marina (Captain
John's) and asked to purchase a six-pack of beer.' Warren Yates, the
owner of Captain John's, replied that he would not sell the beer to
Jupiter because he appeared to be intoxicated. 6 Jupiter pleaded with
Yates to sell him a single can of beer, but Yates again refused.7 At that
point, the discussion ended, and Jupiter left the establishment.' He
returned moments later carrying a shotgun that he had retrieved from
his vehicle. 9 Positioning the gun on the counter so that it pointed at
Yates, Jupiter once again inquired, "Are you going to sell it to me
now?"" "Yes, sir," replied Yates as he produced a six-pack of
Budweiser from a cooler behind the counter."1 In the meantime, Jupiter had placed a twenty-dollar bill on the counter. 12 Yates took the
bill and gave Jupiter sixteen dollars in change.1 " With his change and
1. 328 Md. 635, 616 A.2d 412 (1992).
2. Id. at 636, 616 A.2d at 413.
3. Id. at 639-40, 616 A.2d at 414-15.
4. Id. at 646, 616 A.2d at 418.
5. Id. at 636, 616 A.2d at 413.
6. Id. Jupiter probably appeared intoxicated because earlier that day he and three
friends drank two and one-half cases of beer. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The shotgun contained one shell. Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 636-37, 616 A.2d at 413.
Id. at 637, 616 A.2d at 413.
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beer in hand, Jupiter left Captain John's and drove away. 4 An employee of Captain John's notified the police, who stopped and arrested Jupiter.as
A jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County found Jupiter
guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon, robbery, assault, and driving
under the influence of alcohol.' 6 Arguing that his conduct did not
constitute robbery, Jupiter appealed to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals.1 7 He relied primarily on The Fisherman's Case, 8 decided in
sixteenth-century England, in which a fisherman who was going to the
market with some fish to sell refused to sell the fish to the
defendant. a9
"[W] hereupon the [defendant] tooke away some of the Fishermans [sic] fishes against his will, and gave him more money
for them than they were worth, but the Fisherman was
thereby put in feare, whereupon the other was indicted...
but judgment was respited, 20 for that the court doubted
whether it was felony or no."
Accordingly, Jupiter argued that The Fisherman's Case held that one
who forces a merchant to sell goods intended for sale is not guilty of
robbery and cited several commentators in support of this view. 21 He
claimed that "the facts of The Fisherman's Case portray the lack, as a
matter of law, of the mens rea necessary to support common law larceny or robbery."2 2 The Court of Special Appeals was not persuaded
by this argument and affirmed the circuit court in an unreported
opinion. 2 ' The Court of Appeals granted certiorarito determine if the
14. Id.
15. Id. Jupiter was arrested because his vehicle met the description the employee had
given and because he was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. Id.
16. Id. The court sentenced Jupiter to 10 years for robbery with a deadly weapon,
merged the robbery and assault charges, and imposed a concurrent 60-day sentence for
driving under the influence. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Fisherman'sCase was decided circa 1584 and was reported by a number of commentators. See, e.g., M. DALTON, THE COUNTRYJUSTICE 235 (1622); 2 E. EAST, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 661-62 (1803); 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98 (4th ed. 1762). Jupiter
contended that The Fisherman's Case was controlling in the instant case because it established a common law principle that has never been altered in Maryland. Jupiter, 328 Md. at
638-39, 616 A.2d at 414.
19. DALTON, supra note 18, at 235.
20. Id.
21. Jupiter, 328 Md. at 637-39, 616 A.2d at 413-14. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 243 (1769) ("But it is doubted, whether the forc-

ing of a higgler or other chapman to sell his wares, and giving him the full value of them,
amounts to so heinous a crime as robbery.") (footnote omitted).
22. Jupiter,328 Md. at 639, 616 A.2d at 414.
23. Id. at 637, 616 A.2d at 413.
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State proved robbery. 24 By a five to two majority, the court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, finding that Jupiter had
the necessary intent to commit robbery and had no claim of right to
the beer.25
2. Legal Backgound.-In Maryland, robbery is a common law offense.2 6 Courts have defined it as "the felonious taking and carrying
away of the personal property of another from his person by the use of
violence or by putting in fear."2 7 Maryland law defines property as
"anything of value."2 8 Although the amount of value is relevant only
with respect to sentencing, "[t]hat there is some value, however, is an
element of the crime, for, if the item at issue has no value whatever, it
is not 'property' under the statute."2 9 In order for the taking to be
felonious, it must be done with a specific intent and without a claim of
right.3 0
a. Intent.-In Williams v. State,"l the court explained that
"[t]he word 'felonious' when used in connection with the taking of
property means a taking with the intent to steal."3 2 Intent to steal is
demonstrated where the defendant, at the time of the taking, has the
"intention of converting [the property] to a use other than that of the
owner without his consent."3 3 Where consent is obtained by fraud,
constitute a valid consent and will
force or intimidation, it does not
34
intent.
felonious
the
not negate
b. Where Payment is Made.-Priorto Jupiter, Maryland courts
had not considered the effect that payment for goods held out for sale
has on the intent to deprive a merchant of property. Other jurisdictions, however, have confronted circumstances not unlike those of the
Fisherman's Case of 1584. In Mason v. State,35 for example, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas decided a case in which the defendants
insisted that a merchant, who kept beer for sale in his house, sell a keg
24. Id.
25. Id. at 643, 646, 616 A.2d at 416, 418.
26. Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792, 490 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1985).
27. Id.
28. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340(h) (1992).
29. Stackowitz v. State, 68 Md. App. 368, 373-74, 511 A.2d 1105, 1108 (1986).
30. Jupiter,328 Md. at 639, 616 A.2d at 414.
31. 302 Md. 787, 490 A.2d 1277 (1985).
32. Id. at 792-93, 490 A.2d at 1280.

33. State v. Cover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d 378, 381 (1973).
34. Farlow v. State, 9 Md. App. 515, 517, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (1970).
35. 32 Ark. 238 (1877).
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of beer to them.3 6 The merchant refused to sell the beer because he
had gone to bed.3 7 The following morning, he discovered that a gallon of beer, worth about thirty cents, had been taken.3 ' The defendants returned the next day, admitted to the taking, and offered to pay
three dollars for the beer. 9 The merchant refused the money, and
the defendants were tried and convicted of larceny.4" Reasoning that
"[a] felonious or criminal intent[ ] is an essential constituent of larceny, " " the appellate court held that the intended payment contradicted the requisite felonious intent and reversed the decision.4 2
Similarly, in Pyles v. State,43 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
was confronted with a case in which the defendant took several bundles of oats from a field.44 The defendant testified that he intended to
pay for the oats when he arrived at the owner's residence, a quarter of
a mile from where the oats were taken, but the owner intercepted him
along the way and made him throw the oats into the road.4 5 The trial
court failed to give an instruction that if the defendant had an intent
to pay for the oats, he was not guilty of a felonious taking.4 6 Reversing
the guilty verdict, the appellate court remanded the case and instructed "that if appellant, when he took the oats, had no fraudulent
intent, but took them with a view of paying for the same, and the jury
so believed, he was entitled to an acquittal."4 7 Two modern courts
have reached an analogous conclusion where the defendants took
property with an intent to pay.4"
c. Lucri Causa.-Lucricausa refers to the defendant's intent
to appropriate the thing taken to his benefit or to derive a profit from
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 239.
39. Id. The merchant said that he would accept $30, but the defendants refused. Id.
40. Id. at 238.
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id. at 240. The court emphasized that the merchant kept beer for sale, that the
defendants were intimately acquainted with the merchant and had been his customers for
years, and "the only reason for not letting them have it... was that he had retired to bed,
and did not wish to get up." Id.
43. 136 S.W. 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Lee v. Commonwealth, 105 S.E.2d 152 (Va. 1958) (defendant took tire from a
service station); People v. Jaso, 84 Cal. Rptr. 567 (Cal. App. 1970) (defendant took article
of clothing from department store).
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the theft.4 9 At common law, lucri causa was an essential element of the
felonious intent necessary to prove larceny or robbery. 5 ° The old English case of Rex v. Morfit 1 demonstrates the degree to which courts
have stretched to find the requisite lucri causa. There, the defendants,
who were in charge of taking care of their master's horses, were tried
for the felonious stealing of two bushels of beans."2 The jury found
that the defendants intended to give the beans to their master's horses.5" Reasoning that "the purpose to which the prisoners intended to
apply the beans did not vary the case," eight of the eleven judges declared the defendants guilty of a felony.5 4 They insisted that "the additional quantity of beans would diminish the work of the men who
had to look after the horses, so that the master not only lost his beans,
...
but the men's labour was lessened, so that the 'lucri causa,' to give
themselves ease, was an ingredient in the case." 5 5
Despite the necessity of lucri causa at common law, the Court of
Appeals, in Canton National Bank v. American Bonding & Trust Co.,56
repudiated the lucri causa requirement.5 7 The court decided to align
itself with "the weight of authority[, which holds that] the felonious
intent required for larceny is not necessarily an intent to gain advantage for the defendant. An intention to deprive the owner of his
property is enough.""
d. Claim of Right.--Section 343(c) of Maryland's consolidated theft statute provides: "It is a defense to the offense of theft that
...

[t]he defendant acted under a good faith claim of right to the

property involved."59 Although section 343 does not define claim of
right, "it is clear that this defense usually arises when a person asserts a
right to the property on demand in satisfaction of a claim."60
A number of jurisdictions, due to public policy considerations
against condoning self-help and the use of force to obtain property,
49.
(1970).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Rex v. Morfit, 168 Eng. Rep. 817 (1816). See generally 50 AM. JUR. 2d Larceny § 39

See supra note 49.
168 Eng. Rep. 817 (1816).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
111 Md. 41, 73 A. 684 (1909).
Id. at 44-45, 73 A. at 685.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 343(c) (1992).
60. Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 148, 482 A.2d 483, 487 (1984).
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have limited the claim of right defense in certain cases. 61 For example, where the "defendant's purported 'right' was based on his participation in [a] forgery ring,"62 the California Supreme Court stated:
As a matter of law, one cannot have a good faith belief that
he has a right to property when that "right" is rooted in a
notoriously illegal transaction. A fortiori one cannot have
such a belief when he actually knows the transaction on
which the "right" is based is illegal.6"
The Court of Special Appeals adopted an analogous construction
of claim of right in Cates v. State.6 4 "The phrase claim of right ....when
applied to an intentional taking of property, must be given a limited
and not a broad interpretation. [It] must be taken to require a legally
recognizable right which can be successfully asserted in our courts."6"
Accordingly, the defendant, who lost money in a crap game and recaptured the money from the winner by force, was guilty of robbery.6 6
3. The Court's Reasoning.-InJupiter, the Court of Appeals confronted the question of whether forcibly taking beer from a licensed
seller of alcoholic beverages constitutes robbery when full payment is
made.67 The court began its analysis with a synopsis of the commentaries supporting Jupiter's interpretation of The Fisherman's Case,6" but
61. Several courts have held that the claim of right defense is available only where the
defendant was reclaiming a specific object that was the basis of a prior claim of right. See,
e.g., Thomas v. State, 584 So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 587 So. 2d
1331 (Fla. 1991); State v. Brighter, 608 P.2d 855, 859 (Haw. 1980); People v. Reid, 508
N.E.2d 661, 664 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Winston, 295 S.E.2d 46, 51 (W. Va. 1982); Edwards v.
State, 181 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (Wis. 1970).
Other courts have held that the claim of right defense is not available where the defendant sought to retake the profits of illegal activity. See, e.g., Cates v. State, 21 Md. App.
363, 374, 320 A.2d 75, 82 (gambling losses), cert. denied, 272 Md. 739 (1974); Reid, 508
N.E.2d at 664 (drug money); Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 433 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa. 1981)
(gambling).
Finally, although there is no consensus on this point, some courts have suggested that
claim of right should be abolished entirely as a defense to robbery. See, e.g., State v. Schaefer, 790 P.2d 281, 284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Thomas, 584 So. 2d at 1026; State v. Ortiz, 305
A.2d 800, 801-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Sleighter, 433 A.2d at 471.
62. People v. Gates, 743 P.2d 301, 310 (Cal. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988).
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. 21 Md. App. 363, 320 A.2d 75, cert. denied, 272 Md. 739 (1974).
65. Id. at 369, 320 A.2d at 79.
66. Id. at 374, 320 A.2d at 82.
67. Jupiter, 328 Md. at 636, 616 A.2d at 413.
68. Id. at 637-38, 616 A.2d 413-14 (citing DALTON, supra note 18; BLACKSTONE, supra
note 21; ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 343-45 (3d ed. 1982)); see
also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (describing the facts and outcome of The
Fisherman's Case). The court also cited § 223.1 (3)(c) of the Model Penal Code, which
provides a defendant with a claim of right defense where he or she "took property exposed
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quickly turned to other commentators, who in criticizing the case,
have concluded that it presented a question of fact, rather than law,
"as to the defendant's intent."6
Furthermore, even if The Fisherman'sCase was decided as a matter
of law, the court concluded that the facts in Jupiterwere distinguishable from those in The Fisherman's Case.7" "Whatever the vitality of that
400 year old decision, the facts of this case are different. It was not
because of the '[p] erverseness of his [h]umor' that Yates refused to sell
beer to Jupiter. Yates was prohibited by law from selling to intoxicated
persons." 7' Because Yates informed Jupiter that he could not sell beer
to an intoxicated patron, "the evidence clearly was sufficient to support jury findings that Jupiter knew that he did not have a right to
purchase beer, that he intended to take it in any event, and that he
72
took it away with the intent permanently to deprive the owner of it."
In order for Jupiter to defend against the robbery charge as a matter
of law, the court indicated that he must demonstrate that he lacked an
intent to deprive the victim of any value, or "that paying for the goods
7
conclusively establishes a good faith claim of right to the goods." 1
The court explained that Jupiter was not entitled to either defense.
for sale, intending to purchase and pay for it promptly." Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 223.1 (3)(c) & cmt. at 157-59 (1980)).
69. Jupiter, 328 Md. at 638, 616 A.2d at 414; see, e.g., 2 RUSSELL ON CRIME 964 (Turner
l1th ed. 1958) ("It does not necessarily follow as a conclusion of law that if the value of the
thing taken is offered to be paid at the time, the intent is, therefore, not felonious, yet such
a circumstance could be evidence tending to show a belief in a right to take the thing upon
payment for it.") (citation omitted); EAST, supra note 18, at 662 ("And the circumstance of
the party's offering the full value or more at the time ought to be left to them [the jury] to
shew that his intention was not fraudulent, and so not felonious: for it does not necessarily
follow as a conclusion of law, that if the value of the thing taken be offered to be paid at
the time, the intent is therefore not felonious; though it is, I apprehend, pregnant evidence of the negative.") (citation omitted)); see also Pyles v. State, 136 S.W. 464, 464-65
(Tex. Crim. App. 1911).
70. Jupiter, 328 Md. at 639, 616 A.2d at 414.
71. Id. (quoting 1 W. HAWINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 97 (4th ed. 1762). Section 118 of
Article 2B provides that "[a] licensee licensed under this article, or any employee of the
licensee, may not sell or furnish any alcoholic beverages at any time to... any person who,
at the time of the sale, or delivery, is visibly under the influence of any alcoholic beverage."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a) (1) (ii) (1990). Section 200 provides:
Any person violating the provisions of this article for which no penalty, other than
the suspension or revocation of a license or permit, is provided, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or to imprisonment for not
more than two years in the House of Correction, or jail, or both fined and
imprisoned.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 200 (1990).

72. Jupiter,328 Md. at 640, 616 A.2d at 414.
73. Id.
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a. Felonious Intent.-In order to determine whether Jupiter
lacked the intent to permanently deprive Yates of value, the court analyzed two elements of felonious intent. 74 First, the court established
that although "[a] theft must have as its object something of value[,
q]uantifying the value is not important to whether a theft was committed. Nevertheless, it is essential that the thing taken have some
value." 75 The value requirement of common law larceny "merely ensures that the defendant's conduct constitutes a crime against property."76 The value requirement was met in the instant case.
Second, the court noted the repudiation in Maryland of the common law requisite of lucri causa.7 Because lucri causa is no longer a
necessary element of robbery in Maryland, the Jupiter court stated:
"Our repudiation of any lucri causa requirement exercised this Court's
power to change the common law and is applicable to Jupiter's conduct. Therefore, Jupiter cannot rely on The Fisherman's Case for the
proposition that robbery requires an intent to deprive the possessor of
value."7 8
b. Claim of Right.-Because robbery is a common law crime
in Maryland,79 the court evaluated Jupiter's claim of right defense
under common law principles.8 0 First, the court distilled Jupiter's de74. Id. at 640-43, 616 A.2d at 415-16.
75. Id. at 640, 616 A.2d at 415; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 340(h) (1992); Fisher v.
Warden, 224 Md. 669, 670, 168 A.2d 520, 521 (1961); Stackowitz v. State, 68 Md. App. 368,
372-74, 511 A.2d 1105, 1107-08, cert. denied, 307 Md. 599, 516 A.2d 569 (1986).
76. Jupiter,328 Md. at 640, 616 A.2d at 415. Explaining that the value requirement is
rarely an issue, the court proffered a hypothetical situation where the requirement might
present a quandary:
If, for instance, a person asks another for the time of day, and the other refuses,
but the person who inquired learns the time by glancing at the other's watch, the
one who looked at the watch has not committed theft because that person did not
take property of value. If an accused held a gun to a victim's head to force the
victim to divulge the time, arguably the accused did not commit robbery, for the
same reason.
Id.

77. Id. at 643, 616 A.2d at 416; see supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text; see also
Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 352, 473 A.2d 903, 913 (lucri causa held not required when
the clothes of a rape victim were taken without the intent to derive a benefit from the
taking), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTt, JR., SUB.
STANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 8.5, at 357 (1986).
78. Jupiter,328 Md. at 643, 616 A.2d at 416 (citations omitted).
79. West v. State, 312 Md. 197, 202, 539 A.2d 231, 233 (1988).
80. Jupiter,328 Md. at 643-44, 616 A.2d at 416. Maryland's consolidated theft statute
provides that "[i]t is a defense to theft that: (1) The defendant acted under a good faith
claim of right to the property involved." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 343(c) (1992). Because
§ 343 does not define claim of right, see Sibert v. State, 301 Md. 141, 148, 482 A.2d 483, 487
(1984), the statute essentially codifies the common law meaning of the defense.
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fense into a "supposed consent" argument that "those who force
merchants of goods to sell their goods do not commit robbery because the merchants have been forced only to do what the merchants
held themselves out as willing to do."81 Assuming that in The Fisherman's Case "the evidence of mens rea was insufficient as a matter of law
to convict the fish 'purchaser' because of a claim of right," 2 the court
proceeded to distinguish Jupiter from The Fisherman's Case."3 Jupiter
knew that the merchant was prohibited from selling the goods because of a criminal statute, 4 whereas the fish purchaser was refused
the fish because of the fisherman's mood." Consequently, Jupiter did
not possess a good faith claim of right to the beer. 6
Although the Jupitercourt agreed with the public policy underlying the decisions of other jurisdictions to limit the claim of right defense, 7 it "decline[d] the State's invitation to abrogate the [claim of
right] defense altogether.""8 The court did hold, however, that "the
defense is not applicable to robbery when the transaction that the robbery effects would be illegal even if it were consensual." 9 Although
the court noted that "the criminal laws proscribing the sale of alcoholic beverages to apparently intoxicated persons are directed at the
seller rather than the buyer . . .it is reasonable to charge the buyer

with knowledge that the transaction itself was illegal."" ° Accordingly,
the court held Jupiter was not entitled to a good faith claim of right
defense as a matter of law. 9 '
4.

Analysis.-

a. Intent.--Although the dissent accused the court of "distort[ing] the common law of larcenous intent beyond recognition,"9 2
the court's analysis of the intent requirement was consistent with
Maryland decisions construing felonious intent and the common law
of felonious intent. Maryland has defined felonious intent as the "intention of converting [the property taken] to a use other than that of
81. Jupiter,328 Md. at 644, 616 A.2d at 416.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 645, 616 A.2d at 417.
Id.
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a)(1)(ii) (1990).
Jupiter,328 Md. at 645, 616 A.2d at 417.
Id.
Id. at 645-46, 616 A.2d at 417; see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
Jupiter,328 Md. at 646, 616 A.2d at 418.
Id.
Id. at 647, 616 A.2d at 418.
Id.
Id. at 653, 616 A.2d at 421 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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the owner without his consent."93 Because Yates's intended "use" of
the beer was to sell it to customers who were not visibly intoxicated,
that intent was violated when Jupiter forced Yates to sell to him. Furthermore, consent obtained by fraud, force, or intimidation does not
negate felonious intent.9 4 The sale was not consensual because consent was procured only by pointing the shotgun at Yates to frighten
and intimidate him. Finally, a defendant need not have the intent to
derive a profit from the taking to have a felonious intent.9 5 Therefore, it is irrelevant thatJupiter compensated Yates for the value of the
beer and that he obviously lacked the intent to derive a profit from
the taking. Thus, Jupiter manifested the requisite felonious intent for
robbery.
The court also correctly distinguished the Fisherman's Case from
Jupiter.96 Unlike the Fisherman, Yates did not hold out his merchandise for sale to the general public. Rather, as mandated by Maryland
law, the liquor was for sale only to legally eligible-in this case, sobermembers of the public.9 7 Yates intended to operate his business
within the confines of the law and to avoid the penalties for its
violation.9 8
Finally, the dissent accused the majority of "fail [ing] to set forth
any guiding and logical principles for identifying those circumstances
where the 'intent to steal' element is abrogated."9 9 The court did not,
however, abrogate the intent to steal requirement. Rather, it simply
analyzed the defendant's conduct in terms of the existing elements of
felonious intent and concluded that those elements were satisfied. 0 0
b. Claim of Right.-In Jupiter, the Court of Appeals joined
those jurisdictions which, due to public policy reasons, have limited
the claim of right defense.1" 1 Although the court declined to abrok)

93. State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 606, 298 A.2d 378, 381 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
94. Farlow v. State, 9 Md. App. 515, 517, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (1970).
95. Canton Nat'l Bank v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 111 Md. 41, 44-45, 73 A. 684,
685 (1877).
96. The other cases that the dissent relies upon for support, see Jupiter,328 Md. at 64951, 616 A.2d at 419-20 (Eldridge, J., dissenting), may be distinguished on the same basis.
For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118.
98. That the goods were held out only to sober members of the public takes the case
out of the dissent's formulation of the rule that "[i]f the defendant intends to pay for the
goods, and they are goods held out for sale to the general public, then the intent element
of larceny is absent." Jupiter, 328 Md. at 651, 616 A.2d at 420 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 652, 616 A.2d at 421 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 639-43, 616 A.2d at 414-16; see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
101. Jupiter,328 Md. at 645-46, 616 A.2d at 417-18; see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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gate the claim of right defense entirely, 10 2 the court abolished claim
of right as a defense to robbery "when the transaction that the robbery
effects would be illegal even if it were consensual." ' In other words,
even though a merchant's "supposed consent" to a sale might be inferred from the holding of the merchandise out for sale to the public,
when a seller or buyer is legally prohibited from consummating the
sale, a buyer may not benefit from a claim of right defense to robbery.
This holding not only supports the public policy of discouraging forcible self-help, but also is consistent with the theory behind a goodfaith
claim of right defense.10 4 Because Jupiter was aware of the vendor's
refusal to consent to the sale, whatever claim of right Jupiter had was
not held in good faith.
5. Conclusion.-In Jupiter v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
"forcibly taking from a licensed seller of alcoholic beverages beer that
the seller intended to sell to legally eligible members of the public
constitutes robbery where full payment is made."10 5 Consistent with
Maryland precedent, the court found adequate evidence of felonious
intent. 10 6 The court also reasoned that under the circumstances, full
payment did not impart the defendant a good faith claim of right.10 7
In so holding, the court abrogated the claim of right defense to robbery when the transaction would be illegal even if consensual 0 8 This
holding is consistent with both sound public policy and the legislative
mandate of Maryland's consolidated theft statute.1 0 9
IRENE BUTTERMAN

B. Limiting the Right to Imperfect Self-Defense
In Richmond v. State,' the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the mitigation doctrine of imperfect self-defense, available to
defendants accused of nonhomicide crimes, requires proof of malice.
102. Jupiter,328 Md. at 646, 616 A.2d at 418.
103. Id. The court merely extended the holding in Cates v. State, 21 Md. App. 363, 320
A.2d 75 (1974), to encompass an illegal purchase. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying

text.
104. Jupiter,328 Md. at 646-47, 616 A.2d at 418; see MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 343(c)(1)
(quoted supra note 80); cf M.P.C. § 223.1(3)(c) (omitting "good faith" qualification)
(cited supra note 68).

105.
106.
107.
108.

Jupiter, 328 Md. at 636, 643, 646, 616 A.2d at 413, 416, 418.
Id. at 640-43, 616 A.2d at 415-16.
Id. at 643-47, 616 A.2d at 416-18.
Id. at 646, 616 A.2d at 418.

109. See supra note 80.

1. 330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630 (1993).
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Characterizing imperfect self-defense as a mitigator peculiar to the
crime of homicide, the court limited its application to murder and its
inchoate forms.2 Specifically, it ruled that imperfect self-defense does
not negate malice in malicious wounding cases because the definition
of malice in that crime does not imply the absence of mitigation.3
1. The Case.-In the early morning hours of January 6, 1990, a
Prince George's County police officer was dispatched to the scene of
an affray.4 Emerging from his cruiser, the officer encountered two
men.5 The first man, Thomas Monroe Winston, was bleeding
profusely from lacerations to his head and face. 6 The second man,
Lamont Lee Richmond, stood several feet behind Winston.7 When
the officer ordered Richmond to raise his hands, he observed the suspect clutching a knife that the suspect then tossed away.8 An investigation of the scene recovered a box cutter, a retractable knife of the
type normally used to cut boxes. 9 Richmond was indicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to maim, assault with intent to disable, assault
and battery, malicious wounding with intent to disable, and carrying a
dangerous weapon openly with intent to injure.1 0
At trial, Winston maintained that Richmond attacked him without provocation." Richmond alleged that Winston first assaulted him
and pleaded self-defense. 2 The two men had fought on a prior occasion, and according to Richmond, Winston had continued to taunt
and threaten him whenever they encountered one another, even
though Richmond prevailed in the first altercation.' 3 The defense argued that Richmond honestly and reasonably feared his attacker.1 4
Richmond testified that in the darkness on the night of the second
altercation, Winston became like a "wild man coming at [him] ."

The

2. Id. at 233, 623 A.2d at 634-35.
3. Id. at 232-33, 623 A.2d at 634.
4. Joint Record Extract at 17 (reproducing the direct testimony of Prince George's
County Police Officer Jonathan Wright).
5. Id. at 12-13.
6. Id. at 13.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 14.
9. Id. at 105.
10. Richmond, 330 Md. at 226, 623 A.2d at 631.
11. Joint Record Extract at 175 (reproducing the unreported opinion of the Court of
Special Appeals).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 112-13 (reproducing the cross-examination of Richmond).
14. Id. at 151-52 (reproducing defense counsel's closing argument).
15. Id. at 107.
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defense asserted that Richmond's use of the knife was a result of his
justifiable fear and desperation.1 6 At the conclusion of the State's
case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment of
of assault with intent to murder and assault
acquittal on the charges
17
maim.
to
intent
with
Upon the conclusion of the case, counsel for the defendant requested an instruction on the issue of imperfect self-defense, arguing
that such a finding by the jury would mitigate the remaining aggravated assault charges to assault and battery."i The trial court refused
to issue the instruction,1 9 and Richmond was found guilty of battery
and malicious wounding with intent to disable.2 °
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Richmond argued
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of
imperfect self-defense. 2 1 He argued that recognition of the defense
would have negated the element of malice in the crime of malicious
wounding and entitled him to mitigation.2 2 The Court of Special Appeals noted that it had rejected a "virtually identical argument" in Bryant v. State2 3 and summarily disposed of his argument. 24 The Court of

Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether the 25trial court erred in
not instructing the jury on imperfect self-defense.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. History and Theoy.-The mitigation doctrine of imperfect
self-defense is rooted in the common law. The Texas Court of Appeals explained the concept clearly in Reed v. State,26 the27 "cornerstone" case for imperfect self-defense in the United States:
16. See id. at 103-07.
17. Richmond, 330 Md. at 226, 623 A.2d at 631.
18. Id. at 227, 623 A.2d at 631.
19. Id.
20. Id., 623 A.2d at 631-32.
21. Richmond v. State, No. 1785, slip op. at 1-2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 3, 1991) (per
curiam), affd in part and rev'd in part 330 Md. 223, 623 A.2d 630 (1993).
22. Id. at 2.

23. 83 Md. App. 237, 245, 547 A.2d 29, 33 (1990) (holding the defense of imperfect
self-defense inapplicable to statutory maiming, assault with intent to disable, and assault
and battery charges).
24. Richmond, No. 1785, slip op. at 2.
25. Richmond, 330 Md. at 227, 623 A.2d at 632.
26. 11 Tex. App. 509 (1882) (reversing the defendant's murder conviction because an
erroneous omission of a manslaughter jury instruction precluded the jury's consideration
of the defense of imperfect self-defense).
27. See State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 488, 483 A.2d 759, 762 (1984) (characterizing
the Reed decision).
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[Self-defense] may be divided into two general classes, to
wit, perfect and imperfect right of self-defense. A perfect
right of self-defense can only obtain and avail where the
party pleading it acted from necessity, and was wholly free
from wrong or blame in occasioning or producing the necessity which required his action. If, however, he was in the
wrong,-if he was himself violating or in the act of violating
the law,-and on account of his own wrong was placed in a
situation wherein it became necessary for him to defend
himself against an attack made upon himself which was
superinduced or created by his own wrong, then the law
justly limits his right of self-defense ...."
Since the Reed decision, a number of courts have come to recognize both a "perfect" and "imperfect" right to self-defense in cases of
criminal homicide.2 9 The right to self-defense is characterized as
"perfect" when the defendant makes a primafacie showing of each of
the four basic elements of self-defense: (1) that he did not initiate the
conflict, (2) that he believed he was in imminent danger of death or
grievous bodily injury, (3) that he had reasonable grounds for that
belief, and (4) that he did not employ force beyond that which the
exigency demanded.3" Self-defense is "imperfect" where the defendant is unable to show at least one of the elements necessary to make
out the complete defense.3 '
Because courts disagree regarding which elements must be present to constitute imperfect self-defense, the defense exists in three basic variations. One type of imperfect self-defense, as demonstrated in
Reed, occurs when a defendant who nonfeloniously precipitates an attack is forced to kill in self-defense. 2 Another type occurs when a
defendant kills as a result of employing unreasonable force in defending himself.33 Finally, some courts have recognized the defense when
28. Reed, 11 Tex. App. at 517-18.
29. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr,JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.11(b),

at 271-73 (2d ed. 1986).
30. Id.; see, e.g., Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 718, 415 A.2d 830, 842 (1980) (citing
Guerrieo v. State, 213 Md. 545, 549, 132 A.2d 466, 467-68 (1957)); DeVaughn v. State, 232
Md. 447, 453, 194 A.2d 109, 112 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 927 (1964); Bruce v. State,
218 Md. 87, 96-97, 145 A.2d 428, 432-33 (1958).
31. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 29, at 271-72.
32. See Reed v. State, 11 Tex. App. 509, 517-18 (1982) (recognizing the defense of
imperfect self-defense where the defendant was killed while defending himself against his

lover's husband); see also People v. Deason, 384 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); State
v. Bush, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (N.C. 1982); State v. Flory, 276 P. 458 (Wyo. 1929). See generally ROLLIN PERKINS & RONALD BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 113741 (3d ed. 1982).

33. See Allison v. State, 86 S.W. 409 (Ark. 1905) (dictum); see also Reed, 11 Tex. App. at
517-18 (discussing the concept).
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the defendant honestly, but unreasonably, believed that deadly force
was necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily harm.3"
In 1962, the Model Penal Code proposed its own version of imperfect self-defense. 3" Under the Model Penal Code version, the degree of
the defendant's guilt is dependant upon his culpability as to each element of the crime.3 6 Thus, an honest but unreasonable belief as to
the necessity to kill amounts to negligence, and the defendant could
be convicted of negligent homicide.3 7
Reflecting the doctrine's historical emergence as a mitigation defense, trial courts regularly recite a voluntary manslaughter instruction whenever the facts warrant the self-defense charge in a murder
case.3 8 If the defendant claims the right to imperfect self-defense, and
the particular imperfection advanced is recognized in the jurisdiction
as a viable defense, a murder charge may be mitigated to
manslaughter.39
Unlike provocation, the classic mitigation defense, imperfect selfdefense is grounded in "fear of life," not passion.4" Both defenses
proceed, however, on the premise that the defendant's killing was unlawful, but because of mitigating circumstances, occurred without
malice aforethought-the distinguishing feature of murder.4 1
b. Imperfect Self-Defense and Maryland Law.-In 1976, the
Court of Special Appeals stated that the doctrine of imperfect selfdefense was "little more than an academic possibility."4 2 Shortly
34. Jurisdictions that have adopted this standard by case law include Arkansas, California, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. See Allison, 86 S.W. at 413; People v.
Flannel, 603 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1979); State v. Grant, 418 A.2d 154,156 (Me. 1980); Faulkner v.
State, 301 Md. 482, 499, 483 A.2d 759, 768 (1984); State v. Kidd, 175 P. 772, 774 (N.M.
1917); Commonwealth v. Collandro, 80 A. 571, 574-75 (Pa. 1911). The honest but unreasonable belief standard for imperfect self-defense is also provided for by statute. See ILL.

ch. 750, § 5/9-2(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); 18 PA. CONS.
§ 2503(b) (Purdon 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.01(2)(b) (West 1982).

ANN. STAT.

STAT. ANN.

35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
36. Id.
37. Id. The Arkansas and New Jersey statutes have also taken this position. See ARK.
STAT. ANN.

§ 5-2-614(a) (Michie 1993); NJ.

STAT. ANN.

2C:3-9(b) (repealed 1981) (West

1993).
38. See People v. Lockett, 413 N.E.2d 378, 381 (I1. 1980) (citations omitted); Faulkner,
301 Md. at 500-01, 483 A.2d at 769.
39. See ROLLIN PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 69 (2d ed. 1969). As Professor Perkins has observed, manslaughter has evolved into a "catch-all" concept that includes all homicides that
are "neither murder nor innocent." Id.

40. See
41. See

RoY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 91
PERKINS,

(1952).

supra note 39, at 69-70.

42. Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 658 n.4, 349 A.2d 300, 314 n.4 (1975), affd, 278
Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976).
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thereafter, however, the court, having recognized the doctrines of imperfect defense of another,4 3 imperfect duress,4 4 and imperfect defense of habitation,4" began to cite the doctrine of imperfect selfdefense with increasing, though guarded, approval.4 6
Then, in Faulkner v. State,4 7 the Court of Special Appeals applied
the defense to the charge of assault with intent to murder. 48 Premising its holding on the assertion that imperfect self-defense negates
malice, a sharply divided panel concluded that the mitigating effect of
imperfect self-defense "fatally erodes an assault with intent to murder
charge."4 9 The court reasoned that since there exists no crime of assault with intent to manslaughter, an accused may be found guilty of
assault and battery when malice is negated in an assault with intent to
murder charge.50
The subsequent appeal in Faulknerfinally provided the Court of
Appeals with an opportunity to comment on the defense of imperfect
self-defense. Finding that the defendant in the case "produced evi43. See Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349 A.2d 378 (1975) (reversing a conviction for
second degree murder and assault with intent to murder), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976).
44. SeeWentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110, 349 A.2d 421 (1975) (reversing conviction
of second degree murder), cert. denied, 278 Md. 738 (1976).
45. See Law v. State, 29 Md. App. 457, 349 A.2d 295 (1975) (reversing conviction of
second degree murder and assault with intent to murder), cert. denied, 378 Md. 726 (1976).
46. The advent of the recognition of the defense of imperfect self-defense in Maryland
related directly to federal criminal procedure. See Faulkner v. State, 54 Md. App. 113, 114,
458 A.2d 81, 82 (1983) (noting that state criminal law had been "roiled by the dictates" of
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)), affd, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984). In
Mullaney, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704.
It is arguable that this mandate, and not the doctrinal soundness of the defense of
imperfect self-defense, prompted the Court of Special Appeals to acknowledge the defense. After Mullaney, what was once an "esoteric qualification of the doctrine of self-defense" became "viable." See Faulkner,54 Md. App. at 115, 458 A.2d at 82.
In each of its 1975 and 1976 imperfect self-defense cases, the intermediate court concluded that the evidence admitted at trial raised the issue of mitigation. See Shuck, 29 Md.
App. at 38, 349 A. 2d at 381; Wentworth, 29 Md. App. at 121, 349 A.2d at 428; Law, 29 Md.
App. at 465, 349 A.2d at 299.
47. 54 Md. App. 113, 458 A.2d 81 (1983), affd, 301 Md. 482, 483 A.2d 759 (1984).
48. Id. at 116, 458 A.2d at 82-83.
49. Id. The court noted that "Mullaney v. Wilbur .. . applies to an instruction on
assault with intent to murder just as surely as it applies to an instruction dealing with the
murder charge itself." Id.
50. Id. In a trenchant dissent, Judge Lowe repudiated the Shuck line of cases. According to Judge Lowe, this "ultimate application" of an academic doctrine revealed its "stark
impracticality." Id. at 123, 458 A.2d at 86. "The criminal law as an instrument of social
control cannot allow violence to be excused solely upon the whims of the perpetrator. His
conduct must be measured against some societal norm of reasonableness." Id. at 122-23,
458 A.2d at 86.
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dence sufficient to generate a jury issue as to whether he had a subjectively honest but objectively unreasonable belief that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury,"5 1 the court affirmed the intermediate court's decision and adopted the honest but
unreasonable belief standard for the defense of imperfect self-defense.5 2 In arriving at this judgment, the court uncritically assumed
that imperfect self-defense operates to negate malice. 5" Malice, however, is a compound concept,5 4 and the Faulknercourt did not explain
which element or what aspect of the count is negated by imperfect
self-defense.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Richmond, the Court of Appeals
limited the mitigation doctrine of imperfect self-defense to the crime
of murder and its inchoate forms.55 Although the court reversed
Richmond's conviction of malicious wounding with intent to disable
on separate grounds, 6 itrejected his argument that the principles of
imperfect self-defense should apply to mitigate every crime requiring
proof of malice.5
The court first explained Article 27, section 386 5S-the statute
under which Richmond was convicted-and pointed out that the
51. State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482, 506, 483 A.2d 759, 772 (1984).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 486, 483 A.2d at 761.
54. See generallyPERKINS & BoYcE, supra note 32, at 856-61. The common law concept of
malice is a vital part of the definition of many offenses including murder, mayhem, arson,
libel, and malicious mischief. Each offense defines the element of malice in a slightly
different manner. Most notable of these is "malice aforethought," the distinguishing aspect of the crime of murder. "[M]alice aforethought is an unjustifiable, inexcusable and
unmitigated person-endangering-state-of-mind." Id. at 875. Professors Perkins and Boyce
offer an excellent general definition of this descriptive term, rescuing it from disparagement at the hands of modem code writers:
In brief, malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all elements ofjustification, excuse or recognized mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an
actual intent to cause the particular harm which is produced or harm of the same
general nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing of an act with awareness of a
plain and strong likelihood that such harm may result.
Id. at 860.
55. Richmond, 330 Md. at 233, 623 A.2d at 634-35.
56. See id. at 235-36, 623 A.2d at 635-36. Although the court did not directly address
the issue of due process, the court sua sponte reversed the defendant's principal conviction. Due to an erroneous instruction, Richmond was convicted of malicious wounding
with intent to disable, although he had been acquitted of assault with intent to disable. See
id. at 235, 623 A.2d at 635-36. The court took notice of the trial court's plain error and
concluded that Richmond's constitutional right to a fair trial had been compromised. See
id. at 236-37, 623 A.2d at 636.
57. Id. at 227-28, 623 A.2d at 632.
58. The statute reads:
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types of assault proscribed under the statute are all specific intent
crimes.5 9 Richmond, the court stressed, was not convicted of unlawful
and malicious wounding, but of unlawful and malicious wounding
with intent to disable.6" Noting its refusal in Watkins v. State' t to apply
imperfect self-defense to the crime of unlawful shooting with intent to
disable, the court concluded that the term "malicious" in the charge
against Richmond was of no significance.6 2 In fact, it deemed the offenses in Richmond and Watkins "virtually identical."6 3 The court maintained that even if Richmond had been charged with unlawful and
malicious shooting-instead of malicious wounding with intent to disable-imperfect self-defense would not mitigate the crime because
mitigation is a concept "peculiar to criminal homicide cases."64
Moreover, the court indicated that in homicide cases the absence
of malice is mitigation-an extenuating circumstance that is held to
attenuate the crime of murder.6 5 In this sense, imperfect self-defense
is analogous to provocation, the classic mitigation defense. 6 6 The defendant's reasonable passion is the extenuating circumstance in a defense based on provocation; the extenuating circumstance in a
If any person shall unlawfully shoot at any person, or shall in any manner unlawfully and maliciously attempt to discharge any loaded arms at any person, or shall
unlawfully and maliciously stab, cut or wound any person, or shall assault or beat
any person, with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or with intent
to prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any party for any offense for
which the said party may be legally apprehended or detained, every such offender, and every person counselling, aiding or abetting such offender shall be
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction are subject to imprisonment for not more
than 15 years.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 386 (1992) (emphasis added). Except for minor amendments
and a change in the maximum permitted sentence, the statute is substantially the same as
when it was originally enacted in Chapter 99 of the Laws of 1853. See Hammond v. State,
322 Md. 451, 453, 588 A.2d 345, 345 (1991).
59. Richmond, 330 Md. at 229-30, 623 A.2d at 633. "There seems never to have been
any doubt that the fourth type of assault, 'assault or beat any person,' had to be combined
with one of the two alternative states of mind ... to constitute an offense under the statute." Id. at 230, 623 A.2d at 633; see also State v. Elborn, 27 Md. 483, 488-89 (1867) (holding an indictment charging a defendant with "unlawfully shooting. . ." and "attempting
maliciously and unlawfully to discharge a loaded pistol . . ." defective "in not averring in
the language of the Act, that shooting was done with intent to maim, disfigure or disable").
60. Richmond, 330 Md. at 230-31, 623 A.2d at 633.
61. 328 Md. 95, 613 A.2d 379 (1992). The Watkins court subtly criticized its earlier
decision in State v. Faulkner,stating: "In what may be a generous expansion of the law of
self-defense, this Court has held that imperfect self-defense will serve to mitigate the offense of assault with intent to murder." Watkins, 328 Md. at 106 n.3, 613 A.2d at 384 n.3.
62. Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 633-34.
63. Id.
64. Id., 623 A.2d at 634.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 232, 623 A.2d at 634.
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defense based on imperfect self-defense is the defendant's honest
though unreasonable belief in the imminence of death or grave bodily injury.6 7 In noting the defenses' similarities, the Richmond court
also noted that provocation is not generally6 8accepted as a mitigating
circumstance in crimes other than murder.
The court also pointed out that the concept of malice in the context of murder cases comprises two key elements: (1) the presence of
the required malevolent state of mind, or the mens rea element, and
(2) the absence of legally adequate justification, excuse, or mitigation.6 9 In criminal cases not involving murder, the court asserted that
the definition of malice does not require proof of the absence of mitigation.7 ° In other words, "[t]he absence of mitigation is an element of
malice only when the offense is one to which mitigation may apply
",71

The court distinguished People v. McKelvy,7 2 a California case that
served as Richmond's principal authority for the proposition that a
valid claim of imperfect self-defense will mitigate a nonhomicide
crime to a lesser offense. 7 1 In McKelvy, the California Court of Appeals extended the imperfect self-defense rationale to the crime of
mayhem. 4 Seeming to echo the Faulkner court, the McKelvy court
ruled that a defendant's honestly held belief in the need for self-defense negated malice, thereby mitigating the offense.7 5 In Richmond,
however, the Court of Appeals took issue with the California court's
definition of malice and indicated that the State's mayhem instruc76
tion, describing "maliciously" in its mens rea aspect only, was faulty.
The court observed that a defendant's honest though unreasonable
belief in the need for self-defense is incompatible with the intent requirement for mayhem. 77 It concluded that a defense based on the
absence of the requisite specific intent to commit a crime should not
67. See id. (analogizing provocation to imperfect self-defense).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634; see also Ross v. State, 308 Md. 337, 340 n.1, 519 A.2d 735,
736 n.1 (1987).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634.
Id. at 232, 623 A.2d at 634.
239 Cal. Rptr. 782 (Ct. App. 1987).
Richmond, 330 Md. at 233, 623 A.2d at 635.
McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 786.

75. Id.

76. Richmond, 330 Md. at 233-34, 623 A.2d at 635 (quoting McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. at
786) (defining malice in connection with a specific intent to "vex, injure or annoy").
77. Id. at 234.
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be confused with the principle of mitigation. 7 The court therefore
ruled out any argument that the Faulkner court implicitly accepted
California's mens rea version of the honest but unreasonable belief
standard.7 9
In another crucial distinction, the Richmond court reasoned that
while a defendant may in fact intend the consequences of his act, he
nevertheless may be entitled to mitigation because of the circumstance that induced him to act-the honest but unreasonable belief in
the imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury."0 Thus, the
court determined that imperfect self-defense does not operate to negate the mens rea element of malice; rather, it negates the element of
malice that demands that the killing occurred without mitigating
circumstances.8
Persuaded that the absence of malice implied by the defense of
imperfect self-defense is the lack of the necessary mens rea required for
the crime of murder, Judge Bell dissented.8 2 Unlike the majority,
which focused on the unreasonableness of the defendant's belief as an
extenuating circumstance, Judge Bell focused on the subjective dimension of imperfect self-defense.8 3 He asserted that a defendant's
honest belief in the existence of imminent peril fosters the subsequent exculpatory belief that his or her actions are either justified or
excused.8 4 Judge Bell deemed such a mental state inconsistent with
the specific intent necessary to sustain a conviction for a crime requiring proof of malice and concluded that the doctrine of imperfect selfdefense is not a mitigation defense.8 5 Rather, "if the offense requires
proof of malice, the negation of malice completely exonerates the
defendant."8 6

78. Id. The court explained that "[a] defendant may intend the exact result he brings
about, but be entitled to mitigation because of the circumstances that caused him to act."
Id.
79. In Faulkner,the Court of Appeals found that "a defendant's culpability for a homicide [is] mitigated when he lacks the requisite mens rea for the offense of murder." Faulkner v. State, 301 Md. 482, 490, 483 A.2d 759, 763 (1984).
80. Richmond, 330 Md. at 234, 623 A.2d at 635.
81. Id. at 233, 623 A.2d at 634.
82. Id. at 249, 623 A.2d at 643 (Bell, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 255 n.8, 623 A.2d 646 n.8 (Bell, J., dissenting) ("[Flor the purposes of determining whether malice exists, the focus is on the honesty of the actor's perceived need to
defend him or herself to the exclusion of any consideration of how the actor intends to
accomplish that defense . ..

").

84. Id. at 255, 623 A.2d at 64546 (Bell, J., dissenting).
85. See id. at 241, 623 A.2d at 638.
86. Id.
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4. Analysis.-In Richmond, the Court of Appeals properly decided that the defense of imperfect self-defense does not operate to
mitigate nonhomicide charges. In so doing, it made several noteworthy decisions regarding a doctrine that, while increasingly discussed
among academics, has received comparatively little judicial scrutiny.8 7

Although the Richmond court's interpretation of section 38688
supported its decision in the case, the ambiguity of the Faulknerv. State
holding clearly necessitated a doctrinal justification for limiting imperfect self-defense to the mitigation of homicide crimes.8 9 Confronted with Faulkner's elementary rule that imperfect self-defense
negates malice, Richmond's argument that the defense may be advanced to mitigate any crime requiring proof of malice was understandable. The critical point of law, however, is that "mitigation is a
concept peculiar to criminal homicide cases." 90
Other common law crimes that require proof of malice, such as
malicious mischief and arson (malicious burning), employ the term as
a generalized intent requirement and make no reference to mitigation. 9 In this respect, malicious wounding is no exception. In the
case of murder, on the other hand, the term "malice" connotes intent
coupled with the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation.9 2
Thus, imperfect self-defense negates malice in murder because the
act, although intentional and withoutjustification or excuse, was committed under the mitigating circumstance of an honest though unreasonable belief in the imminent danger of death or grievous bodily
harm. Except in the crime of murder, the term "malice" connotes
only a generalized mental state and the absence ofjustification or excuse, not mitigation.9" Thus, the mitigation doctrine of imperfect selfdefense cannot negate the element of malice in a malicious wounding
charge.
87. Imperfect self-defense is most frequently cited as a murder defense in connection
with claims of Battered Woman's Syndrome. See Donald L. Creach, Note, PartiallyDetermined Imperfect Self Defense: The Battered Wife Kills and Tells Wy, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615 (1982);
LaurieJ. Naylor, Comment, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-PassionManslaughter
and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1679 (1986).

88. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
90. Richmond, 330 Md. at 231, 623 A.2d at 634.
91. See Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 66, 512 A.2d 358, 368 (1986) (holding that the term
"maliciously" in a charge of willfully and maliciously destroying property "is descriptive of a
wrongful act committed deliberately and without legal justification") (emphasis omitted)
(citation omitted); Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469, 474, 403 A.2d 788, 791 (1979) (defining
the term "malice" in an arson statute as intention or desire to harm another).
92. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 32, at
875.
93. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.

770

[VOL. 53:749

M VARYLAND LAW REVIEW

This decision eliminated any argument that imperfect self-defense mitigates nonhomicide crimes. The Court of Appeals may have
intended to eliminate the defense bar's known propensity "to invoke
94
this ... doctrine with inappropriate and promiscuous frequency."
Thus, the opinion in Richmond substantially clarified the right to the
defense of imperfect self-defense in Maryland.
5. Conclusion.-In Richmond, the Court of Appeals correctly
characterized imperfect self-defense as a mitigation doctrine historically and analytically inseparable from criminal homicide. In so doing, the Richmond court established a bright line rule that, while
selectively upholding an exception for murder, prudently retains the
reasonableness standard for self-defense in all other cases.
CHRISTIAN C. MAHLER

C. Loitering with the Intent to Sell Drugs
In Powers v. State,1 the Court of Appeals analyzed a Baltimore City
ordinance that criminalizes loitering in a drug-free zone with the intent to engage in drug-related activities.2 In a case of first impression,
the court strictly construed the law to determine what circumstances
constitute probable cause to arrest a person for a violation of the ordinance. In short, it concluded that probable cause exists only when the
arresting officer has reason to believe the suspect is loitering in the
drug-free zone specifically for the purpose of participating in drugofficer must
related activity.' Once probable cause is established, the
4
issue the suspect a warning prior to making any arrest.
In limiting its review to the elements of the crime and the procedural aspects of the arrest, the court avoided addressing the constitutionality of the ordinance.5 Like similar laws across the country,6 the
Baltimore City ordinance is vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds.' In fact, the Court of Appeals appeared to be clarifying the
law in order to entertain such an attack in the future.
94. Cunningham v. State, 58 Md. App. 249, 253, 473 A.2d 40, 42, cert. denied, 300 Md.
316, 477 A.2d 1195 (1984).
1. 329 Md. 321, 619 A.2d 538 (1993).
2. BALTIMORE CITv, MD., CODE art. 19, § 58C(c)(1)-(7) (1983 & Supp. 1992).
3. Powers, 329 Md. at 333-34, 619 A.2d at 544.
4. Id.
5. Id, at 325-26, 619 A.2d at 540-41.
6. See infra note 35.
7. The maximum penalties for the offense are 30 days in jail and a $400 fine. BALMORE CITY, MD., CODE art. 19, § 58C(f). Because these relatively minor penalties are typi-
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1. The Case.--On May 24, 1991, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Baltimore City Police Officer Laura Deuerling observed Earl Powers
standing among a group of people on a street corner in a certified
drug-free zone in Baltimore City.' Deuerling recognized Powers from
previous occasions and "from information about him received from
fellow police officers."9 She was aware that he had been convicted of
narcotics violations.10
Deuerling approached Powers and requested his name, address,
and purpose for being in the area.
Powers claimed to be visiting a
woman whose name Officer Deuerling did not recognize as someone
who lived in the area.1 2 Moreover, the address Powers gave was not
within the drug-free zone.'" Officer Deuerling did not further investigate the validity of Powers's reasons for being in the drug-free zone,
but did not believe his explanation. 4 She then issued Powers a warning for loitering in a drug-free zone and ordered him to leave. 5 Pow16
ers proceeded to "move on" and was not arrested.
Four hours later Officer Deuerling again encountered Powers,
roughly forty-eight feet from the street corner where he had been that
afternoon, again within the drug-free zone. 7 Powers was talking with
a group of people, some of whom Deuerling had arrested on previous
occasions for narcotics violations."8 Deuerling observed Powers place
a large roll of money in his pocket. 9 The persons with whom he was
speaking fled upon seeing Deuerling.20 Based on these observations
cally disposed of in plea bargaining, these cases rarely progress to trial where the issue of
the ordinance's constitutionality can be raised.
8. Powers, 329 Md. at 327, 619 A.2d at 541. The Police Commissioner may designate a
given geographical area of Baltimore City as a "drug-free zone." BALTIMoRE CITY, MD.,
CODE art. 19, § 58C(e). In determining which areas to designate as "drug free-zones," the
commissioner may consider (1) arrest rates or other statistics which indicate a "disproportionately high occurrence" of drug-related activity in an area, (2) a homicide or multiple
violent crimes in the area linked to drug activity, and (3) "reliable, objective and verifiable
information" concerning illegal drug activity in an area. Id. § 58C(e) (2). The Commissioner may also rely on "any other verifiable information" that indicates a drug-related
health or safety hazard in an area. Id.
9. Powers, 329 Md. at 327, 619 A.2d at 541.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 332, 619 A.2d at 544.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 332-33, 619 A.2d at 544.
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and her earlier warning to him, Deuerling arrested Powers."' In the
search incident to his arrest, she seized $70, nineteen bags of heroin,
22
and seven small bags of crack cocaine.
Powers was tried without ajury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City and convicted of loitering in a drug-free zone for drug-related
purposes and of possession of cocaine and heroin with the intent to
distribute. 23 Before the Court of Special Appeals could hear his appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case on its own motion. 24 It
25
reversed Powers's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
2. Legal Background.-The Baltimore City Council enacted Article 19, section 58C, of the Baltimore City Code in 1989.26 The ordinance is aimed at halting the spread of illegal drug activity and the
violent crime that accompanies it. 27 It states that it is "unlawful for
any person to loiter about or remain at any public way, public place or
place open or legally accessible to the public within a certified drug
free zone . . . for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity."28
The city council found that making such loitering a criminal act was a
"necessary exercise of the police power to maintain the peace, good
government, health and welfare of Baltimore City."29
The ordinance outlines the procedure for making an arrest. It
states that "the totality of the circumstances involved shall be considered"30 and lists specific circumstances that may contribute to a determination of whether a suspect has manifested the requisite intent to
21. Id. at 333, 619 A.2d at 544.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 323, 619 A.2d at 539. Two criminal informations were filed against Powers.

One was for loitering in a drug-free zone for the purpose of engaging in drug-related
activity. Id. The second included the following four crimes: (1) possession of cocaine with
the intent to distribute, (2) simple possession of cocaine, (3) possession of heroin with
intent to distribute, and (4) simple possession of heroin. Id. Powers was convicted of the
charge in the first information and of the first and third charges in the second. Id. Prior
to the trial, Powers filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance, and a motion to suppress the evidence seized incident to his arrest on the grounds
that his arrest was illegal. Id. The trial judge denied both motions. Id. at 325, 619 A.2d at
540.
24. Id. at 323, 619 A.2d at 539.
25. Id. at 335, 619 A.2d at 545.
26. See id. at 324, 619 A.2d at 539-40.
27. BALTIMORE CITv, MD., CODE art. 19, § 58C(a); see also Powers, 329 Md. at 324 n.2, 619
A.2d at 540 n.2.
28. BALTIMORE Cm', MD., CODE art. 19, § 58C(b). Violation of the ordinance is a misdemeanor; it carries a penalty of 30 days in jail, a $400 fine, or both. Id. § 58C(f).
29. Id.

30. Id. § 58C(c).
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engage in drug-related activity."1 Upon such a manifestation, the police officer who suspects a person of violating the law is required to ask
the suspect to leave the area. 2 Only upon refusal may the suspect be
arrested.3 3
Because of the newness of the ordinance and the relatively minor
penalties imposed for its violation, the Powers decision was the first indepth discussion of the law by a Maryland court.3 4 Although the court
avoided the issue of the ordinance's constitutionality, other tribunals
31. Id. The seven circumstances are:
(1) The conduct of the person being observed, including, by way of example
only, that such person is behaving in a manner raising a reasonable belief that the
person is engaging or is about to engage in illegal drug activity such as the observable distribution of small packages to other persons, the receipt of currency for
the exchange of small packages, operating as a "lookout", warning others of the
arrival of police, fleeing without other apparent reason upon the appearance of a
police officer, concealing himself or herself or any object which reasonably may
be connected to unlawful drug-related activity, or engaging in any other conduct
normally associated by law enforcement agencies with the illegal distribution or
possession of drugs;
(2) Information from a reliable source indicating that the person being observed routinely distributes illegal drugs within the drug free zone;
(3) Information from a reliable source indicating that the person being observed is currently engaging in illegal drug-related activity within the drug free
zone;
(4) Such person is physically identified by the officer as a member of a
"gang" or association which engages in illegal drug activity;
(5) Such person is a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller. A
"known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller" is a person who has, within the
knowledge of the arresting officer, been convicted in any court of any violation of
a referenced provision of the referenced state code involving the regulation, use,
possession, purchase, or sale of any of the substances referred to therein, or convicted of violating a substantially similar provision of the federal law or such law of
any other jurisdiction; or a person who displays physical characteristics of drug
intoxication or usage, such as dilated pupils, glassy eyes, or "needle tracks"; or a
person who possesses drug paraphernalia as defined in Section 287a of Article 27
of the referenced Annotated Code of Maryland;
(6) Such person has no other apparent lawful reason for loitering or remaining in the drug free zone (e.g., such as waiting for a bus or being near one's own
residence);
(7) Any vehicle involved in the observed circumstances is registered to a
known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller, or a person for whom there is an
outstanding arrest warrant for a crime involving drug-related activity.
Id
32. Id. § 58C(d).
33. Id.
34. Although the constitutionality of the ordinance was challenged by the appellant in
Guy v. State, 91 Md. App. 600, 605 A.2d 642, cert. denied, 327 Md. 627, 612 A.2d 257 (1992),
the Court of Special Appeals decided the case on other grounds. The court "express [ed]
no opinion on appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of the Baltimore City antiloitering ordinance." Id. at 614, 605 A.2d at 649.
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have considered the question with regard to similar laws 35 that prohibit activities such as prostitution 36 and general vagrancy. 37 For example, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,38 the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a general vagrancy law prohibiting
loitering.3 9 The Court first held that loitering is a constitutionally protected activity 40 and noted that it considered the "unwritten amenities"4" at issue in the case basically innocent acts that the law in
question made criminal.42 The Court held that because the law did
not give a potential offender notice that his conduct was criminal, it
was unconstitutionally vague. 43 The Court has not, however, heard a
case challenging a law prohibiting loitering with the intent to engage
in drug-related activity.
State and federal courts that have heard constitutional attacks on
laws like the Baltimore City ordinance universally have focused on the
doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness." Under the vagueness doc35. See, e.g., Rene M. LaForte, The ConstitutionalImplications of Anti-Drug Loitering Ordinances in Ohio, 18 U. DAYrON L. REv. 423 (1993) (discussing antidrug loitering ordinances
in Seattle, Dayton, Akron, and Cleveland); William Trosch, The Third Generation of Loitering
Laws Goes to Court: Do Laws That Criminalize "Loiteringwith the Intent to Sell Drugs" Pass Constitutional Muster?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 513 (1993) (discussing antidrug loitering ordinances in
Charlotte, Fayetteville, Greensboro, and High Point, North Carolina); see also Lisa A.
Kainec, Comment, Curbing GangRelated Violence in America: Do Gang Members Have a Constitutional Right to Loiter on Our Streets?, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 651 (1993) (discussing ordinances allowing police to force persons reasonably believed to be members of a gang to
disperse if loitering).
36. See New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (per curiam) (rescinding certiorari
and allowing the New York Court of Appeals's decision, which held that a statute broadly
prohibiting loitering for the purpose of engaging or soliciting prostitution was unconstitutional, to stand).
37. See Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 n.1 (1972) (voiding the statute
for vagueness because the law did not give notice to the potential offender of the activity
that was criminal and created an opportunity for its arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement).
38. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
39. See id. at 160-62.
40. Id. at 162-65. The Court stated that loafing and loitering are "historically part of the
amenities of life as we have known them." Id. at 164.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id. at 166.
44. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324
(E.D. Va. 1990) (invalidating a loitering with the intent to sell drugs ordinance for overbreadth); City of Pompano Beach v. Wright, 28 Fla. Supp. 2d 114 (1988) (striking down a
loitering with the intent to sell drugs ordinance for overbreadth, vagueness, and violation
of the Fourth Amendment). But see People v. Goodwin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 189 (N.Y. Dist. Ct.
1987) (holding that an antidrug loitering law is constitutional when ascertainable standards are specified); City of Akron v. Holley, 557 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989) (finding an ordinance banning loitering with unlawful, drug-related intent constitutionally valid
if clear and specific standards for police action are set).
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trine, a law must give notice of the prohibition of particular conduct
45
and must not encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.
The overbreadth doctrine, although very narrow, 46 guards against laws
that place within the zone of criminal
conduct a substantial amount of
47
constitutionally protected activity.

Laws such as the Baltimore City ordinance first appeared in
Yakima, Washington, 48 after the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Seattle v. Drew.i In Drew, the court struck down a Seattle law
criminalizing loitering under "suspicious circumstances" without a
"satisfactory" reason.5" Although the court found the law in question
unconstitutionally vague,5" it articulated the requirements for a constitutionally valid antiloitering law5 2 by endorsing the proposed official
draft of the Model Penal Code. 3
More recendy, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia struck down an Alexandria City ordinance similar
45. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
46. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988) (applying
the doctrine of overbreadth narrowly).
47. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)).
48. For a thorough discussion of the origins of such ordinances, see LaForte, supra
note 35, at 424.
49. 423 P.2d 522 (Wash. 1967).
50. Id. at 523-24.
51. Id. at 525.
52. Id. at 525-26. After Drew, Seattle drafted laws criminalizing loitering for the purpose of prostitution following the guidelines set forth in Drew. Laforte, supra note 35, at
425-26. The revised statutes were upheld in City of Seattle v. Jones, 488 P.2d 750 (Wash.
1971).
53. Drew, 423 P.2d at 526 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1962)). The proposed
official draft states:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in
a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant
alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted
is the fact that the actor takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to
identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless
flight by the actor or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace officer
shall prior to any arrest for an offense under this section afford the actor an
opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person
shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if the peace officer did not
comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that the explanation
given by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, would
have dispelled the alarm.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6. The Model Penal Code appears to have been the model for the
Baltimore City ordinance.
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to the Baltimore City ordinance. 4 The district court found the ordinance overbroad in that "protected expression may be thwarted as individuals abstain from socializing, counseling, organizing community
events, or registering to vote out of fear of prosecution under the
facially overbroad ordinance."5 5 Other courts, however, have upheld
similar ordinances relying on the fact that they require criminal intent
and therefore do not punish innocent acts.56
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Recognizing that a record number of
murders were committed in Baltimore City in 1992, the Powers court
first opined that the concern of the Baltimore City Council in creating
the ordinance was well founded.5 7 With this in mind, the court embarked on a detailed analysis of the ordinance to determine the legality of Powers's arrest.5"
Focusing on the testimony of Officer Deuerling, the court applied the requirements of the ordinance to the facts of the first encounter between Deuerling and Powers. 9 The elements of the
offense, which the court took directly from the ordinance, include:
"(1) loitering or remaining (2) at any public way, public place, or
place open or legally accessible to the public (3) within a certified
drug free zone (4) for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity
60
prohibited by the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Law."
Assuming the existence of the first three elements of the crime, the
court declared the issue to be "whether the evidence was sufficient to
satisfy the fourth element requiring a specific intent. "61

54. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Va.
1990).
55. Id. at 328.
56. See City of Akron v. Holley, 557 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989) (upholding
Akron's antidrug loitering ordinance).
57. Powers, 329 Md. at 324 n.2, 619 A.2d at 540 n.2.
58. Id. at 326, 619 A.2d at 541.
59. Id. at 326-27, 619 A.2d at 541-42; see supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
60. Powers, 329 Md. at 328, 619 A.2d at 541-42. In defining "loitering," the court
adopted the common use of the terms it had discussed in Molinari v. State, 217 Md. 282,
142 A.2d 583 (1958). Powers, 329 Md. at 328 n.3, 619 A.2d 541-42 n.3. The court in
Molinari stated that "[plerhaps the most satisfactory equivalent of [the] terms ['loafing' and
'loitering'] .. .is the colloquial expression 'hanging around.'" Molinari, 217 Md. at 286,
142 A.2d at 586.
The Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Law appears at MD.ANN. CODE art.
27, § 276 (1957).
61. Powers, 329 Md. at 328, 619 A.2d at 542.
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The court looked to section 58C(c)

62

for guidance in determin-

ing whether under the guidelines of the ordinance, 63 the facts surrounding the first encounter would support the existence of the
requisite intent. After carefully analyzing each of the seven circumstances listed in the ordinance,6 4 the court decided that6 5upon objective observation, the defendant's conduct was innocent.
Moreover, Officer Deuerling's failure to factually refute the defendant's explanation for his being in the drug-free zone required the
court to assume his assertions were true when made.6 6 Thus, the
court concluded that Officer Deuerling lacked probable cause in the
first encounter to suspect the defendant of loitering in the drug-free
zone "for the purpose of engaging in prohibited drug-related activity."6 7 Consequently, the officer's request for Powers to leave the area
at that time "had no legal significance whatsoever in the contemplation of the ordinance; there was no proper basis justifying the
request." 68
In reviewing the facts of the second encounter between
Deuerling and Powers, the court assumed that the circumstances "sufficiently evidenced an intent on the part of Powers to engage in drugrelated activity."69 Officer Deuerling therefore had adequate probable cause to request Powers to leave.7 ° Arresting Powers prior to the
issuance of a valid warning, however, was improper.7 ' Even if the officer had the authority to make an arrest under general law,' 2 the
62. BALTIMORE CITy, MD., CODE art. 19, § 58C(c); see supra note 31.
63. Powers, 329 Md. at 328, 619 A.2d at 542.

64. Id. at 329-31, 619 A.2d at 542-43; see supra note 31 (quoting the ordinance).
65. Powers, 329 Md. at 331, 619 A.2d at 543.
66. Id. The court seemed to be particularly swayed by this factor. It pointed out that
"[Powers] said that he was there to visit a girl, and the officer made no attempt to disprove
this," id. at 329,619 A.2d at 542, and declared that "[i] t was obvious that [Officer Deuerling
simply did not believe that Powers was in the area to visit a girl, but she did not press him
on the matter or investigate him further." Id. at 327, 619 A.2d at 541. Had the officer
further investigated the defendant's story and found him to be lying, the court may have
been satisfied that probable cause existed to believe he was violating the ordinance. If a
person has no other apparent or lawful reason for being in the area and loitering, probable cause may exist that he or she is violating the ordinance. BALTIMORE CrrY, MD., CODE
art. 19, § 58C(c)(6).
67. Powers, 329 Md. at 331, 619 A.2d at 543.
68. Id. at 332, 619 A.2d at 544.
69. Id. at 333, 619 A.2d at 544.
70. Id. at 334, 619 A.2d at 544.
71. Id.

72. A police officer may make an arrest without a warrant if the officer has probable
cause to believe a misdemeanor has been committed in his or her presence or view. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 594B(b) (1992). Sections 594B(e) (1) and (f)
(x) allow for arrest upon
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court noted that the ordinance intervened to require 73that an arrest
under it be "subject to a refusal of a request to leave."
The illegality of the arrest made the subsequent search of Powers,
and the seizure incident to that search, violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.74 Thus, the court held that
the evidence obtained in the search and seizure, which resulted in
Powers's conviction, was improperly admitted at the trial.7 5 The
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City and remanded the case for a new trial.7 6
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Powers is the
first analysis by a Maryland court of a loitering in a drug-free zone law.
In Powers, the court clarified the meaning of loitering in a drug-free
zone for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity and set forth
the procedural requirements for arrest under the ordinance. In addition, the decision may serve as a guideline for determining guilt and
innocence under the ordinance.
In order to arrest a person for loitering in a drug-free zone for
the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity, a police officer must
(1) have probable cause that the suspect is loitering for the specific
purpose of engaging in drug-related activity and (2) issue a request to
the suspect to leave the area.7 7 Only if the suspect fails to leave the
area may he be arrested. 78
Although the constitutionality of the ordinance was questioned,
the Court of Appeals declined to rule on the issue. 79 Following the
general practice of not ruling on the constitutionality of a law if the
probable cause that a person has violated the Controlled Dangerous Substances Law of
Maryland. Id. § 594B(e)(1), (f)(x).
73. Powers, 329 Md. at 333 n.4, 619 A.2d at 544 n.4. The arrest in question was illegal
under the ordinance, and according to the court, would have been illegal under general
law as well. "It is certain that Officer Deuerling had no probable cause to believe that
Powers was violating the Controlled Dangerous Substances Law." Id.
74. Id. at 334, 619 A.2d at 545. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
75. Powers, 329 Md. at 334, 619 A.2d at 545. Evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure is inadmissible in a state criminal prosecution. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
76. Powers, 329 Md. at 335, 619 A.2d at 545. This amounts to a dismissal of the charges,
because without the excluded evidence, there is no case against Powers.
77. Powers, 329 Md. at 331, 619 A.2d at 543.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 325-26, 619 A.2d at 540-41.
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case can be decided on a nonconstitutional basis,8 ° the court instead
focused on whether the officer's conduct comported with the law.8"
Because the court found Powers's arrest illegal, addressing the constitutionality of the ordinance was unnecessary. The court instead clarified the terms of the ordinance and set the stage for future attacks on
8 2
its constitutionality.
It is difficult to speculate whether, in a future case in which the
constitutionality of the ordinance is properly at issue, the court will
uphold the ordinance as a valid law. Courts that have upheld such
ordinances have pointed to the specific conduct that is made illegalthe intent to engage in unlawful, drug-related activity.8" Courts that
have struck down such ordinances have focused on the fact that they
may make innocent acts illegal.8 4 The Powers court clarified the prima
facie requirements of the ordinance so courts can, in the future, focus
directly on the law's constitutionality, but gave no hint as to how it
would rule on the issue.
5. Conclusion.-InPowers, the court analyzed the elements of loitering in a drug-free zone for the purpose of engaging in drug-related
activity." An arresting officer must find probable cause that a person
is loitering "for the purpose of engaging in drug-related activity," and
then must request that the suspect leave the drug-free zone. 6 Only
after these two requirements are met is a person subject to arrest
upon refusal to comply with the officer's request to leave. 87 This decision clarifies the elements of the crime and paves the way for future
evaluation of the law on the question of its constitutionality.
TIMOTHY M. MONAHAN

80. Id. at 325-26, 619 A.2d at 540-41; see also DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast

Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
81. See Powers, 329 Md. at 325-26, 619 A.2d at 543 (citing Brittingham v. State, 306 Md.

654, 658, 511 A.2d 45, 48 (1986)).
82.
that to
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

The court left an open invitation for a constitutional challenge, stating "[wie leave
another day and another case." Id. at 326, 619 A.2d at 541.
See supra note 56.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
Powers, 329 Md. at 327-28, 619 A.2d at 541-42.
Id. at 331, 619 A.2d at 543.
Id.
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D. Reassessing the PreferredExplanation of the
"ReasonableDoubt" Standard
In Wills v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that an explanation of
the "reasonable doubt" standard, which suggested that a "nagging
doubt" in the minds of the jurors was insufficient to constitute a reasonable doubt, was erroneous when considering the instruction as a
whole.2 In assessing the probable impact of the erroneous instruction, the court noted that the outcome of the case was dependent
upon the jury's evaluation of conflicting testimony.3 Applying the
standard for harmless error adopted in Dorsey v. State,4 the court reversed the conviction because it could not "say, without reservation,
that the erroneous instruction did not contribute to the jury's guilty
verdicts."5
While the court reaffirmed its reluctance to prescribe a
mandatory explanation of the reasonable doubt standard applicable
in all cases, the court opted to establish guidelines to assist courts in
explaining the standard.6 In outlining an acceptable jury charge, the
court conceded that a portion of the explanation it had endorsed for
almost half a century' may tend to confuse juries.8 As an alternative,
the court strongly endorsed substitute language found in the Maryland
Criminal PatternJury Instructions.'
1. 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993).
2. Id, at 388, 620 A.2d at 303.
3. Id
4. 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). The Dorsey court held that reversal of a conviction is required if an appellant in a criminal case establishes error, and a reviewing court is
unable to "declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced
the verdict." Id. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678. After the Wi//s decision, however, the Supreme
Court, in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2082-83 (1993), held that an erroneous
explanation of the reasonable doubt standard deprives a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and can never be harmless error.
5. WiUs, 329 Md. at 388, 620 A.2d at 304.
6. See id. at 382-83, 620 A.2d at 301.
7. In Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551, 69 A.2d 461 (1949), the Court of Appeals held
that "it is not erroneous to instruct the jury that evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it convinces the judgment of an ordinarily prudent man of the truth of a
proposition with such force that he would act upon that conviction without hesitation in
his important affairs." Id at 560-61, 69 A.2d at 465. The court has cited Lambert with
approval in a long line of cases. See, e.g., Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983);
Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 437 A.2d 654 (1981); Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232,
412 A.2d 88 (1980).
8. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301.
9. See id at 383-84, 620 A.2d at 301-02 (citing MARYLAND PATIRTNJURY INSTRUCTIONSCRIMINAL 2:02 (1991) [hereinafter MPJI-Cr]).
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1. The Case.--On June 15, 1988, William Winters, a detective in
the Charles County Sheriff's Department, drove to Andrew Nathaniel
Wills's trailer in Malcolm, Maryland, as part of an on-going police investigation.' 0 Winters was accompanied by two police informants, Deanna Carmody and Elizabeth Butler." Upon arriving at Wills's trailer,
Carmody got out of the car and approached Wills. 2
At trial, Detective Winters testified that, after a conversation between Wills and Carmody, Wills approached Winters who said,
"Three. Right."' 3 Wills then allegedly replied, "I can get it for you." 4
Winters testified that Wills then beckoned Larry Braswell, who produced some plastic bags from his pocket and offered them to Winters,
who pocketed them. 5 Winters stated that the bags appeared to contain three forty-dollar rocks of crack cocaine. 6 Winters testified that
he gave Braswell $120; Braswell gave the money to Wills, which Wills
then counted and pocketed. 7 Subsequent forensic chemistry tests indicated that the substance turned in by Winters was cocaine.'"
In Wills's version of the event, Carmody asked him if she could
purchase three bags of crack cocaine,' 9 but he told her that he did not
sell crack and then walked away from her.20 Wills attested that he
knew of Carmody's involvement with the police and that he knew she
was at his trailer that day as part of a police investigation. 2 1 A witness
corroborated this point by testifying that Carmody told him that the
police wanted to arrest Wills for selling drugs and that he had related
this information to Wills. 22 Neither Carmody nor Butler could be located to testify at trial.23
Ajury in the Circuit Court for Charles County convicted Wills of
distributing and conspiring to distribute cocaine.2 4 On appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals, Wills raised three issues for consideration.
10. Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 2. The parties stipulated to the statement of
facts in petitioner's brief. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. Wills v. State, No. 91-1123, slip op. at 2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 11, 1992) (per
curiam), rev'd, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295 (1993).
24. Wills, 329 Md. at 385, 620 A.2d at 302.
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First, Wills contended that the trial court should have granted his motion for a continuance in light of the unavailability of Butler and
Carmody to testify.2 5 Second, Wills alleged that the trial court erred
by failing to give a missing witness instruction. 26 Finally, Wills asserted
that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the reasonable
doubt standard by implying that the existence of a "nagging doubt"
was insufficient to constitute a reasonable doubt.2 7 The Court of Spe-

cial Appeals found Wills's claims to be without merit and affirmed the
judgment of the lower court.28 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider the adequacy of the trial court's jury charge on the
29
reasonable doubt standard.

2. Legal Background.-Through a series of opinions, the Court
of Appeals has developed a significant body of case law regarding the
reasonable doubt standard." As a result of these decisions, Maryland's requirements for explaining the standard exceed those mandated by the United States Constitution." Maryland law on the
subject, nevertheless, may be profitably viewed through the constitutional constraints articulated by the Supreme Court.
a. ConstitutionalOverlay.-The Supreme Court has held that
the Due Process Clause 2 "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged." 3 Accordingly, in a
criminal case, the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the
requirement that the State prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt requires automatic reversal.3 4 Despite the "vital role in
the American scheme of criminal procedure" played by the reasonable doubt standard,3 5 the Court has never declared that the Constitution requires judges to give jury instructions explaining the
standard. 6
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Wills, slip op. at 2.
Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Wills, 329 Md. at 385, 620 A.2d at 302.
See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
See id
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

33. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
34.
35.
36.
L. REv.

SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979).
Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
See Henry A. Diamond, Note, ReasonableDoubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90 COLUM.
1716, 1716-17 (1990).
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The Court has, however, established rules for reviewing challenged instructions. When the Court evaluates a jury instruction for
constitutional sufficiency, it has made clear that the challenged language must be evaluated "in the context of the charge as a whole."37
The Court has explained that, while some p arts of a charge may be
"infirm" in isolation, the rest of the instruction may remedy any unconstitutional inference that might have relieved the state of its burden of persuasion. 8 Furthermore, when the Court reviews an
ambiguous instruction which is neither "concededly erroneous, nor
found so by a court,"3 9 it has focused on "'whether there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the jury... applied the challenged instruction in a
way' that violate [d] the Constitution."40
The utility and even the desirability of explaining the reasonable
doubt standard has been the subject of some dispute.4 1 Despite its
reservations, the Supreme Court has cited with approval some at37. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 (1985).
38. See id.
39. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990).
40. Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991) (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380)
(emphasis added). In Estelle, the Court clarified the standard of review with regard to jury
instructions by adopting the "reasonable likelihood" standard announced in Boyde. Id. at
482 n.4. The Court discussed and rejected several prior formulations that considered how
a reasonable juror "could" or "would" have interpreted the charge. Id. For example, the
Court rejected a standard which looked to "'how reasonable jurors could have understood
the charge as a whole.'" Id (quoting Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per
curiam)). In explaining the "reasonable likelihood" standard, the Boyde Court indicated
that a greater showing is required than what a "single hypothetical 'reasonable' juror"
might possibly have done, but the standard does not require a showing that "the jury was
more likely than not to have been impermissibly inhibited by the instruction." Boyde, 494
U.S. at 380.
While the instruction in Boyde concerned a capital sentencing proceeding, subsequent
decisions have indicated that this standard applies to all reasonable doubt instructions. See
Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 482 n.4 (comparing the "reasonable likelihood" standard to the Cage
standard); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 n.1 (1993) (suggesting that the Boyde
standard would have been used to evaluate the reasonable doubt instruction but for the
narrow question presented in the case and the State's failure to raise the issue in prior
proceedings).
41. See Diamond, supra note 36, at 1717-21. Diamond notes that some courts base their
refusal to explain the standard on dictum in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
Id. at 1724. In Holland, the Court upheld a trial court's explanation of the standard, but
noted that "'[a]ttempts to explain the term "reasonable doubt" do not usually result in
making it any clearer to the minds of the jury.'" Holland, 348 U.S. at 140 (quoting Miles v.
United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880)).
Citing this language from Holland, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
"join[ed] in the general condemnation of trial court attempts to define reasonable doubt,"
and has strongly stated that "[d]istrict courts are again admonished not to define reasonable doubt in their jury instructions." United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir.
1985).
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tempts by trial courts to explain the standard.4 2 For example, in Holland v. United States,4 3 the Court upheld a jury instruction explaining
reasonable doubt as "the kind of doubt.., which you folks in the
more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be willing
to act upon."" While upholding the instruction, the Court stated that
"this section of the charge should have been in terms of the kind of
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act rather than the kind
on which he would be willing to act."45 This "hesitate to act" formulation has received considerable support in the federal circuits, and to a
lesser degree, in state courts.4 6
In addition to endorsing some instructions as adequate explanations of the reasonable doubt standard, the Supreme Court also has
held that some explanations do not comply with the due process standard announced in In re Winship4 7 and, therefore, require reversal.
For example, in Cage v. Louisiana,4 8 the Court held that the trial
court's explanation of the reasonable doubt standard could have been
interpreted "to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof
below that required by the Due Process Clause." 49 In evaluating the
instruction in Cage, the Court isolated a portion of the charge that
equated a reasonable doubt with "a 'grave uncertainty' and an 'actual
substantial doubt,"'5 0 and held that this language, when read in connection with a reference to a "'moral certainty,' rather than evidentiary certainty" was constitutionally infirm. 1
At the time Wills was decided, the Court had not passed on the
question of whether an erroneous instruction on the reasonable
doubt standard could ever be considered harmless error. The Court
5" when it held that a
resolved this question in Sullivan v. Louisiana,
constitutionally deficient instruction on the reasonable doubt standard deprives a defendant of a jury verdict as contemplated by the
42. See, e.g., Miles, 103 U.S. at 312; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.9 (1979)
(citing the Holland Court's discussion of different formulations of the standard).
43. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
44. Id. at 140.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. See Jacquelyn L. Bain, Comment, A Proposed Definition of Reasonable Doubt and the
Demise of the CircumstantialEvidence ChargeFollowing Hankins v. State, 15 ST. MARY's LJ. 353,

368 (1984). For a discussion of the various explanations of the standard used in federal
and state courts, see I CHARLEs E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 14 (14th ed.
1985).
47. 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra text accompanying note 33.
48.
49.
50.
51.

498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.

52. 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993).
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Sixth Amendment.5" Thus, the Court concluded that reversal must be
automatic and an erroneous instruction on reasonable doubt is not
subject to harmless error analysis.5 4 It determined that a constitutionally defective instruction on reasonable doubt "vitiates all of the jury's
findings"55 and "cannot be harmless regardless of how overwhelming
the evidence of [the defendant's] guilt.""
b. Maryland Law.-Recognizing that lay juries may not fully
appreciate the often subtle distinctions implicit in legal standards,
Maryland has adopted rule 4-325,1" which governs jury instructions.
Section (c) of the rule generally allows courts, at their discretion, to
instruct juries regarding the applicable law.5" A court must, however,
instruct the jury upon the request of a party, unless the matter in the
requested instruction has already been covered in the instructions
given.5 9 When a court fails upon request to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence, the Court of Appeals has held the omission erroneous. 6 ° Additionally, a trial court commits error when it
refuses to instruct the jury either on the binding effect of the judge's
instruction on the State's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt" or on the meaning of the reasonable doubt standard.6 2
While the Court of Appeals has affirmed the utility and desirability of explaining the reasonable doubt standard to the jury,65 it has
53. Id. at 2081-82.
54. Id
55. Id. at 2082.
56. Id. at 2083 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
57. MD. R. 4-325; see Wills, 329 Md. at 374, 620 A.2d at 297 (explaining that one of the
purposes of the rule is to clarify the subtleties of the differing standards of proof).
58. See Wills, 329 Md. at 374-75, 620 A.2d at 297 (explaining the operation of the rule).
59. See id at 375, 620 A.2d at 297.
60. Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 47, 585 A.2d 209, 215 (1991). The Williams court
noted that, although the principle of the presumption of innocence is "firmly fixed" in
Maryland common law, id. at 45, 585 A.2d at 214, an error of this nature is amenable to
harmless error analysis and does not require automatic reversal. Id. at 47, 585 A.2d at 215.
61. See Davis v. State, 48 Md. App. 474, 475, 427 A.2d 1085, 1086 (1981).
62. Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 242-43, 412 A.2d 88, 93 (1980) (holding that a
correct explanation of the reasonable doubt standard is "not confusing to the jury" and
must be given when requested). The Lansdowne court subjected the trial court's failure to
give the requested charge to harmless error scrutiny. The court concluded that, because
the only defense in the case was an assertion that the State had not proved guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 247-48,
412 A.2d at 96.
63. Id. at 242, 412 A.2d at 93. In Lansdowne, the court observed that "unskilled and
untutored lay jurors are at least as likely as some judges to misconstrue the meaning of
'reasonable doubt,'" id., and cited several cases from other jurisdictions in which judges
have erred in explaining the reasonable doubt standard. See id. at 242 n.4, 412 A.2d at 93
n.4.
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repeatedly declined to require a specific instruction to be used in all
cases.6 4 Through a series of decisions, however, the court has provided guidance to trial courts attempting to explain the reasonable
doubt standard. In Lambert v. State,6 5 the court proposed model language for explaining the standard:
After the judge in a criminal trial instructs the jury that the
State must prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to convict, it is not erroneous to instruct the jury that
evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it
convinces the judgment of an ordinarily prudent man of the
truth of a proposition with such force that he would act upon
that conviction without hesitation in his own most important
affairs.6 6
The Lambert court did not explicitly endorse the trial court's instruc-tion, which did not include the "without hesitation" language found
in its own model.6 7 Although it stated that it "[did] not feel that the
instruction to the jury in the case at bar was prejudicial," it did not
explicitly rule on whether the instruction as given was proper.6 8
The model instruction offered in Lambert has been cited with approval in many Maryland cases examining the adequacy of reasonable
doubt instructions. 69 For example, in Bowers v. State,7 ° the court's
heavy reliance on the Lambert instruction is apparent. In Bowers, the
Court of Appeals addressed a claim that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard in a sentencing
proceeding.7" Because the instruction given did not include the
"without hesitation" language in all portions of the charge, 72 the defendant argued that the instruction erroneously conveyed the prepon64. See, e.g., Wills, 329 Md. at 382, 620 A.2d at 301; Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 186, 453
A.2d 1218, 1228 (1983); Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 95, 437 A.2d 654, 660 (1981).
65. 193 Md. 551, 69 A.2d 461 (1949).
66. Id. at 560-61, 69 A.2d at 465 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at 558, 69 A.2d at 464 (reviewing the trial court's instruction).
68. Id. at 561, 69 A.2d at 465. Although the conviction in Lambert was overturned on
other grounds, the court stated that a definition of the reasonable doubt standard will not
constitute reversible error unless it "misleads or confuses the jury." Id. at 559, 69 A.2d at
464.
69. See, e.g., Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 616-17, 616 A.2d 392, 403 (1992); Montgomery
v. State, 292 Md. 84, 95, 437 A.2d 654, 659 (1981); Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 242,
412 A.2d 88, 93 (1980). But see Brooks v. State, 53 Md. App. 285, 293, 452 A.2d 1285, 128990 (1982) (upholding an instruction that did not include the "without hesitation"
language).
70. 298 Md. 115, 468 A.2d 101 (1983).
71. Id. at 156, 468 A.2d at 122.
72. The instruction in question read:
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derance of the evidence standard to the jury."m In assessing the
defendant's claim, the court first noted that a reviewing court should
not examine any part of an instruction out of context, but it should
instead evaluate the charge as a whole.74 Then, with no further discussion of the judge's charge, the court, citing LamberF5 and the
76
Supreme Court's discussion of the jury instruction in Holland, 77 summarily held that the instruction as a whole was not erroneous.
3.

The Court's Reasoning, Analysis.-

a. The Courts Analysis of the Instruction.-In Wills, the sole issue before the Court of Appeals was the adequacy of the trial judge's
instruction on the reasonable doubt standard. 7' The instruction offered by the trial judge was, in pertinent part, as follows:
The State has to prove that he is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt....

Beyond a reasonable doubt means just that, beyond a
reasonable doubt. I always say ....

let's close our eyes and

let's visualize those words, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Those are the words used ....

It is important to know that

the people who made the laws, the framers of the Constitution, didn't say beyond all doubt. They could have said that,
but they didn't say that, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to a
mathematical certainty. They used the words, beyond a reasonable doubt, so the State's burden in a criminal case, and
in this criminal case, in particular, is to prove that Mr. Wills
committed one or both of these crimes beyond a reasonable
Now, a reasonable doubt is a doubt that is founded upon reason. It is such a
doubt as would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in the graver or more
important transactions in his life.
Thus, if the evidence is of a character as to persuade you of the truth of the
charges against the Defendant, with the same force that would be sufficient to

persuade you to act in the more important transactions in your life then you
would conclude the State has proven aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
If, on the other hand, you could not act based on that evidence in the more
important transactions in your life, then you would conclude that the State had
not met the burden of proof and therefore had not proven the aggravating

circumstances.
Id. at 157, 468 A.2d at 122-23.
73. Id. at 157-58, 468 A.2d at 123.
74. Id. at 159, 468 A.2d at 124.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
77. Bowers, 298 Md. at 158-59, 468 A.2d at 123-24.
78. Wills, 329 Md. at 385, 620 A.2d at 302.
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doubt. A reasonable doubt is the type of doubt that would
cause you to hesitate and not act in an important decision in
your own life.
...When you [apply the facts to the law] you have to be
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt those facts would be
of the same nature and quality that you would rely on in
making an important decision in your own life. Now, picture
making one of those decisions. Picture when you got married or bought a new home or changed jobs or decided to
have an operation, decided to get divorced, it might be anything, a decision that has a major impact on your life. I
doubt that any of you have made one of those decisions without having some question as to whether or not this is the
right thing to do. When you make a major decision, you
generally have a nagging doubt, but if you weigh all of the
factors, if you weigh the things that say, I should do it, and
the things that say, I shouldn't do it, and you decide to go
forward, then you don't have a reasonable doubt. The
State's burden in this case is to persuade you to that same
extent that you would rely on in making an important decision in your own life, that the defendant is guilty of one or
both of these charges pending against him. 9
In finding that the trial court's instruction was erroneous, the
court isolated four elements which, when considered together, rendered the charge infirm. First, the court discussed the judge's suggestion that going forward with a major decision in one's personal life,
after weighing several factors, implies the absence of a reasonable
doubt."0 Describing this reference to the balancing of factors as "confusing and misleading,"8 ' the court concluded that this language conveyed the essence of the preponderance of the evidence standard for
civil cases, and that "it clearly d[id] not comport with the reasonable
doubt standard even when considered in the light of the entire
instruction."82

The court then considered the "balancing-of-factors" reference in
connection with three other discrete portions of the trial judge's
charge to the jury. The court isolated the "hesitate and not act" lan79. Id. at 385-86, 620 A.2d at 302-03.
80. Id. at 387, 620 A.2d at 303. Specifically, the court isolated the part of the judge's
instruction which read: "if you weigh all of the factors, if you weigh the things that say, I
should do it, and the things that say, I shouldn't do it, and you decide to go forward, then
you don't have a reasonable doubt." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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guage, 3 the statements about having questions regarding important
personal decisions, 4 and the remarks regarding nagging doubts.8 5 Of
particular concern to the court was the intimation that having a "nag86
ging doubt" does not rise to the level of having a reasonable doubt.
Viewing the charge as a whole, the court had little difficulty in holding
that the instruction was erroneous.8 7 The court then reasoned that,
because the outcome of the case turned on the credibility of the witnesses, the defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the harmless
error analysis set forth in Dorsey v. State."8
b. Guidelines Establishedfor an Acceptable Instruction.-Despite
the Court of Appeals's reluctance to prescribe a universally applicable
reasonable doubt instruction, ° the Wills court proposed a set of
guidelines to assist courts in explaining the standard.90 As an initial
matter, the court stated that a trial court's instruction must "not tend
to confuse, mislead or prejudice the accused."9" The court suggested
that an instruction begin by explaining to the jury "the principle of
presumption of innocence which places the burden of proof on the
State, where it remains throughout the trial."9 2 Further, the court
83. "A reasonable doubt is the type of doubt that would cause you to hesitate and not
act in an important decision in your own life . . . ." Id.

84. "I doubt whether any of you have made [an important decision in your life] without
" Id. (alteration
having some question as to whether or not this is the right thing to do ....
in original).
85. "[W]hen you make a major decision, you generally have a nagging doubt...." Id.
86. Id. at 388, 620 A.2d at 303.
87. Id. at 387-88, 620 A.2d at 303.
88. Id. at 388, 620 A.2d at 303-04 (citing Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d
665, 678 (1976)). In Dorsey, the court stated:
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing
court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such
error cannot be deemed "harmless" and a reversal is mandated.
Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678.
89. See supra note 64.
90. The court most likely undertook this update of the Lambert charge because "[the
Court of Appeals] and the Court of Special Appeals are seeing increasing numbers of challenges to reasonable doubt instructions." Wills, 329 Md. at 389, 620 A.2d at 304 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 382, 620 A.2d at 301. Presumably, the court intended to express concern
about confusing or misleading the jury and prejudicing the accused. See Lambert v. State,
193 Md. 551, 559, 69 A.2d 461, 464 (1949). Similarly, the Supreme Court has suggested
that a principal concern in evaluating a jury instruction on reasonable doubt is whether it
"could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there was some."
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
92. Wills, 329 Md. at 382-83, 620 A.2d at 301. In fact, the court has held that a failure
to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence principle, when duly requested, is
erroneous under Maryland Rule 4-325(c). See Williams v. State, 322 Md. 35, 47, 585 A.2d

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:749

proposed that the instruction explain that "[t] he State is not required
to prove guilt beyond all possible doubt or to a mathematical certainty."9 3 The court also counseled that the instruction should emphasize that "it is not enough if the evidence shows that the defendant
is probably guilty."9 4 Moreover, the court indicated that an instruction
which defines reasonable doubt "by its own terms" is insufficient.9 5
An adequate instruction should focus on the term "'reasonable
doubt' so as to bring home to the jury clearly that both the corpus
delicti of the crime and the criminal agency of the accused must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."96
c. "Without Reservation" LanguageEndorsed.-Most of the elements of an acceptable reasonable doubt instruction recommended
by the Wills court have appeared in prior opinions of Maryland courts
and the Supreme Court.97 The court's final proposal, however, departs from the relevant precedent. While recognizing that instructions containing the "without hesitation" language have been upheld
for "almost half a century,"98 the court looked to the MarylandPattern
Jury Instructions-Criminal1991 in recommending a change to this
long-approved charge.99 The court suggested that the "without hesitation" language may be confusing to jurors because it suggests that the
immediacy with which they arrived at their decision is relevant to their
209, 215 (1991); see also supra text accompanying note 60. See generally Taylor v. Kentucky,
436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978) (discussing the utility and desirability of instructing the jury on
the presumption of innocence).
93. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301; see also Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 240,
412 A.2d 88, 92 (1980) (quoting Lambert, 193 Md. at 558, 69 A.2d at 464).
94. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301; see also In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68
(1970) (emphasizing the critical difference between the reasonable doubt standard and
the preponderance of the evidence standard).
95. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301; see also Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 95,
437 A.2d 654, 660 (1981) (holding that an explanation of a reasonable doubt as a "doubt
which is founded upon reason," without emphasizing the "grave importance of [the jury's]
decision," is an erroneous instruction "which does nothing more than define the term by
using the term").
96. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301; see also Borza v. State, 25 Md. App. 391, 40809, 335 A.2d 142, 152 (1975) (approving ajury instruction in an arson case in which the
court instructed that the mens rea element of the corpus delicti must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt).
97. See supra notes 91-96.
98. Wills, 329 Md. at 383, 620 A.2d at 301 (citing Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551, 69
A.2d 461 (1949), and its progeny).
99. Id. at 382, 620 A.2d at 301. The pattern jury instruction states in pertinent part:
"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires such proof as would convince you of the truth
of a fact to the extent that you would be willing to act upon such belief without reservationin
an important matter in your own business or personal affairs." MPJI-Cr 2:02 (emphasis
added).
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verdict under the reasonable doubt standard.1"' The court was concerned that jurors would falsely conclude that a reasonable doubt existed "because they 'hesitated to act' or did not act 'without
hesitation."'10 1 It envisioned that ajury might falsely conclude that a
reasonable doubt exists because the jury did not come to its conclusion "immediately," because it "hesitated to act," or because it required some debate to find a defendant guilty.10 2
Wary of the risk ofjury confusion resulting from the "without hesitation" or "hesitate to act" language, the court expressed its "strong
belief" that "'without reservation,' as the pattern instruction suggests,
is the much better term."103 While the court unambiguously expressed its preference for the "without reservation" language, it appeared to recognize the likely residual influence of the Lambert line of
cases. The court announced that it did not deem the "without hesitation" or the "hesitate to act" language erroneous per se. 104
The court's concern about the "hesitate to act" phrase apparently
stemmed from its belief that it might lead a jury to acquit on the basis
of an unjustified finding of reasonable doubt. The petitioner's objection to the trial court's use of the "hesitation" language, however, implicates the opposite concern. 10 5 The trial court's instruction stated
that "[a] reasonable doubt is the type of doubt that would cause you to
hesitate and not act in an important decision in your own life."1 6 Petitioner reasoned that hesitating and then not acting, as opposed to
acting notwithstanding the hesitation, suggested a standard higher
than the reasonable doubt standard. 7 The implication from this
reading of the charge is that an incorrect conviction, not an incorrect
acquittal, would be made more likely.
Judge McAuliffe's concurring opinion also raised a fundamental
concern regarding the "hesitate to act" formulation. McAuliffe suggested that the analogy to decisions made in a juror's personal life
may fail to convey the gravity that should attend the decision to convict a criminal defendant 0 8 and may present a "significant potential
100. See Wills, 329 Md. at 384, 620 A.2d at 301-02; see also Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 8 (arguing that "[c]ombining 'without hesitation' and 'nagging doubt' in the same
instruction encourages jurors to be quick, even if they are uncertain").
101. Wills, 329 Md. at 384, 620 A.2d at 302.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 8 n.1.
106. Wills, 329 Md. at 385-86, 620 A.2d at 302 (emphasis added).
107. See Brief and Appendix of Petitioner at 8 n.1.
108. See Wills, 329 Md. at 389, 620 A.2d at 304 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
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for misunderstanding."' 0 9 McAuliffe cited Monk v. Zelez" ° and the
Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit 1 1' as authority questioning the capacity of the "hesitate to act" formulation to
convey accurately the stringency of the reasonable doubt standard.
Judge McAuliffe noted that decisions made by jurors in their personal
lives are not necessarily made beyond a reasonable doubt, but "are
often, and of necessity, made on a mere preponderance of evidence." 1 2 Despite reservations about the propriety of the "willingness
to act" analogy, Judge McAuliffe strongly embraced the pattern jury
instruction and suggested that adherence to the language of that instruction would reduce the likelihood of confusing jurors or inviting

appellate scrutiny."'
d. Harmless Error Analysis.-After finding the trial court's
charge to be erroneous, the Wills court applied the harmless error
analysis announced in Dorsey. 14 and held that the instruction in Wills
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 In developing its
harmless error analysis, the Dorsey court found "no sound reason for
drawing a distinction between the treatment of those errors which are
of constitutional dimension and those other evidentiary, or procedural, errors which may have been committed during a trial."" 6 It
also noted, however, the Supreme Court's identification of "some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error."" 7 The Supreme Court's recent deci109. Id. (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
110. 901 F.2d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1990). The Monk court cited Scurry v. United States,
347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 883 (1967), for the proposition
that "there is a substantial difference between ajuror's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of personal importance to him."
111. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 9TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCtIONS-CRIMNAL 3.03
(1992). The Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the Ninth Circuit rejected the
analogy between the reasonable doubt standard and the decisions jurors make in their
personal lives "because the most important decisions in life-choosing a spouse, buying a
house, borrowing money, and the like-may involve a heavy element of uncertainty and
risk-taking and are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal cases." Id.
at cmt.
112. Wills, 329 Md. at 389, 620 A.2d at 304 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
113. Judge McAuliffe stated his "strongly held view that trial judges should instruct on
the issue of reasonable doubt in the form suggested by Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction 2:02 and resist the temptation to stray from, or embellish upon, that instruction." Id. at 388-89, 620 A.2d at 304 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
114. See supra note 88.
115. See Wills, 329 Md. at 388, 620 A.2d at 304.
116. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 657, 350 A.2d 665, 677 (1976).
117. Id. at 648, 350 A.2d at 672 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24
(1967)). The rights identified in Chapman include the right to be free from coerced confession, the right to representation by counsel at trial, and the right to be tried by an
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sion in Sullivan 1 8 has added to that list of rights by holding that erroneous instructions on the reasonable doubt standard can never
constitute harmless error because they deprive defendants of a jury
verdict as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment." 9 Thus, in future
cases involving constitutionally defective jury instructions on the reasonable doubt standard, Maryland appellate courts will be required by
Sullivan to bypass the Dorsey analysis and reverse automatically.
4. Conclusion.-In Wills, the Court of Appeals further refined
what constitutes an acceptable explanation of the reasonable doubt
standard. It not only held that the trial court's "nagging doubt" instruction inaccurately described the reasonable doubt standard,1 20 but
it also outlined guidelines for an acceptable charge. The number of
reversals resulting from erroneous reasonable doubt charges should
be significantly reduced because of the clear guidelines established in
Wills, and additionally, because trial courts are now on notice that
constitutionally infirm instructions will automatically result in reversal
under Sullivan. In addition, the court's clear preference for use of the
"without reservation" language may improve jury comprehension of
the standard and increase the accuracy of both convictions and acquittals under the reasonable doubt standard.
KENNETH

D.

O'REILLY

E. Clarifying Trial Courts' Obligation to Conduct Sua Sponte Inquiries
into a Defendant's Competence to Stand Trial and Defendants'
Right to Allocution
In Thanos v. State (Thanos 1),' the Court of Appeals upheld the
murder conviction and death sentence ofJohn Frederick Thanos on a
number of grounds, two of which were particularly significant.2 First,
impartial judge. ld. at 648 n.6, 350 A.2d at 672 n.6. Since Chapman, the Supreme Court
has also held that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the state's burden to prove
the guilt of a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt can never be harmless error.
SeeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n.14 (1979).
118. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
119. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2083 (1993) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
120. Wills, 329 Md. at 388, 620 A.2d at 303.
1. 330 Md. 77, 622 A.2d 727 (1993). This case, later referred to as Thanos Iby the
Court of Appeals, was the first of two direct appeals by John Frederick Thanos. In Thanos
II, Thanos appealed a second conviction and death sentence received in connection with a
different murder and raised many of the same issues originally raised in Thanos L See
Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 576, 625 A.2d 932 (1993). Once again, the Court of Appeals
denied Thanos's appeal and upheld his conviction. Id.
2. Thanos raised eight separate issues on appeal: "(1) the court failed to inquire into
his competency to stand trial; (2) the court allowed him, as opposed to his counsel, to
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the court held that while a trial court has a duty to ensure that a defendant is competent to stand trial, that duty is shared by both defense
counsel and the defendant.' In the absence of an incompetency allegation by either defense counsel or the defendant, the decision to
raise the issue sua sponte is a matter of discretion for the court based
on the evidence presented during the trial.4 The court also implied
that the absence of an incompetency allegation by either defense
counsel or the defendant creates a strong presumption that the defendant is competent to stand trial.5
Second, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's right to
allocute, as outlined in the Maryland Rules,6 includes the right to decide not only if he will allocute, but also when he will allocute. 7 The
court disagreed with Thanos's contention that the decision of when to
allocute was a tactical consideration that should have been left to the
sole discretion of Thanos's defense counsel.' In so holding, the court
reaffirmed the importance of a defendant's right to allocution by refusing to allow defense counsel to interfere with the exercise of that
right.
1. The Case.-On August 31, 1990, Gregory Allen Taylor, Jr.
picked up John Thanos as he was hitchhiking in a rural area of
Worcester County.9 Once inside the car, Thanos pulled a sawed-off
rifle from his duffle bag and ordered Taylor to drive to a remote

decide when he would allocute; (3) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right
to testify; (4) he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to be sentenced by a jury; (5) the court allowed him to waive his right to a jury trial, over his counsel's objection; (6) he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to a
trial by jury; (7) the court admitted improper expert opinion evidence; and (8) the court
failed to grant relief for discovery violations." Thanos I, 330 Md. at 83-84, 622 A.2d at 730.
Issues (1) and (2) are addressed in this Note. Issues (3) through (6) are based on the
argument that Thanos was not competent to make the decisions he did and as such, are
derivative of issue (1). Id. at 90-94, 622 A.2d at 733-35. Issue (7) was dispensed with by the
Court of Appeals with little controversy, and issue (8) was deemed harmless error. Id. at
94-97, 622 A.2d at 735-37.
3. Id. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730.
4. Id. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731. The court stated that "[c]onsidering all the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not have a sua sponte obligation to conduct a
competency hearing." Id.
5. See id. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730.
6. Rule 4-343(d) states that "before sentence is determined, the court shall afford the
defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a statement." MD. R.
4-343(d).
7. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 89-90, 622 A.2d at 732-33.
8. Id. at 88, 622 A.2d at 732.
9. Id. at 81, 622 A.2d at 729.
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wooded area.1" In response to Taylor's pleas for freedom, Thanos
shot Taylor three times in the head, killing him. He then fled in Taylor's vehicle." Police apprehended Thanos in Delaware, where he admitted to various crimes including Taylor's murder. 2 Thanos led
detectives to Taylor's body and subsequently confessed on videotape
to the murder."3
The State charged Thanos with several crimes, including murder
in the first degree, and announced its intention to seek the death penalty. 4 Thanos was tried in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County by
Judge Kaminetz, sitting without ajury. Judge Kaminetz found Thanos
guilty of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, robbery
with a deadly weapon, robbery, use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence, and theft of property having a value over three
hundred dollars. 5 At the sentencing proceeding, also before Judge
Kaminetz sitting without a jury, Thanos offered four witnesses who
testified as to his history of mental illness, his background of institutional placements, and his physical and emotional abuse at the hands
of his father and during his incarceration in the Maryland Correctional Institution at the age of fifteen. 6 After weighing the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, the trial court sentenced Thanos to
death.' 7 Thanos appealed his conviction and death sentence under

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81-82, 622 A.2d at 729.

16. Id. The Maryland Correctional Institution is an adult facility. Id.
17. Id. at 83, 622 A.2d at 729-30. The trial court found six mitigating circumstances:
[(1)] that Thanos's capacity "to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a
result of mental incapacity, mental disorder or emotional disturbance"[;] ... [(2)
Thanos] is a product of a dysfunctional family; [ (3)] early suggestions for mental
health intervention for [Thanos] and his family were not followed; [(4) Thanos]
was emotionally and physically abused as a child; [ (5) Thanos] was inappropriately
incarcerated in an adult correctional facility as a juvenile; and [(6) Thanos] was
entitled to, and received, the mercy of the court.
Id., 622 A.2d at 729. The trial court found only one aggravating circumstance: Thanos
committed the murder while committing a robbery. Id., 622 A.2d at 730. The court concluded that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances and
sentenced Thanos to death. Id. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(10), (g)(4),
(g) (8) (1992 & Supp. 1993) (outlining the recognition of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances).
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the provisions of Article 27, section 414(a) of the Code and Maryland
Rule 8-306(c) (1). "
2. Legal Background.a. Competence to Stand TriaL--Criminal defendants have a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right not to be subjected to a
trial while incompetent.19 In 1975, ChiefJustice Burger stated that "it
has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such
that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial."20 The Maryland
legislature recognized this right in enacting section 12-103(a) of the
Health-General Article, which mandates that "if, before or during a
trial, the defendant in a criminal case appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to
stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the
record, whether the defendant is competent to stand trial."2 1 Consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions on the issue, the Code defines "incompetent to stand trial" as "not able . . . to understand the
nature or object of the proceeding[ ] or . . . to assist in one's

defense."2 2
Slightly expanding section 12-103(a), the Court of Special Appeals ruled in 1986 that the trial court's duty to determine the competence of the defendant "is triggered in one of three ways: (1) upon an
allegation by the accused himself that he is incompetent; (2) upon an
allegation by defense counsel that the accused is incompetent; and
(3) upon the court's sua sponte decision that the accused appears to
"
be
incompetent.
While
not adding
significantly
to the
provisions
of
section
12-103(a),,2 this
holding
made clear
that courts
have
an obliga-

18. Thanos 1, 330 Md. at 83, 622 A.2d at 720. Section 414(a) states that "whenever the
death penalty is imposed, and the judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals shall
review the sentence on the record." MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 414(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
Rule 8-306(c) (1) states that "whenever a sentence of death is imposed, there shall be an
automatic appeal to the Court of Appeals of both the determination of guilt and the sentence, whether or not the determination of guilt was based on a plea of guilty." MD. R. 8-

306(c) (1).
19. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 84, 622 A.2d at 730 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 582 A.2d
794 (1990)).
20. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
21. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-103(a) (1990).
22. Id. § 12-101(e) (1990 & Supp. 1993).
23. Johnson v. State, 67 Md. App. 347, 358-59, 507 A.2d 1134, 1140, cert. denied, 307 Md.
260, 513 A.2d 314, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986).
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tion to determine whether or not defendants are competent to stand
trial, regardless of the action (or inaction) of defendants or their
counsel.
In 1975, the Supreme Court attempted to identify factors that
might trigger a court's inquiry into a defendant's competence. It
stated:
[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether
further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors
standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient.
There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in
which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are
implicated.24
b. Allocution.-The right of allocution has a long and varied
history in both English and American common law. When criminal
defendants had no right to counsel and were considered incompetent
to testify on their own behalf, allocution was viewed as a defendant's
only opportunity to address the court.2 5 Attesting to its fundamental
importance, Maryland formally recognized this common law right in
its 1776 Declaration of Rights.2 6
The Court of Appeals first addressed the right of allocution in
1914. In Dutton v. State,17 the court endorsed the practice of providing
the defendant with an opportunity to address the court in all cases in

24. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180 (discussing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).
25. See Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 354, 509 A.2d 120, 125 (1986) (summarizing the
history of the right to allocution in Maryland) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 368-71 (1769); Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L. REv. 115, 120-24
(1944); Note, ProceduralDue Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARv. L. REv. 821,
821-22, 832-33 (1968); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961); Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation,and the RehabilitativeIdeal: The View from Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv.
1, 9 (1968); Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Question to Defendant as to Whether He Has
Anything to Say Why Sentence Should Not Be Pronounced Against Him, 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, 1295
(1964)).
26. Id. at 355, 509 A.2d at 125. Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights states in part:
"[T] he Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England .... according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed
on the Fourth day ofJuly, seventeen hundred and seventy-six...." MD. CONsT. DECL. RTs.
art. 5 (1981).
27. 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914).
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which sentences of death or imprisonment could be imposed." In
1962, the judiciary adopted rule 761, which applied to both capital
and noncapital cases and provided that "before imposing sentence the
court shall afford an accused or his counsel an opportunity to make2 a9
statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment."
Rule 761 was subsequently rescinded and replaced by rule 772, which
like its predecessor, applied to both capital and noncapital cases.
Rule 772 provided that "before imposing sentence the court shall inform the defendant that he has the right, personally and through
counsel, to make a statement and to present information in mitigation
of punishment, and the court shall afford an opportunity to exercise
this right.""° In 1979, the Court of Appeals amended rule 772 to apply only to noncapital cases and adopted rule 772A for application in
capital cases. Rule 772A did not address a defendant's right to allocution and remained the law in Maryland until the adoption of rule 4343 in 1984. Rule 4-343(d), which governs the right of allocution in
Maryland courts today, states that in capital cases, "before sentence is
determined, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a statement. "31
In Harris v. State,3 2 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the importance of the right to allocution by holding that denial of a defendant's
right to allocute will void the sentence and require a new sentencing
proceeding.33 That same year, the court addressed the question of
whether a prosecutor may comment on a defendant's allocution and
held that "allocution is more like testimony than silence and for Fifth
Amendment purposes is testimonial, carrying with it, at a minimum, a

28. Id. Dutton dealt with a defendant who had been sentenced to death without first
having been asked whether he wanted to make a statement to the court. After a generally
favorable discussion of the right of allocution, the Court of Appeals held that "it is not
reversible error, even in capital cases, not to ask the prisoner if he has any reason to give
why sentence should not be passed, unless it is apparent that the prisoner was or may have
been injured by the omission." Id. at 383, 91 A. at 421.
29. MD. R. 761(a) (1962) (rescinded July 1, 1977 and replaced by MD. R. 772).
30. MD. R 772 (1981) (amendedJan. 1, 1979).
31. MD. R. 4-343(d).
32. 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986).
33. Id. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127. In Hars,the trial court ruled that it is the defendant's
decision whether he or his counsel will address the jury. The court further specified that
the right of allocution cannot be exercised by both defendant and counsel. Id. at 350, 509
A.2d at 123. When pressed on this issue by Harris's counsel, who argued that the court was
effectively denying the defendant his right to allocute, the court replied, "[T]his Court is
not depriving Mr. Harris of his right to address the jury. He may do so. If he elects to do
so, [counsel] may not argue also." Id. at 351, 509 A.2d at 123.
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waiver of any privilege to avoid comment by the prosecutor on the
allocution." 4
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-

a. Sua Sponte Obligationto Determine ifa Defendant Is Competent
to Stand Trial.-The Court of Appeals began by acknowledging that a
trial court has an obligation to make a determination of whether a
defendant is competent to stand trial if the defendant alleges he is
incompetent, defense counsel alleges the defendant is incompetent,
or the defendant appears to the court to be incompetent.35 During
the trial, neither Thanos nor his attorneys alleged that Thanos was
incompetent to stand trial.36 Similarly, the four experts that testified
for Thanos at the sentencing proceeding did not indicate that he was
incompetent to stand trial.37 Furthermore, when the State moved
before trial to conduct a competency hearing, Thanos's counsel successfully argued against the motion on the grounds that "neither the
defendant nor his counsel ha[d] alleged the Defendant [was] incompetent and in the Defendants [sic] prior Court appearance, the Court
did not indicate that the Defendant appeared incompetent."3 8
Thanos's counsel added that "the Defendant now has counsel who
can keep the Court appraised should a competency issue arise in the
future." 9 Thus, the Court of Appeals found that Thanos and his
counsel had ample opportunity before trial to raise the issue of competence and chose not to do so.' The only factor remaining for the
court to consider was Thanos's behavior during trial. The court
stated:
As we see it, Thanos sought to have it both ways in this case,
maintaining at first that he was not incompetent, thereby denying the State an opportunity to evaluate him; then, upon
receiving a death sentence, maintaining that his bizarre behavior warranted a competency hearing. Our independent
review of the record does not indicate that the trial court
erred in failing to grant Thanos a competency hearing.4 1
34. Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 203, 507 A.2d 1098, 1114, cert. granted in part,479 U.S.
882 (1986), vacated in part and remanded, 482 U.S. 496, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
35. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
36. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730; Brief of Appellee at 7.
37. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731; Brief of Appellee at 19.
38. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id.
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The court conceded that Thanos made highly inappropriate remarks
during both the trial and sentencing proceedings,4 2 but was unconvinced that Thanos's behavior amounted to incompetency. 43 Applying the two-pronged test for competence to stand trial articulated by
the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States"4 and section 12-101 (e) of
the Maryland Code, 45 the Court of Appeals felt that Thanos exhibited
both the "present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding" and "a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.""6 The court determined Thanos's proffered justifications for the decisions he made to
be reasonable and articulate and to in no way give rise to an inference
42. Id. at 87, 622 A.2d at 732. For example, Thanos had the following exchange with
Judge Kaminetz over the mitigating circumstance of "youthful age":
THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me. You said youthful age?
THE COURT: The youthful age of the Defendant, of you.
THE DEFENDANT: Suppose the Defendant was extremely old?
THE COURT: Well, that is obviously something for the jury to consider.
THE DEFENDANT: Because I just calculated that in dog years I would be like
200 and some years old.
Brief of Appellant at 17-18.
At sentencing, Thanos offered the following remarks:
Okay. Well, I was planning on allocuting, you know, rebutting every witness, but I
changed my mind on that. First, I want to give my compliments to the lovely
Clerk Allison, and that pink ensemble she's wearing. Very nice. And to the St.
Mary's psychiatrist, she's a very tasty looking morsel. And Channel 13, Paulette
Tubman, who's an extremely sexy lady.
And the appropriate press, Debrah Reittman, her body won't quit. As far as
rebutting anything, I don't think I will, because I don't want to give a lot of
credence to it. To me, it sounds like a whole lot of pretentious rhetoric. Something you might look forward to seeing on one of the soap operas. A whole lot of
malarkey. So I'm not going to dignify any of it.
I think you would have to agree with me, though, psychiatry in general has
got to be a good hustle. As far as the sentence I would like to have, I only have a
few choices, I think. So I think I would take life without parole, without the possibility of escape. I don't think it should take you too long to review these facts, if
you want to call them facts, or innuendo.
I think you've had sufficient time over the weekend to ponder all this, and
render a fast, speedy opinion. And the only thing else I can think of to say is,
Allison, you look good. Great. That's it.
Brief of Appellant at 19-20.
Finally, when sentenced to death, Thanos asked, "Is that death by gas, or death by rooroo?" Thanos I, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 731; Brief of Appellant at 21.
43. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 87, 622 A.2d at 731.
44. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). In Dusky, the Court stated that the test for "competency to stand trial" must be " ' whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Id. at
402.
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. Thanos 1, 330 Md. at 87, 622 A.2d at 731.
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that Thanos was incompetent to stand trial.47 Consequently, the Court
no error in the trial court's failure to hold a compeof Appeals found
48
hearing.
tency
b. The Right of Counsel to Determine when a Defendant Will Allocute.-After discussing the history of allocution in general and in
Maryland specifically, the Court of Appeals rejected Thanos's argument that the decision concerning if and when a defendant will allocute is a tactical one that should be left to the discretion of defense
counsel and that, by allowing Thanos to allocute when he wished, the
trial court thwarted defense counsel's plans and committed reversible
error.

49

The court looked to Treece v. State,5 ° in which it considered
whether a defendant could "override" the decision of counsel to plead
not criminally responsible.5 ' There, the court held that even though
"when a defendant is represented by counsel, it is counsel who is in
charge of the defense and his say as to strategy and tactics is generally
controlling,"5 2 "there are some decisions that a competent defendant
is entitled to make, regardless of the views of counsel, if the defendant
makes them knowingly and voluntarily."" Although the Treece court
did not attempt to list all such decisions, it did categorize such decisions as ones that "involve [ ] a choice that will inevitably have important personal consequences for [the defendant]."54 In justifying its
resolution of this issue, the Treece Court cited Rock v. Arkansas,5 a case
involving a defendant's decision to testify on his own behalf, as an
example of the type of decision the defendant is entitled to make.5 6
47. Id. at 86-87, 622 A.2d at 731.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 87-88, 622 A.2d at 732. For support, Thanos cited Parren v. State, 309 Md.
260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987), in which the court appeared to vest decision-making authority in
counsel when a defendant has chosen to be represented by counsel. Parrendealt with the
issue of hybrid representation-a defendant representing himself pro se with the "assistance" of counsel. The court held that the right of counsel and the right to defend pro se
cannot be asserted simultaneously and that when a defendant has chosen the right of
counsel, it is counsel who "calls the shots." Parren, 309 Md. at 264, 523 A.2d at 599.
50. 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1988).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 671, 547 A.2d at 1057 (quoting Parren, 309 Md. at 265, 523 A.2d at 599); see
supra note 49.
53. Treece, 313 Md. at 673, 547 A.2d at 1058.
54. Id. at 674, 547 A.2d at 1058-59.
55. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
56. Treece, 313 Md. at 674, 547 A.2d at 1059.
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Ultimately, the Court of Appeals in Thanos Icombined its holding
in Booth,5 7 that allocution is "like" testimony, with the Supreme
Court's holding in Rock, 58 that the defendant decides whether to testify, to conclude that it is the defendant who decides if and when to
allocute 9 and that neither the court nor defense counsel can interfere with a defendant's exercise of that right.6 °
4. Analysis.a. Competence to Stand Tial.--On one level, Thanos I is a
fairly uncomplicated decision. Under Maryland statutes and case law,
a trial court has an obligation to raise the issue of a defendant's competence to stand trial if the court determines that there is a question
as to a defendant's competence. 61 The trial court in Thanos I did not
raise the issue because it did not feel there was a question as to
Thanos's competence to stand trial, and the Court of Appeals agreed.
On another level, however, the Court of Appeals accomplished several
things in Thanos L First, it explicitly affirmed the Court of Special
Appeals's holding in Johnson v. State6 2 that the burden to raise the issue of a defendant's competence to stand trial rests with either the
63
defendant, the defendant's counsel, or the court.

Second, the Court of Appeals adopted the criteria established by
the Supreme Court in Pate v. Robinson6 4 and Drope v. Missouri6 5 for trial

courts' determination of whether a competency hearing is warranted.
The application of these criteria is significant because, at first glance,
it might appear, as Thanos's defense counsel argued on appeal, that
the Court of Appeals focused almost entirely on Thanos's demeanor
during trial, to the exclusion of other evidence such as his history of
mental illness. A closer look, however, shows that, based on the factors outlined in Drope,6 6 Thanos gave the Court of Appeals very little to
consider. Neither defense counsel nor Thanos ever raised the issue of
57. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
59. Thanos 1, 330 Md. at 89-90, 622 A.2d at 733.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.

§ 12-103(a) (1990)); supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussingJohnson v. State, 67
Md. App. 347, 507 A.2d 1134 (1986)).
62. 67 Md. App. 347, 507 A.2d 1134 (1986); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
63. Thanos 1, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730.
64. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
65. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
66. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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Thanos's competence to stand trial.67 Defense counsel presented no
testimony regarding Thanos's history of mental illness until sentencing, at which time it was arguably irrelevant to the issue of Thanos's
competence to stand trial. 68
Third, the Court of Appeals clearly distinguished between what
might be considered inappropriate or even bizarre behavior on the
part of a defendant during trial or sentencing proceedings and a defendant's competence to stand trial. Though inappropriate or bizarre
behavior during trial may, in certain circumstances, be sufficient to
trigger a court's obligation to conduct a competency hearing sua
sponte, the question is not whether the behavior is bizarre, but
whether the defendant is able to understand the nature of the proceedings and assist in the defense.6 9
Finally, the Court of Appeals indicated that although trial courts
share the burden of raising the issue of a defendant's competence to
stand trial, a court rarely will be obligated to conduct a sua sponte
hearing when neither the defendant nor defense counsel has alleged
incompetence. 70 Because defense counsel is in a much better position than the court to determine whether the defendant is able to
71
consult with defense counsel and assist in the defense, the burden
rests primarily with defense counsel to raise a competence issue with
the court.72
67. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
68. Section 12-103(a) of the Health-General Article places an obligation on the court
to determine a defendant's competence to stand trial "before or during a triaL" MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-103(a) (1990) (emphasis added). Even if the testimony of the
four expert witnesses Thanos presented at sentencing had specifically stated that Thanos
was incompetent to stand trial, the trial portion of proceedings had already concluded. See
Thanos 1, 330 Md. at 87, 622 A.2d at 731.
69. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing DrLpe, 420 U.S. at 171, and
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 12-101(e) (1990 & Supp. 1993)).
70. This inference is drawn from the amount of attention the court gave to the fact
that Thanos's counsel did not raise the issue of Thanos's competence to stand trial. See
Thanos , 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730. If the court's sua sponte obligation to inquire
into a defendant's competency to stand trial is truly independent of defense counsel's
obligation, as § 12-103(e) would seem to suggest, defense counsel's failure to raise the
issue could have been dispensed with by the court in a single sentence. Similarly, defense
counsel's opposition to the State's pretrial request for a competency hearing and its statements that it would keep the court apprised if such an issue arose are both arguably irrelevant to the question of whether sufficient evidence existed to warrant a sua sponte inquiry,
but the court emphasized both in its affirmation of the trial court's decision not to hold a
competency hearing. Id. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.
71. Brief of Appellee at 16.
72. In fact, this burden actually might constitute a duty on the part of defense counsel.
For example, at what point did Thanos's defense counsel decide that Thanos was incompetent to stand trial? If the determination was made during the trial, defense counsel may
have failed to provide Thanos with effective assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth
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b. Protecting the Right of Allocution.-The Court of Appeals's
ruling on Thanos's right to determine if and when to allocute flows
logically from previous Maryland decisions.h It complements the
court's earlier decision in Booth, 4 allowing a prosecutor to comment
on a defendant's allocution, by allowing the defendant to decide if
and when to allocute, and thus, whether to risk prosecutorial comment on that allocution. In Thanos I, the Court of Appeals characterized the right of allocution as a "precious opportunity for rebuttal,"75
and by its ruling, ensured that nothing and no one will interfere with
a defendant's right to exercise that opportunity.
5. Conclusion.-In Thanos I, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court did not err by not holding a hearing to determine whether
Thanos was competent to stand trial76 and that it is the defendant, not
defendant's counsel, who decides if and when to allocute." 7 Thanos I
points out the difficulty in determining exactly what triggers a court's
obligation to inquire sua sponte into a defendant's competency.
Although there may not be any "fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to
proceed,"7" the Court of Appeals's decision in Thanos I faithfully follows both the letter and the spirit of previous Maryland and Supreme
Court case law. Thanos may have been unwilling to assist in his defense or unwilling to acquiesce in the decisions of his defense counsel,
but this lack of cooperation alone did not make him incompetent to
stand trial.
DANIEL L. OWEL

Amendment and by Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI;
MD. R.P.C. 1.1-Competence; MD. R.P.C. 1.3-Diligence.
73. See, e.g., Shifflett v. State, 315 Md. 382, 554 A.2d 814 (1989); Treece v. State, 313
Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054 (1988); Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986); Harris
v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120 (1986); Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632
(1981); Miller v. State, 67 Md. App. 666, 509 A.2d 135, cert. denied, 307 Md. 260, 513 A.2d
314 (1986).
74. 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098.
75. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 90, 622 A.2d at 733.
76. Id. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.
77. Id. at 89, 622 A.2d at 733.
78. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975); see supra note 24 and accompanying
text.
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F. Defining the Rule of Merger with Regard to the Dangerous and Deadly
Weapons Statute
In Eldridge v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that Article 27,
section 36(a) of the Code creates the single offense of "carrying a
deadly weapon," which may be committed by concealing a weapon or
carrying a weapon openly.' As a result, the court found it impermissible to convict the defendant in the case of both carrying a concealed
dangerous or deadly weapon and carrying the same weapon openly
with intent to injure.' The court further held that a court could not
impose separate sentences for robbery with a deadly weapon and for
carrying the same deadly weapon used in the robbery.4
1. The Case.-James Eldridge was convicted in 1991 of robbery
with a dangerous and deadly weapon 5 under Article 27, section 488 of
the Code,6 and of wearing or carrying such a weapon both concealed,
and openly with intent to injure, under Article 27, section 36(a) .7 Imposing the maximum sentence for each of the three convictions, the
trial court sentenced Eldridge to twenty years for robbery with a
deadly weapon and three years each for the two dangerous weapons

1. 329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993).
2. Id. at 313, 619 A.2d at 534.
3. Id at 315, 619 A.2d at 535.
4. I& at 320, 619 A.2d at 538.
5. Eldridge used a starter's pistol, id. at 310-11, 619 A.2d at 533, which is considered a
dangerous weapon for purposes of robbery with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous
or deadly weapon. Jackson v. State, 231 Md. 591, 595, 191 A.2d 432, 434-35 (1963).
6. Section 488 provides in pertinent part "Every person convicted of the crime of
robbery or attempt to rob with a dangerous or deadly weapon or accessory thereto, shall
...be sentenced to imprisonment in the Maryland Penitentiary for not more than twenty
years." Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 488 (1992).
7. See Eldridge, 329 Md. at 308-09, 311, 619 A.2d 532, 533. Section 36 provides in
pertinent part:
Every person who shall wear or carry any.., dangerous or deadly weapon of any
kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblades and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry any
such weapon ... openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any person in any
unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned in jail, or sentenced to the Maryland Department of Correction for not more than three years; and in case of
conviction, if it shall appear from the evidence that such weapon was carried,
concealed or openly, with the deliberate purpose of injuring the person or destroying the life of another, the court shall impose the highest sentence of imprisonment prescribed.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a) (1992).
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convictions.' All three sentences were to run consecutively for a total
of twenty-six years of imprisonment.9
On appeal, Eldridge contended that the trial court should have
merged the dangerous weapons convictions into the armed robbery
conviction.1" In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Special Appeals, relying on its decision in Selby v. State,1 ' affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. t2 It ruled that because the weapons charges and the
armed robbery offense were not the same under the "required evidence" test set forth in Blockburger v. United States,'" the "so-called
'Rule of Lenity"' did not apply.' 4 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed on the issue of merger. 5
2. Legal Background.-The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 6 bars the government from prosecuting a defendant for
a crime after the defendant is acquitted or convicted of that crime and
affords a defendant protection from receiving multiple punishments
for the "same crime."" The Double Jeopardy Clause, however, imposes limitations on the judicial process-on government prosecutors
and the courts-not on the legislative process.' 8 Legislatures, therefore, retain the power to "define crimes and fix punishments."' 9
In Maryland, the "required evidence" test determines whether
two offenses arising from a single transaction constitute the "same
crime" for sentencing purposes. 20 The Supreme Court established
8. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 309, 619 A.2d at 532.
9. Id.
10. Eldridge v. State, No. 91-1161, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 14, 1991).
11. 76 Md. App. 201, 219, 544 A.2d 14, 23 (1988) (holding that a conviction for carrying a concealed dangerous or deadly weapon, or carrying such a weapon openly with intent to injure, does not merge into robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon), affd on
other grounds, 319 Md. 174, 571 A.2d 1236 (1990).
12. Eldridge, No. 91-1161, slip op. at 1-2.
13. 284 U.S. 299 (1932); see infta notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
14. Eldridge, No. 91-1161, slip op. at 1.
15. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 320, 619 A.2d at 538.
16. The Fifth Amendment states in pertinent part: "nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
17. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977).
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. See Biggus v. State, 323 Md. 339, 351, 593 A.2d 1060, 1066 (1991) (holding that a
battery conviction merged into a third degree sexual assault under the required evidence
test); Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 273-74, 373 A.2d 262, 269 (1977) (stating that under
the required evidence test, a felony murder and the underlying felony are the same
offense).
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the required evidence test, also known as the "Blockburger test," in
Blockburger v. United States." Under the test, if all the elements of one
offense are also the elements of a second offense arising out of the
same transaction, the former offense will merge into the latter offense.2 2 When the required evidence test mandates a merger, double
jeopardy principles usually bar multiple sentences. 2 3 However, because the Double Jeopardy Clause does not limit legislatures, a court
must impose two sentences when a legislature manifests an intent to
impose separate punishments for two offenses that would otherwise
merge. 24 When the legislature's intent as to the merger of two offenses is not clear, the courts will either consider other factors, such as
the approach taken by other jurisdictions, the punishments that the
state has imposed in the past, the general fairness of multiple punishments under the specific facts; or they will apply the "rule of lenity" in
construing the statute.2 5
Courts apply the rule of lenity when multiple punishments conceivably could be imposed based on one transaction, but it is not clear
whether the legislature intended separate punishments. The rule of
lenity provides that doubts about the legislature's intent will be resolved in favor of the defendant and, therefore, against multiple punishments. 26 There is considerable disagreement, however, about
whether the rule of lenity is synonymous with the required evidence
test or is a more flexible guide for sentencing purposes. In 1990, the
Court of Appeals addressed this confusion in White v. State,27 stating:

21. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
22. Id. at 304.
23. See Middleton v. State, 318 Md. 749, 757-58, 569 A.2d 1276, 1279-80 (1990).
24. See Frazier v. State, 318 Md. 597, 613, 569 A.2d 684, 692 (1990) (holding that a
defendant with a prior conviction for attempted armed robbery with a deadly weapon
could be convicted of both carrying a pistol in violation of Article 27, § 445(c), which
makes it unlawful for anyone convicted of a crime of violence to possess a pistol or revolver, and carrying a handgun in violation of Article 27, § 36B(b)); Whack v. State, 288
Md. 137, 143, 416 A.2d 265, 268 (1980) (holding that use of a handgun in commission of a
robbery does not merge into the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction); see also infra
notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing Whack).
25. State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 394 n.9, 631 A.2d 453, 458 n.9 (1993).
26. See Whack, 288 Md. at 144-45, 416 A.2d at 268-69 (explaining that the rule of lenity
means that courts will not interpret a statute "'so as to increase the penalty ...when such
an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended'") (citation omitted); see also Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 323, 593 A.2d 671, 676
(1991) (holding that assault with intent to murder merges into attempted first degree murder under the rule of lenity); White v. State, 318 Md. 740, 748, 569 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1990)
(applying the rule of lenity to hold that child abuse merges into homicide).
27. 318 Md. 740, 569 A.2d 1271 (1990).
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A few cases have attempted to formulate fixed criteria for
deciding whether to apply the rule of lenity, and have indicated that unless two offenses merge under either the required evidence test or under these fixed criteria, there can
be no merger. In our view, however, there should not be any
rigid or fixed criteria for applying the rule of lenity. Rather,
as a principle of statutory construction, it should be used like
other principles of statutory construction as an aid in ascertaining legislative intent with respect to a statutory offense.28
The White court held that a child abuse conviction merged into a
homicide conviction under the rule of lenity even though it would not
merge under the required evidence test.2 9 In support of its holding,

the court looked to the traditional policy of merging felony murder
and premeditated murder and merging the different statutory aggravated assaults, although they would be considered separate offenses
30
under the required evidence test.

Apparently, however, the White decision did not settle the question surrounding the application of the rule of lenity. After White, the
Court of Special Appeals, in Mauk v. State,31 set forth a much narrower
interpretation of the rule. The Mauk court held that the rule of lenity
applies when two offenses meet the standard of the required evidence
test.3 2 In effect, the court confused the required evidence test-a rule
of law-with the rule of lenity-a rule of statutory construction.3 3 Despite the Court of Special Appeals's attempt in Mauk to limit the applicability of the rule of lenity, the Court of Appeals has continued to
advocate the White court's position, distinguishing between the required evidence test and the rule of lenity.34 For example, in State v.
Lancaster,35 the court stated that "the rule of lenity ... is applicable
when offenses are not deemed the same under the required evidence
test." 6
a. Weapons Convictions.--The Court of Appeals faced the issue of multiple prosecutions for carrying a single handgun in Webb v.
28. Id. at 745, 569 A.2d at 1274 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 744, 748, 569 A.2d at 1273, 1275.
30. Id. at 746-47, 569 A.2d at 1274.
31. 91 Md. App. 456, 605 A.2d 157 (1992).
32. See id. at 467-68, 605 A.2d at 162-63.
33. See State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 409, 631 A.2d 453, 466 (1993) ("[T]he required
evidence test is not simply another rule of statutory construction. Instead, it is a longstanding rule of law to determine whether one offense is included within another....").
34. Id. at 413 n.16, 631 A.2d at 468 n.16.
35. 332 Md. 385, 631 A.2d 453 (1993).
36. Id. at 413 n.16, 631 A.2d at 468 n.16.
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State. 7 In Webb, the defendant was first convicted and sentenced to
one year of imprisonment for violating Article 27, section 36B(b). a3
He subsequently was found guilty of violating the same statute in an
incident that occurred approximately three hours prior to the incident that resulted in the first conviction.3 9 He was sentenced to another three years imprisonment, to run immediately following his first
sentence.' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Webb to decide
whether the defendant could be prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced "twice for carrying a single handgun over a three hour period[ ].41 In its opinion, the court equated the offense created by the
statute with a possession offense and concluded that, like possession,
any violation of the statute is a continuing violation.4 2 The court concluded that the law is concerned with the carrying of the handgun,
regardless of how that carrying is done-"whether concealed or
open."4" Stating that it could not "read into the plain language of the
section" any intention on the part of the legislature that multiple victims or the carrying of the weapon over an extended period of time
give rise to separate offenses," the court reversed the second
conviction.4 5
In Hunt v. State,4 6 the defendant was convicted of using a handgun in the commission of a violent crime in violation of Article 27,
section 36B (d),"' and of unlawfully wearing, carrying, or transporting
a handgun in violation of Article 27, section 36B(b) .4' The former
conviction carried a sentence of twenty years; the latter carried a sentence of three years.4 9 The Court of Appeals found that, while section
36B(d) explicitly called for a separate sentence over and above the
37. 311 Md. 610, 536 A.2d 1161 (1988).
38. Id. at 613, 536 A.2d at 1163. Section 36B(b) provides in pertinent part: "Any person who shall wear, carry or transport any handgun, whether concealed or open, upon or
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
about his person ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ...
§ 36B(b) (1992).
39. Webb, 311 Md. at 613, 536 A.2d at 1163.

40. Id. at 613-14, 536 A.2d at 1163.
41. Id. at 614, 536 A.2d at 1163.
42. Id. at 615, 536 A.2d at 1164.
43. Id. at 617, 536 A.2d at 1165.
44. Id. at 618, 536 A.2d at 1165.
45. Id. at 619, 536 A.2d at 1166.
46. 312 Md. 494, 540 A.2d 1125 (1988).
47. Section 36B(d) reads in pertinent part: "Any person who shall use a handgun...
in the commission of any felony or any crime of violence as defined in §441 of this article
shall be guilty of a separate misdemeanor. . . ." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(d) (1992).
48. Hunt, 312 Md. at 497, 540 A.2d at 1126; see supra note 38 (setting forth the relevant
text of § 36B(b)).
49. Hunt, 312 Md. at 509-10, 540 A.2d at 1132-33.
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sentence for the underlying violent crime, section 36B(b) did not display the same clarity of intent.5 ° Thus, the court concluded that the
legislature did not intend separate punishments and vacated the judgment as to the handgun violation under section 36B(b). 5 '
b. Merger of Weapons Offenses into Other Crimes.-In Whack v.
State,5 2 the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's separate convictions and sentences for robbery with a deadly weapon, the use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony,5 3 and assault. 4 The court
concluded that, even assuming that the offenses of robbery with a
deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony
would have merged under Blockburger, it was clear that the legislature
"intended to authorize the imposition of punishment under both...
when one commits a robbery with a handgun."5 5
The statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and deadly
weapons, however, does not include an explicit demand or authorization by the legislature for separate sentencing.5 6 Nevertheless, in Selby
v. State,5 7 the Court of Special Appeals held that wearing or carrying a
deadly weapon openly with intent to injure" does not merge into robbery with a deadly weapon under either the required evidence test or
the rule of lenity.5 9 Similarly, in Biggus v. State,6" the Court of Appeals
refused to allow a merger of such a weapons offense with a sex offense. In Biggus, the defendant was convicted of a weapons charge
under section 36(a) and a third degree sex offense involving sex with
a minor.6 1 The court determined that the offenses should not be
merged under the required evidence test or under the rule of lenity
because the legislature intended to treat weapons violations harshly.6 2
50. Id. at 510, 540 A.2d at 1133.
51. See id. (holding that the § 36B(b) offense merged into the § 36B(d) offense).
52. 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980).
53. See supra note 47 (setting forth the relevant text of Article 27, § 36B(d)).
54. Whack, 288 Md. at 139, 416 A.2d at 266.
55. Id. at 149, 416 A.2d at 271.
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36(a) (1992).
57. 76 Md. App. 201, 544 A.2d 14 (1988), affd on other grounds, 319 Md. 174, 517 A.2d
1236 (1990).
58. Although the defendant in Selby carried a weapon concealed and openly, he was
not charged with carrying a concealed weapon. See Selby, 319 Md. at 175, 571 A.2d at 1237.
Thus, the Article 27, § 36(a) merger question did not arise. See Selby, 76 Md. App. at 201,

544 A.2d at 14.
59. Selby, 76 Md. App. at 218-19, 544 A.2d at 23.
60. 323 Md. 339, 593 A.2d 1060 (1991).
61. Id. at 344-45, 593 A.2d at 1062-63.
62. Id at 356-57, 593 A.2d at 1068-69. In particular, the court cited the following excerpt from Article 27, § 36(a): "[I] n case of conviction, if it shall appear from the evidence
that such weapon was carried, concealed or openly, with the deliberate purpose of injuring
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The court also inferred a legislative intent against merger by noting
that the legislature had not reacted to Maryland courts' universal refusal to merge section 36(a) convictions into other offenses 6 3-except
when mandated to do so by statute or the required evidence test.64 In
Biggus, however, the underlying crime, a third degree sex offense, was
not based solely on the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon, but also
involved the defendant's contact with a victim under fourteen years of
age. 65 Had the second offense been based solely on weapons use, the
court may have merged the section 36(a) conviction into the sex offense conviction.6 6
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-

a. The Weapons Convictions.-In Eldridge, the court first determined whether a court could impose separate sentences for carrying a concealed dangerous or deadly weapon and for carrying the
same weapon openly with intent to injure.6 7 To discern the legislative
intent behind Article 27, section 36(a), the dangerous and deadly
weapons statute, the court began by examining its earlier holding in
Webb.6 It determined that, based on the similarity between the handgun statute at issue in Webb69 and the dangerous or deadly weapons
statute at issue in Eldridge, section 36(a) was the counterpart of the
handgun statute. 70 Thus, the court concluded that the activities prohibited by section 36(a) constitute one offense. 7 1 It further reasoned
the person or destroying the life of another, the court shall impose the highest sentence of
imprisonment prescribed." Id. at 356, 593 A.2d at 1068 (citing Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 36(a) (1992)).
63. Id. at 357, 593 A.2d at 1069; see Brooks v. State, 284 Md. 416, 422-24, 397 A.2d 598,
599-600 (1979) (stating that the crime of carrying a deadly weapon openly with intent to
injure does not merge into assault with intent to murder because it fails the required evidence test). The Brooks court discussed the rule of lenity without naming it. See id. It
stated that the appellant had not argued that the legislature intended merger, so the issue
was not before the court. Id. at 423-24, 397 A.2d at 600; see also Nance v. State, 77 Md. App.
259, 267, 549 A.2d 1182, 1185-86 (1988) (holding that a weapons conviction under Article
27, section 36(a) does not merge into first degree rape and first degree sex offenses). The
Nance court stated that the elements of the particular weapons offense at issue were the
carrying of the weapon, openly and with intent to injure. See id. at 265, 549 A.2d at 1185.
Therefore, these offenses failed to satisfy the required evidence test. Id. at 266, 549 A.2d at
1185.
64. Biggus, 323 Md. at 357, 593 A.2d at 1069.
65. Id. at 354, 539 A.2d at 1067.
66. Id.
67. See Eldridge,329 Md. at 312-13, 619 A.2d at 534.
68. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
69. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B (1992).
70. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 314, 619 A.2d at 535.
71. Id.
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that applying the Court of Special Appeals's view-that carrying the
weapon concealed is a separate offense from carrying it openlywould result in the absurd imposition of a new sentence every time a
defendant moved a weapon in and out of open view. 72 According to

the court, common sense dictated that the intent of the legislature was
to make these weapons offenses one crime. 73 The prohibition against
double jeopardy prohibited the imposition of multiple punishments
for violations of the statute that arose from the same transaction.7 4
b. The Merger of the Weapons Charges into Robbery with a Dangerous orDeadly Weapon.-Finding that the violation of Article 27, section
36(a) was a single offense, the court determined that regardless of
which of the two weapons convictions it formally vacated, the remaining offense would merge into the conviction for robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon.7 5 Once again, the court looked to its
holding in a handgun case-this time to Whack-to determine
whether to merge the two offenses. 76 The court first noted that, unlike the handgun statute, which makes use of a handgun during the
commission of a felony a separately punishable offense, there is no
express indication that the legislature intended section 36(a) to be
separately punishable. 77 The court also noted that the twenty-year
maximum sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon was already an
enhanced penalty78 and concluded that the legislature did not intend
multiple punishments in this case.79
Finally, the Eldridge court briefly explained the relationship between legislative intent and the required evidence test to show why it
permitted multiple sentences in Whack."0 The court explained that
although the required evidence test is the general rule for determining whether to merge two criminal violations, it "is not the only standard for determining when two statutory violations are [the same] ...
72. I&.at 314-15, 619 A.2d at 535.
73. Id. at 315, 619 A.2d at 535.
74. See id.
75. See id.

76. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
77. Eldndge, 329 Md. at 317-19, 619 A.2d at 536-37.
78. See id. at 316, 619 A.2d at 536 ("It offends common sense to believe that the legislature, already punishing the robber for using a deadly weapon, contemplated that the robber could receive an additional term of imprisonment because he carried the weapon used
in the robbery."). The maximum penalty for robbery is 10 years, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 486A (1992), while the maximum penalty for robbery with a deadly weapon is 20 years.
Id. § 488.
79. Eldiidge, 329 Md. at 320, 619 A.2d at 538.
80. Id. at 319, 619 A.2d at 537.
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,"as "[t]he imposition of multiple punishment... is often particularly
dependent upon the intent of the legislature."8 1 In Whack, for example, the court's decision to allow multiple punishment was based on
legislative intent." It is not entirely clear in either Whack or Eldridge,
however, whether the Court of Appeals considered the weapons offenses and the underlying crimes at issue "the same" under the re83
quired evidence test.
4. Analysis.-The Court of Appeals's holding in Eldridge, that violations of Article 27, section 36(a) arising from the same transaction
constitute a single offense and must merge into a robbery with a
deadly weapon conviction, was well reasoned. 4 The court's first holding, that the prosecution for a single deadly weapons offense may be
based on the wearing, transporting, and carrying of the weapon,
stemmed from the court's determination of the legislative intent as to
the definition of the offense.8 5 Because the legislature had not made
its intent clear, the court looked to its holding in Webb, which defined
the "unit of prosecution" under a similar handgun statute, to ascertain
the intent of the legislature with regard to the deadly weapons
statute.8 6
The court's second holding, that the weapons conviction merged
into the robbery with a deadly weapon conviction, was, in light of the
court's first holding, logically inevitable. Based on the required evidence test, and given that the unit of prosecution of the dangerous or
deadly weapons offense consisted of wearing and carrying the
weapon, the court correctly held that, because the legislature did not
explicitly provide to the contrary, the weapons conviction must merge
into the conviction for robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon.8 7
In support of its decision, the court again turned to a handgunmerger case, this time to distinguish between the clear legislative directive for multiple punishments in the case of handguns violations,
and the legislative silence with respect to punishments for dangerous
and deadly weapons offenses.88

81. Id.
82. See Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 143, 416 A.2d 265, 268 (1980).
83. See id. at 149 n.5, 416 A.2d at 271 n.5 (noting different views of the required evidence test).
84. See Eldridge, 329 Md. at 313-14, 619 A.2d at 534-35.
85. See id.
86. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
87. Eldyidge, 329 Md. at 315, 619 A.2d at 535.
88. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

814

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:749

The reason for the court's search for legislative intent, however, is
unclear. It could have undertaken this analysis for either of two reasons: to determine if multiple punishments were intended even if the
offenses would merge under the required evidence test, or because
the court considered the offenses separate but read the rule of lenity
as mandating a resolution in favor of the defendant. Because the
court did not explicitly state that the two offenses passed the required
evidence test, it is impossible to know which of the two reasons motivated the court.
This ambiguity may pose a problem in future cases involving two
offenses that are closely related but do not merge under the required
evidence test. While the court has reiterated its interpretation of the
rule of lenity on several occasions,8 9 it might have alleviated the confusion as to when the rule applies by responding directly to the Court of
Special Appeals's decision in Eldridge. Because the court did not specify whether it considered the offenses at issue the same, merger could
have resulted under either the required evidence test or the rule of
lenity-or, in other words, under either the narrow or broad interpretation of the rule of lenity. Given the disagreement in Maryland surrounding the rule of lenity, it would have been helpful for the court to
respond directly to the Court of Special Appeals's statement that the
offenses did not merge because they were not the same under the required evidence test.
5. Conclusion.-While the Court of Appeals has, for the first
time, clearly ruled on merger issues surrounding Article 27, section
36(a) violations, its decision in Eldridge will offer little guidance in
other merger cases. The controversy over the correct application of
the rule of lenity will continue. State v. Lancaster,9" decided eight
months after Eldridge, sets out in a footnote the relationship between
the required evidence test and the rule of lenity.9 1 Its discussion, however, differs very little from that in White v. Statep2 -in fact, it cites
White as a guide.9 3 Yet, as seen in the Court of Special Appeals's opinions in Mauk and Eldridge,9 4 a narrower vision of the rule of lenity
survived White. It remains to be seen whether the Eldridge court's fail89. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
90. 332 Md. 385, 631 A.2d 453 (1993); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Lancaster,332 Md. at 413 n.16, 631 A.2d at 468 n.16.
318 Md. 740, 569 A.2d 1271; see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
See Lancaster, 332 Md. at 413 n.16, 631 A.2d at 468 n.16.
See supra notes 10-14, 31-33 and accompanying text.
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ure to address this dispute directly will render Lancasteras inconclusive as White.
RITA PAZNIOKAS

VI.

A.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Simultaneous Expansion and Limitation of Environmental Response
Cost Recovery Under Comprehensive General Liability Insurance
Policies

In Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,' the Court of
Appeals disregarded prior interpretations of Maryland law and held
that environmental response costs constituted recoverable "damages"
under a standard comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance
policy. 2 It limited the ability of insureds to recover such costs, however, by refusing to overturn precedent indicating that preventive actions by policyholders are not covered' and ruling that the State does
not have a property interest in the groundwater within its borders.4
Because CGL policies only cover damages to third parties,5 the lack of
a property interest on the part of the State means that another third
party property interest holder must bring suit against the insured
before coverage will be triggered.
1. The Case.-In 1965, Bausch & Lomb (B & L) purchased the
Diecraft facility, located in Sparks, Maryland, to machine and plate
telescope and microscope parts.6 Although B & L's techniques for
disposing of the plating wastes conformed with common industry
practice, they resulted in the deposit of heavy metals in the soil.7 B &
L discovered the deposits in a soil analysis it conducted in November
1982.8 In February 1983, it notified the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) of the contamination. 9 Seven months later,
B & L hired Fred C. Hart & Associates (Hart), an environmental consulting firm, to test the site further and to make remedial sugges1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(1992),

330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993).
Id. at 782, 625 A.2d at 1033.
Id. at 789, 625 A.2d at 1036.
Id. at 788, 625 A.2d at 1036.
Id. at 783, 625 A.2d at 1033.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 91 Md. App. 1, 7, 603 A.2d 1241, 1244
affd in part, modified in part, 330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993).

7. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 766, 625 A.2d at 1025. For 17 years, B & L deposited
plating wastes at the Diecraft facility into either a holding lagoon or a set of drywells, depending on the wastes' concentration. Id.
8. Utica, 91 Md. App. at 7, 603 A.2d at 1244.
9. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 766, 625 A.2d at 1025. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) required B & L to
report the contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (1980). Section 103(a) of CERCLA requires the reporting of hazardous releases in excess of federally permissible amounts. Id.
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tions.1 ° Hart discovered in mid-1984 that, in addition to the pollution
of Diecraft's soil by heavy metals, the groundwater underneath the site
was contaminated by trichloroethylene (TCE).1 1
At approximately the same time that Hart's testing revealed the
heavy metal and TCE contamination, the State Waste Management
Administration listed the Diecraft facility as a potentially hazardous
site in the August 31, 1984 edition of the Maryland Register In November 1985, Hart reported the TCE contamination to B & L.13 The
State and B & L entered into a "cooperative arrangement" in July
1986.14 B & L agreed to test and clean up the site, and the State
agreed to receive, review, and comment on the tests and remediation
plans prepared for B & L by Hart. 5
In June 1987, B & L received a letter from Highlands Park I Limited Partnership (Highlands Park), the owner of the adjacent parcel
of land, claiming TCE contamination of the ground and surface water
under its property and threatening to sue.16 B & L notified its insurer,
Utica, 17 of the potential claim and requested approximately $76,000
in reimbursement for the testing completed to date at the Diecraft
facility."i Utica refused to extend coverage until it reviewed the mat10. Utica, 91 Md. App. at 7-8, 603 A.2d at 1244.
11. Id. at 8, 603 A.2d at 1244. TCE, an organic solvent, contaminated the groundwater
near the disposal site and a small stream that ran onto an adjacent parcel of land. Bausch
& Lomb, 330 Md. at 767, 625 A.2d at 1025.
12. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 768, 625 A.2d at 1026. The agency named the Diecraft
facility as a potentially hazardous site based on the information B & L supplied EPA. Id. In
August 1985, the agency decided to conduct a preliminary assessment of the Diecraft facility. State officials completed the preliminary assessment in December 1985. Id. at 768-69,
625 A.2d at 1026.
13. Id. at 767, 625 A.2d at 1025.
14. Id. at 769, 625 A.2d at 1026.
15. Id. The State neither sued B & L nor ordered it to clean up the site. Id. at 770, 625
A.2d at 1027.

16. Id. at 767, 625 A.2d at 1025-26.
17. Although more than four years had elapsed since B & L learned of the site contamination, this was its first attempt to notify Utica that it expected reimbursement for its
environmental response costs. Id. at 767-68, 789, 625 A.2d at 1026, 1036.
18. Id. at 767, 625 A.2d at 1026. Utica issued B & L a CGL policy annually from approximately 1970 to 1986. Id. at 764, 625 A.2d at 1024. A CGL policy is a third party policy
whereby the insurer promises to pay damages to third parties who are injured, or who have
an interest in property that is injured, as a result of the insured's acts or omissions. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LBLrrv INSURANcE LAw 23-24 (1991). The relevant
language of B & L's policy provided that
[t] he company [Utica] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of.. . property damage
to which this insurance applies caused by an occurrence, and the company shall
have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages
on account of such ... property damage.
Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 764, 625 A.2d at 1024.
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ter further.1 9 B & L subsequently sold the Diecraft facility, but retained responsibility for the site's environmental liabilities.2 ° After
further investigation, Utica denied coverage, and on November 20,
1987, filed suit in Baltimore County Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or to indemnify B &
L.21

The trial court denied Utica's declaratory judgment and ruled
that it must pay for present and future clean-up costs 22 and defend B
& L against third party property damage claims. 23 In addition, it
awarded B & L costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. 24 The court limited the award, however, by holding that Utica had no duty to pay
monitoring and testing expenses. 25 The parties cross-appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals, which held that Utica was not liable for any
of B & L's costs and had no duty to defend B & L. 2 6 Following the
reasoning of the decisions in Maryland Cup Corp. v.Employers Mutual
Liability Insurance Co. 2 7' and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,28 the

court concluded that reimbursement of clean-up costs was a form of
equitable relief and not "damages" within the meaning of the CGL
policy. 29 Furthermore, the court found that because B & L's clean-up
measures were preventive in nature and the State did not have a property interest in the groundwater, there was no third party property
damage as required under the CGL policy.3" The Court of Appeals
19. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 768, 625 A.2d at 1026.
20. Id. As part of the sales agreement, B & L reserved up to $1 million of the purchase
price for environmental clean-up costs at the facility. Id.
21. Id. at 770, 625 A.2d at 1027. B & L counterclaimed for breach of contract and

asserted that "Utica failed to provide [it] with full investigation, defense, and indemnification, as required by the policy." Id. at 771, 625 A.2d at 1027.
22. The court restricted future clean-up costs to claims where the State required remedial action and to claims involving potential liability. Id. at 771-72, 625 A.2d at 1028.
23. Id.

24. Id. at 773, 625 A.2d at 1028.
25. Id. at 772, 625 A.2d at 1028.
26. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 91 Md. App. 1, 10, 603 A.2d 1241, 1245
(1992), affd in part, modified in part, 330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993).

27. 81 Md. App. 518, 568 A.2d 1129 (1990); see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
28. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); see infra notes 4146 and accompanying text.
29. Utica, 91 Md. App. at 20, 603 A.2d at 1250.
30. Id. at 15-16, 603 A.2d at 1248-49. The court relied on W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 325 Md. 301, 600 A.2d 836 (1992), in holding that preventive
measures are not covered under CGL polices. See Bausch & Lomb, 325 Md. at 18-19, 603
A.2d at 1249.
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granted certiorari to determine whether environmental response
costs3 1 constitute "damages" under a CGL policy.5 2
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Interpretationof Insurance Contracts Under Maryland Law.Several well-established principles govern the construction of insurance contracts in Maryland. The contract is measured by its terms
and construed as a whole to determine the intention of the parties.13
Rather than following the rule that an insurance policy is to be construed against the insurer, 4 Maryland courts examine "the character
of the contract, its purpose, and the facts and circumstances of the
parties at the time of execution."" To establish the character and
purpose of the contract, words are accorded their ordinary and accepted meaning-the meaning a reasonably prudent layperson would
attach to them. 6 If the language of the contract is general and would
suggest two possible meanings to a reasonably prudent layperson, extrinsic or parol evidence is admitted to determine the intention of the
parties and whether the ambiguous language has a trade usage.17 If
the language of the contract remains ambiguous,
it is construed
31
instrument.
the
of
drafter
as
insurer
against the
b. Determination of What Constitutes "Damages"in Maryland.Before Bausch & Lomb, courts interpreting Maryland law consistently
31. Environmental response costs in this case refer to the costs B & L incurred in testing and cleaning up the Diecraft facility.
32. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 775, 625 A.2d at 1029.
33. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d
486, 488 (1985); see also Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 324 Md. 44, 56,
595 A.2d 469, 475 (1991) (stating that the application of the terms of the contract is the
primary principle of insurance policy construction). A contract is not measured by its
terms, however, when so doing would violate a statute, regulation, or public policy. Pacific
Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488.
34. Several jurisdictions regularly construe insurance policies against the insurer. See,
e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1182 (N.D. Cal.
1988), affid in part, rev'd in part,952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[Ain insurance contract,
like any other contract, is construed against the party who prepared the document."); Midwest Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 190 N.E. 702, 703 (Ill.
1934) ("Insurance
contracts should be liberally construed in favor of the insured.").
35. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 388, 488 A.2d at 488.
36. Id. See, e.g., Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 766, 556 A.2d 1135,
1138 (1989); LloydE. Mitchell 324 Md. at 56, 595 A.2d at 475.
37. Pacific Indem., 302 Md. at 389, 488 A.2d at 489.
38. Cheney, 315 Md. at 767, 556 A.2d at 1138; see also Mutual Fire, Marine & Island Ins.
Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 251, 508 A.2d 130, 134 (1986).
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held, with one apparent exception,39 that an insurance claim requesting equitable relief did not constitute "damages" under a standard
CGL policy.4 ° The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,a" held that under a CGL
policy, environmental response costs" constituted a form of equitable
relief for which the insurance company was not obligated to indemnify and reimburse the policyholder.4 3 Although the court recognized that "[i] t is black-letter law that the terms of an insurance policy
are to be construed according to the meaning a reasonably prudent
layman would infer," it exempted the term "damages" from this rule."
The court stated that "Maryland law ... has... adopted the somewhat

narrow, technical definition of damages,"45 and thus "damages" refers
only to payments made to third persons seeking legal, as opposed to
equitable, relief.4 6
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals adopted the reasoning of
47
Armco in Maryland Cup Corp. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.
There, the court found that complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and in a Title VII suit sought noncompensatory remedies and thus were not "damages" as defined by the
insurance policy.4" Both the Armco and Maryland Cup courts concluded that if the term "damages" were interpreted to include nonlegal damages, any obligation to pay would be covered and the term
49
would become surplus language in the insurance contract.

39. In Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co., 704 F. Supp. 551, 560 (D.
Del. 1988), the court applied Maryland law and denied the insurer's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that a "reasonably prudent layperson" would not distinguish
between damages at law and equity. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the term
"damages" did not exclude environmental clean-up costs. Id. at 561.
40. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
41. 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
42. In Armco, the environmental response costs at issue were the costs of reimbursing
the federal government pursuant to CERCLA § 107(a) for engineering and clean-up costs.
Id. at 1352.
43. Id. at 1354.
44. Id. at 1352.
45. Id. (citing Haines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 435 (D. Md.
1977)).
46. Id.
47. 81 Md. App. 518, 568 A.2d 1129 (1990). The United States District Court for the
District of Maryland also has adopted the Armco rationale. See Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Allied-Signal Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1989) (concluding that Armco dictated its
decision that environmental response costs did not constitute "damages").
48. Maryland Cup, 81 Md. at 527, 568 A.2d at 1134.
49. Armco, 822 F.2d at 1352; Marland Cup, 81 Md. App. at 524, 568 A.2d at 1132.
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c. OtherJurisdictions.-The majority of state appellate courts
have held that CGL policies cover environmental response costs, but
federal courts are split on the issue.5" Two cases are illustrative of the
division in the federal courts. In the first, Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 1 a federal district court held that costs incurred in cleaning up contaminated groundwater constituted
"damages" within the scope of CGL policy coverage.5 2 By employing a
statutory definition of "damages,"" the court concluded that the State
and citizens of California had "suffered a detriment from the unlawful
54
acts or omissions of Intel and [were] entitled to damages as a result."
The court rejected the legal/equitable distinction as a "tautology defining damages as payment to a person who 'has a legal claim for damages."' 5- In the second case, Continental Insurance Co. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceuticaland Chemical Co., 6 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that environmental response costs did not
constitute "legal damages" and thus were not covered under the insured's CGL policy. 57 The court reasoned that, when used in an insurance context, the term "damages" was unambiguous and plainly
meant "legal damages.""
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Bausch & Lomb, the Court of Appeals applied the general rules of insurance contract interpretation to
the relevant language of B & L's CGL policy.59 Specifically, the court
examined three phrases in the policy: "shall become legally obligated
to pay"; "as damages"; and "because of.. . property damage to which
this insurance applies."60
In examining the phrase "shall become legally obligated to pay,"
the court found that, although the State did not act in an adversarial
50. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 777-78, 625 A.2d at 1030-31.
51. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988), affd inpartand rev'd inpart, 952 F.2d 1551 (9th
Cir. 1991).
52. Id.
53. California Civil Code section 3281 states that "[every person who suffers detriment
from the unlawful act or omission of another, may recover from the person in fault a
compensation therefor [sic] in money, which is called damages." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281

(West 1970).
54. Intel Corp., 692 F. Supp. at 1189.
55. Id. at 1187 n.21 (quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352
(4th Cir. 1987).
56. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
57. Id
58. Id. at 985.
59. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 779, 625 A.2d at 1031.
60. Id. at 779-83, 625 A.2d at 1031-33.
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manner towards B & L,61 the State's regulatory activities compelled
the company to test the site and adopt and implement a remediation
program to clean up the contaminated soil and groundwater.6 2 Thus,
the court concluded that "B & L's response costs, undertaken in the
regulatory context, represented a sum the corporation was legally ob"
ligated to pay.

13

Under the second inquiry, the court noted that the term "damages" was not listed in the policy's definition section, nor was there
any indication in the contract that Utica and B & L wanted it defined
in any special or technical manner.6 4 Therefore, the court interpreted "damages" as a reasonably prudent layperson would in daily
life.6 5 By consulting both Webster's dictionary and an insurance dictionary, the court determined that the trial court was correct in defining damages as "'anything that a third party can make you pay for
because of damage to that third party's property."' 6 6 The court concluded that in Armco, the Fourth Circuit "misperceive[d] the law of
Maryland" by giving the term "damages" a legal, technical meaning,
because "[t]he reasonably prudent layperson does not cut nice distinctions between the remedies offered at law and in equity."6 7 Thus, the
court concluded that although reimbursement for environmental response costs was a form of equitable relief, it was included within the
definition of the term "damages. " '
The last phrase the court concentrated on was "because of...
property damage to which this insurance applies."6 9 The CGL policy
contained an "own property" exclusion7" and, therefore, insured only
against injury to third party property.' 1 As a result, the court had to
determine whether the State of Maryland possessed a property interest in the contaminated groundwater.7 2 The court found that case law
and the original Charter to Lord Baltimore established that the State
is a quasi-trustee for the public of all navigable waters within the
61. See supra note 15.

62. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 780, 625 A.2d at 1032.
63. Id.

64. Id. at 780, 625 A.2d at 1032.
65. Id. at 781, 625 A.2d at 1032.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 781-82, 625 A.2d at 1032-33.
68. Id. at 782, 625 A.2d at 1033.
69. Id. at 783, 625 A.2d at 1033.
70. Id. at 765, 625 A.2d at 1024. The "own property" provision excluded coverage for
.property damage to property owned by, occupied by, rented to, used by, or in the care,
custody, or control of the insured." Id.
71. Id. at 783, 625 A.2d at 1033.
72. Id.
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State.7" The court distinguished surface waters from groundwaters,
however, and held that this body of law did not apply to groundwater.7 4 Thus, the extent of the State's interest in groundwater, as it
relates to standard CGL policies, was a question of first impression.7 5
After examining various sections of the Natural Resources and
Environment Articles of the Code,7 6 the court concluded that the
State maintained a regulatory and conservatory interest, rather than a
property interest, in the groundwater. 77 Relying on two Supreme
Court cases, 78 the court also dismissed the state ownership theory as a
"legal fiction." 79 It then concluded that because no third party incurred property damage, B & L could not recover its environmental
response costs under its CGL policy.8"
4. Analysis.--The court's holding in Bausch & Lomb simultaneously expanded and limited the ability of insureds to recover environmental response costs under CGL policies. The inclusion of equitable
claims in the definition of damages broadened the types of costs that
are reimbursable under CGL policies, but preventive measures appear
to remain uncovered.8 1 As a result, reimbursement may still be substantially limited for environmental response claims. In addition, by
holding that the State does not have a property interest in groundwater, the court effectively prohibited future policyholders from re73. Id.
74. Id. at 784, 625 A.2d at 1034. The court defined the groundwater under the
Diecraft facility as "percolating waters ... 'which ooze, seep or filter through soil beneath
the surface, without a defined channel, or in a course that is unknown and not discoverable from surface indications.'" Id. (quoting Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 Md. 428, 248
A.2d 106 (1968)).
75. Id. at 784-85, 625 A.2d at 1034.
76. See id. at 785-86, 625 A.2d at 1034-35.
77. Id. at 788, 625 A.2d at 1036. B & L based its argument that the State had a property
interest in the groundwater on statutory references to "waters of the State" and "State waters." The court rejected the argument and explained that the phrases were "simply generic usage addressing the location of waters within State borders.. ." Id. at 786, 625
A.2d at 1035.
78. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979). These decisions emphasized that states do not "own" their natural
resources; rather, they maintain a regulatory and preservationist interest in those natural
resources. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951; Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334.
79. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 787, 625 A.2d at 1035-36. But see Continental Ins. Cos.
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d 1180, 1187 (recognizing the "state
and federal governments' . . . 'interest ... independent of ... its citizens in all the earth
and air within [their] domain'" (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230,
237 (1907)), reh'g granted, 815 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1987), affld in part, rev'd in part, 842 F.2d
977 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
80. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 788, 625 A.2d at 1036.
81. Id. at 789, 625 A.2d at 1036.
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covering their groundwater clean-up costs unless a third party
property interest holder files a claim against the policyholder.
a. The Expansion of Recovery Available Under CGL Policies.The court's abolishment of the legal/equitable distinction in damages
claims brought environmental cleanups within standard CGL coverage. In fact, one commentator has called the holding "a major victory
for Maryland policyholders ..,s""

The extent of the victory, however,

is unclear, and insurance companies and policyholders alike may suffer from the uncertainty the holding could create in the insurance
market. Conversely, the requirement that insurers pay environmental
response costs may benefit Maryland citizens and the State Department of the Environment through reduced litigation.
By abolishing the legal/equitable distinction in CGL policies, the
court may have assisted in both hastening environmental clean-up
projects and lowering transaction costs by reducing the time spent litigating the issue of who should pay for the clean-up operation.8 3 Expeditious cleanups benefit citizens in that they decrease the exposure
time to hazardous substances.8 4 Furthermore, the State may benefit
economically from the reduction in litigation. The approximately 450
potentially hazardous sites in Maryland, for example, already have
stretched the State Department of the Environment's resources to the
limit.8 5 Thus, whenever possible, the agency prefers to have the
owner or operator8 6 of the contaminated site involved in the clean-up
82. Patty Reinert, High Court Rules on Insurance Liability for Environmental Spills, WAR§ 1, at 4.
83. Four insurers surveyed by the RAND Corporation spent a combined $70 million on
Superfund claims and related expenditures. Katherine N. Probst & Paul R. Portney, Assigning Liabilityfor Superfund Cleanups,RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 23 (June 1992). Ninety
percent of this money went to "defending their policyholders in legal actions with EPA,
states, or other [potentially responsible parties], and for disputing (with these same policyholders) whether their policies covered the cleanup costs .... As for insurance coverage
litigation, little can be done to reduce these transaction costs ... at least until this issue
reaches the highest court in each state and legal precedent is made clear." Id. at 23-24.
84. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry recently reported that TCE,
the chemical found in the groundwater at the Diecraft facility, has been linked to higherthan-average disease rates. ATSDR Finds Higher-Than-AverageDisease Rates Among People Exposed to TCE in Drinking Water, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 465 (July 16, 1993). For example, people exposed to TCE in drinking water reported high blood pressure, strokes,
anemia and blood disorders, diabetes, kidney disease, urinary tract disorders, speech impairment, hearing difficulties, heart problems, skin rashes, and eczema. Id.
85. Telephone interview with Mark Cox, Chief of the Site Assessment Division, Maryland Department of the Environment (Oct. 14, 1993).
86. Section 7-201 (x) of the Environment Article designates the party responsible for
the pollution as the owner or operator of a site, regardless of negligence or other degree of
fault. MD.CODE ANN., ENWR. § 7-201(x) (1987).
FIELD'S BUSINESS RECORD, May 21, 1993,
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operation. 7 The Bausch & Lomb holding that CGL policies cover environmental response costs will encourage owners and operators to
cooperate with state agencies. If the court had distinguished between
legal and equitable remedies for purposes of insurance coverage, owners and operators might have been tempted to wait for the State to
clean up the sites. This process would needlessly expend scarce
agency resources and delay the cleanup of contaminated sites.
While Maryland citizens and the State could benefit from expedited cleanups, insurance companies may perceive their liability for
environmental response costs as excessively uncertain "judge made insurance.""8 Uncertainty is disadvantageous to the insurance industry
because "[i]nsurance companies must be able to predict not only the
number of claims that will be filed against the pool of insured businesses, but also the magnitude of the damages that will be awarded in
each case."89 If a judge extends coverage beyond what was predicted
or intended, " [ i] nsurers suffer an immediate financial loss, lose a measure of confidence in the fairness of the judicial system, and come to
doubt their ability to predict future judicial developments."90 To protect themselves financially, they begin to charge astronomical premiums or refuse to offer insurance to certain businesses.9" If this occurs
as a result of the Bausch & Lomb decision, it may not be the "major
victory for Maryland policyholders"9 2 that has been predicted.
b. Limitations on Recovey-Preventive Measures and Property Interests.-Although the court increased the breadth of coverage under
87. Under § 7-222(a) of the Environment Article, the State can require a property
owner or operator to remediate a polluted site. MD. CODE ANN., EY-vR. § 7-222 (a) (1987).
If the Secretary determines that the owner or operator will not clean up the site "properly
and in a timely manner," the Secretary may use the State Hazardous Control Fund to remediate the polluted site. Id. §§ 7-220(a), 7-222(a), 7-222(a) (2) (i).
Mark Cox, Chief of the Site Assessment Division of the Maryland Department of the
Environment, stated that the agency "always prefers to work with the site owner or operator," rather than remediate the property and then seek reimbursement from the owner or
operator. Telephone interview with Mark Cox, Chief of the Site Assessment Division,
Maryland Department of the Environment (Oct. 14, 1993). Furthermore, Maryland is one
of three states involved in a pilot program under the Superfund Accelerated Cleanup
Model, which explicitly states that the State should seek cooperation with the site owner or
operator to encourage the owner or operator to remediate the site and facilitate cleanup.
Id.
88. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 942, 960 (1988).
89. Daniel W. Pugh, Comment, Insurer Liabilityfor Environmental Clean-up: Do Contract
PrinciplesExcuse Performance?,48 Bus. LAw. 1707, 1722 (1993).
90. Abraham, supra note 88, at 961.
91. Pugh, supra note 89, at 1721.
92. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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CGL policies, it did not mandate complete coverage. It did not overturn the current notion that preventive measures are not covered,93
and by holding that the State does not have a property interest in
groundwater,9 4 it limited coverage under CGL policies to cases in
which a third party brings suit for property damage.
B & L's actions were undertaken, in part, to prevent the further
spread of TCE groundwater contamination on the neighboring parcel
of land owned by Highlands Park.9 5 In W.M. Schlosser Co., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America,9" the Court of Appeals held that such costs,
incurred in preventing harm to a third party's property, were not recoverable under a CGL policy because actual property damage had
not occurred.97 Its holding in Bausch & Lomb that the State does not
have a property interest in the groundwater, combined with the fact
that Highlands Park never filed a claim against B & L,9" indicates that
the court probably would have viewed B & L's actions as preventive
and barred its claim for reimbursement under Schlosser.9 Although
environmental response costs associated with cleanups are now recoverable in Maryland under CGL policies, it still appears that they are
not recoverable if undertaken to prevent, rather than clean up, damage to a third party's property.
The court's holding that the State does not have a property interest in the groundwater located within it 00 also restricted recovery of
groundwater clean-up costs under CGL policies. As a result of the
court's decision, if a policyholder contaminates the groundwater, it
cannot recover its clean-up costs under a CGL policy unless a third
party, other than the State, brings an action against it. Even if the
State brings an action to recover its costs in cleaning up the contaminated groundwater, the policyholder cannot be reimbursed under its
93. See Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 789, 625 A.2d at 1036. The court concluded that
because Highlands Park had not filed a claim against B & L, there was no reason to determine whether Utica would have been obligated to pay the costs of remediating the Diecraft
facility in order to prevent future harm to Highlands Park's property. Id.
94. Id. at 788, 625 A.2d at 1036.
95. But see Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner at 13 (arguing that B & L's actions
should not be characterized as preventive because "Bausch and Lomb paid money to remedy environmental damage that had already taken place in response to an existing claim by
the State of Maryland").
96. 325 Md. 301, 600 A.2d 836 (1992).
97. Id. at 306-07, 600 A.2d at 838.
98. Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 789, 625 A.2d at 1036.
99. The Court of Special Appeals viewed B & L's actions as preventive and held that its
environmental response costs were not recoverable under Schlosser. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bausch & Lomb Inc., 91 Md. App. 1, 18-20, 603 A.2d 1241, 1249-50 (1992), affd in part,
modified in part, 330 Md. 758, 625 A.2d 1021 (1993).
100. See Bausch & Lomb, 330 Md. at 788, 625 A.2d at 1036.
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CGL policy. This potential exposure to liability may benefit prevention efforts, but it also may discourage early cleanups by owners and
operators. Policyholders who have polluted the groundwater may be
tempted to wait until a third party brings suit to begin clean-up operations, thus ensuring that its CGL policy will cover the costs.
Although the court ruled that the State does not have a property
interest in groundwater, 10 1 it neglected to explore the possibility that
its citizens might have such an interest. As the court noted, section 1302(c) of the Natural Resources Article "directs that State agencies
must conduct their affairs as 'stewards of the air, land, [and] water...
resources. '102 The plain meaning of "steward" is "a person who manages another's property .... "103 Furthermore, section 8-801 (a) states
that it is the policy of the State to "conserve, protect, and use water
resources of the State in accordance with the best interests of the people of Maryland ....

"104

These provisions would support a finding

that the citizens of Maryland have a property interest in the state's
groundwater. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reached a similar conclusion in Intel Corp. v. Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co. 10

5

It held that "by polluting the ground

10 6
water, [a company] ha[d] damaged the property of all Californians."
Although a California statute explicitly states that the people of California own all the water in the state, 10 7 public ownership of groundwater in Maryland could be inferred based on the "stewardship" and
"best interests" language of the Natural Resources Article. The citizens of Maryland could then qualify as the injured third party capable

101. See id.
102. Id. at 786, 625 A.2d at 1035 (citing MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. § 1-302(c) (1990)).
103. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1395 (unabr. ed.
1967).
104. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 8-801(a) (1990).
105. 692 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1988). Other courts have applied a similar rationale.
See Pepper's Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 668 F. Supp. 1541,
1550 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that "where the property damage alleged constitutes damage to the environment ... that such property in truth belongs not to the Plaintiffs, but
rather to the State and the citizens thereof.... ."); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
444 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. App. 1989) (holding that the contamination of the groundwater
was compensable under the company's insurance policies because the groundwater belonged to the people of Puerto Rico, rather than to the company), rev'd, 476 N.W.2d 392
(1991); cf. Township of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 399 (D.NJ.
1987) (endorsing the view that damage to groundwater constituted damage to a third
party's property, as it "threaten[ed] harm to health, safety and welfare of the State of New
Jersey" (quoting the complaint of the NewJersey Department of the Environment)), summ.
judgment granted, 702 F. Supp. 1126 (1988).
106. Intel 692 F. Supp. at 1183.
107. Id. Section 102 of the California Water Code states that "[a ] ll water within the State
is the property of the people of the State." CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971).
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of bringing suit against policyholders for property damage. Further,
the State's action against owners or operators of contaminated sites
could be viewed as action on behalf of the citizens, triggering the necessary third party interest to invoke CGL liability coverage of the
clean-up efforts of policyholders.
5. Conclusion.-By holding that environmental response costs
are covered under CGL policies, the Court of Appeals in Bausch &
Lomb expanded the breadth of coverage of CGL policies. The expansion was not complete, however, because preventive measures continue not to be covered. In addition, in the case of groundwater
contamination, a policyholder cannot receive reimbursement under a
CGL policy for clean-up costs unless a third party, other than the
State, files a claim.
LAUREN C. MCKEEN

VII.
A.

EVIDENCE

Upholding the Constitutionality of a Statutory Hearsay Exception

In Chapman v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that admission of
a bank's affidavit to establish dishonor of a check under a statutory
hearsay exception did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation embodied in the Sixth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 The court determined that the evidence,

admitted pursuant to Article 27, section 142(c) of the Code,3 had sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy constitutional requirements.4
Accordingly, the court held that the State's failure to lay a foundation
for the affidavit through in-court testimony or to establish the unavailability of any bank employee before admitting the affidavit did not
violate the defendant's confrontation rights.' In so holding, the Chapman court expanded the test applied by the Supreme Court to determine the admissibility of hearsay. These alterations were unjustified
because they materially narrowed the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. 6
1. The Case.--On April 19, 1988,John Vernon Chapman bought
a color television and a maintenance service agreement for $315.49,
1. 331 Md. 448, 628 A.2d 676 (1993).
2. Id at 450, 628 A.2d at 677. All references to the Confrontation Clause or to confrontation fights refer to the rights contained in both the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court of
Appeals has held that these provisions ensure "[t]he same right." Crawford v. State, 282
Md. 210, 211, 383 A.2d 1097, 1098 (1978).
3. Section 142(c) allows for admission of a bank affidavit to prove dishonor of a
check, insufficient funds, or lack of an account, without compelling testimony of a bank

employee. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 142(c) (1992). The statute provides:
Dishonor of a check by the drawee, that the drawer had no account with the
drawee at the time of utterance, and insufficiency of the drawer's funds at the
time of presentation and utterance may properly be proved by introduction in
evidence of a notice of protest of the check, or of a certificate under oath of an
authorized representative of the drawee declaring the dishonor, lack of account
and insufficiency, and this proof shall constitute presumptive evidence of the dishonor, lack of account and insufficiency.
Id.
4. Chapman, 331 Md. at 450, 628 A.2d at 677.
5. Id. at 470-71, 628 A.2d at 688. The court also held that a typographical error on the
face of the affidavit did not undermine its reliability so as to make it inadmissible at trial.
Id. at 473-74, 628 A.2d at 689.
6. Adjustments to the rule against hearsay are legitimate only to the degree that they
comport with Confrontation Clause scrutiny. Id. at 453-54, 628 A.2d at 679.
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including tax, shipping and handling charges,7 at the Sears, Roebuck
& Co. catalogue store (Sears) in Bel Air, Maryland.' After verifying his
identity, the assistant manager of the store, acting as a cashier, accepted a check from Chapman for the total purchase price. 9
Sears delivered the check to its bank for deposit on the following
day. 1 ° On April 21, 1988, the drawee, Fairfax Savings Bank, dishonored the check.1 1 The depositary bank so notified Sears and returned
the check to the store marked "DO NOT REDEPOSIT."' 2 The face of
the check was stamped to indicate that Chapman's account with
Fairfax Savings Bank was closed." After several unsuccessful attempts
over the course of a year to contact Chapman at the address and telephone number printed on the check, Sears filed an "Application for
Statement of Charges" on September 7, 1989.14 Chapman was
charged with Obtaining Property or Services by Bad Check under Article 27, section 141 of the Code.15
At Chapman's jury trial,1 " the State introduced the testimony of
the assistant store manager, the dishonored check, and an affidavit
from Fairfax Savings Bank, introduced under section 142(c), indicat7. Id.
8. Id. at 451, 628 A.2d at 677.
9. Id. The assistant manager compared the signatures on the license and the check
and the photo on the license with the man. Id. At trial, the assistant manager testified that
between April 19, 1988, and the trial, Chapman appeared to have gained 75-100 pounds.
Brief of Appellant at 3.
10. Chapman, 331 Md. at 451, 628 A.2d at 677.
11. Id.
12. I&
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Section 141 provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of obtaining'property or services by a bad check when:
(a) (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he obtains property or services
by uttering a check knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, has
insufficient funds with the drawee to cover it and other outstanding checks;
(2) He intends or believes at the time of utterance that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation; and
(3) Payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation[.]
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 141 (1992).
16. Before the trial began, Chapman filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of
limitations. Brief of Appellee at 2. In support of the motion, he argued that the maintenance agreement ($32.00) and the sales tax ($13.50) did "[n]ot come within the definition
of obtaining services for purposes of the statute." Brief of Appellant at 9. When those two
costs are subtracted from the $315.49 amount of the check, the remaining amount
($269.99) is less than $300.00, the amount required to make the offense a felony. Id. at 910; see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 143(b) (1992) ("A person convicted of obtaining property
or services by bad check when the property or services has a value of less than $300 is guilty
of a misdemeanor . . . .").

Chapman asserted that since the statute of limitations for the

misdemeanor was one year and the case was instituted more than fifteen months after the
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ing that Chapman did not have an account with Fairfax Savings Bank
on the date of the alleged incident.1 7 Chapman objected to the affidavit's admission on two grounds: (1) that admission of the affidavit
under section 142(c) was unconstitutional because it violated his right
to confrontation; and (2) that, even if this type of hearsay was generally constitutional, an apparent irregularity on the face of the affidavit-the year on the face of the affidavit was incorrect18 -undermined
its reliability and mandated live testimony by the affiant.' 9 Overruling
the objections, the court admitted the affidavit, 2° and Chapman was
convicted of the charges. 2 1 He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but before that court considered the case, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari on its own motion.22 The court accepted the case
to determine whether hearsay admitted under section 142(c) violates
21
an accused's confrontation rights.

2. Legal Background.-The Sixth Amendment 24 and Article 21 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee the right of defendants
to confront the witnesses against them.25 In the nineteenth century
case of Mattox v. United States,26 the Supreme Court articulated its vision for the Confrontation Clause as follows:
The primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits .

.

. [from] being

used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination
and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused
has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and
sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
alleged incident, the case should be barred. Brief of Appellant at 10. He later repeated
this argument before the Court of Appeals, but the court did not address it. See id. at 9-13.
17. Chapman, 331 Md. at 452, 628 A.2d at 678.
18. Id. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689.
19. Id. at 453, 628 A.2d at 678.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... " Id. Deemed the Confrontation Clause, this provision was made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965).
25. Article 21 provides in pertinent part: "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man
hath a right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " MD. CONST. DECL. OF
RTS. art. 21.
26. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy
27
of belief.
The Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay are generally
understood to safeguard "similar values."2 8 While a state may develop
new hearsay exceptions, the overlap between the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause subjects these alterations to Confrontation
Clause scrutiny.' Any alteration in the rule against hearsay that materially erodes an accused's right to confrontation will be void.3 0 In
spite of the close relationship between hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has insisted that the Confrontation
Clause is not merely a codification of the rules of hearsay."
In the leading case on hearsay, Ohio v. Roberts,12 the Supreme
Court set forth a two-pronged test to determine when hearsay can be
admitted without violating a defendant's confrontation rights.3"
Under the first prong, the prosecution must establish the necessity for
the use of the hearsay evidence. 4 This standard requires that the
state "either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant."3 5 Once
27. Id. at 242-43. More recently, the Supreme Court described the purpose of the Confrontation Clause as assuring three conditions of witness testimony: oath, personal presence, and cross-examination. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); 2 JOHN W.
STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245, at 93 (4th ed. 1992). The Court of Appeals
echoed this sentiment in Moon v. State, 300 Md. 354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984), stating that it is
"[i]ndelibly clear that the essence of the Confrontation Clause is to secure the right of the
defendant to have the witness against him produced in court." Id,at 368-69, 478 A.2d at
702.
28. Green, 399 U.S. at 155. The hearsay rule generally excludes a declarant's out-ofcourt statements when the statements are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801.1, at 271 (1st ed. 1987). Exclusion under the

hearsay rule, similar to a Confrontation Clause exclusion, is based on the "opponent's
inability to cross-examine the declarant with regard to ...perception, memory, sincerity,
and narration." Id. (citations omitted).
29. Chapman, 331 Md. at 453-54, 628 A.2d at 679; see also Moon v. State, 300 Md. at 359,
478 A.2d at 698 ("[T] he Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal right to confrontation is binding upon this State.").
30. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) ("The Confrontation Clause ...
bars the admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule."); Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 ("[W]e have more than once found a
violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under
an arguably recognized hearsay exception.").
31. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 814.
32. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
33. Id. at 65.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Court noted that for a witness to be considered unavailable, the prosecution must make a "'good faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.'" Id. at 74 (quoting
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)).
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the unavailability of a declarant is demonstrated, the second prong of
the Roberts test requires that the out-of-court statement provide sufficient "indicia of reliability." 6 Sufficient reliability "can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception."" If the evidence does not fall within such an exception, it is inadmissible "absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."" Applying its two pronged test, the Roberts
Court determined that admission of an unavailable declarant's prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing to rebut the defendant's in-court
testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confrontation. 39
In a series of decisions since 1980, the Court has modified the
Roberts standard. It initially diluted the Roberts necessity requirement
in United States v. Inadi.4 ° In Inadi, the Court held admissible an outof-court statement of a defendant's coconspirator, even though the
declarant was available but had not been produced. 4 ' Declaring that
"Roberts cannot fairly be read to stand for the radical proposition that
no out-of-court statement can be introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable," the Court held that
the Roberts unavailability requirement is inapplicable to coconspirator
statements. 4 2 The Court then distinguished coconspirator statements
from prior testimony.43 It reasoned that while prior testimony is often
"[o]nly a weaker substitute for live testimony," coconspirator statements have "independent evidentiary significance."4 4 The InadiCourt
further held that in coconspirator cases, the burdens imposed by the
36. Id. at 66.
37. Id.; see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (stating that "no
independent inquiry into reliability is required when the evidence 'falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception'") (citation omitted). "Firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions satisfy
the reliability test "because of the weight accorded longstanding judicial and legislative
experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements."
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). The Supreme Court has identified seven hearsay exceptions as "firmly rooted": (1) excited utterances, White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736,
742 n.8 (1992); (2) statements made in the course of seeking medical treatment, id.; (3)
coconspirator statements, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987); (4) dying
declarations, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980); (5) cross-examined prior trial
testimony, id; (6) business records, id., and (7) public records. Id.
38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
39. Id. at 77.
40. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
41. Id. at 400.
42. Id. at 394.
43. See id. at 394-95.
44. Id. at 394. The Court stated that coconspirator statements are valuable in large
part precisely because they are made away from court "[w] hile the conspiracy is in progress"
and because they "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated
... in court." Id. at 395.
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unavailability rule on the prosecution and the entire criminal justice
system outweigh any benefit gained by a defendant.4 5
In White v. Illinois,4 6 the Court further qualified the Roberts unavailability standard, holding that both spontaneous declarations and
statements made for the purposes of medical treatment are admissible
even when an available declarant is not produced at trial.4 7 In reaching this result, the Court again highlighted the independent evidentiary significance of the applicable hearsay exceptions.4
The Court addressed the "indicia of reliability" prong of Roberts in
Idaho v. Wright.4 9 In Wright, the Court held that statements made by a
two-and-a-half year old alleged sexual assault victim were inadmissible."0 In evaluating the evidence, which was admitted pursuant to
Idaho's residual hearsay exception, 5 the Court held that the residual
hearsay exception did not qualify as a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.5 2 Thus, the statements in question were "presumptively unreliable"5 5 and could not be admitted "[a] bsent a showing of particularized

45. Id. at 398-99. The Court surmised that requiring a showing of unavailability before
a coconspirator's out-of-court statements could be admitted at trial would only slightly benefit the defendant since the defense is free to call any witness that would be helpful to its
case. See id. at 397-98. The Court further noted that if it required that unavailability be
proven, the court system would have the significant burden of adjudicating the additional
issue of availability every time coconspirator statements were sought, id. at 398-99, and that
the prosecution would have to transport incarcerated coconspirators from prison to the
courthouse and remain continually aware of the whereabouts of unincarcerated coconspirators. Id.
46. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
47. Id. at 743. The White Court believed that the decision in Inadi confined the unavailability requirement to prior testimony in ajudicial proceeding and refused to extend this
more narrow rule to all out-of-court statements. Id. at 741-42. However, the Court did not
go so far as to claim that the Roberts unavailability requirement did not merit extension to
some out-of-court statements. Rather, in taking pains to distinguish the applicable hearsay
exceptions from prior testimony, the Court suggested that each out-of-court statement
must be considered individually. See id. at 742-43.
48. Id. The Court explained that because a spontaneous statement is often made in a
frenzied moment, without consideration of its consequences, it may be more persuasive
than the same statement "offered in the relative calm of the courtroom." Id. Statements
made when seeking medical treatment are similarly credible because declarants are aware
that any misstatement may lead to the wrong treatment. Id. at 743.
49. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
50. Id. at 827.
51. See id. at 817-22.
52. Id. at 817. The residual hearsay exception, or catchall exception, allows for admission of hearsay evidence that "is both necessary and also has circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, even though it does not fall within one of the established exceptions to the
hearsay rule." MCLAIN, supra note 28, § 803(24).1, at 435; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
53. Wright, 497 U.S. at 818 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)).
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guarantees of trustworthiness."5 4 To be adequately trustworthy, the
Court held that out-of-court statements must be "so trustworthy
that
55
adversarial testing would add little to [their] reliability."
The Wright Court also rejected the State's assertion that "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" could be established by the use
of corroborative evidence.5 6 The Court instead held that "the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of
the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief." 7 "Hearsay evidence . . . must possess indicia of reliability by

virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evi58

dence at trial."

3.

The Court's Reasoning.-

a. "Indicia of Reliability" Requirement.-The Chapman court
first addressed the reliability of the bank affidavit.5" Recognizing that
such evidence does not fit into any firmly rooted exception,60 the
court proceeded to search for "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."6 1 The court found several sufficient guarantees, including:
(1) section 142(c)'s "close similarity to business and public records
exceptions and the indicia of reliability associated with those exceptions";6 2 (2) "[section] 142 (c)'s adoption of familiar evidentiary principles";6 (3) "the lack of any apparent motive to fabricate" on the part
of the bank;6 4 and (4) "the corroborative quality of the canceled
check." 5
54. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
55. Id. at 821 (citing Lee, 476 U.S. at 544). This showing establishes that the hearsay
evidence admitted under the residual hearsay exception is "at least as reliable as evidence
admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id. (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
56. Id. at 822. The majority believed that allowing the use of corroborative evidence
"would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the
trustworthiness of other evidence at trial." Id. at 823. In Wright, the two-and-a-half year old
girl's statements were corroborated by: (1) physical evidence that she had been sexually
abused; (2) evidence that she was in the suspect's custody when injured; and (3) testimony
by her older sister. Id. at 834 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. 1I at 819.
58. I& at 822. The majority asserted in dicta that the existence of corroborating evidence may suggest that any mistake in admitting the statement results only in harmless
error. Id. at 823.
59. Chapman, 331 Md. at 456-67, 628 A.2d at 680-86.
60. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
61. Chapman, 331 Md. at 456-57, 628 A.2d at 680-81.
62. Id. at 467, 628 A.2d at 686.
63. Id,
64. Id.
65. Id.
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The court asserted that section 142(c) is a "direct derivative of
the business records exception, "66 a firmly rooted hearsay exception, 67 and that the rationale underlying the reliability of business
records6" applies in equal force to section 142(c). 69 Section 142(c)
relaxed the traditional procedures for admitting bank records into evidence as business records in two ways: (1) by allowing the state to
submit a summary (the affidavit) of the relevant information rather
than requiring the admission of the actual bank records, 70 and (2) by
enabling the evidence to be admitted without testimony by a bank
employee.7 1 These procedural "short-cuts" did not erode the reliability of the evidence because they were based on "well-accepted eviden72
tiary practices."
One such well-accepted evidentiary practice is that, as an exception to the best evidence rule,7 3 summaries of business records may be
admitted into evidence. 74 While section 142(c) goes beyond the established use of summary evidence by not requiring a bank employee
to testify and lay a foundation, the court did not believe this departure
was critical. 75 Rather, it drew another analogy-this time between the
evidence admitted under section 142(c) and that admitted under the
66. Id. at 459, 628 A.2d at 682. Maryland's business records exception states that "[a]
writing or record made in the regular course of business as a memorandum or record of
an act, transaction, occurrence, or event is admissible to prove the act, transaction, occurrence, or event." MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-101(b) (1989).
67. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980).
68. The business records exception is based on the assumption that the desire of businesses to produce accurate records will minimize insincerity, Chapman, 331 Md. at 459, 628

A.2d at 681 (citing McLAIN, supra note 28, § 803(6).1, at 380), and that the regular and
continuous nature of maintaining business records will result in precision on the part of
record keepers. Chapman, 331 Md. at 459, 628 A.2d at 681-82 (citing 2 STRONG, supra note
27, § 286, at 265).
69. See Chapman, 331 Md. at 459, 628 A.2d at 682.
70. See id. at 460-61, 628 A.2d at 682. While the court referred to the information
contained in a § 142(c) affidavit as a "summary" of data in the bank records, see id. at 461,
628 A.2d at 682, it might more appropriately be considered a "compilation" of that data.
71. Id. at 460-61, 628 A.2d at 682.
72. Id. at 461, 628 A.2d at 683.
73. The best evidence rule forbids extrinsic evidence to prove the contents of admissible documentary evidence. Id. "Rather, the documents or records themselves must be
introduced into evidence." I.
74. Id. The court maintained that summaries either may detail information that is in
the records or may report information that is not in the records. Id As authority for the
latter circumstance the court cited Summons v. State, 156 Md. 382, 387, 144 A. 497, 500
(1929) (holding that the testimony of a corporation director as to the absence of a record
was proper without production of the official records). Chapman, 331 Md. at 461-62, 628
A.2d at 683. Summaries may be admitted in lieu of written evidence that is "so voluminous
as to make impractical its proof on an item by item basis." MCLAIN, supranote 28, § 1006.1,
at 545.
75. Chapman, 331 Md. at 462-63, 628 A.2d at 683.

1994]

EVIDENCE

837

public records exception7-to justify the absence of the out-of-court
declarant. 7 7 The court found that "[t]he banking industry possesses
7
qualities that assure the same degree of accuracy as public records" 1
and that the General Assembly therefore was justified in treating
banks as "public or quasi-public agencies" to allow their affidavits
to
79
be "readily admissible" without testimony by a bank official.
The court also rejected Chapman's argument that the affidavit
lacked reliability because it was produced in anticipation of litigation."° Judge Chasanow wrote that the bank had "[n] either a position
to advocate nor a stake in the outcome" of the trial and that the "affidavit does not reflect a pre-conceived bias."8 ' Moreover, the court
concluded that, despite the holding in Idaho v. Wright,8 2 the use of the
canceled check as corroborative evidence to help demonstrate "guarantees of trustworthiness" was appropriate in this case.8"
Chapman also maintained that the incorrect year on the face of
the affidavit raised doubts about the reliability of the affidavit and ren-

76. Id. at 463, 628 A.2d at 683-84. The public records exception provides that a court
may admit into evidence a public record without the testimony of either the preparer or
custodian of the record so long as the record is "certified as a true copy by the custodian of
the record." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-204 (1989); see also MCLAiN, SUpra
note 28, § 803.(8).1, at 394 ("[T]he statute ... provides ... that certified copies of...
public records are self-authenticating . . ").
In Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581, 612, 495 A.2d 348, 363-64 (1985), the
Court of Appeals adopted the rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), which allows
for admission of public records "unless the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness." FED. R. EvID. 803(8). The court reasoned that public
records are presumptively admissible because public agencies are reliable and have no
motive other than to objectively inform the public. Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 607, 495 A.2d at
361 (citing Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble, 724 F.2d 613, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1983)).
77. Chapman, 331 Md. at 463-64, 628 A.2d at 684.
78. Id. at 464, 628 A.2d at 684. The court explained that, like public agencies, banks
have "strong incentives to generate and maintain accurate account records" and no "apparent motive ... to fabricate." Id.
79. Id. at 463-64, 628 A.2d at 684.
80. Id. at 464, 628 A.2d at 684.
81. Id. at 464-65, 628 A.2d at 684-85.
82. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). For a discussion of the holding, see supra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
83. Chapman, 331 Md. at 467, 628 A.2d at 686. The court reasoned that because
§ 142(c) is only employed after a check has been dishonored, "the dishonored check is...
a prerequisite to, and a component part of, the hearsay exception." Id. Rather than other
evidence, the canceled check is a "[p]art of the circumstances surrounding the genesis of
the affidavit, and therefore ... permissible corroboration under Wight." Id.
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dered it inadmissible.8 4 The court rejected this contention
deeming the incorrect year a simple typographical error.8 6

5

by

b. Necessity Requirement.--Chapman argued that section
142(c) is per se unconstitutional because it does not require a showing of unavailability of the affiant s7 The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, finding that under Inadi8 and White,8 9 the necessity
requirement could be satisfied without showing that a declarant is unavailable.9" The court dismissed the need for establishing the unavailability of those who generate 91 the documents in the records.92
Because of the "routine nature" of such tasks, the court asserted, the
declarant is unlikely to remember the events, and cross-examination93
thus would result in evidence less accurate than the affidavit itself.
Regarding the employees who prepared the affidavit, the court again
drew an analogy between banks and public agencies.9 4 The court determined that in light of the "limited utility" of cross-examining bank
96
employees9 5 and the substantial burden it would place on banks,

84. Id. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689. The argument was based on Moon v. State, 300 Md.
354, 370, 478 A.2d 695. 703 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985) (holding that when a
discrepancy on the face of a report "gives rise to a question as to the reliability of the
record and the [preparer of the record] is available ... [J [uit is error not to require the
declarant to testify before the record is admitted").
85. Chapman, 331 Md. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689.
86. Id. at 474, 628 A.2d at 689. In determining that the mistake was only clerical, the
court again used the canceled check as corroborating evidence. See id.
87. Id. at 467, 628 A.2d at 686.
88. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
90. Chapman, 331 Md. at 470-71, 628 A.2d at 687-88.
91. The court's treatment of declarants who generate the documents in the record was
separate from its treatment of those who review and summarize those documents. See id. at
471, 628 A.2d at 688. Under the appropriate circumstances, hearsay evidence by either of
these distinct classes of out-of-court declarants is admissible. Id.
92. See id.; see also State v. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 216-17, 545 A.2d 27, 30 (1988) (admitting a hospital record under the business records exception without the testimony of the
employee who made the entry into the patient's medical records); Bowers v. State, 298 Md.
115, 136-37, 468 A.2d 101, 112 (1983) (holding that the right of confrontation was not
violated when an autopsy report was admitted under the business records exception without testimony from the medical examiner).
93. Chapman, 331 Md. at 471, 628 A.2d at 688.
94. Id. at 471-72, 628 A.2d at 688.
95. Id. at 472, 628 A.2d at 689. The court reasoned that bank employees, like public
officials, have no motive to fabricate and are unlikely to remember details apart from what
is in the record. Id., 628 A.2d at 688-89.
96. Id. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689. The court maintained that § 142(c) was intended to
keep banks from having to carry their business records to court. Id. at 472, 628 A.2d at
689.
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failing to require such testimony did not violate Chapman's right of
confrontation.9 7
4. Analysis.-Although the Court of Appeals has consistently
posited that "I[i] t is an almost undeviating rule of the courts, both State
and Federal, that a constitutional question will not be decided except
when the necessity for such decision arises,""8 the Chapman court apparently regarded the constitutionality of section 142(c) as an issue
requiring immediate settlement. The court's urgency to address the
issue was evident in two respects. First, it took the Chapman case out
of order, granting certiorari on its own motion before the Court of
Special Appeals could consider the case.9 9 Additionally, the court did
not consider the harmless error argument that the State had persuasively presented. The State maintained that because the check Chapman delivered to Sears bore several stamps indicating that his bank
account was closed, the admission of the check into evidence rendered "[h]armless any error caused by admission of the affidavit." 100
This assertion was meritorious because the stamped check alone,
properly admitted, provided sufficient evidence to establish Chapman's guilt. A determination of section 142(c)'s constitutionality was
therefore unnecessary. By accepting the State's harmless error argument, the court could have disposed of the case without rendering a
constitutional decision.
Instead, the court broadened the concept of accepted evidentiary
practices with respect to each prong of the Roberts test. These revisions, while essential to the court's affirmation of section 142 (c)'s constitutionality, materially diminished the rights of accuseds under the
Confrontation Clause.
a. "Indicia of Reliability" Requirement.-Evidence admitted
under section 142(c) contains two levels of hearsay-the business record from which the affidavit was created and the affidavit itself. The
court correctly maintained that because section 142(c) does not fit
into a firmly rooted hearsay exception, evidence submitted under it is
97. Id. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689.
98. Jeffers v. State, 203 Md. 227, 230, 100 A.2d 10, 11 (1953). The Supreme Court has
also discussed this aspect of judicial restraint, stating that "[i]f there is one doctrine more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Servs., Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
99. Chapman, 331 Md. at 453, 628 A.2d at 678.
100. Brief of Appellee at 19. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme
Court indicated that the existence of corroborating evidence suggests that any erroneously
admitted hearsay may result only in harmless error. Id. at 823.
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presumptively unreliable, and inadmissible unless "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" are found. 0 1 In its search for such particularized guarantees, however, the court premised section 142(c)'s
reliability on the reliability of the underlying bank records, even
though the reliability of the underlying records was not at issue.1 0 2 In
so doing, the court ignored the questionable trustworthiness of the
affidavit itself.10 The court's failure to adequately address the affidavit's trustworthiness rendered its reliability analysis unsound.
The court defended the use of an affidavit under section 142(c)
by comparing the affidavit to summaries of business records, which
are normally admissible.1 04 This analogy does not comport with logical reasoning, however, as a section 142(c) affidavit is distinguishable
from business records in ways that directly impact its reliability. While
summaries of business records are generally admissible10 5 and some
business records have been admitted without testimony, 1 6 before
Chapman, no court had held that summaries of business records could
be admitted without testimony.1 0 7 The Chapman holding therefore
creates a loophole through which unreliable evidence may be
admitted.
Business records are reliable, in part, because they are produced
contemporaneously with the event in question and in the regular
course of business.108 Conversely, affidavits produced pursuant to sec101. Chapman, 331 Md. at 457-58, 628 A.2d at 681.
102. Because the underlying bank records were business records, their reliability could
be "inferred without more." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980).
103. The prevention of trial by ex parte affidavit has been the "primary object" of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for almost one hundred years. See Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 337, 339 (1895); see also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
104. See Chapman, 331 Md. at 461-62, 628 A.2d at 683.
105. See O'Donnell v. State, 188 Md. 693, 698, 53 A.2d 688, 689 (1947).
106. See Pine St. Trading Corp. v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 278 Md. 363, 373, 364 A.2d 1103,
1110 (1976) (holding that laying a foundation, which is a necessary prerequisite to the
admission of business records, need not always consist of testimonial evidence). But see
Testerman v. State, 61 Md. App. 257, 269-70, 486 A.2d 233, 238-39 (1985) (holding that a
witness is needed to authenticate a business record though not required to authenticate a
public record). The court cited several cases where, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3505, foreign
business records were admitted without testimony. Chapman, 331 Md. at 460, 628 A.2d at
682; see United States v. Stuman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1489-90 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 2964 (1992).
107. In cases cited by the court where the need for foundation testimony was waived, the
actual business records were admitted. See Pine St. Trading Corp., 278 Md. at 373, 364 A.2d
at 1110. In O7)onnel4 a summary was accepted in lieu of the actual business records in part
because the witness was present to testify. See OZonnell 188 Md. at 696, 53 A.2d at 689-90.
108. McLAIN, supra note 28, § 803(6).1, at 381. The contemporaneous requirement "reinforces the business need for accurate writings of the type in question ...enhancing the
business' interest in sincerity." Id. The "regular course of business [requirement] ensures
the business need for it and thus provides the circumstantial guarantee of sincerity." Id.
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tion 142(c) are produced neither contemporaneously with the
event' 0 9 nor in the regular course of business."' Thus, there are
fewer circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness associated with affidavits than with business records.
In addition, the reliability of section 142(c) affidavits is undermined by the lack of procedural safeguards that accompany their admission. Because no witness is required to testify as to the document's
validity, the defense is afforded no opportunity to show, for example,
that the bank misidentified the defendant or that the bank's search of
its records in compiling the affidavit was not thorough. The procedural safeguards generally afforded defendants in connection with the
acceptance of hearsay evidence, such as the presence at trial of the
actual documents at issue or a witness through whom a foundation for
the evidence can be laid, are lost when evidence is admitted pursuant
to section 142(c)."' Without these safeguards, the likelihood that an
error exists in the affidavit increases, and the affidavit's reliability correspondingly diminishes.
The court's analogy between section 142(c) and the public
records exception is even more transparent. The public records case
cited by the court in drawing this comparison concerned the admission of an actual public record, which carries a presumption of relia12
bility, rather than an affidavit, which carries no such presumption.
Moreover, public records are admitted without testimony because
they represent government work. The rule stems from the reluctance
of courts to burden the government by requiring that it produce a
witness every time one of its records is used as evidence," 3 as well as
the presumption of inherent reliability associated with public
109. The affidavit in question was produced on November 9, 1989, more than 19
months after April 19, 1988, the date of the incident. Chapman, 331 Md. at 452, 628 A.2d
at 678.
110. The affidavit in Chapman was produced in preparation for litigation and without
any independent business purpose. See Brief of Appellant at 8.
111. The court noted that Chapman could have subpoenaed the bank records if he
believed they would assist his defense. Chapman, 331 Md. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689. The
ability of a defendant to subpoena evidence or summon a witness, however, should not
relieve states of their obligations under the Confrontation Clause.
112. See Chapman, 331 Md. at 463, 628 A.2d at 684 (citing Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie,
Inc., 303 Md. 581, 600, 495 A.2d 348, 357 (1985) (deciding the admissibility of five government reports).
113. See 2 STRONG, supra note 27, § 295, at 289 ([RIequiring public officials to appear in
court ... would disrupt the administration of public affairs... [and] almost certainly would
create a class of official witnesses."); McAIN, supra note 28, § 803(8).1, at 396 (stating that
it is an interference with the government's work to "unnecessarily require public employ-

ees to testify in court").
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records.' 14 The considerations that account for the presumption of
the validity of public records therefore are not transferable to bank
records, let alone affidavits of bank records.
Furthermore, Chapman's contention that the reliability of the affidavit was negatively impacted because it was prepared in anticipation
of litigation merits some consideration.1"' While Chapman's bank did
not have a financial stake in the outcome of his criminal trial, banks
have a general interest, based on their desire to deter potential badcheck writers in the future, in seeing that parties such as Chapman are
prosecuted. 1 6 Thus, a bank's neutrality in a case such as Chapman is
at least questionable.
Finally, the court's reasoning is flawed because it lacks a limiting
principle. The court held not only that hearsay evidence could come
in under a hearsay exception not firmly rooted in the law of evidence,
but that a summary of that evidence in the form of an affidavit could
be admitted without a witness's accompanying testimony. Thus,
under the court's reliability analysis, the legislature could pass a statute allowing for the admission, without testimonial support, of virtually any form of hearsay evidence. Such a broad legislative mandate
would undoubtedly be unconstitutional. 1 7 Moreover, bank records
do not differ from other evidence admitted pursuant to the business
records exception. By holding that, consistent with the Confrontation
Clause, the prosecution can prove the contents of bank records solely
through an affidavit, the court has indicated that, under the same
principles, the contents of the business records of any sole proprietor
are also provable merely by affidavit.
b. Necessity Requirement.-In Inadi and White, the Supreme
Court limited the expansive language in Roberts regarding unavailability.1 18 In each case, however, the Court also expounded on the "independent evidentiary significance" of the applicable hearsay
114. Chapman, 331 Md. at 463, 628 A.2d at 684;

MCL.AIN,

supra note 28, § 803(8).1, at

395.

115. See Brief of Appellant at 8.
116. Banks would save substantial amounts of time and money if citizens ceased from
uttering bad checks. To the degree that criminal prosecutions accomplish this end
through deterrence, banks have an interest in such cases.
117. For example, this analysis would allow the court to uphold a statute providing for
the admission, without testimony, of an ex parte affidavit by a witness who claims to have
heard a dying declaration. Even though the hearsay exception for dying declarations is
firmly rooted in the law of evidence, the admission of such an affidavit, without affording a
defendant the chance to cross-examine the witness who purportedly heard the dying statement, would violate the defendant's confrontation rights.
118. See generally supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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exceptions.11 9 A reasonable interpretation of those cases indicates
that hearsay evidence that is necessary in a case can be admitted without testimony, while unnecessary hearsay can only come in through a
live witness. Under this interpretation, necessary hearsay has independent evidentiary significance; unnecessary hearsay is merely a
substitute for live testimony. In Chapman, the affidavit proved that
Chapman did not have an account with Fairfax Savings on the day he
wrote the check.1 2 ° Because a live witness also could have proved this
fact, the affidavit did not have independent evidentiary significance.
Thus, the court should have held that since the affidavit did not qualify as necessary hearsay evidence, a bank employee was required to

testify at trial.
Additionally, the court's assertion that it would be disruptive and
burdensome to force banks to produce witnesses in such cases is untenable. Even if the court had adequately supported its contention
that requiring banks to provide witnesses at criminal trials for uttering
bad checks would impose a "substantial burden" on banks, 121 such an
inconvenience should be overlooked when the alternative may result
in the violation of a constitutional right.
5. Conclusion.-In Chapman, the Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of a statutory hearsay exception, thus narrowing the
scope of a defendant's right to confrontation. While the decision was
not surprising given the recent legal trends toward limiting rights of
the accused in the area of criminal procedure, the strained reasoning
employed by the court to reach the decision was unjustified and unnecessary. Similar casual treatment of confrontation rights has led
Clause is nothing
some scholars to conclude that the Confrontation
1 22
more than a codification of the hearsay rules.
PAUL S. CAIOLA

119. See supra notes 44, 48 and accompanying text.
120. See Chapman, 331 Md. at 452, 628 A.2d at 678.
121. Id. at 473, 628 A.2d at 689.
122. See generally Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth

Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 558 (1988) ("The confrontation clause is no longer a
constitutional right protecting the accused, but essentially a minor adjunct to evidence
law."); Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
for a ProsecutonialRestraint Mode4 76 MINN. L. Rv. 557, 557 (1992) (maintaining that the

Supreme Court has transformed the Confrontation Clause into an evidentiary doctrine).
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Maryland Rule 1-502: A Required Balancing Test Before Impeachment
by PriorCriminal Conviction

In Beales v. State,' the Court of Appeals held that newly adopted
rule 1-5022 requires that, in determining whether to admit evidence of
a witness's prior conviction offered for impeachment purposes, a trial
judge must balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice to the witness or objecting party.' Under
prior law, evidence of a witness's conviction for an infamous crime was
per se admissible for impeachment purposes.4 Moreover, the Beales
court ruled that a trial judge's failure to perform the requisite balancing test cannot constitute harmless error unless it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the untested impeachment evidence did
5
not influence the jury.
The decision in Beales confirmed that rule 1-502 significantly
changed trial practice in Maryland's state courts. While the new Rule
did not change the class of admissible crimes, it mandated that the
balancing test be applied to "all convictions used to impeach credibility." 6 The Beales decision also indicated that, despite the Rule's fifteen-year limit on admissibility,' courts should still consider the
1. 329 Md. 263, 619 A.2d 105 (1993).
2. MD. R. 1-502 (1991). The Rule states in pertinent part:
(a) Generally.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination, but
only if the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant to the witness's
credibility and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting
party.
(b) Time Limit.--Evidence of a conviction under this Rule is not admissible if
a period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction.
Id. Rule 1-502 went into effect eight days before the Beales trial began. Beaks, 329 Md. at
267 n.1, 619 A.2d at 107 n.1.
3. Beaks, 329 Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110.
4. MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 10-905 (1989). Section 10-905 read:
(a) In general-Evidence is admissible to prove the interest of a witness in
any proceeding, or the fact of his conviction of an infamous crime. Evidence of
conviction is not admissible if an appeal is pending, or the time for an appeal has
not expired, or the conviction has been reversed, and there has been no retrial or
reconviction.
(b) Certificate under seal as evidence.-The certificate, under the seal of the
clerk of the court, of the court in which the conviction occurred is sufficient
evidence of the conviction.
Id.
5. Beaks, 329 Md. at 274-75, 619 A.2d at 111.
6. Id. at 270, 619 A.2d at 109.
7. MD. R. 1-502(b); see supra note 2.
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remoteness of a conviction when performing the balancing test.' The
court did not, however, suggest other factors courts should consider
in conducting the requisite balancing or explain how judges should
indicate to an appellate court that the balancing was done. Thus, the
Beales decision left trial judges free to apply their own standards and
failed to ensure a measure of uniformity in application of the balancing test.
1. The Case.-William Lee Beales was tried before a jury in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges of battery and carrying a
deadly weapon with intent to injure.' The charges stemmed from an
altercation in which Beales allegedly stabbed Sandra Herbert.1 ° Evidence proved that Herbert sustained a puncture wound to her shoulder,1" but she and Beales presented markedly different versions of the
surrounding incident. 2 At trial, Beales called as witnesses Joseph
Lambert, who was with him during the alleged attack, and his girlfriend, Tina McGee, who testified that she witnessed the altercation
from her second story window."
Both witnesses corroborated
Beales's claim that he did not stab Herbert and was not carrying a
knife at the time of the incident.1 4
During cross examination, the prosecutor asked Lambert
whether he had ever been convicted of a crime of dishonesty.1" Defense counsel objected on the basis of rule 1-502, arguing that impeachment evidence was no longer per se admissible and that, under
the new Rule, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice before ruling on its
admissibility. 6 The prosecutor dismissed defense counsel's interpretation as "hogwash" and asserted that bias is always admissible.17 The
judge recharacterized the issue as one of credibility. 8 He found that
rule 1-502 retained the per se admissibility of prior convictions of infamous crimes embodied in section 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article 19 and granted the prosecutor the right to put the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Beales, 329 Md. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.
Id. at 267, 619 A.2d at 107.
Id.
Id
Id. at 274-75, 619 A.2d at 111.
Id. at 267, 619 A.2d at 107.
Id.
Id. at 268, 619 A.2d at 107.
Id
Id, 619 A.2d at 107-08.
Id., 619 A.2d at 108.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PRoc. § 10-905 (1989); see supra note 4.
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information before the jury.20 The prosecutor elicited that Lambert
had been convicted of theft fourteen years earlier.21
Beales was convicted of battery and sentenced to three years in
prison. 22 He appealed the conviction to the Court of Special Appeals,
asserting that the trial court erred by not applying the balancing test
required under rule 1-502 before admitting Lambert's theft conviction into evidence. 23 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to
a determination by the intermediate appellate court,24 reversed
Beales's conviction, and ordered a new trial. 5
2. Legal Background.a. Common Law Impeachment for Prior Conviction.-At common law, a person convicted of treason, a felony, or crimen fals 6 was
barred from appearing as a witness at trial. 27 Disqualification arose
from the view that anyone convicted of such a crime was of bad character and likely to lie in court.28 Eventually, however, every jurisdiction abandoned absolute disqualification based on prior
convictions.2 1 Instead, to protect against potential of untruthful testimony, witnesses with prior criminal convictions were permitted to testify subject to impeachment by the opposing party."0 In Maryland, the
General Assembly ended common-law disqualification when it enacted chapter 109 of the Acts of 1864.31 Later, chapter 109 was incorporated into section 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings

20. Beales, 329 Md. at 268, 619 A.2d at 108.
21. Id. at 268-69, 619 A.2d at 108.
22. Id. at 269, 619 A.2d at 108.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 275, 619 A.2d at 111.
26. Crimenfalsi"include crimes in the nature of perjury or subornation of perjury, false
statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or any other offense involving
some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the witness's propensity to testify truthfully." Wicks v. State, 311 Md. 376, 382, 535 A.2d 439, 461-62 (1988)
(citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 335 (5th ed. 1979)).
27. THOMAS PEAI.E, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 124, 126-29 (1806); 3JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 609(02), at 609-28 (1993).
28. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884); see also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra

note 27,

29.

609(02), at 609-29.

609(02), at 609-28.
30. Id.
31. Act of Mar. 2, 1864, ch. 109, 1864 Md. Laws 136-37; see also Prout v. State, 311 Md.
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 27,

348, 358-59, 535 A.2d 445, 450 (1988).
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Article, 2 which governed impeachment law until rule 1-502 took effect on January 1, 1992."a
Section 10-905(a) provided that "evidence is admissible to prove
the interest of a witness... or the fact of his conviction of an infamous
crime."14 The Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the
phrases "is admissible" and "infamous crime" in a trilogy of 1988 cases:
Prout v. State,3 5 Watson v. State,36 and Wicks v. State.3 7 The court based
its decisions on the legislative history of section 10-905, which indicated an intent to abolish the rule of absolute incompetence.38
In Prout,the court held that by enacting chapter 109, the General
Assembly transformed the common-law bar to testifying into an issue
of witness credibility.3 9 Consequently, when a witness had been convicted of a crime that under common law would have barred the witness from testifying, the court held that, under section 10-905, the
opposing party must have an opportunity to test that witness's credibility by introducing evidence of a prior conviction.4" Despite the statute's permissive statement that "evidence is admissible," the court
interpreted section 10-905 to mean that evidence of a conviction of an
"infamous crime" is per se admissible.4 1 The Prout court, however,
designated crimes that did not disqualify a witness at common law as
"lesser crimes."4 2 These lesser crimes were admissible under section
10-905 for impeachment purposes, subject to judicial discretion, only
if the crimes had a bearing on the credibility of the witness. 43 Accordingly, the court held that it was within the trial judge's discretion not
to admit into evidence the prior convictions for prostitution and solic44
itation (for prostitution) of the State's sole witness, the victim.

32. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905 (1973); see supra note 4; see also Prout,
311 Md. at 358-59, 535 A.2d at 450.
33. 18 Md. Reg. 2622 (1991).
34. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-905(a) (1973).
35. 311 Md. 348, 535 A.2d 445 (1988).
36. 311 Md. 370, 535 A.2d 455 (1988).
37. 311 Md. 376, 535 A.2d 459 (1988).
38. Prout, 311 Md. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452; Watson, 311 Md. at 374, 535 A.2d at 457;
Wicks, 311 Md. at 380-81, 535 A.2d at 460-61.
39. Prout, 311 Md. at 359-60, 535 A.2d at 450-51.
40. Id. at 359, 535 A.2d at 450.
41. Id. at 359-60, 535 A.2d at 450-51.
42. Id. at 363-65, 535 A.2d at 452-53.

43. Id. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
44. Id. at 351, 352-53, 535 A.2d at 446, 447. Historically, prostitution was an ecclesiastical crime and not within the jurisdiction of the common-law courts. Id. at 364 n.8, 535
A.2d at 453 n.8. Thus, because prostitution was not a common-law offense, the court
found that prostitution and solicitation were lesser crimes, subject to judicial balancing. Id.
at 365 n.8, 535 A.2d at 453 n.8.
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In Watson, the court used its Prout definition of lesser crimes to
rule that attempted rape was a lesser crime because it did not constitute a common-law infamous crime.4 5 At common law, all attempted
crimes were misdemeanors.4 6 Furthermore, attempted rape was not
considered a crimenfalsi because it does not involve fraud, dishonesty,
or treason.4 7 Consequently, the court determined that the trial judge
erred in allowing the defendant to be impeached on the stand on the
basis of his attempted rape conviction, when the judge found that the
probative value of the conviction outweighed its unfair prejudicial
effect.48

Finally, in Wicks, the court allowed admission of a thirty-five-yearold conviction for petit larceny, holding that petit larceny was an infamous crime within the meaning of section 10-905 because it was a
common-law felony in 1864.4 ' The court found it immaterial that the
General Assembly had made petit larceny a misdemeanor in 1933,
well before the witness was charged,5" and concluded that even if petit
larceny were not a common-law felony, it constituted a crimenfalsi because "theft, in any amount, is the embodiment of deceitfulness."5" In
so ruling, the court indicated that the decisive factor in determining
whether a crime was an infamous crime, and thus per se admissible
for impeachment purposes, was its status in 1864 when chapter 109
was enacted.5 2
Thus, under section 10-905, ajudge potentially had to apply three
tests. First the judge had to determine whether a crime was an infamous crime, and as such per se admissible, or a lesser crime.5 3 If it
was a lesser crime, the judge had to decide whether it had a bearing
on the credibility of the witness. 4 Finally, if the crime was deemed
relevant to the witness's credibility, the judge had to weigh the proba55
tive value of the prior conviction against its unfair prejudicial effect.

Deferring to the discretion of trial judges, the court did not establish
rigid guidelines for the balancing test, but instead suggested several
factors to be considered. Acts of violence and convictions remote in
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Watson v. State, 311 Md. 370, 375, 535 A.2d 455, 458 (1988).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 373, 535 A.2d at 457. Watson was on trial for first degree rape. Id.
Wicks v. State, 311 Md. 376, 382-84, 535 A.2d 459, 462-63 (1988).
Id. at 381-82, 535 A.2d at 461.

51. Id. at 382, 535 A.2d at 462.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 380-82, 535 A.2d at 460-61.
See Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 363, 535 A.2d 445, 452 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 364, 535 A.2d at 452-53. These suggestions included the following:
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time, however,7 were deemed to have little, if any, bearing on honesty
and veracityA5
While the court continued to adamantly adhere to prior law regarding section 10-905, it seemed, in Wicks, to invite a rule change.5"
The court noted the inflexibility of section 10-905, but stated that a
rule change must come either from legislative action or the court's
rule-making powers, 9 the latter being the preferred route.'
b. The Rule-Making Process.-Soon after the Wicks decision,
the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure" began formulating a new rule, using Federal Rule of Evidence 6096" as a model." Committee minutes indicate that while
First, acts of deceit, fraud, cheating or stealing are generally regarded as reflecting adversely on one's likelihood to be truthful, while acts of violence generally
have little, if any, bearing on honesty and veracity. Second, a conviction for dishonesty, if followed by a long period of exemplary living may be too remote to
have significant probative value on the truth-telling process. Another important
factor to remember is that a prior conviction which is similar to the crime for
which the defendant is on trial may have a tendency to suggest to the jury that if
the defendant did it before he probably did it this time. The above factors are by
no means exhaustive and are only offered as examples of the kind of matters
which the trial judge may consider in determining the consequences of admitting
this kind of impeachment evidence.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Wicks, 311 Md. at 383-84 & n.5, 619 A.2d at 462 & n.5.
59. Id. at 384, 535 A.2d at 462.
60. Id. at 384 n.5, 535 A.2d at 462 n.5. The court stated, "the area of law addressed in
this opinion would appear to be an appropriate one for consideration by the Rules Committee." Id. at 384 n.5, 619 A.2d at 462 n.5.
61. The Rules Committee's membership includes judges, members of the General Assembly, and practitioners. See Minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure [hereinafter Minutes], Sept. 7-8, 1990, at 1.
62. Rule 609 reads in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that the witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted
if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a
period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the
release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that
the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
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there was considerable disagreement and negotiation over what
crimes should be admissible for impeachment purposes and over the
appropriate time limit for their admission, there was early and consistent consensus on the inclusion of the balancing test. 64 The Commit-

tee published proposals for a new rule twice and each time provided a
balancing test.15 In its deliberations, the Committee made clear its
view of the effect the new rule would have on existing statutes, specifically sections 9-10466 and 10-905.67 The Committee worked under the
assumption that when section 10-905 and the new impeachment rule
conflicted, the new rule would take precedence. 6" But with regard to
section 9-104, the perjury statute, the Committee believed that if the
new rule made no mention of section 9-104, the statute would prevail,
retaining the absolute incompetency of a witness convicted of
perjury.6 9
Finally, the Court of Appeals considered the proposed rule 1-502
at a public hearing on October 24, 1991.70 At the hearing, Judges
Murphy, McAuliffe, Karwacki, Chasanow, and Bell agreed that the
new rule would "preserve the existing law concerning what crimes are
available for impeachment, but add a weighing and balancing in every
instance ...

. "7

The rule-making process concluded when the Court

of Appeals published its final version of rule 1-502 in the Maryland

proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to
use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest
the use of such evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 609.
63. Minutes, Apr. 22-23, 1988, at 33. The Committee approved a new rule of impeachment and sent it to the Court of Appeals. Id. Ultimately, the court tabled action on the
measure because of impending changes in Federal Rule of Evidence 609, on which the
Maryland Rule was based. Minutes, Sept. 7-8, 1990, at 13. The Rules Committee resumed
work on a new Maryland Rule in 1990 after the expected amendment of federal Rule 609.
Id. Because the Court of Appeals considered enacting a new rule so important, it requested that the committee not wait for the entire codification of the Maryland rules to
reconsider impeachment by prior conviction. Id.
64. Minutes, Sept. 7-8, 1990, at 14-36, and May 17-18, 1991, at 6-15.
65. See 17 Md. Reg. 2722-23 (1990); 18 Md. Reg. 1907 (1991).
66. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 9-104 (1973). "A person convicted of perjury
may not testify." Id.
67. Minutes, Sept. 7-8, 1990, at 18.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 29.
Beales, 329 Md. at 272, 619 A.2d at 109.
Id. (citing transcript of Oct. 24, 1991 meeting).
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Regiter,7 2 making the rule effective and applicable to all actions beginning on or after January 1, 1992."s
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Beales court regarded the central
issue on appeal as whether evidence of a defense witness's"4 prior
theft conviction is per se admissible or subject to a required balancing
of its probative value and potential for unfair prejudice under rule 1502." Although it was interpreting a self-authored rule, the court relied on prior case law, traditional rules of statutory construction, and
the history of rule 1-502 to reach its conclusion that the Rule "requires
a preliminary determination of probativeness and potentially unfair
76
prejudice for all convictions used to impeach credibility."
As a preliminary matter, the court grafted onto rule 1-502 its section 10-905 meaning of the term "infamous crime," as interpreted in
Prout, Watson, and Wicks. 7 7 Thus, under rule 1-502, infamous crimes
include common-law felonies and crimen fali.78 In the court's view,
theft, the crime for which Beales's witness was convicted, constitutes a
crimen falsi because "it is the embodiment of deceitfulness."7 9
Turning to the applicability of the balancing test, the court noted
that principles of statutory construction apply to interpretation of
court rules.8 ° Although it purported to apply the plain meaning
rule-that courts should look first to the "ordinary and natural im-

72. 18 Md. Reg. 2622 (1991).
73. Id. Rule 1-502 was rewritten as rule 5-609 in the recently enacted Maryland Rules of
Evidence. The reporter's note states that the changes to rule 5-609(a) "codify the interpretation of this rule set forth in Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263 (1993)." 20 Md. Reg. P-15 (1993).
74. The court used the term "defense witness" when stating the issue, but at all other
times referred simply to "witnesses." It is unclear whether the court used the term "defense
witness" inadvertently or was preserving a separate issue. See Beales, 329 Md. at 267, 619
A.2d at 107.
75. Id.

76. Id. at 270, 619 A.2d at 109.
77. Id. at 269-70, 619 A.2d at 108. The court noted that during the October 24, 1991
public hearing, Judge McAuliffe made a motion "the effect of which should be to preserve
the existing law concerning what crimes are available for impeachment, except to add to it
a weighing and balancing in every instance." Id. at 272 n.2, 619 A.2d at 109 n.2.
78. Id. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108. Crimenfalsi continue to include offenses such as "crimes
in the nature of perjury, false statements, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense, or
any other offense involving some element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification
bearing on the witness's propensity to testify truthfully." Id. at 269-70, 619 A.2d at 108.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 271, 619 A.2d at 109; see State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 533, 555 A.2d 494,
497 (1989) (reasoning that principles of construction apply equally to the court's rules);
accord In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 481, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986).
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port" of the words in a rule 8 1-the court actually focused on the grammatical construction of rule 1-502.82 In so doing, the court found that
the phrase "but only if the crime was an infamous crime or other
crime relevant to the witness's credibility," operates "as a single, integral component of that rule.""3 The court determined that the most
natural reading of the rule was to read it as a whole and without a
pause. 84 It rejected the State's contention that the phrase containing
the balancing test was a qualifying clause, not preceded by a comma,
and therefore, applicable only to the phrase "other crimes relevant to
85

the witness's credibility."

To bolster its conclusion that "Rule 502(a), by design, differs
from earlier Maryland law in that it abandons every vestige of per se
admissibility regarding evidence of prior convictions for the purposes
of impeachment," 6 the court drew upon the rule's history. Authoritative support included the court's suggestion in Wicks that a new rule
be created, 7 the Rules Committee's work in response to that suggestion," and the Committee's minutes and published proposals, each of
which included a balancing test.8 9 Most significant was the transcript

of the court's October 24, 1991 public hearing at which Judges McAuliffe, Karwacki, Chasanow, Bell, and Murphy voted to retain the crimes
then available for impeachment under section 10-905, but to add the
balancing test "in every instance."9 ° The transcript also supports the
court's conclusion that the absence of a comma before the phrase "or
other crime relevant to the witness's credibility" meant that the balancing test applies equally to infamous crimes and other crimes bearing on credibility.9" The court noted that rule 1-502 is more lenient
than Federal Rule of Evidence 609 because the federal Rule still pro81. Beales, 329 Md. at 271, 619 A.2d at 109 (citing NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md.
118, 124, 544 A.2d 764, 767 (1987); Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493
A.2d 341, 343 (1985)).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108-09; see also Brief for Appellee at 6. The State's interpretation was based on the rule advanced in Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 373 A.2d 1245
(1977), that "a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately preceding words
or phrase-particularly in the absence of a comma." Id. at 451, 373 A.2d at 1249.
86. Beales, 329 Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110.
87. Id. at 271, 619 A.2d at 109 (citing Wicks, 311 Md. 376, 384 n.5, 535 A.2d 459, 462
n.5 (1988)).
88. Id. at 271-72, 619 A.2d at 109.
89. Id
90. Id. at 272 n.2, 619 A.2d at 109 n.2.
91. I& at 271, 619 A.2d at 109.
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vides for per se admission of impeachment convictions where the
crime involves dishonesty or false statement.9 2
Lastly, the court asserted that its power to create rules derives
from its authority "to regulate . . .the admissibility of evidence in all

cases, including criminal cases,"9" and that under Maryland statutory
and common law, a later rule supersedes an earlier statute if they conflict.9 4 The court rejected the State's contention that when possible,
rules and statutes should be interpreted so as not to conflict with each
other.9" Where rule 1-502 conflicts with section 10-905, the court held
that rule 1-502 prevails.9 6
Applying its interpretation of rule 1-502 to Beales's case, the
court viewed the trial court's actions in light of its presumption that
judges properly perform their duties.9 7 The court reversed Beales's
conviction, however, because it did not find sufficient evidence to indicate that the trial court performed the requisite balancing test.98
Although the court appeared not to require specific findings, it
looked at the trial judge's remarks "as a whole" and found three errors.9 First, the trial judge only considered whether the prosecutor's
question was in proper form and did not consider the effect the impeachment evidence would have on the defense.1"' Second, the trial
judge granted the State a per se right to impeach the witness, leaving
no possibility that he exercised discretion in conjunction with the balancing test.1"' Finally, the trial judge failed to ascertain whether the
conviction occurred within the past fifteen years, as required by rule 1502.1 2 Because the court viewed remoteness of the prior conviction
as an essential element of rule 1-502's balancing test, this error clearly
indicated to the court that the trial judge applied section 10-905
rather than rule 1-502.103

92. Id at 273, 619 A.2d at 110; see FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
93. Beaks, 329 Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC.
§ 1-201(a) (1989)).
94. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 1-102(a) (1989);Johnson v. Swann,
314 Md. 285, 289, 550 A.2d 703, 705 (1988).
95. See Beaks, 329 Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id.
103. Id., 619 A.2d at l10-11.
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The court did not believe that the judge's failure to perform the
balancing test was harmless error. 10 4 It reasoned that because Beales
and his alleged victim presented completely different descriptions of
the incident in question, witness credibility was crucial to the case. 10 5
When the defendant's chief witness was labeled a thief, his testimony
was tainted and there was no way to measure its effect on the jury's
verdict."16 Because appellate courts can find errors harmless only
when they are certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not in any way sway the verdict, the court remanded the case for a new
10 7
trial.
4. Analysis.-This case is unique because the Court of Appeals
interpreted a rule that the court itself wrote and promulgated after
holding a public hearing. Traditional rules of statutory construction
and the court's clear intent to make rule 1-502's balancing test apply
to all crimes support the court's interpretation. Still, the court's opinion is deficient in three ways. First, its purported reliance on the plain
meaning rule and the Rules Committee process give the impression
that the underlying rationalization for the court's interpretation was
that it knew what the Rule meant because the court wrote it. Second,
the court's comparison of rule 1-502 to Federal Rule of Evidence 609
was flawed. Third, and most importantly, the court's opinion insufficiently instructed judges and practitioners on how to implement the
rule.
a. Statutory Construction.-The court's purported reliance
on the plain meaning rule was misplaced because the meaning of the
words of rule 1-502 was not in question."0 At issue instead was
whether the Rule's grammatical construction rendered the balancing
test applicable to all crimes or only to lesser crimes. 10 9
In Comptroller v. Fairchild,"' the court stated that a rule "[s] hould
not be construed by forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation." ' ' The Beales court properly
rejected the strained interpretation offered by the State, which asserted that only evidence of lesser crimes should be subject to rule 1104. Id. at 274-75, 619 A.2d at 111.
105. Id. at 275, 619 A.2d at 111.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
Beales, 329 Md. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108.
303 Md. 280, 493 A.2d 341 (1985).
Id. at 284, 493 A.2d at 343.
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502's balancing test. 11 2 A common sense reading of the Rule supports
the court's view that the lack of a comma in the phrase "[i] nfamous
crime or other crime" indicates that the balancing test applies to both
types of crimes.11 3 Thus, in this case, the court properly rejected the
State's argument that, in the absence of a comma, a qualifying phrase
is ordinarily limited to the proceeding word or phrase. 4
Rules of statutory construction also require a reading that comports with legislative intent,' 15 which in the instant case was to change
the old rule. 6 The court correctly viewed as particularly significant
the transcript of the public hearing where five members of the court
agreed that the balancing test applied to every crime admissible for
witness impeachment. 1 7 The relevance of the Rules Committee's
drafts and meetings, the proposed rules that included a balancing
test, and their publication in the Maryland Register is less clear. Members of the court do not sit on the Rules Committee and, except for
the balancing test, the court did not adopt the Rules Committee's proposals. 1 Much of the Committee's time, moreover, was spent trying
to draft a rule which would garner enough votes on the court. 1 9
Nevertheless, in light of the court's express intent to apply the
balancing test to all crimes admissible for impeachment purposes and
the court's power to make rules,1 20 the court had clear authority for
its conclusion that rule 1-502 takes precedence over section 10-905.121

112. Beales, 329 Md. at 270, 619 A.2d at 108.
113. See MD. R. 1-502 (1991); see supra note 2.
114. See Beales, 329 Md. at 270-71, 619 A.2d at 108-09. Although the court did not explain this determination, a comparison of Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 373 A.2d 1245
(1977), on which the State relied, and Beaks indicates that the two cases are distinguishable
and the State's contention was spurious. In Sullivan, the court construed the phrase "a
professional corporation may invest its funds in real estate, mortgages, stocks, bonds, or
any other type of investment, and may own real or personal property necessary for the
performance of a professional service." Id. at 450, 373 A.2d at 1249. The qualifying phrase
not preceded by a comma was "necessary for the performance of a professional service,"
which the court construed to limit or qualify the kind of "real or personal property" that a
corporation could own. Id. at 451, 373 A.2d at 1249. In contrast, the phrase "and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice" in rule 1-502 does not identify a smaller class of lesser crimes to which
the rule would be applicable. MD. R. 1-502(a); see supra note 2, notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Unlike the phrase in Sullivan, the rule 1-502 phrase is not a qualifying phrase.
115. Sullivan, 280 Md. at 451, 373 A.2d at 1249.
116. See Beaks, 329 Md. at 271-72, 619 A.2d at 109.
117. Id. at 272 n.2, 619 A.2d at 110 n.2.
118. See 18 Md. Reg. 1906-07 (1991); 17 Md. Reg. 2722-23 (1990); see also supra notes 6465 and accompanying text.
119. See Minutes, May 7-8, 1991, at 4-15.
120. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PRoc. § 1-201 (a) (1989).

121. Id. § 1-201 (c) (stating that a rule supersedes a statute if they conflict).
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Consequently, the court properly rejected the State's contention that
rule 1-502 and section 10-905 should be read so as not to conflict wiih
1 22
each other.
b. Comparison with Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and the Rules of
Other States.-The Court of Appeals viewed rule 1-502 as more lenient
than Federal Rule of Evidence 609,123 but this conclusion is only partially accurate. While rule 609(a) (2) allows per se admission of convictions involving dishonesty or false statement, it severely narrows the
class of crimes that are admissible. 1 24 Most common-law felonies and
crimen falsi are not admissible as crimes of dishonesty or false statement under the federal Rule. 125 In addition, the time limit in the
federal Rule is ten years.1 26 It may be extended at the discretion of
the trial court, but only if stringent requirements are met. 1 27 These
requirements include support by specific facts and circumstances that
the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect and that there was advance notice to the adverse party
28
sufficient to provide a fair opportunity to contest such admission.'
Rule 609(a) (1) allows impeachment for any crime punishable by
death or imprisonment for more than one year, subject to a balancing
test.1 29 For a defendant in a criminal case, the balancing test is identical to the rule 1-502 test.'3 Under both rules, evidence of prior convictions is presumptively inadmissible unless it passes the balancing
122. See Beales, 329 Md. at 273, 619 A.2d at 110.
123. Id.
124. FED. R. EVD. 609. See supra note 62 for the text of rule 609.
125. The federal rules do not contemplate including crimes such as robbery and theft
within the rule 609 meaning of dishonesty and false statement. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to 1990 amendment. The Committee noted that
Congress extensively debated the rule and the Report of the House and Senate
Conference Committee states that "[b]y the phrase 'dishonesty and false statement,' the Conference means crimes such as perjury, subornation of perjury,
false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other
offense in the nature of crimenfalsi, commission of which involves some element
of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to
testify truthfully. The Advisory Committee concluded that the Conference Report provides sufficient guidance to trial courts and that no amendment is necessary, notwithstanding some decisions that take an unduly broad view of
'dishonesty' admitting convictions such as for bank robbery or bank larceny."
Id.
126. FED. R. Evm. 609(b).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
130. See MD. R. 1-502.
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test."3 ' As applied to nondefendant witnesses, or defendant witnesses
in civil trials, however, the federal Rule is more stringent than rule 1502 because admission is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.132
Under rule 403, evidence is presumptively admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 13 The tenyear time limit, with the same limited possibilities for extension, also
apply to rule 609(a) (1).

1 4
3

In contrast, the Maryland Rule has an ab-

solute time limit but the term is longer, fifteen rather than ten years,
and runs from the date of conviction instead of the later of conviction
13
or release from prison.

5

Thus, whether rule 1-502 will operate more leniently than the
federal Rule will depend on the facts of the case. If Beales's trial had
been held in a federal court, it is unlikely that Beales's witness would
have been impeached. In most circuits, theft is not classified as a
crime involving "dishonesty or false statement" and is therefore not
per se admissible under rule 609.136 Admittedly, a federal prosecutor
could try to impeach a witness convicted of theft under rule
609(a) (1), which has a more stringent balancing test for
nondefendant witnesses."3 7 But, even in a federal circuit that classifies
theft as a crime of "dishonesty or false statement," it is unlikely that a
judge would have extended the ten-year limitation to cover a lone
fourteen-year-old conviction.13

s

While rule 1-502 is important, Maryland is not in the forefront of
change with regard to impeachment law. A significant number of
states have already adopted the federal Rule with minor changes and
most states have included balancing tests with a wide range of liberality either by statute or judicial interpretation.139 At the extreme, Ha131. Id.
132. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
133. FED. R. EVID. 403.
134. FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
135. MD. R 1-502.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 998 F.2d 1025, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that
taking property without a right is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement); United
States v. Media-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 989-90 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that burglary, robbery, and shoplifting are not automatically impeachable under rule 609); United States v.
Brackeen, 969 F.2d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that bank robbery is not a crimenfalsO.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 131-133.
138. See FED. R. EVID. 609(b); see supra note 62.
139. See, e.g., ARx. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101, R. 609(b) (Michie 1992) (imposing a 10-year
limit on admissibility); Aiuz. R. EVID. 609 (requiring a balancing test for all admissible
crimes and a 10-year limit with allowance to admit crimes more than 10 years old with
judicial discretion and advance notice to the opposing party); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305
(1992) (imposing a 10-year limit on admissibility); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50.095 (Michie
1986) (providing an absolute 10-year limit on admissibility of prior convictions). But see
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waii allows no impeachment of criminal defendants 4 ' and Montana
41
allows no impeachment of any witness.1
c. Implicationsfor Mayland.-The significance of the court's
interpretation of rule 1-502 was illustrated in the Beales case. Who possessed the knife and what actually transpired was crucial to the case,
and Lambert's testimony was important to Beales.' 4 2 A fourteen-yearold theft conviction was likely to have had only minimal probative
value for determining the credibility of Beales's witness. Indeed, if the
conviction had occurred only one year earlier, it would have been
barred entirely by the Rule. 4 ' Introduction of this impeachment evidence might well have caused the jury not to weigh the witness's credibility objectively. 4' 4 With his primary witness impeached, Beales had
to rely on the testimony of his girlfriend, Tina McGee, to rebut the
victim. The jury might well have been reluctant to rely on McGee's
testimony because of her remoteness from the scene and her possible
bias.14 Applied properly, rule 1-502's presumption of inadmissibility
of impeachment evidence should have forced the trial judge to consider whether the probative value of the witness's testimony outweighed its potential for unfair prejudicial effect. In this context, an
unfair prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals gave little guidance to future
trial courts regarding factors they should consider in conducting the
requisite balancing. While rule 1-502(b) provides an absolute time
limit on admissibility, the Beales opinion indicated that the remoteness
of the conviction should nevertheless be considered in the balanc14 7
ing.' 4 6 Unstated is whether, like the definition of infamous crimes,
the court intended all factors identified in prior Maryland case law
regarding section 10-905 to apply equally to rule 1-502. Under section
10-905, the balancing test applied only to lesser crimes and a trial
court had to make a threshold determination as to whether the crime
for which the witness had been convicted reflected on his propensity
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 R. 609 (1992) (admitting all convictions punishable by 60 days of
confinement but placing a 10-year limit on admissibility with judicial discretion to admit
older convictions with notice to the opposing party).
140. HAw. REv. STAT. EvIl. R. 609 (making convictions of criminal defendants per se
inadmissible).
141. MoNT. R. EVID. 609.
142. Beales, 329 Md. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.
145. See Appellant's Brief at 6; supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
146. Beales, 329 Md. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.
147. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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to tell the truth. 14 8 Presumably, under rule 1-502, a judge must still
make a threshold determination of relevance to truth telling for the
lesser crimes.
The type of balancing required for infamous crimes also needs
clarification. For example, three equally plausible interpretations of
the rule are that (1) the conviction of an infamous crime is admissible
only if weighed against some other factor such as remoteness; (2) the
tendency of a particular infamous crime to indicate a witness's credibility must be balanced against the need of the introducing party to
present the testimony of that witness; or (3) a simple determination of
whether the particular infamous crime tends to implicate the credibility of the witness is enough. Justice might well become random if individual judges are permitted to decide whether a particular infamous
crime, such as murder, implicates credibility. Rules Committee minutes indicate that judges varied greatly in their opinions regarding impeachment. 149 Despite the concept that impeachment by prior
conviction is supposed to be used only when it reflects on the witness's
propensity to tell the truth, many judges believe that "[t] here is a serious question as to the credibility of persons who have previously been
convicted of a serious crime."1 5 ° Alarmingly, one Rules Committee
member thought, for example, that "a husband's murder of his wife
may not be evidence of untruthfulness, but since he broke a basic rule
of society, he has to suffer the possible consequences of having the
conviction used against him in a later case."1 51 Moreover, although
rule 1-502 does not create a separate category for criminal defendants,
some judges believe that defendant witnesses should be treated differently from nondefendant witnesses.1 52 It remains unclear what, if any,
deference should be given to criminal defendants.' 5 3 Some judges
consider limiting instructions sufficient to cure any prejudice, while
others believe instructions are not always followed."5 Clearly the judiciary needs guidance.

148. Prout, 311 Md. at 363, 535 A.2d at 452.
149. Minutes, May 17-18, 1991, at 4-14 & App. 1.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. at 13.
152. Id.
153. Minutes, Sept. 8-9, 1990, at 16-36. The problem with having different impeach-

ment rules for defendants is illustrated by the following example: Suppose a husband and
wife had been convicted of various crimes together, including writing bad checks and committing robberies. If at a later time the husband is tried for assault and battery on his wife,
the wife could be impeached with her convictions but the husband could not. Id. at 17.
154. Minutes, May 17-18, 1991, at 9-11.
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Furthermore, the court did not instruct trial courts as to how they
should demonstratively weigh probative value against unfair prejudice. The Beales decision on this issue was unsatisfying because the
court seemed to contradict itself. The presumption noted by the
court "that judges properly perform their duties"1 55 and that "trial
judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of
logic," 156 suggests that almost any indication of a balancing test will
suffice. Yet, in its detailed evaluation of the trial judge's conduct, the
court seemed to insist that a proper balancing by the trial court be
clearly shown.

15

7

The court's failure to identify specific factors to be considered in
the balancing, and its failure to clarify what evidence of balancing by
the trial court it will require, may result in unfair convictions as trial
judges balance the consequences of admitting impeachment evidence
according to their own standards. Moreover, the lack of guidance left
defendants open to needless and costly appeals that may unnecessarily
clog the courts with litigation aimed at ascertaining a standard that
might just as easily have been stated in Beales.
5. Conclusion.-The Beales decision represents an important
milestone in Maryland's rules of evidence. The Court of Appeals held
that, before a trial court may admit evidence of a witness's prior criminal conviction, the judge must balance the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice and that a judge's
failure to do so will very rarely constitute harmless error. The court,
however, did not sufficiently explain to trial courts how to conduct the
requisite balancing or how to indicate to the appellate court's satisfaction that they properly performed the balancing test.
MARION

C.

K

GOLDBERG

The PrejudicialImpact of Testimony Regarding Accusations of Prior
Bad Acts Similar to the Acts for Which the Defendant Is on Trial

In Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland v. Evans
(Medical Mutual), the Court of Appeals found that the prejudice
caused by the improper cross-examination of Medical Mutual's former
claims manager regarding accusations of prior bad acts similar to the
acts for which Medical Mutual was on trial transcended the trial
155. Beaes, 329 Md. at 273, 616 A.2d at 110.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 274, 619 A.2d at 110.

1. 330 Md. 1, 622 A.2d 103 (1993).
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judge's curative instruction. 2 Consequently, the court held that the
trial judge abused his discretion in denying Medical Mutual's motion
for mistrial.'
In so holding, the court recognized that the decision whether to
grant a motion for mistrial rests with the trial judge,4 but indicated
that the judge's discretion is limited when the inadmissible evidence
involves accusations of prior bad acts, especially when the prior bad
acts are similar to the acts for which the defendant is on trial.5 In
addition, the court urged attorneys to use motions in limine to obtain
6
advance rulings on the admissibility of questionable evidence.
1. The Case.--On September 17, 1983, Deborah L. Evans was admitted to Lutheran Hospital for the removal of an intrauterine device
(IUD) that had extravasated into her intraperitoneal cavity. 7 In preparation for the surgery, Evans was placed under general anesthesia
and monitored by Dr. Clarence E. Beverly.' Following the operation,
Evans suffered permanent neurological impairment 9 and brought a
claim against Beverly in Health Claims Arbitration. 10 She argued that
due to Beverly's failure to monitor her adequately during surgery, she
suffered a brain injury caused by lack of oxygen." The arbitration
panel awarded Evans $500,000; she rejected the award and sought a
jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 12 Beverly, who was
represented by Medical Mutual, his malpractice insurance carmer, successfully moved to set aside the arbitration panel's award, thereby al13
lowing the trial to proceed as if no award had been granted.
Pending proceedings in the circuit court, counsel for Beverly
withdrew and Medical Mutual engaged new counsel on his behalf.'4
2. Id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 19, 622 A.2d at 112.
5. See id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 6, 622 A.2d at 105.
8. Id.
9. See id. Evans's condition was characterized by a tremor in her right arm and hand,
with numbness and weakness. Her thinking processes and concentration also were impaired. She was unable to continue her teaching job and was determined to be totally
disabled by the Social Security Administration. Id.
10. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., Cs. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-2A-01 to -09 (1989) (governing
Health Claims Arbitration).
11. Medical MutuaL 330 Md. at 6, 622 A.2d at 105.
12. Id. at 8, 622 A.2d at 106.
13. Id. at 8-9, 622 A.2d at 106.
14. Id. at 10, 622 A.2d at 107.
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During this transition, Evans made a settlement offer of $500,000."
Eight days later, after receiving no response from Medical Mutual, Evans increased her demand to "policy limits, if not less than $1 million."16 Although Beverly implored Medical Mutual to settle within
policy limits, Medical Mutual was unable to reach an agreement with
17

Evans.

The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict of
$2.5 million in favor of Evans. 8 Beverly then assigned Evans his claim
against Medical Mutual for bad faith failure to settle.' 9 This assignment precipitated the instant action before the Court of Appeals.20
The initial trial against Medical Mutual for bad faith failure to
settle resulted in a mistrial.2 1 Retrial began on February 4, 1991,
before a jury of eleven women and one man. 22 The motion for mis23
trial at issue was made on the seventh and last day of testimony.
Medical Mutual called as a witness Kenneth Robert Phillips, the claims
manager who handled the settlement negotiations with Evans. 24 During cross-examination, Evans's counsel questioned Phillips regarding
a previous case, Thimatariga v. Chambers,25 in which he and Phillips
had been similarly pitted against each other.26 Chambers involved a
malpractice claim against a doctor who removed a young woman's
ovaries and uterus without authorization.2 ' The questioning inferred
that Phillips had valued the woman's loss at only $23,000.28 Counsel
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 11, 13-14, 622 A.2d at 108-09.
18. Id. at 14, 622 A.2d at 109. Medical Mutual paid Evans $1 million, the amount of
Beverly's policy, plus interest thereon. Id. at 5, 622 A.2d at 104.
19. Id. at 14, 622 A.2d at 109. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the assignment, noting that "[a] Ithough we have not explicitly held that a cause of action for bad
faith failure to settle is assignable, the general rule favoring assignability and case law elsewhere support that conclusion." Id. at 29, 622 A.2d at 116.
20. Id. at 14, 622 A.2d at 109.
21. Id. at 15, 622 A.2d at 110. During the initial trial, counsel for Evans elicited testimony indicating that Medical Mutual recently had been involved in another case for bad
faith failure to settle. Id., 622 A.2d at 109. The trial judge declared a mistrial because the
testimony had robbed Medical Mutual of "an opportunity to fairly present its case." Id.,
622 A.2d at 110.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 15-16, 622 A.2d at 110.
25. 46 Md. App. 260, 416 A.2d 1326 (1980).
26. Medical Mutual 330 Md. at 16-17, 622 A.2d at 110-11.
27. Id., 622 A.2d at 110.
28. Id. The examination was as follows:
"Q: Did I not, Mr. Phillips, many years ago, before the Beverly case, call you
up involving a case-where suit was brought, where you were the claims manager-of a young woman who claimed that her reproductive organs were re-
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for Medical Mutual made a timely objection to the line of questioning,
but the trial judge overruled it.2 9 Counsel for Evans then inferred
Medical Mutual's bad faith in handling the case by pointing out that
the Chambers jury returned a $1.4 million verdict for the plaintiff,
doctor's insurance coverage,
more than $400,000 in excess of 3 the
°
which Medical Mutual paid in full.

Following several objections by Medical Mutual, the judge called
a bench conference.3 1 At that time, Medical Mutual moved for a mistrial.3 2 In response, Evans's counsel argued that the line of questioning was admissible to show that Phillips had a personal bias toward
him that affected his desire to settle Evans's claim. 33 The trial judge
denied the motion for mistrial and permitted counsel for Evans to
question Phillips as to a possible bias resulting from the prior case, but
not as to the issue of bad faith failure to settle.3 4 Before questioning
resumed, the judge gave the jury a cautionary instruction intended to
cure any prejudice to Medical Mutual. 5
The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Evans for $1.5
million, the entire amount by which the judgment in the original malmoved over at Bon Secours Hospital without her permission, she was 28 years old,
took out her ovaries, her uterus?...

"Q: And a suit was filed and I called you up, sir, and you said what, asked me
what was the demand, and I said the client has advised me she will accept
$300,000, and was your response, sir, did you say $23,000? You remember that
episode, don't you?"
Id. at 17, 622 A.2d at 110.
29. Id.
30. Id., 622 A.2d at 110-11. There was never an adjudication of the bad faith failure to
settle issue in Chambers. Id. at 18, 622 A.2d at 111.
31. Id. at 17, 622 A.2d at 111.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 18, 622 A.2d at 111. The judge distinguished the line of questioning intended to show bias from the one necessitating a mistrial in the initial trial by stating that,
in the initial trial, the improper examination "'made a reference to something that in fact
had never occurred.'" Id. at 19, 622 A.2d at 111.
35. Id. at 18, 622 A.2d at 111. The instruction was as follows:
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, it will be your responsibility to judge this
case fairly and impartially by giving each party the benefit of a fair trial. In doing
that, you will assess the evidence in this case and determine the facts with regard
to this case based on what has been presented to you as to this case.
"We implore you to recall your oath and your responsibilities to assess what
did or did not, what has or what has not, what was or was not the facts in this case
based on the evidence presented and do that with impartiality, devoid of prejudice, and with fairness to both sides."
Id. at 18-19 n.13, 622 A.2d at 111 n.13.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:829

practice suit exceeded policy limits.3 6 The Court of Special Appeals
affirmed, and the Court of Appeals subsequently granted Medical Mutual's petition for certiorari. 3 '
2. Legal Background.--In Maryland, a witness may be impeached
by evidence establishing that the witness has been convicted of a
crime "only if the crime was an infamous crime or other crime relevant
to the witness's credibility and the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the witness or the objecting party."3 1 Under this exclusionary
rule, 39 evidence of prior bad acts is generally barred, but may be admitted to establish a material issue in a case.4 0
In State v. Cox,4 1 the Court of Appeals discussed the admissibility
of prior bad acts evidence generally and explained that the law requires a reasonable basis for the introduction of such evidence.4 2 A
court must assess whether "the primary purpose of the inquiry is... to
harass or embarrass the witness, and [whether] there is [a] likelihood
of obscuring the issue on trial."43
The Court of Appeals outlined its position on such evidence in
Kantor v. Ash44 by describing instances in which prior bad acts evidence may be admitted. The court stated that a witness "may be crossexamined on such matters and facts as are likely to affect his credibility, test his memory or knowledge, show his relation to the parties or
36. Id. at 5, 622 A.2d at 105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this measure of damages,
noting that "[p] resent Maryland law, and the majority rule, is that the measure of damages
in a bad faith failure to settle case is the amount by which the judgment rendered in the
underlying action exceeds the amount of insurance coverage." Id. at 25, 622 A.2d at 114.
37. Id. at 5, 622 A.2d at 105.
38. MD. R. 1-502(a) (emphasis added).
39. In Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991), the Court of Appeals set forth
two reasons why this exclusionary rule is appropriate when considering the admissibility of
evidence of prior bad acts. First, it is "the exceptional, and not the usual, case where the
evidence of other bad acts is substantially relevant for reasons other than proof of criminal
character." Id. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961. Second, the exclusionary rule "ensure[s] that adequate consideration [is] given to the conceded, but sometimes overlooked, potential for
unfair prejudice that invariably accompanies the introduction of evidence of other bad
acts." Id., 597 A.2d at 962. See generally Michael P. May, Comment, Evidence of Other Crimes
as SubstantiveProofof Guilt in Maryland,9 U. B~AT. L. REv. 245 (1980) (discussing the operation of the exclusionary rule in Maryland).
40. See Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-70, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976). The Ross court
held that evidence of other crimes may be admissible to establish motive, intent, absence
of mistake, a common plan, or identity. Id It further noted that this list of exceptions was
not exhaustive. See id. at 670, 350 A.2d at 684.
41. 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983).
42. Id. at 179, 468 A.2d at 322.
43. Id.
44. 215 Md. 285, 137 A.2d 661 (1958).
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the cause, his bias, or the like." 45 The court has recognized, however,
that even when there is a permissible purpose for admitting prior bad
acts evidence, this type of evidence "carries with it heavy baggage that
must be closely scrutinized before admissibility is warranted." 46 In addition, the court has cautioned that where such evidence is admitted
for impeachment purposes, mere accusations of crime or misconduct
may not be used.4 7
When evidence of prior bad acts is improperly admitted at trial,
opposing counsel will typically move for a curative instruction or, if
the resulting prejudice is overwhelming, for a mistrial. When a motion for mistrial is made, the trial judge must review the circumstances
of the particular case and determine whether the prejudicial effect of
the inadmissible evidence can be eradicated by a curative instruction
or whether a mistrial is required.4"
In DeMay v. Carper,49 the Court of Appeals held that "only in the
exceptional case, the blatant case, will [the trial judge's] choice of cure
and his decision as to its effect be reversed on appeal."5" In State v.
Hawkins,5 1 the court further explained that "[t] he fundamental rationale in leaving the matter of prejudice vel non to the sound discretion
of the trial judge is that the judge is in the best position to evaluate
it."52 The court noted that "the judge has his finger on the pulse of
the trial" because he is able to observe both the demeanor of the witnesses and the reaction of the jurors to the inadmissible evidence.5 3

45. Id at 290, 137 A.2d at 664.
46. Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 500, 597 A.2d 956, 962 (1991).
47. See Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 559, 52 A. 496, 499 (1902) ("Whatever may be
the law elsewhere, the courts of this state have always recognized the distinction ... between actual misconduct itself, and the charge of misconduct, and have excluded the latter."); see also Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 406, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992) (holding that
evidence that alluded to the defendant's alleged sexual abuse of a child was not admissible
in a case involving sexual abuse of another child); Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292
Md. 328, 340, 439 A.2d 534, 541 (1982) (holding that testimony regarding a previous
charge against the defendant for fraud was inadmissible to impeach the witness's credibility in an unrelated civil suit).
48. See Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A.2d 1137, 1141 (1989). Although Kosmas is a lie detector case, the factors applied in lie detector cases to decide whether a
defendant's right to a fair trial is sufficiently protected by a jury instruction are equally
applicable to cases involving prior bad acts evidence. See Rainvile, 328 Md. at 408, 614
A.2d at 954.
49. 247 Md. 535, 233 A.2d 765 (1967).
50. Id. at 540, 233 A.2d at 768.
51. 326 Md. 270, 604 A.2d 489 (1992).
52. Id. at 278, 604 A-2d at 493.
53. Id.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:829

Appellate review of a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial
generally is limited to whether there was an abuse of discretion.5 4 The
proper inquiry on appeal is whether the inadmissible evidence was
clearly prejudicial to the defendant.5 5 The appellate court is not
"bound by the trial judge's determination ... that the remarks were

nonprejudicial," 56 but in Wilhelm v. State,57 the court affirmed the trial
court's position of primacy. 58 It held:
[A] significant factor in determining whether the jury were
actually.., influenced to the prejudice of the [defendant] is
whether or not the trial court took any appropriate action, as
the exigencies of the situation may have appeared to require,
to overcome the likelihood of prejudice, such as informing
the jury that the remark was improper, striking the remark
and admonishing the jury to disregard it.5 9
If the reviewing court finds that the trial court's curative action was
sufficient, the judgment will not be reversed.60
In Guesfeird v. State,61 the Court of Appeals set forth several factors
that appellate courts should consider when determining the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence. 62 These factors include:
[W]hether the reference to [the inadmissible evidence] was
repeated or whether it was a single, isolated statement;
whether the reference was solicited by counsel, or was an inadvertent and unresponsive statement; whether the witness
making the reference is the principal witness upon whom
the entire prosecution depends; whether credibility is a cru54. Id. at 277, 604 A.2d at 493; see also Hickman v. State, 76 Md. App. 111, 120, 543 A.2d
870, 875 (1988) (holding that when an improper question is admitted, the appellate court
should defer to the trial court's judgment, "since the trial judge is in the best position to
evaluate the effect of the question on the jury").
55. See Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 408, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992) ("'[T he question
is one of prejudice to the defendant.'") (quoting Hawkins, 326 Md. at 276, 604 A.2d at
492); see also Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658, 480 A.2d 800, 802-03 (1984) (explaining
that the "ultimate question" on appeal was whether the testimony regarding the witness's
taking of a lie detector test was so clearly prejudicial that a motion for a mistrial should
have been granted); Hawkins, 326 Md. at 278-79, 604 A.2d at 494 (holding that "[i]n the
light of the lack of prejudice, there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion
for a mistrial" by the trial judge).
56. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 430, 326 A.2d 707, 724 (1974).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 423-24, 326 A.2d at 720.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 424, 326 A.2d at 720.
61. 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984).
62. Id. at 659, 480 A.2d at 803.
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cial issue; [and] whether a great deal of other evidence exists
63

The court specified, however, that "[n] o single factor is determinative
in any case." 64 Furthermore, it explained that the factors do not constitute an exclusive test, but serve only to guide the judge in determining whether the defendant was prejudiced.6 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Medical Mutual, the Court of Appeals examined the scope of the trial judge's discretion to deny a motion for mistrial when inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts similar
to the act for which the defendant is on trial has been admitted.6 6
Judge Rodowsky, writing for the majority, began the opinion by setting forth the standard that appellate courts should use when determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a
motion for mistrial. 67 The court stated that "[t]he question is one of
prejudice."' If the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence outweighs the curative effect of the instruction to the jury, the trial
judge's denial of a motion for mistrial should be reversed.6 9
The court then discussed the admissibility of the evidence elicited
by Evans's counsel on cross-examination of Phillips. First, the court
considered whether a reasonable basis existed for admitting the testimony regarding the Chambers case.71 At trial, Evans's counsel argued
that the primary purpose for admitting the Chambers evidence was to
establish that he and Phillips had battled often over the years and that
Phillips had a personal bias toward him.7" The court found that even
73
if it assumed bias was a reasonable basis for admitting the evidence,
the testimony actually admitted went beyond the issue of bias and improperly tended to establish that Medical Mutual was guilty in Cham63. Id. Although the factors set forth in Guesfeird were specifically designed to weigh
the prejudicial effect of inadmissible testimony regarding lie detector tests, the Court of
Appeals has stated that those factors "are equally applicable for purposes of deciding
whether [a defendant's] right to a fair trial was adequately protected by a jury instruction
following a different kind of inadmissible and prejudicial testimony." Rainville v. State, 328
Md. 398, 408, 614 A.2d 949, 954 (1992).
64. Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659, 480 A.2d at 803.
65. Id.
66. Medical Mutual 330 Md. at 14, 622 A.2d at 109.
67. Id. at 19, 622 A.2d at 112.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 20-22, 622 A.2d at 112-13.

71. Id. at 20, 622 A.2d at 112.
72. See id. at 16-17, 622 A.2d at 110-11.

73. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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bers of bad faith failure to settle.7 4 The court held that "[t] here was no
basis for referring to Med Mutual's payment of 'the additional money'
in Chambers on an assigned claim of bad faith failure to settle ..

.

It further noted that such evidence could not be used for impeachment purposes because 76the question of bad faith in Chambers had
never been adjudicated.
The court concluded that Evans's counsel's
statement that Phillips had valued the unauthorized removal of the
young woman's ovaries and uterus at only $23,000 demonstrated that
the primary purpose of the questioning was to embarrass and harass
the witness.7 7
Next, the court balanced the prejudicial effect and probative
value of the evidence.7 8 It agreed with the trial judge's observation
that the reference to a bad faith suit and its subsequent settlement
may be more prejudicial than probative and determined that it should
have guided his decision in favor of a mistrial.79 The court reasoned
that serious prejudice resulted because "[m]any lay persons would consider that, if Med Mutual refused to protect another insured by failing, in bad faith, to settle within policy limits in a different case, it
would be more likely that Med Mutual failed in bad faith to protect
Beverly's interest."80
After determining that the prior bad acts evidence was both "irrelevant and prejudicial,"8 1 the court reviewed factors relied on in previous cases to determine the extent of the prejudicial effect resulting
from the admission of evidence.8 2 First, the court recognized that
"[r] eference to the purported, but dramatic, facts of Chambersserved to
obscure the real issue" in the case 8 ' and found that the confusion of
issues was exacerbated by the fact that Medical Mutual was already a
74. Medical Mutual, 330 Md. at 20, 622 A.2d at 112.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 21-22, 622 A.2d at 112-13.
77. Id., 622 A.2d at 113. The court's conclusion is especially apparent in light of the
composition of the jury, which included 11 women, 10 of whom were at or below the age of
40. See id. at 15, 622 A.2d at 110.
78. See id. at 21, 622 A.2d at 112-13.
79. Id., 622 A.2d at 112.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 22-24, 622 A.2d at 113-14; see also Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 659, 480
A.2d 800, 803 (1984) (setting forth several factors a court should consider when determining the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence).
83. Medical Mutua 330 Md. at 22, 622 A.2d at 113; see also State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173,
179, 468 A.2d 319, 321-22 (1983) (stating that a witness may be cross-examined about relevant prior bad acts as long as the trial judge is satisfied that "there is a reasonable basis for
the question . .. and that there is little likelihood of obscuring the issue on trial").
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difficult case for the jury. 4 The court pointed out that, since jury
members sent twenty-two notes asking questions and requesting clarification during the trial, the trial judge "had ample indicia that the
jury had difficulty in keeping focused on that which was relevant to
the issue to be decided.""5
The court also considered it significant that Phillips did not accidently blurt out the evidence at issue, but that Evans's counsel apparently prepared questions in advance aimed at eliciting it. 6 The
court held that "[even the most intense and dedicated advocate would
recognize the likely inadmissibility of, and the potential for a mistrial
caused by a reference to, an allegedly bad faith failure to settle in a
collateral matter."" In a case involving such evidence, contemporary
practice recognizes the need for counsel to make a motion in limine,
which allows the trial judge to rule on the admissibility of evidence
that might otherwise lead to a mistrial."8 Evans's counsel, the court
indicated, should have been particularly aware of the need to make
such a motion, in light of the fact that the initial trial was aborted as a
result of his improper questioning of a witness.8 9
Judge Bell, dissenting in part and concurring in part, criticized
what he described as the majority's failure to "defer[ ] to the trial
court's superior position to gauge the mood and tone of the trial."90
He emphasized that the decision whether to grant a motion for mistrial is the trial judge's and that appellate review is limited to whether
the judge's ruling was an abuse of discretion. 91 Asserting generally
that trial judges are men and women of discernment who know the
law and how to apply it correctly,9" Judge Bell pointed out that the
trial judge in Medical Mutual thoroughly considered whether to grant
the motion for mistrial.9 3 Judge Bell further noted that the offending
evidence was referred to only once and that the trial judge promptly
84. Medical Mutual, 330 Md. at 22, 622 A.2d at 113.
85. Id. at 22-23, 622 A.2d at 113.
86. Id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
87. I&
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 33, 622 A.2d at 118 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring).
91. Id., 622 A.2d at 118-19 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring).
92. Id. at 34, 622 A.2d at 119 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring).
93. See id. at 35-37, 622 A.2d at 119-20 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring). The trial
judge heard extensive argument both in and outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 36,
622 A.2d at 120 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring). Furthermore, the trial judge reviewed Medical Mutual's motion for mistrial twice. Id. at 37, 622 A.2d at 120 (Bell, J.,
dissenting and concurring).

870
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made a curative instruction.9 4 Accordingly, Judge Bell argued that the
court should have exercised more restraint in reviewing the trial
judge's decision. 95
4. Analysis.-The court's holding in Medical Mutual reflects a
trend toward limiting the trial judge's discretion to deny motions for
mistrials in cases involving the improper admission of evidence of
prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the defendant is on trial.
Moreover, the court indicated that it would be especially strict when
the elicited testimony relates to mere accusations as opposed to verified facts.9 6 This imposition of restraint on the trial judge's discretion
is a reaction to the highly prejudicial character of this type of evidence
and the difficulty of alleviating such prejudice through a curative instruction. Ultimately, the court advocated the use of the motion in
limine to obtain an advance judicial ruling on the admissibility of such
97
evidence.
The Medical Mutual decision suggests that evidence regarding
mere accusations of prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the
defendant is on trial is more prejudicial than other forms of prior bad
acts testimony. Reading Medical Mutual in conjunction with the holding in Rainville v. State,9 8 the trend in this area of law is clear. In
Rainville, the court stated that a witness's remark regarding a prior
similar offense by the defendant had "great potential for prejudicing
the jury"9 9 because evidence of "a prior conviction which is similar to
the crime for which the defendant is on trial may have a tendency to
suggest to the jury that if the defendant did it before he probably did
it this time."10' Moreover, the court found the reference to prior bad
acts in that case "particularly prejudicial" because the defendant had
not been convicted of the prior acts."0 1 As in Rainville, the inadmissi02
ble testimony in Medical Mutual consisted of a mere accusation.
94. See id. at 37-38, 622 A.2d at 120-21 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring).
95. Id. at 38-39, 622 A.2d at 121 (Bell, J., dissenting and concurring).
96. See id. at 20-21, 622 A.2d at 112.
97. Id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
98. 328 Md. 398, 614 A.2d 949 (1992). In Rainville, the defendant was on trial for the
alleged sexual abuse of a seven-year-old girl. Id. at 399, 614 A.2d at 949. Just prior to the
girl's report of the abuse, the defendant was arrested for a third degree sexual offense and
battery of the girl's brother. Id. at 400, 614 A.2d at 950. During direct examination, the
mother of the victim testified that the girl told her of the sexual abuse while the defendant
was "in jail for what he had done to [her brother]." Id. at 399, 614 A.2d at 949.
99. Id. at 407, 614 A.2d at 953.
100. Id. (quoting Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 364, 535 A.2d 445, 453 (1988)).
101. Id. at 407, 614 A.2d at 953.
102. See Medical Mutual 330 Md. at 21-22, 622 A.2d at 112-13.
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The court held admission of such unsubstantiated testimony so prejudicial that it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial judge to deny
10 3
Medical Mutual's motion for mistrial.
The court's view of the heightened potential for prejudice resulting from the admission of accusations of prior bad acts similar to the
acts for which the defendant is on trial is comparable to its view of the
10 4
highly prejudicial character of evidence regarding lie detector tests.
Although reference to a lie detector test is not always so prejudicial as
to warrant a mistrial, the Court of Appeals has held that a motion for
mistrial should be granted if the result of the test can be inferred and
10 5
the inference is substantially prejudicial to the defendant's case.
The court has stated that " [s]imply putting before the jury the fact that
a lie detector
test was taken can be the equivalent of revealing the
10 6
results."

The rationale for granting a motion for mistrial in lie detector
cases is that there is a strong possibility that a jury will make an improper inference from the evidence. 7 The jury might infer that the
witness took the test and passed and is, therefore, telling the truth, or8
10
that the defendant took the test and failed and is, therefore, guilty.
Once members of the jury have drawn such an inference, the risk that
they will not, or cannot, follow a curative instruction directing them to
disregard the evidence is so great that a mistrial is the only way to
ensure a fair proceeding.10 9
The rationale underlying the court's approach to admitting evidence of lie detector tests is also applicable to cases involving accusations of prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the defendant is on
trial. When this form of evidence is admitted at trial, the jury may
draw two types of inferences prejudicial to the defendant. First, the
jury may infer that the defendant actually committed the prior bad
act, even though that issue has never been adjudicated.11 0 Second,
the jury may "infer that the [defendant] is a 'bad man' who should be
punished regardless of his guilt of the charged crime, or ...

that he

103. Id. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
104. See supra note 63.
105. See Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 659, 480 A.2d 800, 803 (1984).
106. Id. at 661, 480 A.2d at 804.
107. See id. at 661-62, 480 A.2d at 804.
108. See id. at 661, 480 A.2d at 804.
109. See id. at 666-67, 480 A.2d at 807.
110. See Rainville v. State, 328 Md. 398, 407, 614 A.2d 949, 953 (1992). In Rainville, the
court recognized that "it is highly likely that the jury assumed that 'what [the defendant]
had done to [the victim's brother]' was a crime similar to the alleged crimes" against the
young girl. Id.
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committed the charged crime due to a criminal disposition" or propensity."' 1 Because the jury will likely draw these inferences as soon as
the accusations of similar prior bad acts are made and because the
resulting prejudice is so unfair, the court has correctly realized that it
would be difficult to eradicate the prejudice effectively through a curative instruction.' 1 2 In Rainville, the court stated that it was "highly
probable" that such evidence has "such a devastating and pervasive
effect that no curative instruction, no matter how quickly and ably
given, could salvage a fair trial for the defendant."' 13 Thus, the
judge's discretion to deny a mistrial in such a case is limited.
The Medical Mutual court also advised attorneys that, in cases involving accusations of prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the
defendant is on trial, they should make motions in limine to secure
14
advance rulings on whether the proposed testimony is admissible.' 5
By so doing, they could avoid causing many unnecessary mistrials.'
The decision in Medical Mutual is a warning to attorneys that Maryland
courts are growing increasingly intolerant of attorneys who sidestep
the rules of evidence by attempting to admit evidence of prior bad
acts. This intolerance is especially severe in cases involving mere accusations of prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the defendant is
on trial because of the strong possibility that the resulting prejudice
can only be cured by a mistrial.
5. Conclusion.-The court's holding in Medical Mutual re-emphasizes the highly prejudicial character of evidence regarding accusations of prior bad acts similar to the acts for which the defendant is on
trial. Recent Court of Appeals holdings suggest that the trial judge's
discretion to deny a motion for a mistrial in cases in which such evidence is improperly admitted is limited, because it is almost impossible to eliminate the prejudice through less drastic means. Ultimately,
Maryland practitioners must be aware that the courts are impatient
with those who knowingly attempt to admit improper testimony. In
the wake of MedicalMutual, attorneys who fail to use motions in limine
111. See Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 74, 629 A.2d 1233, 1237 (1993); see also Medical
Mutual, 330 Md. at 21, 622 A.2d at 112 (stating that the jury may infer from the inadmissible evidence that "if Med Mutual refused to protect another insured by failing, in bad faith,
to settle within policy limits in a different case, it would be more likely that Med Mutual
failed in bad faith to protect Beverly's interest").

112. See Medical Mutual, 330 Md. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
113. Rainville, 328 Md. at 411, 614 A.2d at 955 (emphasis added).
114. See Medical Mutual, 330 Md. at 24, 622 A.2d at 114.
115. See id.
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to obtain advance judicial rulings on the admissibility of such evidence will find little sympathy on the Maryland bench.
ANDREA SAUM-ECHEVERIO

VIII.
A.

FAMILY LAW

Contempt Power in Child Support ArrearageEnforcement

In Middleton v. Middleton,' the Court of Appeals held that because
a parent's child support obligation is not a debt within the meaning of
article III, section 38 of the Maryland Constitution,' a defaulting parent's obligation may be enforced through a court's contempt power,
including imprisonment, until the default is purged.3 The court further held that it is the "essential nature" of the obligation that determines the reach of section 38, not the method of support
enforcement.4 In reaching its decision, the court sought to clarify
Maryland constitutional jurisprudence, case law, and statutory provisions regarding child support enforcement. It succeeded in defining
the boundaries of power available to Maryland courts when enforcing
child support obligations.
1. The Case.-Brian and Crystal Middleton married on April 27,
1987.' They separated after two and one-half years and entered into a
consent order on child support, custody, and visitation. 6 Under the
terms of the consent order, Mrs. Middleton received temporary custody of their minor child, and Mr. Middleton was to make weekly support payments of seventy-five dollars.
After a short time, Mr. Middleton stopped making the payments.'
Consequently, Mrs. Middleton filed a motion for contempt and other
relief.9 The trial court held a hearing and found Brian Middleton in
civil contempt for not making support payments. 10 Instead of making
an immediate disposition, however, the court scheduled a review hear1. 329 Md. 627, 620 A.2d 1363 (1993).
2. Id. at 639, 620 A.2d at 1369. Section 38 of the Constitution provides in pertinent
part:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt, but a valid decree of a court of competentjurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of
a spouse or dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or
children, or for alimony (either common law or as defined by statute), shall not
constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.
MD. CONST. art. III, § 38.
3. Middeton, 329 Md. at 639, 620 A.2d at 1369.
4. Id. at 638-39, 620 A.2d at 1369.
5. Id. at 637, 620 A.2d at 1368.
6. Id.
7. id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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ing to allow Mr. Middleton an opportunity to purge the contempt."
When he failed to show up for the hearing, the court issued a body
attachment. 2 The court then granted Crystal Middleton a divorce,
incorporating in it the previous consent orders governing support,
custody, and visitation. 3 It also reduced to ajudgment the then outstanding child support arrears. 4
Upon locating Mr. Middleton, the court reactivated his child support payment obligations and issued a wage withholding order.1 5 Mrs.
Middleton then sought payment of the accrued arrears via the court's
contempt powers.' 6 After another hearing, the court ruled that Mr.
Middleton's support arrears had been reduced to ajudgment. Therefore, he could not be held in contempt for failure to pay them.' 7 According to the court, ruling otherwise would subject Mr. Middleton to
possible imprisonment for his financial obligation, in violation of article III, section 38 of the Maryland Constitution.'" The court therefore
denied Mrs. Middleton's motion with prejudice.' 9 Prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a
writ of certiorari on its own motion to hear the case.2 °
2. Legal Background.-The Maryland Constitution first prohibited imprisonment for failure to pay a debt in 1851.21 The meaning of
the term "debt," however, was not clarified for family law purposes
until 1950, when section 38 of article III was amended to include a
child support exclusion.2 2 It stated that "a valid decree of a court of
competentjurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court
11. Id. at 637-38, 620 A.2d at 1368.
12. Id. at 638, 620 A.2d at 1368.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id, at 642, 620 A.2d at 1370. The trial judge stated:
So that my ruling is clear, I am not ruling whatsoever that Mr. Middleton is not in
contempt of court. I am ruling just the contrary. He is indeed in contempt of
court, but on account of the money judgment that has come into existence, I am
satisfied that Maryland law does not permit this plaintiff to take advantage of the
contempt sanction.
Id.
19. Id. at 638, 620 A.2d at 1368.
20. Id.
21. Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277 n.2, 412 A.2d 396, 398 n.2 (1980). The prohibition first appeared in article III, § 44 of the Constitution of 1851. Id.
22. Id.
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for the support of ... dependent children.., shall not constitute a

23
debt within the meaning of this section."
Even before this amendment, the case law regarding section 38
distinguished the concepts of "debt" and "duty."24 In State v. Mace, 5
the first Court of Appeals decision interpreting section 38, the court
held that the definition of "debt" did not include fines or penalties for
violations of public law.2 6 Later, in Dickey v. Dickey,2 7 the court distinguished between debt and duty in the context of a domestic relations
case and held that the obligation to pay alimony is a duty, not a
debt.2" Since that decision, the Court of Appeals consistently has held
that fathers and mothers have a common law duty to support their
minor children.2 9 Moreover, section 5-203(b) (1) of the Family Law
Article states that parents of a minor child "are jointly and severally
responsible for the child's support, care, nurture, welfare and educa-

23. Id In 1962, the exclusionary provision's definition of children expanded to include those born illegitimately. Id,Section 38 was last amended in 1982. That amendment explained the meaning of alimony and made clear that the child support provision is
gender neutral. Midd/eton, 329 Md. at 629 n.1, 620 A.2d at 1364 n.1.
24. Brown, 287 Md. at 280, 412 A.2d at 400.
25. 5 Md. 337 (1854).
26. Id. at 351. The court stated that "[t]he evident intention of the Constitution was to
relieve those who could not pay their debts, and not to shield from punishment those who
had violated the public law." Id. Attention to the difference between the financially incapacitated and those seeking absolution from legitimate responsibilities increased as case
law regarding the scope of § 38 developed. See, e.g., Ruggles v. State, 120 Md. 553, 564, 87
A. 1080, 1084 (1913) (holding that imprisonment for failing to pay a motor vehicle fine is
not imprisonment for debt); State v. Nicholson, 67 Md. 1, 3, 8 A. 817, 818 (1897) (holding
that the imprisonment of a tax collector for failing to pay collected taxes to the State is not
imprisonment for debt).
27. 154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387 (1928).
28. Id at 681, 141 A. at 390. The court stated:
The obligation to pay alimony in a divorce proceeding is not regarded as a debt
but a duty growing out of the marital relation and resting upon a sound public
policy, and so this obligation may be enforced by attachment of the person for
contempt, and the defendant may be imprisoned unless he can purge himself of
the contempt by paying or showing that he has neither the estate nor the ability
to pay.
Id.
29. See, e.g., Carroll County v. Edelmann, 320 Md. 150, 170, 577 A.2d 14, 23 (1990)
(asserting that parenthood, by nature and law, imposes an obligation to support minor
children); Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 531, 510 A.2d 546, 548 (1986) (noting that "a long
line of Maryland cases places the responsibility of child support squarely upon the shoulders of the natural parents"); Kerr v. Kerr, 287 Md. 363, 367, 412 A.2d 1001, 1004 (1980)
(stating that supporting their dependent children is the duty of the father and mother);
Kriedo v. Kriedo, 159 Md. 229, 231, 150 A. 720, 721 (1930) ("It is settled in this state that a
father is under the common law obligation to support a minor child .. ").
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non ... ."3 In addition, section 10-203 makes it a misdemeanor for a
parent deliberately to fail to support a minor child."'
The Supreme Court and Congress also characterize child support
as a duty rather than a debt. In Wetmore v. Markoe,12 for example, the
Supreme Court stated that "a decree awarding alimony to the wife or
children, or both, is not a debt which has been put in the form of a
judgment, but rather a legal means of enforcing the obligation of 33a
husband and father to support and maintain his wife and children."
Congress recognized the distinction in seeking enforcement of child
support obligations under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. 4 As
the legislative history of Title IV-D demonstrates, Congress considered
children to have a "right" to support and parents to have a duty to
35
provide it.

3. The Court's Reasoning;Analysis.-In concluding that child support obligations may be enforced by a court's contempt powers, the
Middleton court emphasized that under the 1950 amendment to section 38, child support obligations do not constitute debt.3 6 Thus, according to the court, the amendment also allows courts "to enforce by
imprisonment, if need be, the legal and moral obligation of support...
30. MD.CODE ANN., Fma. LAw § 5-203(b) (1) (1991). This provision, first enacted by
the legislature in 1929, originally charged both parents with the "care, nurture, welfare and
education of their minor child." Middleton, 329 Md. at 633, 620 A.2d at 1366. Parents
became "jointly and severally" responsible for child support under a 1951 amendment. Id.
31. Section 10-203 states in part:
(a) Failingto support minor child.-A parent may not willfully fail to provide for the
support of his or her minor child.
(c) Penalties.-An individual who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment not
exceeding 3 years or both.
MD. CODE ANN., F~A. LAw § 10-203 (1991).
32. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
33. Id. at 74; see also Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 351 (1903) (stating that it was not
the intention of Congress in passing a bankruptcy act to provide for discharge of the father's child support obligation).
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-662 (1988). Section 651 provides in part:
For the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to
their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are
living, locating absent parents, establishing paternity, obtaining child and spousal
support ... there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a
sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this part.
Id. § 651; see alsoWehuntv. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating that the Social Security Amendments
of 1974, 1984, and 1988 were designed to strengthen the effectiveness of federal child
support enforcement efforts).
35. Wehunt, 875 F.2d at 1573 (Clark, J., dissenting).
36. Middleton, 329 Md. at 629, 620 A.2d at 1364.
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that parents owe to their children."3 7 Noting that support is a lasting
obligation, the court simply dismissed as immaterial the issue of
whether or not the obligation was reduced to a judgment.38
The court traced the rise of constitutional jurisprudence distinguishing between a "debt" as defined by section 38 and a "duty" under
the law.3 9 In discussing the debt/duty distinction, the court noted
that although many courts considered child support a duty prior to
the 1950 amendment,40 they did not apply this principle uniformly.4 '
The 1950 amendment and its subsequent modifications made the distinction a constitutional mandate.4" Capitalizing on the constitutional
exception carved out for child support, the court cited numerous examples of cases43 that reinforced its conclusion that parental support
is "simply a natural and legal duty."44 It further noted that it may not
be performed at whim 45 or be avoided because the child is
illegitimate.4 6
Central to the court's reasoning was the principle that "[i] t is the
substance of the obligation that the monetary claim represents, not
the form that it takes, that is dispositive."4 7 Thus, the court patently
rejected the trial court's ruling that once accrued support arrearages
were reduced to ajudgment, a court could no longer use its contempt
powers against the parent because doing so might lead to imprisonment for a "debt."4" The court explained:
37. Id. at 630, 620 A.2d at 1364 (quoting Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 283, 412 A.2d
396, 401 (1980)).
38. See id. at 639, 620 A.2d at 1369.
39. Id. at 629-31, 620 A.2d at 1364-65 (citing Brown, 287 Md. at 278-85, 412 A.2d at 399403).
40. Id. at 631-32, 620 A.2d at 1365.
41. Brown, 287 Md. at 281, 412 A.2d at 400-01. Compare Blades v. Szatai, 151 Md. 644,
647, 135 A. 841, 842 (1927) (holding that child support is a common law duty of the
father) with Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 171, 145 A. 488, 491 (1929) (holding that
child support is a debt within the meaning of the constitutional imprisonment
prohibition).
42. See Brown, 287 Md. at 281-82, 412 A.2d at 401.
43. See cases cited supra note 29.
44. Middleton, 329 Md. at 632, 620 A.2d at 1365 (quoting Blades, 151 Md. at 654, 135 A.
at 845).
45. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 351, 164 A.2d 467, 473 (1960).
46. Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 61, 441 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1982).
47. Middleton, 329 Md. at 633, 620 A.2d at 1366. The court analogized the substance of
the obligation examination to the theory underlying marital property division. "[A ]lthough
it may have been used for marital purposes, property acquired by one spouse before the
marriage, by inheritance or gift, excluded by valid agreement or directly traceable to any of
those sources retains its character as nonmarital property." Id. at 633-34 n.2, 620 A.2d at
1366 n.2.
48. Id. at 639, 620 A.2d at 1369.
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[T]he reach of the constitutional provision is not determined, nor meant to be, by the method chosen to enforce
the child support claim. The determination whether a particular obligation constitutes a debt within the contemplation of the constitutional provision depends upon the
essential nature of that obligation. Once the nature of that
obligation has been determined, the provision's reach has
also been determined.4 9
Recent decisions by sister courts on this issue strengthened the
Court of Appeals's resolve. 50 For example, in 1990 the Florida
Supreme Court rejected the argument that reducing a support decree
to a money judgment "transforms the obligation it represents into an
ordinary judgment debt, enforceable only by an action at law." 1 Like
the Court of Appeals, the Gibson court stressed that child support, a
parent's moral and legal duty, is distinguishable from a judgment for
money or property.5 2 Practical considerations also motivated its
decision:
The courts have a duty to provide an effective, realistic
means for enforcing a support order, or the parent or former spouse for all practical purposes becomes immune from
an order for support. In our view, this duty includes enforcement of a judgment of support by equitable processes of the
court because a remedy at law that is ineffective in practice is
not an adequate remedy.5
Acknowledging similar concerns, the Middleton court insisted that
the framers of the 1950 amendment intended courts to use their contempt power to enforce child support obligations.5 4 Therefore, the
court structured its decision as a further enunciation of established
precedent.5 5 Given that legislative and judicial action firmly established child support as a duty and not a debt, the Middleton decision

49. Id. at 638-39, 620 A.2d at 1369.
50. See, e.g., Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1990) ("A decree for support is
different than a judgment for money or property: It is a continuing obligation based on
the moral as well as legal duty of a parent."); Ex parteWilbanks, 722 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[E]ven though the amount of child support arrearage may be reduced to
judgment, neither that judgment nor the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment
for debt is a bar to enforcing the child support order by contempt and confinement until
the arrearage is paid.").
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Gibson, 561 So. 2d. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 570.
See Middeton, 329 Md. at 639, 620 A.2d at 1369.
Id. at 629-41, 620 A.2d 1364-70.
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fits well into the post-1950 body of case law regarding child support.5 6
Had the court decided that support obligations could be "converted,
by the enforcement method chosen, from a duty to a mere debt,"5 7 it
would have indicated that only sometimes is child support a duty and
created a large loophole for defaulting parents.
On the contrary, the court took the opportunity to send a
message to defaulting parents that child support obligations will be
strictly enforced. Under Middleton, it is clear that parents who, without excuse or justification, ignore their court-ordered child support
obligations may be held in contempt.5s The court's primary concern,
however, was for the welfare of Maryland's children, not the punishment of their parents. 9 Aware that the state could become burdened
with the responsibility of supporting children whose parents have neglected them,60 the court sought to ensure that courts will have the
requisite power to enforce support obligations. Consequently, when a
court seeks collection of child support arrearages in the future, it may
exercise its contempt power, complete with the threat of imprisonment, to achieve compliance.
4. Conclusion.-In holding that a defaulting parent's support
obligation may be enforced by a court's contempt power, whether or
not the obligation has been reduced to a judgment, the Middleton decision underscored the significance that the Maryland courts and leg56. See supra note 29.
57. Middleton, 329 Md. at 638, 620 A.2d at 1368.
58. The trial court found that Mr. Middleton had the ability to pay support but had
"contemptuously" acknowledged the court's order. Id. at 641-42, 620 A.2d at 1370 (quoting the trial judge).
59. The court explained that "[p]ermitting a parent's child support obligations to be
enforced by contempt and, if necessary, imprisonment, is consistent with this State's policy
of insuring that child support obligations are met and met to the extent necessary for the
well-being of the child." Id. at 640, 620 A.2d at 1369; see also Stambaugh v. Child Support
Admin., 323 Md. 106, 111, 591 A.2d 501, 503 (1991) (holding that an agreement under
which a mother agreed to waive the liability of a father for child support payments violated
public policy and was invalid); Virginia v. Autry, 293 Md. 53, 57, 441 A.2d 1056, 1058
(1982) (stating that one of the purposes of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act "is to provide liberal enforcement in Maryland of the claims of non-resident parents and children entitled to support"); Pope v. Pope, 283 Md. 531, 533, 390 A.2d 1128,
1130 (1978) (stating that a lien may be placed on unemployment benefits for the purpose
of obtaining child support payments in default); Lieberman v. Lieberman, 81 Md. App.
575, 588, 568 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1990) ("A parent cannot agree to preclude a child's right to
support by the other parent, or the right to have that support modified in appropriate
circumstances. The State has a vested interest in requiring a responsible parent to support
his or her child.").
60. Middleton, 329 Md. at 641, 620 A.2d at 1370 (citing Lieberman, 81 Md. App. at 588,
568 A.2d at 1163).
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islature traditionally have recognized in child support issues. By the
sheer weight of legal precedent, the court disposed of any residual
notions that child support is, or could be, considered a debt. In the
future, courts will feel free to protect the welfare of Maryland's children by exercising contempt power on defaulting parents.
VERONICA P. JONES

B. JudicialDistribution of Marital Property Acquired After Separation
In Alston v. Alston,' the Court of Appeals held that equally dividing an item of marital property, acquired entirely through the effort
and resources of one spouse after a separation, is inequitable.2 The
court determined that an equal division in such circumstances is contrary to the intent of section 8-205 of the Family Law Article. 3 Specifi1. 331 Md. 496, 629 A.2d 70 (1993).
2. Id. at 507, 629 A.2d at 76.
3. Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., F A. LAW §§ 8-201 to -205 (1991). Section 8-205 provides:
(a) Grant of award.-Subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,
after the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of
the marital property, the court may transfer ownership of an interest in a pension,
retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan from one party to
either or both parties, grant a monetary award, or both, as an adjustment of the
equities and rights of the parties concerning marital property, whether or not
alimony is awarded.
(b) Factors in determining amount and method of payment or terms of transfer.-The
court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary
award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in the pension, retirement,
profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both, after considering each of
the following factors:
(1) the contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the wellbeing of the family;
(2) the value of all property interests of each party;,
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be
made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the
effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or
both;
(9) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has
made with respect to family use personal property or the family home; and
(10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to
consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of
an interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation
plan, or both.
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cally, it ruled that in cases in which property is acquired after a
separation, "greater weight" must be given to "how and when specific
marital property... was acquired, including the effort expended by
each party in accumulating the marital property,"4 than to the other
factors listed in section 8-205(b).5 By emphasizing that the General
Assembly originally intended marital property to be equitably distributed, the court changed the process by which Maryland courts divide
marital property independently acquired after separation.6
1. The Case.-Vioia and Herman Alston separated in 1985 after
twenty-one years of marriage." In November 1987, Mrs. Alston filed a
complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City based on
the couple's voluntary separation for over a year.' In her complaint,
she asked for neither alimony nor a marital property award.9
Although served and notified that a divorce could be granted if he did
not file an answer within thirty days, Mr. Alston did not respond and
assumed that the divorce was granted." Coincidentally, several days
before the expiration of the thirty-day period, Mr. Alston won the District of Columbia "Lotto," which had an annuity value of more than
one million dollars.1
Upon learning of her husband's Lotto prize, Mrs. Alston dismissed her petition for divorce." Later, in April 1989, she filed an
amended complaint for absolute divorce in which she charged Mr.
Alston with adultery and sought permanent alimony, attorney's fees,
and half the marital property, including the Lotto annuity.1i Mr. Al(c) Award reduced to judgment.-The court may reduce to a judgment any monetary award made under this section, to the extent that any part of the award is due
and owing.
Id. § 8-205.
4. Alston, 331 Md. at 507, 629 A.2d at 75 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8205(b) (8) (1991)).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See Alston, 331 Md. at 507, 629 A.2d at 76.
7. Id. at 500, 629 A.2d at 72.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 501, 629 A.2d at 72. Alston's Lotto winnings were to be paid as an annuity of
approximately $44,000 per year over 20 years. Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 180, 582
A.2d 574, 576 (1990), rev'd, 331 Md. 496, 629 A.2d 70 (1993). By the time of trial, Alston
had received two $44,000 payments, none of which Mrs. Alston received. Id.
12. Alston, 331 Md. at 501, 629 A.2d at 72.
13. Alston, 85 Md. App. at 181, 582 A.2d at 576. In her amended complaint, Mrs. Alston alleged that she and Mr. Alston had cohabitated for a short period in March 1988,
thereby foregoing her previous claim for a no-fault divorce based on voluntary separation
for more than a year. Alston, 331 Md. at 501 n.4, 629 A.2d at 72 n.4.
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ston responded with a motion to dismiss, an answer, and a countercomplaint for absolute divorce on the grounds of Mrs. Alston's adultery, desertion, and cruelty. 4 Mr. Alston's motion to dismiss was
denied. 5
At trial, both parties testified to the other's adultery and lack of
contribution, economic or noneconomic, to the family's well-being.' 6
Each party pointed to factors in section 8-205(b) of the Family Law
Article that supported his or her position as the more aggrieved
spouse. 17 They agreed, however, that the Lotto annuity was marital
property because it was acquired before the legal expiration of the
marriage.' 8 On November 15, 1989, the circuit court granted Mrs.
Alston a judgment of absolute divorce based on Mr. Alston's admitted
adultery.' 9 The circuit court denied alimony,20 but after considering
in equal measure the ten factors set forth in section 8-205(b) ,21 determined that Mrs. Alston should receive a marital property monetary
22
award of one-half the yearly net distribution of the annuity.
Mr. Alston appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.2 3 Alston
argued that because he acquired the Lotto annuity more than two
years after his separation, the eighth factor, "how and when the specific marital property.., was acquired, including the effort expended
by each party in accumulating the marital property,"21 should be given
greater significance than the other factors.2 5 Affirming the circuit
14. Id. at 501, 629 A.2d at 73.
15. Id.
16. See Alston, 85 Md. App. at 181-83, 582 A.2d at 576-77 (including an extensive recapitulation of the trial testimony).
17. Alston, 331 Md. at 502, 629 A.2d at 73.
18. Id. Marital property is defined as "property, however titled, acquired by 1 or both
parties during the marriage." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-201(e)(1) (1991).
19. Alston, 331 Md. at 503, 629 A.2d at 73.
20. Id. At the time of filing her first complaint for divorce in late 1987, Mrs. Alston's
net worth was approximately $26,000, which included pension rights worth approximately
$22,000 and incidental assets in savings, furniture, and her car. Id at 500-01, 629 A.2d at
72. Mr. Alston had a net worth of approximately $25,000, excluding the value of his car,
which consisted of a pension valued at $17,000 and the value of his furniture. Id. at 501,
629 A.2d at 72. Neither of the Alstons owned any real estate in late 1987. See id Mrs.
Alston was earning $19,000 per year as a clerk with the Social Security Administration. Id.
at 500, 629 A.2d at 72. Mr. Alston was earning $29,500 per year as a guard with the Department of Corrections in Washington, D.C. Id. at 501, 629 A.2d at 72.
21. See supra note 3.
22. AIston, 331 Md. at 503, 629 A.2d at 73.
23. Id. at 503-04, 629 A.2d at 73.
24. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8-205(b)(8) (1991).
25. See Alston v. Alston, 85 Md. App. 176, 188, 582 A.2d 574, 580 (1990), rev'd, 331 Md.
496, 629 A.2d 70 (1993).
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court's equal application of the ten section 8-205(b) factors, the Court
of Special Appeals stated:
When the parties correctly conceded that the D.C. Lotto annuity was marital property, the court could not find it to be
individual property and thus the method of acquisition,
which would have controlled under a [section] 8-203(a) distribution, became merely one factor among ten statutory factors, with
its weight to be determined by the court as the trier
26
of fact.

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari, but limited its review to the
27
marital property issue.
2.

Legal Background.-Priorto the adoption of the Property Dis-

position in Divorce and Annulment Act, 28 Maryland courts disposed

of property acquired during a marriage according to which party
owned each particular asset. 29 Courts divided marital property only
when joint ownership existed.3 ° In many cases, this method of disposi26. Id. at 188-89, 582 A.2d at 580 (citation omitted). Section 8-201 (e) (2) of the Family
Law Article states that "'Marital property' does not include property: (i) acquired before
the marriage; (ii) acquired by inheritance or gift from a third party, (iii) excluded by valid
agreement; or (iv) directly traceable to any of these sources." MD. CODE ANN., Fiv. LAW
§ 8-201(e)(2) (1991).
27. Alston, 331 Md. at 504, 629 A.2d at 74.
28. Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., F m. LAw §§ 8-201 to -205 (1991)).
29. Alston, 331 Md. at 505, 629 A.2d at 74.
30. Id. This method of division of marital assets is based on the inception of title theory and is derived from common-law doctrines. See Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 65, 448
A.2d 916, 921 (1982). The alternative method is the community property system, based on
the source of funds theory. Id. at 70, 448 A.2d at 924; see also Scott Greene, Comparisonof the
Property Aspects of the Community 1rperty and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their
Relative Compatibility with the Current liew of the MarriageRelationship and the Rights of Women,
13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 71 (1979).
The [inception of title] system rewards the spouse who is directly responsible for
the acquisition of property and generally ignores the nonmonetary contributions
of the other spouse toward that acquisition. By ignoring such contributions of
the nonacquiring spouse during the marriage, any portion of the other spouse's
property which the nonacquiring spouse receives on the dissolution of the marriage can be perceived as a mere gratuity, albeit forced perhaps, from the acquiring spouse or his estate. Any feeling that the nonacquiring spouse "earned" the
property is absent.
Id. at 83 (citation omitted).
By contrast, "[t] he philosophy of the community system balances the contributions of
the spouses during the marriage and attempts to balance the interests of the spouses in the
property acquired during marriage." Id. at 85. In states that subscribe to a community
property system, the manner in which marital assets are divided falls into two broad categories. Id. at 97. A few states, such as California and Louisiana, provide by statute that community property shall be equally divided. Id. Most other community property states have
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tion was unfair because the noneconomic contributions of one spouse
toward the acquisition of marital assets did not result in any legally
cognizable property interest. 3 1 In response to such inequities, Governor Marvin Mandel appointed a commission in 1976 to study and recommend changes in the Family Law Article. 32 The Commission
stated:
The Commission does not believe that the people of Maryland today hold the view that a spouse whose activities within
the marriage do not include the production of income has
"never contributed anything toward the purchase of" property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage.
Its members believe that non-monetary contributions within
the marriage are real and should be recognized in the event
that the marriage is dissolved or annulled.
...

Recognition of the "partnership" or unit theory of

marriage, and the valuable contribution to it made by "nonstatutes directing courts to use their discretion in dividing the community property. Id.
This system treats the marriage as a single economic unit to which both spouses contribute
individually but share alike as partners. Id. at 82. The source of funds theory recognizes
that noneconomic, as well as economic, contributions are integral to the acquisition of
marital property. See id. at 83. Consequently, assets acquired during the marriage and not
purchased with resources that one spouse possessed before the marriage are said to have
been acquired through use of a communal source of funds; they are considered community property. Id.
Suppose, for example, a spouse makes a down payment on a house from assets owned
before the marriage (or simply owns the house with a mortgage), but makes subsequent
payments with funds earned during the marriage. According to the inception of title theory, the spouse who made the down payment would own all property in the house outright
regardless of the source of funds used to complete payment. A disposition of the same
property according to the source of funds theory would grant the spouse making the down
payment an amount directly proportional to the initial investment and the purchase price,
but then divide the balance equally between the spouses. See generally LAWRENCE GOLDEN,
EQUrrABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §§ 8.01 to 8.07 (1983 & Supp. 1993).

31. See Gebhard v. Gebhard, 253 Md. 125, 130, 252 A.2d 171, 173-74 (1969) (holding
that the trial court did not have the power to award a portion of certain property to a wife
whose work in the home and at her husband's business "never contributed anything toward the purchase of the husband's property") (quoting Lopez v. Lopez, 206 Md. 509, 518,
112 A.2d 466, 470 (1955)). For a full discussion of the social and legal background of the
Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, see Paula Peters, Property Disposition
upon Divorce in Mariyland: An Analysis of the New Statute, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 377 (1979). See
a/SoJOHN F. FADER, II & RICHARDJ. GILBERT, MARYLAND FAMILY LAW, ch. 17 (1990 & Supp.
1992).
32. Letter from Beverly Anne Groner, Chairperson, The Governor's Commission on
Domestic Relations Law, to The Honorable Blair Lee III, Governor of the State of Maryland (Jan. 9, 1978), facsimile reproducedin GOWRNOR'S COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS
LAWS, REPORT ACCOMPANYING THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED BILL ON THE DISPOSITION OF

PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT, at ii-iii (1978) [hereinafter GovERNOR'S COMMISSION].
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earning" and homemaking spouses, does not require that
upon dissolution of the marriage all property be divided
equally irrespective of need or title.3 3
Acting upon the Commission's recommendations, the General
Assembly passed the Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment
Act in 1978.1' The Preamble stated that "it is the policy of this State
that when a marriage is dissolved the property interests of the spouses
should be adjusted fairly and equitably, with careful consideration being given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by
the respective spouses. "" The Act established a three-step process by
which courts should grant monetary awards: They should (1) determine which property is marital property, (2) determine the value of
the marital property, and (3) then grant a monetary award "as an adjustment of the equities and rights of the parties concerning marital
property, whether or not alimony is awarded."3 6
Since the Act took effect on January 1, 1979, a steady progression
of case law has refined and clarified the definition and disposition of
marital property.3 7 Although the issue of whether lottery winnings
33.

GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 3.
34. Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, ch. 794, 1978 Md. Laws 2304
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., Fsm. LAw §§ 8-201 to -205 (1991)).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2308 , see also Zandford v. Wiens, 314 Md. 102, 106, 549 A.2d 13, 15 (1988)
(holding that "when a monetary award is at issue, the court is permitted to effectuate a
realignment of assets via a three step process").
37. See, e.g., Pope v. Pope, 322 Md. 277, 281-82, 587 A.2d 481, 483-84 (1991) (recognizing that the appropriate focus for determining whether property is nonmarital or marital
for the purposes of granting a monetary award is the source of contributions made, rather
than the time at which title is obtained); Herget v. Herget, 319 Md. 466, 473-74, 573 A.2d
798, 801-02 (1990) (holding that antenuptial agreements, relinquishing one spouse's claim
to the property of the other, bar claims to a monetary award); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321
Md. 227, 239, 582 A.2d 784, 790 (1990) (holding that goodwill of a sole law practice is a
personal asset of the practitioner and not marital property); Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226,
237, 545 A.2d 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that anticipated insurance renewal commissions
accruing after dissolution of marriage are marital property); Queen v. Queen, 308 Md.
574, 586-87, 521 A.2d 320, 327 (1987) (ruling that the only portion of a disability award
subject to equitable distribution is that which is acquired during the marriage); Unkle v.
Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 596, 505 A.2d 849, 854 (1986) (holding that an inchoate personal
injury claim that accrued during marriage was not marital property subject to equitable
distribution upon divorce); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 357, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079
(1985) (finding that a professional degree or license, and the prospective increase in earning power that it may confer, does not fall within the ambit of marital property); Grant v.
Zich, 300 Md. 256, 268-70, 477 A.2d 1163, 1169-70 (1984) (holding that portions of property directly traceable to the contribution of a spouse's nonmarital property is not to be
considered marital property and not subject to equitable distribution); Deering v. Deering,
292 Md. 115, 128, 437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981) (ruling that a spouse's pension right accumulated during the marriage constitutes marital property).
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constitute marital property had not come before Maryland's appellate
courts prior to Alston, 8 the designation of property acquired after separation but prior to a decree of absolute divorce seemed well settled.
In Williams v. Williams, 9 the Court of Special Appeals held that
"[p]roperty acquired by a party up to the date of the divorce, even
though the parties are separated, is marital property."40 In Wilen v.
Wilen,4 1 the court was even more emphatic. Reversing a trial court's
determination that a marriage was factually dead and that property
acquired after separation should not be considered marital property,4 2 the court declared that "'marital property is to be determined
43
and valued as of the date of divorce, not the date of separation.'
The Williams and Wilen decisions comport with the absence of any language in sections 8-201 to 8-205 of the Family Law Article distinguishing separation from divorce."
The issue of whether a court can give any one of the ten factors
listed in section 8-205(b) 45 greater weight than the others in distributing marital property was also fairly well settled before Alston. Trial
courts consistently were required to consider all ten factors.4 6 Appel38. Other states have generally found that lottery winnings acquired during the marriage are marital property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mahaffey, 564 N.E.2d 1300, 1305 (IIl.
App. Ct. 1990) (holding that acquisition of the winning ticket during the marriage constituted marital property regardless of which spouse purchased the ticket); Giedinghagen v.
Giedinghagen, 712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that marital property encompasses any property, including lottery winnings, acquired up to the date of a decree of legal
separation or dissolution); Smith v. Smith, 557 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that lottery winnings are marital property and should be divided equally in a divorce action
when both spouses made equal contributions to the marriage even though the winning
ticket was acquired solely by husband's effort), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 83 (N.Y. 1991);
Ullah v. Ullah, 555 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (N.Y. App. Div.) (holding that a lottery jackpot won
during marriage is marital property and that equal division is appropriate since the jackpot
was won as a result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of either spouse's toil or
labor), appeal denied, 559 N.E.2d 677 (N.Y. 1990). But see Dyer v. Dyer, 536 A.2d 453 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (holding that trial court had not abused its discretion in determining that a
husband's lottery winnings obtained after a lengthy separation but before divorce were his
sole property), appeal denied, 546 A.2d 58 (Pa. 1988).
39. 71 Md. App. 22, 523 A.2d 1025 (1987).
40. Id. at 34, 523 A.2d at 1031.
41. 61 Md. App. 337, 486 A.2d 775 (1985).
42. Id. at 345-46, 486 A.2d at 779-80.
43. Id. at 345, 486 A.2d at 779 (quoting Cotter v. Cotter, 58 Md. App. 529, 537, 473
A.2d 970, 974, cert. denied, 300 Md. 794, 481 A.2d 239 (1984)).
44. See supra note 3.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321 Md. 227, 231, 582 A.2d 784, 786 (1990) (requiring that trial courts "apply the ten factors in § 8-205(b)"); Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301
Md. 283, 293, 483 A.2d 1, 6 (1984) (stating that "it is important that the chancellor consider all relevant factors beginning with those expressly set out in FL § 8-205") (emphasis
added); Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md. App. 180, 185, 574 A.2d 1, 3 (stating that "[t]he statute
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late courts, for example, had held them in error for misinterpreting a
factor4 7 and for giving only lip service to a factor.4" No Maryland
court had ever ruled that courts could weigh one factor more heavily
that another as a matter of law.49 In light of this well-articulated precedent, the Court of Appeals reviewed Alston to determine whether
property acquired after separation should be given special consideration under section 8-205(b).50

3. The Court's Reasoning.-Despite the precedent indicating that
courts must give equal weight to all section 8-205 (b) factors, the Court
of Appeals held in Alston that the statutory language of section 8-205,
as well as the legislative intent, required the trial court to give greater
weight to section 8-205(b) (8), "how and when specific marital property... was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in
accumulating the marital property," in order to distribute marital
property acquired after separation equitably."' Thus, the Alston court
found the trial court to have erred in awarding Mrs. Alston half of the
52
Lotto annuity.
The court acknowledged that Mr. Alston's Lotto annuity was
properly defined as marital property, 53 but shifted its focus from the

definitional question to the criteria used to determine the distribution
of marital property.5 4 The court observed that "[t] he decision whether
to grant a monetary award is generally within the sound discretion of
the trial court,"55 but noted that section 8-205(a) is constructed in the
lists ten factors that the court is required to consider in granting a monetary award"), cert.
denied, 321 Md. 67, 580 A.2d 1077 (1990).
47. See Mount v. Mount, 59 Md. App. 538, 553, 476 A.2d 1175, 1183 (1984) ("[TJhe
Chancellor erred as a matter of law when he found that the 'facts and circumstances leading to the estrangement of the parties and the dissolution of the marriage' were not 'important' in considering either the award of alimony or the monetary award.").
48. See Ward v. Ward, 52 Md. App. 336, 343-44, 449 A.2d 443, 448 (1982) ("[I]t is clear
from the record that the chancellor gave no more than lip service to the nine factors. We
see nothing fair or equitable in... the court's findings.") (citation omitted).
49. Judge Bell's dissent vigorously argues this point. Alston, 331 Md. at 516-17, 629
A.2d at 80 (Bell, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 504, 629 A.2d at 74.
51. Id.at 507, 629 A.2d at 75-76.
52. Id. at 509, 629 A.2d at 76-77.
53. Id. at 505, 629 A.2d at 74.
54. Id. at 506-07, 629 A.2d at 75.
55. Id. at 504, 629 A.2d at 74; see also Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 230-31, 545 A.2d 35,
37 (1988) ("[The statute] does allow the trial judge to make a monetary adjustment to
more fairly and equitably allocate the various property interests."); Deering v. Deering, 292
Md. 115, 131, 437 A.2d 883, 892 (1981) ("[1]n selecting an appropriate method of allocating retirement benefits ....should the chancellor conclude it to be proper to do so, it is
important that he carefully consider all relevant factors ....") (emphasis added).
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permissive; it states "the court may ...grant a monetary award."5 6 The
court maintained that a trial court, in exercising its discretion, must
act "in accordance with correct legal standards."5 7 It also pointed to
the General Assembly's intention that courts "make equitable, as opposed to presumptively equal, property divisions,"" and indicated
that this emphasis was primarily intended to aid the trial court in reflecting the nonmonetary contributions made toward the acquisition
of marital property.5 9 The court concluded that "[w] hile no hard and
fast rule can be laid down, and while each case must depend upon its
own circumstances to insure that equity be accomplished, generally in
a case such as this the eighth factor should be given greater weight
than the others."' Accordingly, the court held that, when one party
acquires a specific asset wholly through his or her own effort without
any indirect or direct help from the other and the marital family effectively has ceased to exist, an equal division of the asset is inequitable
and contrary to the history and intent of the statute.6"
The Alston court acknowledged that, when weighed in light of the
legislative purpose of achieving an equitable result, the relevant factors used in making a marital property monetary award may lead the
trial judge to make an equal distribution.6 2 The court also recognized, however, that each divorce case is unique and must be evaluated individually,6" and thus concluded that " [ i] n light of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.., the trial judge erred in awarding half of
the Lotto annuity to Mrs. Alston."' The court further declared that
56. Alston, 331 Md. at 504, 629 A.2d at 74 (quoting MD.CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 8205(a) (1991)) (emphasis added by court).
57. Id.; see Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 275, 539 A.2d 657, 661 (1988) ("It is well
settled in this State, however, that the trial court's determination is reviewable on appeal,
... and may be reversed if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if
the trial court clearly abused its discretion.") (citing Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173,
367 A.2d 472, 476 (1977)). In Alston, the court applied this "error of law" standard in
reversing the trail court. See Alston, 331 Md. at 509, 629 A.2d at 77.
58. Alston, 331 Md. at 506, 629 A.2d at 75. The court noted that in drafting the Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, the General Assembly deleted language
that read: "'A monetary award shall be presumptively such as is necessary to divide the
value of the marital property equally between the parties. The court may adjust the division of the value of the marital property on a basis other than equal after considering'
several factors." Id. (quoting Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act, ch. 794,
1978 Md. Laws 2304, 2308 (codified at MD. CODE ANm., FAM. LAw §§ 8-201 to -205
(1991))).
59. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
60. Alston, 331 Md. at 507, 629 A.2d at 75.
61. Id., 629 A.2d at 76.
62. Id. at 509, 629 A.2d at 76.
63. Id., 629 A.2d at 76-77.
64. Id., 629 A.2d at 77.
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the record revealed "no evidence which would justify awarding any
portion of the annuity to Mrs. Alston."6 5 In view of its denial of a
monetary award, the court remanded the case for reconsideration in
the matter of alimony.6 6
4. Analysis.-In Alston, the Court of Appeals departed from precedent in the area of marital property distribution when it acknowledged that the Lotto annuity was marital property, but held it subject
to special consideration because of the "peculiar circumstances" of its
acquisition after separation.6 7 In so ruling, the court overruled the
Court of Special Appeals's Williams and Wilen decisions, which had
refused to accord post-separation property any special status upon disposition in a divorce settlement. 68 Before Alston, trial courts were required as a matter of law to give serious consideration to each of the
ten factors enumerated in section 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article.69 Now, by directing that more weight be given in certain circumstances to how and when the marital property was acquired, the court
has added an extra layer of consideration in cases involving the disposition of some marital property acquired by a spouse after separation.7" Although the Alston decision will, to some degree, restrict the
discretionary authority of trial courts,7 1 courts will continue to exercise a considerable amount of discretion in deciding what constitutes
an "equitable" division of the property in light of this special consideration and the many circumstances unique to each case. 72
65. Id.
66. Id. For a discussion of the relationship between alimony and monetary awards, see
McAlear v. McAlear, 298 Md. 320, 347,469 A.2d 1256, 1270 (1984) ("We recognize... that
there is an interrelationship between a monetary award ... and an award of alimony....
[I]n determining the amount of a monetary award, equity courts must consider any award
of alimony, while in determining the amount of alimony, equity courts must consider any
monetary award.").
67. Alston, 331 Md. at 509, 629 A.2d at 77.
68. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
69. See Comptroller v. Fairchild Indus., 303 Md. 280, 285-86, 493 A.2d 341, 343-44
(1985) ("[T]he word 'and' [in the list of factors in § 2-805(b)] should be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning and that it is not interchangeable with the word
'or.'"). See generally IA NORMANJ. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21.14,
at 127-28 (4th ed. 1985) (defining and distinguishing between conjunctive and disjunctive
terms).
70. Alston, 331 Md. at 508, 629 A.2d at 76. The extra layer of review is in having to
consider "different factors, depending on the timing of acquisition." Id. at 519, 629 A.2d at
81 (Bell, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 507, 629 A.2d at 75.
72. Id. In his dissent, Judge Bell pointed to the court's continued reliance on the trial
judge's discretion as reason enough to leave the weighing of all factors, including how and
when the post-separation property was acquired, in the hands of the chancellor. See id. at
518, 629 A.2d at 81 (Bell,J., dissenting). Judge Bell argued that, had the General Assembly
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In Alston, the court correctly concluded that the legislative intent
of sections 8-201 through 8-205, focusing on the value of a spouse's
noneconomic contributions in the acquisition of marital assets, would
preclude the equal division of a fortuitous windfall acquired by one of
73
the spouses after separation and without the facilitation of the other.
The Governor's Commission, as well as the General Assembly, sought
to protect nonincome earning spouses from the inequities of property
disposition based strictly on an individual's economic contribution or
ownership of title.74 The statute does not discuss the status of spouses'
contributions to the marriage and marital property after separation
but before a decree of divorce, but it logically follows that after a separation in which the marriage has functionally ceased to exist, the
wholly independent acquisition of property by one spouse should not
be subject to equal division between the divorcing spouses. 75 Prior to
Alston, however, Maryland courts generally divided such property on
the theory that the source of funds used to purchase the asset was
derived from a statutorily defined common source. 76 To resolve this
inequity, the Court of Appeals could have defined as nonmarital property an asset acquired after separation. Instead, the court focused on
the original intent of the statute 77 and avoided addressing the issue of
78
whether the ticket should have been defined as marital property.
Under the broad rubric of equity, the court ruled that in the distribution of marital property acquired after separation, "greater weight"
must be given to how and when the marital property was acquired.7 9
Consequently, the interest of a spouse in property acquired by the
other spouse after separation has been diminished.
While the Alston decision resolved certain inequities in the distribution of marital property, it also created some difficulties. The decision does not make entirely clear, for example, how courts should
define "equitable" with regard to distributing marital property acquired after separation. In his dissent, Judge Bell pursued this point
to its logical extreme; he noted that, had the Lotto ticket been acintended to distinguish preseparation property from postseparation property or to prioritize the relative weights of the factors, it would have drafted the legislation accordingly. Id
at 519, 629 A.2d at 82 (Bell, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 507, 629 A.2d at 76.
74. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text. As conceived and drafted, the 1978
Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment Act viewed marriage as a partnership of
variously contributing spouses. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
75. Alston, 331 Md. at 507, 629 A.2d at 76.
76. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
78. See AIston, 331 Md. at 508, 629 A.2d at 76.
79. Id. at 507, 629 A.2d at 75.
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quired "pre-separation, even if by only an hour, the chancellor's decision to weigh all of the relevant factors would not be a problem for
the majority. If, however, the property were acquired after separation,
even if by only an hour, a different result would obtain .

.

. ."0 In

future cases, courts will be forced to draw discretionary lines when
determining the circumstances under which, and the degree to which,
greater weight should be accorded to how and when the property was
acquired.
The Alston court did not, however, leave trial judges entirely without guidance. In cases "[w] here one party, wholly through his or her
own efforts, and without any direct or indirect contribution by the
other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the parties
have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter,
ceased to exist," it expressly held that an equal division of the property
would be contrary to the statute.8 1 On the other hand, it warned that
"no hard and fast rule can be laid down"8" and that "[e]ach divorce
situation is different, and must be evaluated individually.""3 A review
of the particular circumstances in Alston may make the court's emphatic denial of any portion of the annuity to Mrs. Alston 84 seem unduly harsh. But, by remanding the case for redetermination with
respect to alimony, the court may have given back with one hand what
it took away with the other.8 5 That is, by remanding the case, the
court stressed the interrelationship between monetary awards and alimony and indicated that courts should take into account the existence
or nonexistence of any monetary award in determining alimony.8 6
5.

Conclusion.-The Alston decision broke new ground in the

law regarding the division of marital property upon divorce. By mandating special consideration of how and when marital property was
acquired when it was acquired after separation, the Court of Appeals
decreased the potential for inequitable distributions of such assets.

Also significantly, the court underscored the importance of considering the amount of any monetary award when determining alimony in
a case.
THOMAS P. LEFF
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 516, 629 A.2d at 80 (BelJ., dissenting).
Id. at 507, 629 A.2d at 76.
Id., 620 A.2d at 75.
Id. at 509, 629 A.2d at 76-77.
Id, 629 A.2d at 77.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See AIston, 331 Md. at 509, 629 A.2d at 77.
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C. PaternityDeterminations in Custody Disputes: Blood Testing and the
Child's Best Interests
In Monroe v. Monroe,1 the Court of Appeals concluded that during
a custody dispute, blood tests used by a biological mother to disestablish an acknowledged father's paternity should not be ordered without first assessing the impact on the child's welfare.2 In reaching this
conclusion, the Monroe court evaded the Court of Special Appeals' equitable estoppel theory' and instead focused on broader policy notions of the child's best interests. Because the trial court had admitted
the blood test results into evidence, the Court of Appeals ultimately
remanded the custody issue as one involving a biological parent and a
third party.' Before doing so, however, it requested that the trial
court more fully consider the "universe of circumstances" that potentially could rebut the presumption that a child's best interest lies with
the biological parent.'
1. The Case.-In the spring of 1985, Patricia Thomas informed
her then boyfriend, Donald Monroe, that she was pregnant with his
child.6 Due to his low sperm count, Mr. Monroe expressed doubts.'

To persuade him of his paternity, Ms. Thomas underwent a voice
stress analysis test that strongly indicated her belief that he was the
father of the expected baby.8 Seemingly convinced, Mr. Monroe then
moved in with Ms. Thomas and later was present at the birth of the
child, Beth. 9 In addition, his name appears on Beth's birth certificate
as her father.1 0
The couple lived together with Beth for about two and one-half
years before they married in May 1988.11 A few months later, during
an argument, Mrs. Monroe admitted that her new husband was probably not Beth's biological father." This remark strained the marriage
and a brief separation ensued, during which Mrs. Monroe filed for
1. 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
2. Id. at 773, 621 A.2d at 905.
3. Monroe v. Monroe, 88 Md. App. 132, 138-40, 594 A.2d 577, 580-81 (1991); vacated,
329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
4. Monroe, 329 Md. at 773, 621 A.2d at 905.
5. Id. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906.
6. Monroe, 88 Md. App. at 135, 594 A.2d at 578-79.
7. Id., 594 A.2d at 579.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10, Id.
11. Id.
12. Monroe, 329 Md. at 761, 621 A.2d at 899.
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divorce." Mr. Monroe responded with a Motion for an Order Requiring Blood Tests, accompanied by an affidavit indicating his doubt
about his paternity.1 4 The couple, however, reconciled before any
tests were ordered.1 5
In July 1989, the couple separated again by mutual consent. 6 At
this time, they entered into a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement in which they agreed to joint custody of Beth. 7
The agreement included a clause providing that neither party would
move from the state with the child without the express consent of the
other."8 In addition, the parties signed two separate consent orders.19
The first confirmed the custody arrangement, including provisions for
child support and private education costs to be paid by Mr. Monroe.20
The second required psychiatric evaluations of the parties and Beth to
inform future custody and visitation recommendations.'
In June 1990, Mr. Monroe discovered that his wife was planning
to leave Maryland with Beth. 22 He immediately filed a motion to obtain temporary and exclusive custody of Beth, which the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County granted. 23 Prior to a full evidentiary hearing,
Mrs. Monroe filed a Motion to Order Blood Tests to Establish Paternity, officially claiming for the first time that her husband was not
Beth's father. 24 The court granted the motion and later denied Mr.
Monroe's Motion for Reconsideration. 2 5 At the evidentiary hearing,
the court admitted into evidence the blood tests, which proved that
Mr. Monroe was not Beth's biological father. 26 Despite the blood test
results, the Master in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County found
that "exceptional circumstances" existed and allowed Mr. Monroe to
maintain custody of Beth. 27 Both parties entered exceptions to the
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

20. Id. at 761-62, 621 A.2d at 899.
21. Id. at 762, 621 A.2d at 899.
22. Monroe v. Monroe, 88 Md. App. 132, 136, 594 A.2d 577, 579 (1991), vacated, 329
Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
23.

Id.

24. Id. at 137, 594 A.2d at 580.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.

27. Id. The exceptional circumstances inquiry is part of the standard of review set
forth in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977), for custody suits involving
biological parents versus third parties. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.

1994]

FAMILY LAW

895

Master's determination, Mrs. Monroe to the custody arrangement and
Mr. Monroe to the admission of the blood test results into evidence.28
Judge Levitz denied Mr. Monroe's exceptions and further held that
"as a matter of law" exceptional circumstances did not exist to rebut
29
the presumption that custody should be with the biological parent.
Accordingly, he transferred custody of Beth to Mrs. Monroe. °
On review, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, holding that it erred in ordering the blood tests without inquiry into the child's best interests."1 In reaching its conclusion,
the court applied a theory of equitable estoppel to the facts and concluded that Mrs. Monroe was estopped by her prior conduct 2 "from
using the results of the blood test to bastardize her child." 3 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider the applicability of the
child's best interest standard to the ordering and admitting of blood
test results.
2. Legal Background.a. Ordering of Blood Tests.--Traditionally, the issue of blood
testing was confined to paternity proceedings.3 4 The evolving policy
goals behind the evidentiary use of blood tests in this context, however, foreshadowed its introduction into the custody realm. Initially
acknowledged as a viable evidentiary tool in 1941 in criminal bastardy
proceedings,3 5 blood testing forwarded the State's interest in punishing fornication and alleviating the fiscal burden of illegitimate children. 6 In 1963, the legislature, in a major revision to the paternity
28. Monroe, 329 Md. at 762, 621 A.2d at 900.
29. Id. at 762-63, 621 A.2d at 900.
30. Id. at 762, 621 A.2d at 900.
31. Monroe, 88 Md. App. at 140, 594 A.2d at 581.
32. The court noted that "Mrs. Monroe voluntarily represented to Mr. Monroe that he
was the father of her child and Mr. Monroe reasonably believed he was the child's father."
Id., 594 A.2d at 582.
33. Id. at 138, 594 A.2d at 580. The Court of Special Appeals explained that the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that "the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel
must have been misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party to be estopped." Id. at 139, 594 A.2d
at 580-81.
34. See Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945) (justifying the admission of
blood test results in a criminal rape case based on their extensive use in bastardy
proceedings).
35. MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 66G (1941) (repealed 1984) recognized blood testing for
use in criminal bastardy proceedings.
36. Eagan v. Ayd, 313 Md. 265, 269, 545 A.2d 55, 56 (1988). At that time, bastardy
determinations were criminal proceedings. Id. Blood testing therefore served as a defense
and evasion of punishment if it established nonpaternity. See id. at 270, 545 A.2d at 57.
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statute, decriminalized the proceedings3 7 and "removed some of the
legal impediments to establishing paternity. "31 Significantly, an "apparent pro-male tilt" present in the original statute was retained to
promote the putative father's interest in using blood tests to assert
nonpaternity. 39 In the 1970s, the evolution continued as mothers began to rely on blood testing to prove paternity for child support
purposes.4 °
Only recently have the policy goals behind blood testing in the
paternity context shifted their focus from the interests of the parents
to those of the child. With the development of the more reliable
Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) genetic blood testing,4 1 which was
recognized by the General Assembly in 1982,42 a "more contemporary
Maryland perspective" on the use of blood tests emerged. 43 Specifically, Maryland courts and the legislature acknowledged the need "to
protect illegitimate children through court-ordered support based
4
upon sophisticated and reliable genetic testing."
In pursuit of this goal, the legislature in 1984 revised the Code's
blood testing provision at section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article to
establish a mandatory acceptance of blood test results in paternity proceedings.4 5 This most recent amendment, although intended to further the "generalwelfare" of the illegitimate child,4 6 is more narrowly
focused on the child's economic interest in the enforcement of sup-

37.

Id. at 271, 545 A.2d at 57.

38. Id. at 273, 545 A.2d at 58.
39. See id. at 272, 545 A.2d at 58 (noting "the apparent pro-male tilt" underlying the
goals of the 1963 legislation decriminalizing paternity proceedings).
40. See id at 275, 545 A.2d at 59 (discussing "the 1976 enlargement of effective procedures for child support recovery" and the resulting use of blood testing as a viable evidentiary weapon for the mother).
41. HLA blood testing produces a 92% mean probability of exclusion of nonbiological
fathers. Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92 , 95, 468 A.2d 1365, 1366 (1984).
42. Id. ("The Maryland Legislature, by enacting Chapter 784 of the 1982 Laws of Maryland, recognized the advances made in the science of genetic testing and authorized a new
proceeding in which blood test results could be used in paternity cases, in which exclusion
is not established, if the results are sufficiently extensive to exclude 97.3 percent of putative
fathers who are not biological fathers and where the statistical probability of the alleged
father's paternity is at least 97.3 percent.").
43. Eagan, 313 Md. at 275, 545 A.2d at 59.
44. Id. The purpose of the current paternity statute is "to promote the general welfare
and best interests of children born out of wedlock". MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1002
(b) (1) (1984).
45. The statute states that, if qualified, "laboratory blood tests shall be received in evidence." MD. CODE ANN., Fm. LAw § 5-1029(e) (1984) (emphasis added).
46. Id. § 5-1002(b)(1).
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port payments.4 7 Although judicial emphasis increasingly is placed on
the psychological well-being of the child,4" the application of section
5-1029 in the context of visitation or custody battles may work against
the goal of protecting the overall welfare of the illegitimate child.
Specifically, admitting blood tests into evidence in custody proceedings may harm a child's interests in established relationships. Moreover, the mandatory nature of section 5-1029 imposes a straightjacket
on trial judges'4 9 discretion to consider the broader policy issues surrounding a child's welfare.
The Court of Appeals first struggled with the best interests of the
child dilemma in Turner v. Whisted.5 ° In Turner, a putative father, wishing to assert visitation rights, attempted to use blood test results to
rebut the presumption of another man's acknowledged paternity.5 1
The trial court and the Court of Special Appeals both held that his
request for blood tests pursuant to section 5-1029 should be denied
because such results, if they proved his paternity, would directly undermine the traditional marital presumption that "[a] child born or
conceived during a marriage is . . . the legitimate child of both

spouses."5 2 The Court of Appeals affirmed.5 3 In doing so, however,
the court expanded the narrow holding of the lower courts, explaining that a paternity determination is not confined to resolution under
47. The legislative goals outlined in § 5-1002(b) (1) targeted the need to secure for
illegitimate children "the same rights to support, care, and education as children born in
wedlock." Id. The case law has likewise narrowly construed the purpose of this provision as
imposing the basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood on those who have children out of wedlock and enforcing support payment. See Williams v. Williams, 18 Md. App.
353, 356, 306 A.2d 564, 565-66 (1973) (holding that the paternity provisions were "patently
designed to provide a special procedure for fixing the amount that the father of an illegitimate child is required to contribute to its support and to prescribe a remedy for the enforcement of any support order").
48. This concern was initiated primarily by the 1973 groundbreaking publication of
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit. The
authors of this study proposed that courts should focus on the child's established "psychological parent" or the "one who, on a continuing, day to day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child'sphysical needs." JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD 98 (1973) (emphasis added).

49. Before the 1984 amendment, § 5-1029 allowed trial judges discretion in admitting
blood test results. See Haines v. Shanholtz, 57 Md. App. 92, 97-98, 486 A.2d 1365, 1367
(1984) (holding that in light of the new mandatory nature of § 5-1029, the trial judge
erred in refusing to admit blood test results).
50. 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992).
51. Id. at 109-10, 607 A.2d at 937.
52. Id. at 110, 607 A.2d at 937 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206 (a)
(1991)).
53. Turner, 327 Md. at 117, 607 A.2d at 941.
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Maryland's paternity statute. 54 Alternatively, the putative father's request could have been viewed under section 1-208 of the Estates and
Trusts Article, which applies to illegitimate children.5 5 This section
was designed primarily for intestate purposes and focuses on the
strength of relational ties between the putative father and the child.5 6
Moreover, the court added that resort to section 2-108 allowed for a
more equitable inquiry into the nature of the relationship between
the putative father and the child.5 7 It concluded that section 1-208
presents a "more satisfactory" and "less traumatic" means of establishing paternity in visitation rights cases, as opposed to child support
cases.

58

Under section 1-208, the Turner court concluded that an order
for blood tests is "best analyzed as a request for a physical examination
under Maryland Rule 2-423."" 9 Included in rule 2-423 is a "good
54. Maryland's paternity statute is contained at MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 5-1001 to
-1048 (1991).
55. Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938. In support of its assertion, the court cited
the reciprocal reference in § 5-1005(a), which states that "[a]n equity court may determine
the legitimacy of a child pursuant to § 1-208 of the Estates and Trusts Article." Id. at 112,
607 A.2d at 938.
56. Section 1-208 provides in part:
(b) Child of his father-A child born to parents who have not participated
in a marriage ceremony with each other shall be considered to be the child of his
father only if the father
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an action brought
under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; or
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father; or
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be his child; or
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself,
orally or in writing, to be the father.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (1974) (emphasis added).

57. Turner, 327 Md. at 112-13, 607 A.2d at 938.
58. Id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d
777, 781 (1971)). In Thomas, the court held that a putative father's attempt to prove his
paternity to protect his visitation rights was better handled under § 1-208 than the paternity statute, "which deals with the narrow question involving bastardy proceedings to determine the putative father for the purpose of fixing responsibility for support." Thomas, 263
Md. at 542, 283 A.2d at 780. See also Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 313-14, 262 A.2d
729, 732 (1970) (dissuading a putative father from seeking to legitimate his children
through adoption under the predecessor of §§ 5-1001 to -1048 and instead referring to § 1208 as "the less traumatic approach to the problem").
59. Turner, 327 Md. at 13, 607 A.2d at 939. Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-423
provides in pertinent part:
When the mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party or of a
person in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy, the
court may order the party to submit to a mental or physical examination by a
physician or to produce for examination the person in custody or under the legal
control of the party. The order may be entered only on motion for good cause
shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties.
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cause" requirement, which establishes that the trial judge has the discretion to grant or deny an order for blood tests for "good cause
shown."6 ° The Turner court played on the notion of "good cause" to
construct a balancing test more appropriately tailored to this type of
paternity dispute, weighing "the integrity of the familial relationships
already formed"6" versus the rights of the biological father.6 2 Most
significantly, the Turner court stated that "the determination of good
cause allows the court discretion to consider the best interests of the
child."6 3
b. The ParentalRights Doctrine and the Child's Best Interest Standard.-By factoring in the best interests of the child, the Turner decision represented a more sensitive appraisal of the impact admission of
blood test results has on children in paternity cases. In the custody
dispute context, however, Maryland courts have long conducted inquiries into the child's best interests.64 But, as in many jurisdictions,
the best interest inquiry has been hindered by the imposition of judicial and legislative presumptions.6" Perhaps the most deeply rooted
notion in Maryland family law is the parental rights doctrine: the
"primafacie presumption that a child's welfare will be best served in
the care and custody of its [natural] parents rather than a third
party."6 6 The standard was clearly enunciated in Ross v. Hoffman:6 7
MD. R. Civ. P. 2-423 (1994).
60. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-423 (1994).
61. Turner, 327 Md. at 117, 621 A.2d at 940 (referring to the concerns expressed by
Justice Scalia in the recent Supreme Court custody decision, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989), reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1991)).
62. Id. at 116-17, 621 A.2d at 940 (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)). The court further noted the need for "substantial protection under the Due
Process Clause" for unwed fathers seeking to assert parental rights. Id.
63. Id. at 116, 621 A.2d at 940 (citing In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 338 (Kan.
1989) (holding, for the first time in a paternity suit, that an evidentiary hearing on the
child's best interests was required before blood tests could be ordered)).
64. See, e.g., Piotrowski v. State ex rel.
Kowalck, 179 Md. 377, 382, 18 A.2d 199, 201
(1941) (concluding that the common law paternal preference doctrine "must yield to the
paramount consideration of what will be the best interest of the children"); Dietrich v.
Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116, 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945) (asserting that the best interest of
the child is "of transcendent importance"); see alsoJohn W. Ester, Maryland Custody Law--Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD.L. Rav. 225 (1982) (discussing Maryland
courts' historical consideration of the best interests of the child).
65. See generally Suzette M. Haynie, Biological Parentsv. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child
Custody is ConstitutionallyProtected?, 20 GA. L. Rav. 705 (1986) (placing the custody law of
each state along a continuum of presumptions favoring one party over the other); Ester,
supra note 64 (arguing that various historical presumptions should be abolished because
they infringe on full exploration of the child's best interests).
66. Newkirk v. Newkirk, 73 Md. App. 588, 593, 535 A.2d 947, 949 (1988); see also Ross v.
Pick, 199 Md. 341, 352, 86 A.2d 463, 469 (1952) ("[T]he court gives more weight to the law
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[I]n parent-third party disputes over custody, it is only
upon a determination by the equity court that the parent is
unfit or that there are exceptional circumstances which
make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interest
of the child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial
disposition.6"
Relying on the standard set forth in Ross, a court must initially
focus on the disputing parties rather than on the interests of the
child.6 9 While there is some discretion afforded in the notion of "exceptional circumstances" to consider the child's best interests, 70 the
court's evidentiary perspective is skewed in favor of the biological parent's right to custody. Therefore, under the Ross standard, the third
party incurs a substantial burden in rebutting the presumption.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Monroe, the Court of Appeals primarily focused on the issue of whether an acknowledged father in a
custody dispute should be ordered to submit to a blood test without
first considering the best interests of the child.7" Because the blood
tests in this case had been ordered and admitted into evidence below,
the court also was forced to address the secondary issue of whether
blood-test results, which prove that the acknowledged father is not the
biological father, should be dispositive in the outcome of a custody
dispute under the Ross standard.7 2

of nature, which recognizes the force of parental affection."); Montgomery County Dep't
of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 416, 381 A.2d 1154, 1161 (1977) ("While there
is a school of thought that shelves sentiment and ignores the old shibboleth that 'bluid is
thicker than water,' Maryland has remained loyal to the common law presumption that the
right of either natural, intermarried parent is generally superior to that of a third party.")
(citation omitted).
67. 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
68. Id. at 179, 372 A.2d at 587.
69. See id (stating that the analysis focuses on the biological parent)
70. For example, the "exceptional circumstances" factors specified in Ross included,
among others, (1) "the possible emotional effect on the child of a change in custody," (2)
"the nature and strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian," and
(3) "the stability and certainty as to the child's future in the custody of the parent." Id. at
191, 372 A.2d at 593. The inclusion of these child-centered inquiries in the "exceptional
circumstances" rebuttal has led one commentator to call Maryland's parental rights doctrine a "disappearing presumption" because the definition is "virtually indistinguishable
from an analysis of the child's best interest." Haynie, supra note 65, at 719 n.48.
71. Monroe, 329 Md. at 760, 621 A.2d at 899.
72. Id.; see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Ross standard).
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In addressing the primary issue, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on its rationale in the recent Turner decision.7 The court essentially modified the Turner "good cause" balancing test as applied to
blood tests to fit the context of the custody proceeding. Moreover, it
looked to section 5-1001 of the Family Law Article and section 1-208 of
the Estates and Trusts Article to inform its determination.7 4 The
court prefaced its "good cause" analysis by noting that the use of
blood tests by Mrs. Monroe in this factual scenario directly undermined "the policies and purposes underlying [the] statutes"-specifically, the legislature's goal of furthering the child's welfare through
legitimation.7 5 In contrast, the court posited that Mr. Monroe, in
"acknowledg[ing] his paternity of Beth in three of the four ways enumerated in [section] 1-208, "76 acted to further the purpose of the legitimation statutes.7 7
Given that Mrs. Monroe's request ran counter to legislative goals
in the paternity context, the court critically evaluated her "motive" in
using blood test results during a child custody dispute to disestablish
an acknowledged father. 71 Citing Turner,the court concluded that, at
a minimum, Mrs. Monroe should have been required to show "good
cause"-specifically, how ordering blood tests worked in the best interests of the child.79 Consequently, the Court of Appeals concluded

73. Monroe, 329 Md. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905 (claiming that the "factors identified in
Turner apply with equal force" to the best interest/good cause inquiry developed in
Monroe).

74. Id. at 767, 621 A.2d at 902. The court acknowledged that although "establishing
paternity is not a necessary factor to be considered when addressing the issue of custody[,
tihe policies and purposes underlying those statutes are... relevant to the determination
whether good cause... has been shown." Id.
75. Id. The court expressed concern over Mrs. Monroe's wish to disestablish her husband's acknowledged paternity, despite concerns about the effect on Beth, without "the
establishment, concomitantly or otherwise, of paternity in someone else." Id. at 766, 621
A.2d at 902. This sentiment dictated the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that Mrs.
Monroe was "equitably estopped from using the results of a blood test to bastardize her
child." Monroe v. Monroe, 88 Md. App. 132, 138, 594 A.2d 577, 580 (1991), vacated, 329
Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
76. Monroe, 329 Md. at 768-69, 621 A.2d at 902-03; see supra note 56.
77. Monroe, 329 Md. at 768-69, 621 A.2d at 902-03.
78. See id. at 770-71, 621 A.2d at 904 (questioning Mrs. Monroe's decision to disprove
Mr. Monroe's paternity in light of her previous affirmations of his paternity).
79. Id. at 767, 621 A.2d at 902. The Monroe court also relied on case law from other
jurisdictions for support in concluding that the best interests of the child must be assessed
before admitting blood tests. Id. at 771, 621 A.2d at 904; see, e.g., Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d
1014, 1017 (Ariz. App. 1990); In reMarriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 336 (Kan. 1989); Boyles
v. Boyles, 466 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (1983),
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that the trial court should have required this threshold
determination. s o
While not remanding this issue for application to the Monroe
facts, l the Court of Appeals, drawing from Turner, outlined the appropriate "weighing process" for assessing the child's best interests as
a "good cause" prerequisite.8 2 Although the court conceded that Mr.
Monroe was not, de facto, a presumptive father, it treated his interest
"in protecting the relationship he [had] formed, and maintained, with
the child" as having weight comparable to Mrs. Monroe's interest in
gaining sole custody.8" The child's "physical, mental, and emotional
needs," preferably advocated by a representative, should have then,
according to the court, informed a balancing of their interests.8 4
More significantly, the court concluded that the trial court must ultimately view the impact of blood test results on these respective interests from the "child's perspective."85
Because the results of Mr. Monroe's blood tests were known, the
court remanded the case as a biological parent versus third party custody dispute. With no other options, the Monroe court felt compelled
to clarify the Ross court's "exceptional circumstances" rebuttal to the
presumption favoring biological parents."6 In particular, the Court of
Appeals chastised the trial court for narrowly defining exceptional circumstances as involving a long separation between the child and the
biological parent." The court then reiterated that the best interest
standard should control, as it is "the critical question" in assessing exceptional circumstances. 8 The court, therefore, found that the trial
court erred in ignoring the possibility that a "bonding or psychological dependence" upon a third party, one without a biological connection, could have developed despite the presence of an on-going
80. Monroe, 329 Md. at 773, 621 A.2d at 905.
81. Id. at 773, 621 A.2d at 905 (explaining that since "the cat is now out of the bag and
cannot now be stuffed back in," there is no point in remanding for further consideration
of this issue).
82. Id. at 772-73, 621 A.2d at 905.
83. Id. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905.
84. Id. The Monroe court further stressed the significance of focusing on the child's
needs by ruling that "no genetic information will be generated for use medically or historically." Id.
85. Id. at 772-73, 621 A.2d at 905 ("Significant to the best interest determination is the
desirability, from the child's perspective, of establishing that the man that is the only father
the child has ever known, the husband of the child's mother, and who has acknowledged
the child, is in fact, not the child's father.").
86. See id. at 774, 621 A.2d at 905.
87. Id. at 774-75, 621 A.2d at 906.
88. Id. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906.
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biological parent/child relationship. 9 The court further noted that
"the relationship [to a third party often develops] in the context of a
family unit and is fostered, facilitated and for most of the child's life,
encouraged by the biological parent."9 ° Accordingly, the Monroe
court remanded the case for the trial court to consider fully "the universe of circumstances sufficiently exceptional as to warrant resolving
a custody dispute against a biological parent in favor of a third
party."9 1
4.

Analysis.-

a. Blood Testing and the Child's Best Interests.-The Monroe
case demonstrated that the General Assembly's confidence in the ability of scientifically reliable blood tests consistently to further the best
interests of children in custody proceedings was unwarranted. First,
the use of blood testing in Monroe directly conflicted with the legislative goal of legitimation of children born out of wedlock. 2 More significantly, blood testing in the Monroe custody context potentially
violated the court's broader notion of a child's best interests, including the impact on the child's "emotional needs."93 After Monroe,
therefore, courts may not be required to routinely order and admit
blood tests in a custody proceeding without first considering the best
interests of the child under the "good cause" standard.9 4
In focusing on the child's interests, the Monroe court correctly disregarded the Court of Special Appeals's application of the equitable
estoppel doctrine. Traditionally "interposed to guard against fraud,"
this doctrine primarily focuses on the dialogue between two competing parties.9 5 In the custody context, therefore, the doctrine works to
displace the crucial focus on the best interests of the child. Furthermore, it requires intrusive analysis of one party's past behavior to assess whether the other party relied to his or her "detriment" in acting
89. Id. at 775-76, 621 A.2d at 906. The Monroe court noted that the child psychiatrist
who testified below referred to Mr. Monroe as Beth's "psychological father." Id. at 776, 621
A.2d at 907.
90. Id. at 775, 621 A.2d at 906.
91. Id.

92. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
93. Monroe, 329 Md. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905.
94. See id. at 769, 621 A.2d at 903 (asserting that "information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child, as well as the interest sought to be protected by the
legitimation statutes" must first be subjected to a best interest inquiry); see also supra notes
79-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Monroe court's interpretation of the good
cause standard).
95. Shipley v. Fox, 69 Md. 572, 579, 16 A. 275, 278 (1888).

MARYLAND ]LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:874

as a parent to the child.9 6 This type of inquiry perpetuates the image
of the child as a proprietary burden. Additionally, the effort to find
deceit within a relationship only heightens the adversarial nature of a
proceeding specifically designed for equitable resolution.
While agreeing with the court's rejection of the equitable estoppel argument, 97 Judge Eldridge, in a strongly worded concurring
opinion, objected, as he did in Turner, to the majority's treatment of
the best interest inquiry as an evidentiary standard.9 8 The focus of his
objection, however, is misplaced in the custody context. He insists on
relegating the central tenet in Maryland custody decisions-the best
interests of the child-to a mere afterthought, important only "after
considering all of the relevant evidence and appropriate
presumptions."99
In contrast, the majority, led by Judge Bell, more logically concluded that such an inquiry should "permeate[] the entire proceeding,not
simply the bottom line determination of in whose custody the child
should be placed." 0 0 It could be argued that, if the best interest inquiry is to apply anywhere, it should be applied in the initial pretrial
discovery stage, as this is the most crucial phase in determining the
outcome of the proceeding. Too often the custody dispute is perceived as incident to the divorce proceeding, and therefore, is subject
to treatment analogous to a marital property disposition.'0 ° After
Monroe, trial judges, wielding significantly more discretion, can act as a
protective shield for the child amidst competing parties and can offset
the impact of damaging and perhaps irrelevant evidence in the custo2
dial arrangement.

10

The root of Eldridge's objection in Monroe seemed to lie in the
discretionary latitude afforded trial judges after Monroe to consider

96. See Petitioner's Brief at 23 ("To apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to a paternity determination would be to intrude too deeply behind the domestic privacy.").

97. Monroe, 329 Md. at 778, 621 A.2d at 907 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 781-82, 621 A.2d at 909-10 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 782, 621 A.2d at 910.
100. Id. at 769, 621 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added).
101. See Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 411, 278 A.2d 674, 679 (1971) ("It must
be borne in mind that the award of custody is not a prize to be handed by the court to the
innocent or unerrant parent solely on the basis of his or her innocence or unerring

ways.").
102. This discretion is more in keeping with the traditional role of the equity court in
exercising the "parens patriae" power to protect minors under its jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103,
116-17, 43 A.2d 186, 191-92 (1945); Montgomery Co. Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38
Md. App. 406, 414, 381 A.2d 1154, 1160 (1977).
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the child's best interests before ordering blood tests."' 3 The concern
that the best interest standard often serves as a repository for judgemade values has sparked substantial debate.10 4 It has been argued, for
instance, that the Monroe court's extension of the "amorphous notion"
of a best interest standard into the evidentiary stage will only breed
more confusion in an already uncertain area.10 5 This fear of discretion argument, however, is not persuasive enough to merit abandoning the best interest inquiry as a viable evidentiary standard.
Given the highly emotional nature of the custody dispute, Maryland
courts have long asserted that "there is no litmus paper test that provides a quick and relatively easy answer to custody matters."1 0° It follows that blood testing, no matter how scientifically reliable, should
not be allowed to be dispositive in the custody proceeding.
Moreover, several safeguards already exist that help offset biased
judicial assessment of the child's best interests. These include the nature of the master-chancellor relationship 0 7 and the use of court-ordered custody investigations.1 0° Additionally, the role of the child's
attorney, recognized by the Monroe court as important in this regard,
is a viable source for informing the best interest inquiry and maintain103. See Monroe, 329 Md. at 782, 621 A.2d at 910 (Eldridge,J., concurring) (arguing that
"the majority's view will allow a trial court to give effect to unilateral assertions while ignoring conclusive evidence as to paternity").
104. See, e.g., R. Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be Unconstitutional:
Religion as a Factor, 15 CREIGTrrON L. REv. 25 (1981) (discussing judicial control over custody decisions and the constitutional limits on that control); Eileen M. Blackwood, Race as
a Factorin Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 209 (1985)
(discussing the significant judicial discretion afforded by the best interest standard and
commenting on the recent constitutional limitations placed on this standard when considering race). The best interest inquiry also has been used to preclude homosexual parents
from asserting custody rights. See Lisa M. Pooley, Heterosexism and Children'sBest Interests:

Conflicting Concepts in Nancy S. v. Michele G., 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 477, 482 (1993) ("Guided by
myths and misconceptions regarding gays and lesbians, judges often deny lesbians the
right to raise their children, holding such custody is contrary to the best interests of the
child.").
105. See Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 419, 381 A.2d at 1163 ("The best interest standard is an
amorphous notion, varying with each individual case, and resulting in its being open to
attack as little more than judicial prognostication.").
106. Id.
107. After the master conducts an evidentiary hearing on the child's best interests, his
or her recommendations are sent to the chancellor. Based on the evidence presented, the
chancellor is then required to use independent judgment as to whether the custodial decision is in the best interests of the child. JOHN F. FADER, II & RicHARDJ. GILBERT, MARYLAND
FAMILY LAw § 20 (1990); see also Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md. App. 361, 365, 311 A.2d 428, 430
(1973) (holding that a "gross miscarriage of justice . . . occurred" when the chancellor
failed to exercise his own, independent judgment of the best interests of the child in
awarding custody).
108. FADER & GILBERT, supra note 107, § 7.9, at 122-28.
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ing the focus on the child.1" 9 As stated in Turner, the child's representative may, for example, request a protective order if the child's best
interests would be jeopardized by blood testing. 1a Finally, perhaps
the most logical solution to the excessive discretion concern is explicit
legislation outlining the various "best interest" factors to be considered. l Many states already have such a provision to serve as a guide
and thereby curb unsupported discretion." 2
b. The ParentalPresumption After Monroe.-While the precedential value of child custody cases is limited by the fact-centered nature of such decisions, 13 one far reaching consequence of Monroe may
be that, in questioning routine reliance on blood testing, the Court of
Appeals subtly undermined the biological presumption that exists in
custody cases. After Monroe, trial courts will closely scrutinize the motive of a biological mother seeking to disestablish acknowledged paternity, particularly when she does not present the biological father. The
biological mother, therefore, will be forced to frame her request for
blood tests in terms of the child's best interests. This slightly higher
evidentiary burden prevents a biological parent from resting solely on
the Ross parental preference.
More significantly, if the burden is not met and the court concludes that the child will be adversely affected by the admission of
blood test results, a biological mother may be precluded from taking
advantage of any presumption in her favor. This possibility sparked a
strong objection from Judge Eldridge, who argued that the majority
109. Section 1-202 of the Family Law Article provides: "In an action in which custody,
visitation rights, or the amount of support of a minor child is contested, the court may: (1)
appoint to represent the minor child counsel who may not represent any party to the
action; and (2) impose against either or both parents counsel fees." MD. CODE ANN., FAr.
LAw § 1-202 (1991); see also Monroe, 329 Md. at 772, 621 A.2d at 905 (noting the important
role of the child's representative); Goldstein, supra note 48, at 66-67 (arguing that children
in custody disputes should always be represented by legal counsel).
110. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 116, 607 A.2d 935, 940 (1992).
111. Appropriate guidelines for conducting a child's best interest inquiry in custody
proceedings can be drawn from a wealth of resources. See, e.g., RjSA GARON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR CHILD FOCUSED DECISION MAKING: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, ATrrORNEYS,
MEDIATORS, MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND PARENTS CONCERNING CHILDREN OF DI-

VORCE (1993) (outlining the relevant considerations according to the child's developmental stage).
112. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410-124 (West Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3) (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1983).
113. See Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 419,
381 A.2d 1154, 1162 (1977) ("There can be very little constructive or useful precedent on
the subject of custody determinations, because each case must depend upon its unique fact

pattern.").
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failed to acknowledge the "constitutionally protected rights" of biological and adoptive parents.' 1 4 Judge Eldridge, however, was too quick
to condemn the majority's analysis as one-sided. As stated in Turner,
and reiterated in Monroe, the "good cause" standard involves a careful
weighing of "the entirety of the relationship between the child, the petitioner and the respondent."' 15 The majority's analysis, therefore,
did not sacrifice the biological parent's interest in favor of the child's;
it merely re-evaluated the weight to be given the child's best interests.
Moreover, although it is not as easily accessed, the Monroe court left
the Ross presumptive standard essentially unchanged.
5. Conclusion.-In Monroe, the Court of Appeals countered routine reliance on the scientific validity of blood testing with a more
humane and logical emphasis on its ultimate impact on the child's
best interests. This best interest inquiry in turn undermined the inflexible reliance on the Ross biological presumption in the custody
arena. The practical effect of Monroe will be the downplaying of the
once overriding significance of biological ties and the emergence of
the child's best interests as a more controlling inquiry. The Monroe
decision signals an enlightened shift in focus from heated debates
about parental and third party rights to an acknowledgement that, in
custody disputes, "it is always the child who
is not only the innocent
16
victim, but who has the most at stake."'

DANIELLE J. SABA

114. Monroe, 329 Md. at 782 n.4, 621 A.2d at 909 n.4 (Eldridge, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 767, 621 A.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
116. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 173-74, 372 A.2d 582, 584 (1977).

IX.
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HEALTH CARE

Who Decides when PatientsDie?

In Mack v. Mack,' the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
when a health care provider may withhold nutrition and hydration
from a hospital patient who is in a persistent vegetative state, but who
is not terminally ill.' The court ruled that, when deciding whether
withholding nourishment is appropriate, courts should apply the "substituted judgment" doctrine to determine what treatment decision the
patient would make if she were able to make one.3 Moreover, the
court held that clear and convincing evidence is necessary before determining that a patient's4 "judgment was, or would be, that life-sustaining measures should be withdrawn."5 Thus, the court imposed a
severe burden of proof on patients' families who wished to stop the
hydration and nutrition keeping their family member alive. In effect,
the court required that families or guardians present "little other than
explicit statements" made by the patient prior to entering into the
vegetative state. 6 In so ruling, the court "required humans to exercise
foresight [that] they do not [usually] possess"7 and meet a standard
that "is often impossible . . . ,even when available evidence points to
nontreatment as a perfectly reasonable course of action."8
1. The Case.-Ronald W. Mack has been a patient at Fort Howard Veterans' Hospital in Baltimore County since September 1983,
when he was transferred there from a hospital in California to be
1. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
2. Id. at 191, 618 A.2d at 746. The court also held that a potential guardian's desire to
withdraw nutrition and hydration from a potential ward does not constitute good cause to
disqualify that party from guardianship; id. at 199-206, 618 A.2d at 750-54, but this Note will
limit its discussion to the issue of withdrawing sustenance from those in a persistent vegetative state.
3. Id. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757.
4. This Note uses the term "patient" to refer to previously competent individuals who
are no longer considered competent because they exist in a persistent vegetative state with
no hope of recovery. See id. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746 (defining a persistent vegetative state's
distinguishing feature as "wakefulness without awareness").
5. Id. at 207, 618 A.2d at 753.
6. Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L. REv. 375, 391 (1988).
7. Id. at 391 n.74 (quoting In re O'Connor, No. 88-312, slip op. at 17 (N.Y. Oct. 14,
1988) (Simons, J., dissenting)).
8. Id. at 391. Within one year of the Mack decision, the General Assembly enacted the
Health Care Decision Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994) to reduce
the burdens on family members attempting to terminate the life support systems of patients in persistent vegetative states.
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closer to his family.' While stationed in California as a member of the
army, Ronald was involved in an automobile accident that caused him
to suffer massive brain injuries and lose all consciousness.10 Ronald
was twenty-one years old at the time of his accident."1
The past ten years of inactivity have caused the muscles in Ronald's arms and legs to become moderately spastic.1 2 He is incontinent
of bladder and bowel and has a tracheotomy that periodically suctions
his lung secretions. 13 Because he cannot chew or swallow, Ronald is
fed through a gastrostomy tube.' 4 There is "'no medically reasonable
ever recover or regain cognitive moveexpectation'" that Ronald will
15
pain.
no
feels
he
but
ment,
In May 1984, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County appointed
Ronald's wife of three years, Deanna Mack, guardian of Ronald's person.1 6 A few months later, Deanna moved to Florida with their two
children to be with a man with whom she had recently commenced a
relationship. 7 By order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County,
Deanna was discharged as Ronald's guardian in December 1985.18 In
the meantime, however, she was appointed his guardian by the Circuit
Court for Marion County, Florida. 9
Sometime before May 11, 1991, Deanna learned that it was possible to have Ronald's gastronomy tube removed. 2 ° She subsequently
consulted counsel in Florida regarding this possibility.2 ' On May 11,
9. Mack, 329 Md. at 192, 618 A.2d at 746. At the time, Ronald's wife and children
lived near Fort Howard Veterans' Hospital, as did his father and younger sister. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Ronald's "legs are straight and resist bending, while his arms are flexed, with
the hands clenched, and resist straightening." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. A gastrostomy tube is a means by which persons who are unable to eat or drink
are provided with nutrition and hydration. See id. at 192-93 n.1, 618 A.2d at 746-47 n.1.
Liquids are inserted "'into a functioning gastrointestinal tract, most commonly through
the nose and esophagus into the stomach or through a surgical incision in the abdominal
wall and directly into the stomach.'" Id. (quotingJoanne Lynn &James F. Childress, Must
PatientsAlways Be Given Food and Water?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17-18).
15. Id. at 193, 618 A.2d at 747 (quoting the circuit court's finding of fact).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 193-94, 618 A.2d at 747. Deanna has visited her husband three to four times a
year since she moved to Florida. Id. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747. Ronald's sister, on the other
hand, testified that she visits him "regularly" at the hospital. Id. Ronald's father testified
that he usually visits his son once a week "with occasional intervals of two weeks between
visits." Id.
19. Id. at 193-94, 618 A.2d at 747.
20. Id. at 194, 618 A.2d at 747.
21. Id.
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Ronald's father and sister filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and applied for a temporary
restraining order against the Veterans Administration. 2 They alleged
that Deanna was attempting to have a Florida state court order the
Veterans Administration to transfer Ronald to a Florida hospital,
where she would seek to terminate Ronald's life support systems. 5
The federal district court granted the order, and after a hearing, ordered the parties to determine who was to act as Ronald's duly authorized guardian.2 4
The Circuit Court for Baltimore County held that the appointment of Deanna as guardian by the Florida court was not entitled to
full faith and credit.25 It appointed a temporary guardian 26 and27reserved judgment on the guardianship issue until a later hearing.
Deanna argued in her pretrial memoranda that the circuit court
"should order withdrawal of Ronald's feeding tube. ''S2 After a full
hearing on this issue,2 9 the circuit court determined that "absent
either a living will or a power of attorney for health care, the decision
to withhold sustenance should be based on what intent Ronald had,
or would have, as determined under a clear and convincing standard
of proof."" ° The court found insufficient evidence that Ronald would
have desired to terminate his life support systems rather than exist in
a permanent vegetative state. 3 '
Deanna appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, but prior to
that court's consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeals granted
22. Id. The two actually filed a pro se pleading that the court treated as a complaint.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The court issued a preliminary injunction maintaining the status quo until the
guardianship issue was resolved. Id.
25. Id. at 194-95, 618 A.2d at 747. The court held that "the Florida court had nojurisdiction over Ronald's person." Id.
26. Id. at 195, 618 A.2d at 747. The court designated the attorney who had served as
Ronald's appointed counsel during the circuit court proceedings as Ronald's temporary
guardian. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id., 618 A.2d at 748.
29. See id., 618 A.2d at 747. The court treated the withholding of nourishment issue as
the principal question to be decided. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 196, 618 A.2d at 748 ("'The conflicting and non-definitive testimony, recollection and impression from various individuals, eight years ago, does not convince the
court, of what intent Ronald W. Mack had or would have if faced with the situation which
presently confronts him.'") (quoting the circuit court's opinion). The circuit court further
held that Ronald's father should be appointed guardian because Deanna's intention not to
continue nutrition and hydration was inconsistent with "'the objectives and directives of
Maryland law.'" Id (quoting the circuit court's opinion).
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a writ of certiorari.3 2 In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, 33
various interested persons and agencies filed amicus briefs because of
the important legal issues addressed. 4
2.

Legal Background.-

a. The Supreme Court's Holding in Cruzan.-In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health, 5 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not forbid Missouri from requiring that an incompetent
patient's wishes as to the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.36 Like Ronald, Nancy
Cruzan entered into a persistent vegetative state after being injured in
an automobile accident.3 She too was kept alive by means of a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube implanted in her stomach.3 8
The Cruzan Court began its discussion by recognizing that a patient's right to refuse treatment is a logical corollary of the common
law informed consent doctrine. 39 The Court also stated that "a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."4" In cases examining the rights of
a person in a persistent vegetative state, however, the Court noted that
the person whose rights are at issue is incompetent. 4' Consequently,
the majority held that Missouri's establishment of a "procedural safeguard to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it
32. Id.
33. The attorney for Ronald filed a brief as appellee, "supporting the circuit court decision in all respects." Id. at 197, 618 A.2d at 748-49.
34. Dr. Timothy James Keay of the University of Maryland School of Medicine filed a
brief arguing that "current medical ethics permit discontinuing feeding Ronald through
the gastrostomy tube." Id., 618 A.2d at 749. The State filed a brief, arguing that the correct standard was applied by the circuit court. Id. Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. also filed a brief,
urging the Court of Appeals "to adopt guidelines for determining when life support can be
withdrawn from a patient in a persistent vegetative state." Id., 618 A.2d at 748.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36. Id. at 280.
37. Id. at 266.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 269-70. Justice Cardozo, then sitting on the New York Court of Appeals, described the common law informed consent doctrine, as applied to bodily integrity, as follows: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v.
Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
40. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278; see alsoJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)
(holding that an individual had a liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine that should be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disease).
41. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. Thus, the right would have to be exercised, "if at all, by
some sort of surrogate." Id.
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may to the wishes expressed by the patient while competent" was constitutionally valid.42
The Court held that the State has a particular interest at stake in
cases such as Cruzan.43 The Court found that while " [ t] he choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality," 44 the State can place burdens in front of a

guardian or surrogate wishing to terminate another individual's life to
protect potential abuse from occurring in such situations.45 It further
held that Missouri had permissibly sought to advance its interests in
preserving human life through the adoption of the clear and convincing standard of proof in such proceedings.4 6 It acknowledged that
such a high standard of proof generally would prevent an irrevocable
erroneous decision from being made.4 7
b. Decisionsfrom OtherJurisdictions.-The seminal right-to-refuse-treatment case is In re Quinlan,48 in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court granted the request of Karen Anne Quinlan's father
to disconnect his daughter's respirator. 49 The court granted the relief, holding that Karen's constitutional right to privacy outweighed
the State's interest in preserving her life.5" The court held that the
only "practical way" to protect Karen's privacy5 1 was to allow her
guardian and family to decide what action she would take if she were
aware of her condition.5 2 By allowing the family to decide, the New
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 281.
45. Id.; see also In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (NJ. 1987) ("There will, of course, be
some unfortunate situations in which family members will not act to protect a patient.").
46. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283 ("[N]ot only does the standard of proof reflect the importance of a particular adjudication, it also serves as 'a societal judgment about how the risk
of error should be distributed between the litigants.'") (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). The Court also explained that "[t]he more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that
party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." Id.
47. See id. (opining that an erroneous decision to continue life support "results in a
maintenance of the status quo" and provides for the "possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science [or] the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent... [whereas] [a]n erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment... is not susceptible of correction").
48. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. NewJersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
49. Id. at 671-72.
50. Id. at 664.
51. The court defined this "privacy interest" as a party's interest in protecting herself
from a medical intervention's "bodily invasion" of her person. Id.
52. Id. Quinlan left no directive for her family concerning whether she should be
treated if she ever entered a persistent vegetative state. Id.
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Jersey court adopted the "substituted judgment" test.53 It did not,
however, apply the clear and convincing evidence standard to deter54
mine the accuracy of the family's decision to terminate life support.
The majority of state courts have adopted the Cruzan clear and
convincing evidence standard in right to die cases. 5 In some instances, the standard is relatively easy to apply because the evidence is
direct, due to either a patient's prior attainment of a living will or
grant of a durable power of attorney.5 6 In other cases, the evidence is
not direct but still adequately satisfies the clear and convincing evidence standard. For example, in In re Sevems, 7 the patient had not
only expressed her clear intent not to be sustained on life support
systems if she were ever in a persistent vegetative state, but also participated actively in the Delaware Euthanasia Education Council.5"
In many cases, however, the evidence is unclear and the court is
forced to make a determination of the matter by inferring from the
facts. The Massachusetts Supreme Court addressed such a situation in
53. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431
(Mass. 1977) (defining substituted judgment as "taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter
into the decision-making process of the competent person").
54. See Rhoden, supra note 6, at 384 (describing the "notion of proxies implementing
the patient's right by deciding as the patient would have decided" and noting that, by
adopting such a rights-based paradigm, the Quinlan court created a situation whereby future courts would attempt to protect patient's rights by using the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard).
55. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that "courtresolved disputes in [right-to-die] cases.., must be resolved by clear and convincing evidence"); McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. 1989) (holding that the correct standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence); In re Estate of
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (I1. 1990) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); In re
Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y.), cert. denied sub nom. Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)
(holding that "clear and convincing" is the appropriate standard of review); see also ALA
MEISEL, THE Ris-HT TO DIE § 8.3, at 24 ("The predominant standard is clear and convincing
evidence."); Rhoden, supra note 6, at 376 (stating that the clear and convincing evidence
standard is "the typical legal requirement" in such cases).
56. In Maryland, living wills permitting the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration were
permissible under the former living will statute, MD. CODE As., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605
(1990), and through a grant of a durable power of attorney under MD. CoDE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 13-601 (1991). See generally Wendy A. Kronmiller, Comment, A Necessary Compromise: The Right to Forego Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Under Mayland's Life-Sustaining
ProceduresAct, 47 MD. L. REV. 1188 (1988) (discussing Maryland law regarding the removal
of artificial nutrition and hydration).
57. 425 A.2d 156 (Del. 1980).
58. Id. at 158; see also McConne, 553 A.2d at 598-99 (involving a former registered
nurse, whose last position was as manager of a hospital emergency room, who "expressly
and repeatedly told her family and her coworkers that, in the event of her permanent total
incapacity, she did not want to be kept alive by any artificial means, including... feeding

tubes").
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Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 59 where it held that if direct
evidence is unavailable, the substituted judgment of a guardian can be
used to determine whether the patient's "choice would be to decline
the provision of food and water and to terminate

. . .

life."6" Signifi-

cant to this finding were (1) the patient's expressed preferences related through the testimony of family and friends, (2) religious
beliefs, (3) impact on the family, (4) probability of adverse side effects
and, importantly, (5) the prognosis with and without treatment.6" In
Brophy, the court weighed all of these factors and concluded that the
patient would not have wanted to live in a persistent vegetative state.62
In commenting on applying the clear and convincing evidence
standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court has noted that express remarks sometimes will not alone be sufficient to overcome the burden
of the test.6" In In re Conroy,64 the court noted that "an offhand remark about not wanting to live under certain circumstances made by a
person when young and in the peak of health would not in itself constitute clear proof twenty years later that he would want life-sustaining
treatment withheld under those circumstances." 65 Most courts agree
that the standard requires more-that the evidence must show that a
competent adult thought about the issue of life-sustaining treatment
and expressed a desire to forego treatment "forcefully and without
wavering" and that testimony of others indicates that foregoing treatment reflects the patient's values.6 6
A few jurisdictions have applied a less stringent test than the clear
and convincing evidence standard. For example, in In re Guardianship
of Doe,67 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the
lack of a prior expressed intention regarding medical treatment does
not bar the use of the substituted judgment doctrine to allow a guardian to make the decision to terminate treatment. 68 The court rejected
59. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986).
60. Id. at 631.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 632. Brophy had discussed the case of Karen Anne Quinlan with his wife and
stated, "I don't ever want to be on a life-support system. No way do I want to live like that;
that is not living." Id. at 632 n.22. Five years later, he helped a man from a burning truck;
when the man later died from extensive burns, Brophy stated, "I should have been five
minutes later. It would have been all over for him ....

If I'm ever like that, just shoot me,

pull the plug." Id.
63. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (NJ. 1985).
64. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
65. Id. at 1230.
66. See McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Co.nn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 604-05 (Conn. 1989).
67. 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass.), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. Gross, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992).
68. Id. at 1271.
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the clear and convincing standard in favor of an approach in which
'Judges, mindful of the serious consequences following entry of substituted judgment orders, will enter such orders only after carefully considering the evidence and entering specific findings . . . and then
balancing the various interests."6 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court
made a similar finding in In reJobes,7 ° where the majority found that
there was no clear and convincing evidence of the patient's desire to
terminate life support, yet held that, because "some trustworthy evidence" supported her family's decision that she would have approved
of efforts to terminate life support, life-sustaining treatment should be
stopped. 7 '
c. The Common Law of Maryland.-The Court of Appeals has
recognized the common law doctrine of informed consent 72 under
the same rationale as has the United States Supreme Court. 73 In Sard
v. Hardy,74 the Maryland high court stated that the "fountainhead of
the doctrine... is the patient's right to exercise control over his own
body . . . by deciding for himself whether or not to submit to the
76
particular therapy." 75 In Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital,Inc.,
the Court of Appeals examined whether, in conjunction with an application by coguardians to have an incompetent minor ward sterilized
by means of a hysterectomy, the common law requires that courts examine the "best interests of an incompetent minor, the welfare of society or the convenience or peace of mind of the ward's parents or
guardian." 77 It held that such factors should play no part in the
court's analysis. 78 Thus, by analogy, the common law in Maryland
does not support focusing on the best interests of a patient in determining whether life support should be terminated; rather, it indicates
that courts should focus on the patient's right to refuse treatment,
69. Id. The court referred to this standard as "a preponderance of the evidence with
an extra measure of evidentiary protection by reason of specific findings of fact after a
careful review of the evidence." Id. (citations omitted).
70. 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987).
71. Id. at 447 ("Mrs. Jobes is blessed with warm, close, and loving family members. It is
entirely proper to assume that they are best qualified to determine the medical decisions
she would make.").
72. See Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 438-39, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (1977) (holding that a
physician is required to get "informed consent" from a patient before commencing
treatment).
73. See supra note 39.
74. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
75. Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019.
76. 293 Md. 385, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983).
77. Id. at 704-05, 447 A.2d at 1254.
78. Id.
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and whether the patient would have wanted to continue living had she
79
known she would someday be in a persistent vegetative state.
d. The General Assembly's Intent.-Before the legislature enacted the Health Care Decision Act8" in 1993, section 5-605 of the
Health General Article stated, in pertinent part, that a qualified patient's request made on a living will to "withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures may not be implemented .

.

. [b]y the denial of

food [or] water.""1 In contrast, section 13-708(b) (8) of the guardian
statute states that a guardian has the power, if approved by the court,
to withdraw "medical or other professional care" from an incompetent ward even when withholding such care may result in the ward's
death.8 2 In a 1988 opinion, the Attorney General reconciled this apparent contradiction by clarifying that the language of section 5-695
meant only that a living will could "not itselfserve as the basis for withholding artificially administered sustenance." 3 The opinion further
noted that "[e]very appellate court that has addressed the issue [of terminating life-support] has held that there is no difference as a matter
of law between artificially administered sustenance and other forms of
life-sustaining treatment. "84 Consequently, the Attorney General asserted that the guardian statute's failure to exclude artificially administered nutrition and hydration from its definition of medical
treatment indicated that the General Assembly intended the cessation
of artificially administered sustenance to be covered by the guardian
statute. 5
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Before Mack, the Court of Appeals
had never addressed the issue of the standard of proof necessary to
terminate the administration of nutrition and hydration of patients in
a persistent vegetative state. The Mack court began its analysis of the
standard of proof issue by citing with approval the Supreme Court's
79. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-70 (recognizing the common law's support for a patient's right to refuse treatment).
80. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1993).
81. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605 (1990). This statute is deemed "former" in
the text because it was amended after the Mack decision. See supra note 8.
82. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS 13-708(b) (8) (1991). Note that if the withholding
of care involves a "substantial risk to the life of a disabled person," the guardian must first
receive the court's authorization before withholding treatment. Id. § 13-708(c).
83. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 181 (1988) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 179 (citations omitted); see also In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 504 n.5, 564
A.2d 812, 816 n.5 (1989) (commenting that "the withdrawal of respiratory life-support or a
gastric feeding tube is the termination of already existing medical treatment").
85. See 73 Op. Att'y Gen. at 181.
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decision in Cruzan.8 6 It then noted that it had previously applied the
clear and convincing evidence standard in deciding punitive damages
awards in similar types of cases8 7 and in granting the request of a
guardian to sterilize an incompetent ward.8 8 Comparing those fact
situations to the circumstances in Mack, the majority held that "[n]o
lesser standard should be applied to deciding facts that will determine
whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a patient."8 9 Finally, the court noted that in "the overwhelming majority of cases involving requests to withdraw sustenance from a person in a persistent
vegetative state," courts have required clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's wishes from the proponent of withholding or withdrawing life support.9 °
In contrast to the court's discussion, Deanna asserted that the
clear and convincing standard unfairly favored life over death and
thus left "'little room for debate on the issue."' 91 She argued that the
court should adopt a best interests standard of proof, which would
vary depending on the quality of life of the patient.9 2 Under such a
standard, "' [w] hen the direct and indirect indicia of a disabled's intent
are unclear, the last resort must be to do what a reasonable person in
[the patient's] situation would want."' 9 3
The majority rejected the best interests test, holding that to terminate treatment for a person "who is not in pain, and who is not terminally ill requires [courts] to make... quality-of-life judgment[s] under
judicially adopted standards, without any legislative guidelines."9 4
The court quoted the Supreme Court of Illinois in support of its rejection of the standard: "'The problem with the best-interests test is that
it lets another make a determination of a patient's quality of life,
thereby undermining the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of the person upon which the right to refuse medical treat86. See Mack, 329 Md. at 207, 618 A.2d at 753-54.
87. Id. at 208, 618 A.2d at 754 (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469,
601 A.2d 653, 657 (1992)).
88. Id. (citing Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d
1244, 1253-54 (1982)).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citations omitted); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
91. Mack, 329 Md. at 209, 618 A.2d at 755 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 35).
92. Id. Deanna argued that the only existence Ronald "has is as the 'subject of bodily
intrusions that . . . are humiliating and undignified.' Furthermore, he forces others
around him to wait on him and perpetuate his condition. He is condemned to life without
hope of improvement and without any sensation of positive value." Id. at 217-18, 618 A.2d
at 759 (quoting Reply Brief of Appellant at 6).
93. Id. at 218, 618 A.2d at 759 (quoting Reply Brief of Appellant at 7).
94. Id.
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ment stands."' 95 Thus, the court accepted the Attorney General's
argument against the best interests testO6 and held that any analysis
under that test would violate Maryland common law. 97 In addition,
the court expressed a fear that if it applied the best interests test in
Mack, courts might conclude that it is in the best interest of patients to
die when they exist in a persistent vegetative state.9 Thus, it would set
a precedent for withholding artificially administered sustenance from
all persons in a persistent vegetative state, even those "whose actual
desires concerning the administration of such sustenance are unknown." 9 The court held that making such a broad-reaching societal
judgment concerning the value of life properly belonged with the
legislature.1 00
Although declaring the substituted judgment test a misnomer,
the court in fact applied the test and attempted to determine by clear
and convincing evidence whether Ronald would have desired a withdrawal of treatment had he been aware of the circumstances of his
case.1" 1 The court held that because Ronald had not executed a medical durable power of attorney or a living will, the inquiry necessarily
focused "on whether Ronald, while competent, sufficiently had evidenced his views

. . .

to enable the court to determine ...

what Ron-

ald's decision would be under the present circumstances. ' 12
The court determined that written and oral statements by Ronald
were admissible, as was evidence of his character, his religious, philosophical, moral, and religious views, and his attitudes towards medical
95. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989)); see also In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990) ("One does not exercise another's
right of self-determination ... by making a decision which the state, the family, or public
opinion would prefer. The surrogate decisionmaker must be confident that he or she can
and is voicing the patient'sdecision.") (citation omitted).
96. See Mack, 329 Md. at 220-21, 618 A.2d at 760. In a 1988 opinion, the Attorney
General commented that according to medical experts, a person in a persistent vegetative
state does not experience either physical or emotional suffering. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162,
189 (1988). Consequently, the Attorney General found the best interests test inappropriate because " [t ] he balancing of costs and benefits to the patient that a surrogate must undertake for a terminally ill patient cannot be done in the same way for a patient who is
permanently unconscious." Id. at 189-90.
97. Mack, 329 Md. at 219, 618 A.2d at 760. The Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the
best interests test in Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 294 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244
(1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983).
98. Mack, 329 Md. at 221, 618 A.2d at 761.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761.
101. Id. at 214, 618 A.2d at 757.
102. Id. at 215, 618 A.2d at 757-58. The court stated that the inquiry "is a particular
application of a familiar judicial task, that of determining a person's state of mind, based
on the evidence, and relating that state of mind to an applicable legal standard." Id.
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procedures, sickness, suffering and death.'
The court set forth these
guidelines not to serve as a limitation on other forms of evidence, but
to "'aid in ascertaining [the patient's] desires and in reaching a decision' based upon clear and convincing evidence." 0 4
The court analogized its decision in Mack to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court's decision in In re Brophy.' °5 There was no
direct evidence in either case that indicated the patient's desires concerning the continuation of treatment.'0 6 In contrast to Brophy, however, the Mack court was unable to infer from Ronald's previous
statements his desire to forego artificial hydration and nutrition. The
evidence that Deanna and Ronald's father offered was too conflicting."0 7 Because Mack was a case in which the court did "not know
what decision, if any, the patient had made or would make," the majority in Mack held that Deanna had "not met the burden of proof,
requiring clear and convincing evidence of Ronald's desire to have
the feeding tube removed." 0 8
Justice McAuliffe dissented, arguing that the court merely paid
"lip service to the concept of 'substituted judgment"' and applied it in
such a limited way that it lost all meaning.'0 9 The test that Judge McAuliffe favored would "'ensure that the surrogate decisionmaker effectuates as much as possible the decision that the incompetent
patient would make if he or she were competent.'"110 Under McAuliffe's definition of the substituted judgment test, where family members could not reach a decision regarding the continuation of life
support, the trial judge could look at all relevant evidence, including
the patient's medical status, and make a decision.' Judge McAuliffe
noted that Ronald could live in a persistent vegetative state for thirty
to forty years.' 1 2 Finding that Ronald's condition is permanent and
irreversible, Judge McAuliffe stated that because most reasonable per103. Id.
104. Id., 618 A.2d at 758 (quoting In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989)).

105. 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); see also supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
106. Mack, 329 Md. at 216, 618 A.2d at 758.
107. Id. at 217, 618 A.2d at 758-59 (noting that "[t]he trial judge found that '[i]f anything, the evidence produces a stalemate'").
108. Id., 618 A.2d at 759.
109. Id. at 223, 618 A.2d at 761 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (quoting In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987)). Judge McAuliffe stated the
test as follows: "When prior statements alone do not provide the requisite evidence of
intent, those seeking to ascertain the wishes of the ward should add to the relevant considerations all that is know about the ward and his condition and prognosis, and determine
from that ...

information ...

the intent of the ward." Id. at 224, 618 A.2d at 762 (McAu-

liffe, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 224-26, 618 A.2d at 762-63 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 226, 618 A.2d at 763 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
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sons would not want to continue life in such a condition, and absent
evidence to the contrary, "one may certainly infer that Ronald would
'
share that view." "

3

Judge Chasanow concurred with the majority's conclusion to continue Ronald's life support, but disagreed with its reasoning." 4 He
argued that the majority's test had two problems: (1) most very young
people like Ronald never seriously consider that they may one day "be
reduced to a persistent vegetative state" and, thus, rarely if ever express their views on the matter clearly and convincingly, and (2) infants and incompetents will never satisfy the majority's test because
they cannot clearly and convincingly evidence a desire not to be maintained on life support systems."'
In complete contradiction to the majority, Judge Chasanow argued that the trial court is not the most appropriate body to make the
decision to terminate a patient's life." 6 Rather, he maintained that in
all possible cases, the family should be able to make the decision without the need for judicial intervention and without the burden of the
clear and convincing evidence standard.' 7 Only in instances such as
Ronald's, when family members disagree as to whether to terminate a
patient's life support systems, should the courts play a role in so personal a decision.118
Judge Chasanow also criticized the majority for not expressly including in its list of determinative factors"' "the opinions of those
closest to the patient about what the patient would have chosen under
113. Id. at 228, 618 A.2d at 764 (McAuliffe,J., dissenting). Judge McAuliffe stated that if
"the evidence shows that the ward harbored religious, philosophical, or other beliefs in
favor of the preservation of 'life' at all costs, no matter how barren and hopeless, the result
would be different." Id.
114. Id. at 236, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow,J., concurring). Judge Chasanow dissented
from the majority's decision to remand the guardian issue to the trial court for further
examination in light of all of the issues. Id. at 235, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow,J., concurring). He found that the trial court properly decided the guardian issue. Id.
115. Id. at 236, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow,J., concurring).
116. Id. at 239, 618 A.2d at 770 (Chasanow,J., concurring) ("The courts are less suited
than the patient's loved ones, acting with concurrence of the patient's physicians, to make
these decisions."); see also Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standardsfor Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REv. 581, 600 (1992) ("Although several

courts initially suggested that the judicial system was the appropriate forum to decide
whether life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn from an incompetent patient, courts
have more recently declined to require judicial intervention as a prerequisite to [the family
and attending physicians] making such decisions.").
117. Mack, 329 Md. at 239, 618 A.2d at 770 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
118. Id. Due to the differing opinions of Ronald's father and Deanna, Judge Chasanow
found that the trial court properly ruled that Ronald's life support should be continued.
Id. at 238, 618 A.2d at 769 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
119. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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the present circumstances." 2 ° While accepting as helpful the other
factors put forward by the court, Chasanow posited that none can be
as beneficial as "the opinions of the patient's loved ones who best
knew the patient. "121 Judge Chasanow stated that such an approach,
in contrast to the majority's reliance on competent choice, would give
persons who never considered the issue, and infants who could not
consider the issue, the chance to be treated as if they had been
granted "the opportunity to develop or express their own views" con1 22
cerning whether to live in a persistent vegetative state.
In closing, Judge Chasanow chided the majority for looking for
legislative
guidance when it should have exercised judicial responsibility. 123 He warned that relying on the legislature would cause extremely personal decisions to be made under the guidelines of
"objective criteria," possibly causing "the appalling specter of a patient
meeting the legislature's criteria and being taken off life support despite the family's unanimous belief that the patient, though never ex1 24
pressing a view, would have chosen to continue to live."
Furthermore, Judge Chasanow convincingly stated that if a family
makes an error, "then one patient may be harmed, but if the legislature establishes imperfect guidelines, then
large numbers of patients
25
harmed."'
be
may
families
their
and/or

120. Mack, 329 Md. at 242, 618 A.2d at 771 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Judge Chasanow declared this to be "the most probative and compelling evidence other than express
statements by the patient." Id.
121. Id. at 243, 618 A.2d at 772 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Judge Chasanow found that
the lay opinions were likely to aid "a judge who never knew the patient." Id.; see, e.g., John
F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (holding that
.close family members or legal guardians [should] substitute their judgment for what they
believe the terminally ill incompetent persons, if competent, would have done under these
circumstances"); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980) (approving an order terminating life support for an incompetent patient based on the patient's son's opinion that the
patient would have wanted treatment withdrawn).
122. Mack, 329 Md. at 243-45, 618 A.2d at 772-73 (Chasanow, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Guardianship of Barry, 455 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. App. 1984) (holding that parents could
decide, without court approval, based on their substituted judgment, to remove their infant child's life support system); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 431-32 (Mass. 1977) (stating that parents could speak for their retarded
child to aid the court's determination of whether the patient would choose not to undergo
potentially life saving, but extremely painful (and, to the child, not understandable)
chemotherapy).
123. Mack, 329 Md. at 249, 618 A.2d at 774-75 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
124. Id., 618 A.2d at 775 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
125. Id.
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4. Analysis.-In his concurrence, Judge Chasanow posed two
probing questions that reveal serious problems with the majority's decision in Mack:
Does the majority really believe that all people in a persistent
vegetative state who have not clearly and convincingly evidenced their views about life support would prefer to remain
on artificial life support indefinitely? Does the majority also
believe that incompetent patients who have not sufficiently
evidenced their views about life support would prefer that
the legislature or a judge, rather than their loved ones, decide under what circumstances their artificial life support
should be terminated?' 2 6
Whether the majority believed that patients would prefer these two
scenarios, the outcome Judge Chasanow feared would have been the
result of the court's decision in Mack1 7 had the legislature not interceded. In 1993, the General Assembly enacted the Health Care Decision Act, 128 effectively codifying Judge Chasanow's approach to
deciding whether to withhold life-sustaining nutrition and hydration.
The majority's decision was an attempt to further society's and
the State's interest in preserving human life. 129 The court stated that
"sustaining Ronald and other persons like him, whose desires concerning the withdrawal of artificial sustenance cannot clearly be determined, is a price paid for the benefit of living in a society that highly
values human life."1 3 ° While taking such a cautious approach was "calculated to prevent abusive terminations," the majority failed to acknowledge that it also ensures "abusive continuations." 131 Under the
test set forth by the majority, patients who did not have the educational background, experience, or good fortune to formulate a living
will, or grant a power of attorney, or even discuss the difficult moral
126. Id. at 251, 618 A.2d at 775-76 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
127. See Rhoden, supra note 6, at 391 (stating that the "stringent [clear and convincing
evidence] evidentiary standard . .. is often impossible to meet, even when available evidence points to nontreatment as a perfectly reasonable course of action").
128. Mn. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994). When it enacted the Health
Care Decision Act, the General Assembly simultaneously repealed former §§ 5-601 to -614.
129. See Mack, 329 Md. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761.
130. Id. This basic tenet of the majority's position is not grounded on a solid proposition. As Judge Chasanow noted, "it is doubtful that society 'highly values' life in a persistent vegetative state." Id. at 236, 618 A.2d at 768 (Chasanow, J., concurring); see also
Sanford H. Kadish, LettingPatientsDie: Legal and Moral Reflections, 80 CAL.L. REv. 857, 860
(1992) (noting that some public opinion polls show that nearly 90% of the public favor
removing life-support systems from permanently comatose patients under certain
circumstances).
131. Rhoden, supra note 6, at 434.
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issues that right-to-die cases entail, would have been forced to live in a
persistent vegetative state merely because they lacked the foresight or
to be kept alive by means of artifiability to express their desire not
32
sustenance.1
administered
cially
The tests put forth by Judges Chasanow and McAuliffe would
broaden the substitute judgment test adopted by the majority to provide a more equitable result for patients in persistent vegetative
states." 3' Judge McAuliffe, however, would swing the balance too far
in the opposite direction by creating a rebuttable presumption that
patients do not desire to live in persistent vegetative states.13 4 Under
Judge McAuliffe's approach, patients who would prefer to live in a
persistent vegetative state would nevertheless be deemed to prefer
death unless adequate evidence proved otherwise.
Judge Chasanow's approach avoids such pitfalls. He would allow
those who know the patient best to contribute their opinions to ajudicial determination of whether the patient would, if competent, desire
her treatment to end. 3 5 Such a decision-making matrix would not
only provide individuals who have failed to make their desires known
a greater degree of choice, 136 but also would prevent individuals, families, and society from being harmed by broad judicial or legislative
for deciding an
policy statements that attempt to set forth 3guidelines
7
extremely complex moral and social issue.'
Judge Chasanow and the majority both reached the conclusion
that Ronald should continue to receive hydration and nutrition artificially. If future cases had been controlled by the majority's holding in
Mack, however, a guardian seeking to withdraw or withhold artificially
administered nutrition and hydration, even if all family members
agreed that the patient would so desire, would have to prove that the
132. See id. at 391-92 n.74 (stating that the "'clear and convincing'" evidentiary standard
is unworkable "'because it requires humans to exercise foresight they do not possess'")
(citation omitted).
133. These approaches provide for the disparity between those who are aware of their
options in the event of becoming incompetent in the future, and those who are not. Judge
McAuliffe, however, placed more emphasis on the choice a reasonable person would make
when confronted with living in a persistent vegetative state. See Mack, 329 Md. at 223-29,
618 A.2d at 762-65 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). Judge Chasanow emphasized the importance of including family members' opinions in the trial court's factual determination. See
id. at 229-51, 618 A.2d at 765-76 (Chasanow,J., concurring). This difference caused Judge
McAuliffe to dissent while Judge Chasanow concurred.
134. See id. at 227-28, 618 A.2d at 764 (McAuliffe, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 229-51, 618 A.2d at 765-76 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
136. See Kadish, supra note 130, at 879. Kadish contends that a court could determine
"what a permanently incompetent person would now choose" by examining the patient's
past life and values. Id.
137. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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patient had, at some previous time, clearly and convincingly evidenced that desire. Fortunately, the General Assembly substantially
made Judge Chasanow's well-reasoned approach the governing law
when it enacted the Health Care Decision Act."3 8 Those who know
the patient best will now be able to step forward and prevent her from
being forced to live a life that she would not have chosen to continue
by artificial means, an event the majority's decision in Mack might
have precluded. 3 9
5. Conclusion.-The Mack court limited the possibilities for withdrawing and withholding the administration of artificial sustenance to
patients in a persistent vegetative state by adopting a strict clear and
convincing evidence standard. The court's holding would have prevented persons who were never competent, or who never made an
express declaration as to their desires concerning treatment should
they ever enter a persistent vegetative state, from receiving the benefit
available to persons who did express their intent. By not allowing family members to give their opinion as to what the patient would have
wanted, and by practically requiring express declarations, the court's
holding necessarily would have resulted in persons being maintained
by artificially administered sustenance, who, if given the choice, would
have chosen death over continued life in a persistent vegetative state.
Fortunately, the legislature answered the majority's call 140 and set
forth reasonable guidelines for deciding when life support can be
terminated.
WILLIAM

S. HEYMAN

B. Physicians' Duty to Disclose HIV Status and Proof of Exposure
Requirements in Fear of Disease Cases

In Faya v. Almaraz,1 the Court of Appeals addressed the issues of
whether a surgeon is negligent for failing to tell his patients that he is2
a carrier of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus
138.

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.

§§ 5-601 to -618 (1994).

139. See id.

140. See Mack, 329 Md. at 222, 618 A.2d at 761 (stating that persons in Ronald's circumstances would be maintained in a persistent vegetative state "[ulnless and until current
public policy, as we perceive it, is changed by the General Assembly").
1. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
2. Id. at 438, 620 A.2d at 328. AIDS is a condition caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), a microorganism that attacks the human immune system and
ultimately destroys the body's ability to fight disease. HIV may be transmitted by vaginal
and anal sexual intercourse, by the contamination of uninfected blood with HIV infected
blood and blood products, and from mother to child during childbirth. Because of their
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and whether a claimant can recover for fear of having contracted HIV
without identifying any actual channel of transmission of the virus.'
Reversing the lower court's dismissal of the case, the court determined that it could not rule, as a matter of law, that a physician owed
no such duty to his patient 4 and that it would be unfair to require a
claimant to prove actual exposure to the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) to recover for fear of contracting AIDS.5 In so ruling, the
court adopted the minority view' as the standard in Maryland for recovery in claims alleging fear of disease.
1. The Case.-In 1988 and 1989, Dr. Rudolf Almaraz, an oncological surgeon specializing in breast cancer, performed surgery on
Sonja Faya and Perry Mahoney Rossi at The Johns Hopkins Hospital
(Hopkins). 7 At the time of these operations, Almaraz knew he was
infected with HIV, the infectious agent responsible for AIDS.' By the
time he performed Rossi's surgery in November 1989, Almaraz had
developed secondary infections attendant to full-blown AIDS.' He
died of AIDS in November 1990.10
Neither Faya nor Rossi knew of Almaraz's illness until December
1990 when they read about his death in a local newspaper.1 1 Immediately upon learning that Almaraz was infected when he performed
their surgeries, both Faya and Rossi underwent blood testing for the
AIDS virus.1" Both tested HIV-negative. 1 3
Faya and Rossi filed separate actions against Almaraz's estate, his
professional association, and Hopkins, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.1 4 Both plaintiffs alleged negligence, failure to obtain
impaired immune systems, persons with AIDS are highly susceptible to opportunistic infections and life-threatening diseases. AIDS is fatal. See id. at 439, 620 A.2d at 329; see also SAM
B. PucKEn-r & ALAN R. EMERY, MANAGING AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 29-45 (Addison-Wesley
1988).
3. See Faya, 329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 336-37.
4. Id. at 450, 620 A.2d at 334.
5. See id. at 455, 620 A.2d 337.
6. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
7. Faya, 329 Md. at 440, 620 A.2d at 329.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

12. Id. at 441, 620 A.2d at 329.
13. Id. The court took judicial notice of the fact that at least 95% of all HIV carriers
will test HIV-positive within six months of acquiring the virus. Id. at 446, 620 A.2d at 332.
The court also noted that the blood tests available for detecting HIV, when used in combination, have an accuracy of more than 99.9%. Id. at 446 n.4, 620 A.2d at 332 n.4.
14. Id. at 441, 620 A.2d 329-30.
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informed consent, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 5 They claimed that Almaraz acted wrongfully in failing to inform them that he was HIV-positive prior to their operations and that
Hopkins failed to take appropriate steps to prevent Almaraz from performing surgery without disclosing his HIV status to his patients. 1 6 Relying on agency principles, they asserted that Hopkins was vicariously
liable for Almaraz's conduct. 7 They averred injuries in the form of
"exposure to HIV and risk of AIDS," physical injury and financial costs
associated with the blood testing, fear, anxiety, grief, shock, emotional
8
distress, headaches, and sleeplessness.'
In May 1991, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County dismissed
the complaints for failure to allege a legally compensable injury.' 9
Finding that neither Faya nor Rossi alleged facts sufficient to support
a claim of actual exposure to the AIDS virus during surgery and that
neither Faya nor Rossi tested positive for HIV,2 ° the court held that it
could not, as a matter of law, allow recovery for "the fear that something that did not happen could have happened." 2 ' Faya and Rossi
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.2 2 Before that court could
consider the case, however, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari "to address the important and timely issues raised in these
cases." 23 In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the
Circuit Court's dismissal of the complaints and remanded the cases to
2 4
the Circuit Court for further proceedings.
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Duty to Disclose HIV Status.-Under Maryland law, a physician has a duty to use the degree of care and skill expected of a reasonably competent practitioner of the same class and acting in the
same or similar circumstances. 2 5 In malpractice actions alleging medi15. Id., 620 A.2d at 330. Faya also alleged negligent misrepresentation and breach of
contract, and Rossi's complaint contained additional counts for loss of consortium, breach
of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id.
16. Id. at 442, 620 A.2d at 330.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Faya v. Almaraz, No. 90-345011, 1991 WL 317023 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991);
Rossi v. Almaraz, No. 90-344028, 1991 WL 166924 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991).
20. Faya, 1991 WL 317023, at *4; Rossi, 1991 WL 166924, at *4.
21. Faya, 1991 WL 317023, at *4; Rossi, 1991 WL 166924, at *5.
22. Faya, 329 Md. at 443, 620 A.2d at 331.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 461, 620 A.2d at 339.
25. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 200, 349 A.2d
245, 253 (1975); Riffeyv. Tonder, 36 Md. App. 633, 651, 375 A.2d 1138,1148 (1977); Reed
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cal negligence, a physician's conduct is measured against a national,
rather than local, standard of care.2 6 To state a cause of action against
a physician for professional malpractice, a claimant must establish a
lack of the requisite skill or care on the part of the physician and that
such deficiency was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
suffered.
The doctrine of informed consent, set forth in Sard v. Hardy,28
imposes on physicians rendering medical treatment an additional, affirmative "duty to explain the procedure to the patient and to warn
him of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the
therapy, so as to enable the patient to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether or not to undergo such treatment."29 A
material risk is "one which a physician knows or ought to know would
be significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position in deciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treatment or procedure.""° The standard recognized by Maryland courts for
determining whether a physician has fulfilled her obligation of obtaining informed consent is based on an assessment of what an ordinary patient would consider material."1 Underlying this patientv. Campagnolo, Misc. No. 1, 1993 Md. LEXIS 144, at *10 (Sept. 17, 1993). In Reed, the
court noted that among the factors considered when evaluating a physician's conduct
under this standard of care are: (1) advances made in the medical profession, (2) the
availability of facilities, (3) whether the physician is engaged in a specialized or general
practice, and (4) the proximity of specialists and special facilities. Id. (citing Shilhret, 276
Md. at 200-01, 349 A.2d at 249-51).
26. See, e.g., Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Ctr., 67 Md. App. 75, 86, 506 A.2d 646,
652 (1986); Muenstermann v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 499, 520 (D. Md. 1992).
27. See, e.g., Reed, 1993 Md. LEXIS at 144, *9; Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v. Mewhinney, 230
Md. 480, 484, 187 A.2d 671, 673 (1963).
28. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
29. Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1020. This duty specifically requires that a physician reveal
"the nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success
of the contemplated therapy and its alternatives, and the risk of unfortunate consequences
associated with such treatment." Id. at 440, 379 A.2d at 1020. In Maryland, "a cause of
action for lack of informed consent is one in tort for negligence, as opposed to assault or
battery." Faya,329 Md. at 450 n.6, 620 A.2d at 334 n.6; see also Sard,281 Md. at 440 n.4, 379
A.2d at 450 n.4.
30. Sard, 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
31. See id. at 443-44, 379 A.2d at 1021-22. In contrast to this patient-oriented standard
whereby the materiality of risk is assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the patient's position, other jurisdictions continue to follow the traditional professional
standard of materiality. See id. at 441-42, 379 A.2d at 1021. Under the traditional standard,
the materiality of risk is a function of the judgement and discretion of a reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances. See Mark D. Johnson, Comment, HIV Testing
of Health Care Workers: Conflict Between the Common Law and the Centersfor Disease Control, 42
Am.U.L. Rav. 479, 509-10 & n.180 (1993). Some courts follow a third, purely subjective
standard under which a risk is deemed material if it would affect a patient's decision to
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oriented, objective standard is the recognition of a patient's right of
physical self-determination. 2 A physician is not required to communicate or explain all possible risks and complications, only those "material to the intelligent decision of a reasonably prudent patient. " "
Prior to Faya, Maryland state courts had not addressed the issue
of whether a physician infected with the AIDS virus or any other communicable disease has a duty to disclose her health condition to her
patients.3 4 Several other states have held, however, that the concept
of "material risk" contained in the doctrine of informed consent may
require the disclosure of information about the physician in addition
to information about the treatment or procedure.3 5 On the other
hand, federal courts applying Maryland law have indicated that a physician's failure to disclose alleged incompetence and lack of surgical
skill could not serve as the basis for an action for lack of informed
consent under Sard."6 The Fourth Circuit has noted that Sard leaves
receive treatment. Id. at 510. For further discussion of these three standards and whether
a physician's HIV status is "material information," see id. at 508-13.
32. Sard, 281 Md. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1021. The patient has the exclusive right to weigh
the risks and alternatives with "his individual subjective fears and hopes and to determine
whether or not to place his body in the hands of the physician or surgeon." Id. at 443, 379
A.2d at 1021.
33. Id., 379 A.2d at 1022. A physician is not required to disclose obvious risks and may
withhold information for therapeutic reasons or in emergency situations. Id. at 444-45, 379
A.2d at 1022.
34. A NewJersey court has recognized a physician's duty to disclose his HIV infection
to his patient prior to invasive surgery. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton,
592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (holding that the risk of a surgical
accident involving an HIV-positive surgeon would be a legitimate concern to a patient,
warranting disclosure of the risk of transmission within the context of informed consent);
cf.In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that,
in light of the public health concern regarding the risk of transmission of HIV from an
HIV-infected surgeon during invasive surgery, a hospital did not violate confidentiality laws
by disclosing a physician's identity and his HIV-positive status to his colleagues and
patients).
35. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (determining that a physician must disclose personal economic and research interests unrelated to
the patient's health in obtaining the patient's informed consent to medical treatment);
Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a surgeon's failure
to disclose chronic alcohol abuse, which created a material risk associated with the surgeon's ability to perform, violated informed consent requirements). For a comparison of
the risk to patients from a physician's alcoholism with the risk associated with surgery by an
HIV-positive surgeon, see Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care Worker's Duty to Undergo
Routine Testingfor HIV/AIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to Patients,52 LA. L. Rv. 933, 94951 (1992) (noting that with both alcoholism and HIV infection, the undisclosed risk is the
doctor's disease).
36. See Shock v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Md. 1988) (ruling that the plaintiff's claim that the competence of an attending physician was not disclosed or affirmatively
represented raises no question of informed consent); Wachter v. United States ( Wachter]),
689 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the concept of informed consent does not
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open the issue of whether "revelations of information about one's
physician are within the scope of the duty to disclose ....
."",
Outside the context of the physician-patient relationship, the
Court of Appeals has recognized a legal duty to warn others of a foreseeable risk of contracting one's infectious disease. In B.N. v. K.K, 3a
the court held that a person who knows she has a highly infectious
disease and can foresee that the disease may be communicated to
others has a duty to take reasonable precautions, such as warning
others or avoiding contact with them, to avoid transmitting the
disease.3 9
b. Damages for Fear of Contracting AIDS.-Maryland courts
have long recognized a right to recover for emotional injuries in tort.
They do not adhere to the "physical impact rule," which denies recovery in tort for mental distress absent a showing a physical impact.' To
discourage feigned and abusive claims, however, they apply a "physical
injury test," allowing recovery for emotional suffering only if it resulted in a "physical injury."4 1 In Vance v. Vance,42 the Court of Appeals explained that, in the context of the physical injury test, the
term "physical" means merely that which is "capable of objective mani-

festation."4 3 As a consequence, evidence indicative of a mental state,
such as spontaneous crying, depression, deteriorated physical appearance, sleeplessness and the inability to socialize, has served as an objective manifestation of emotional injuries sufficient to satisfy the
physical injury test.4 4

encompass misrepresentations as to a surgeon's competence, experience, or track record),
affd, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1989). According to the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, the doctrine of informed consent requires that a physician disclose
the "nature and consequences medically inherent in a course of treatment so as to allow an
intelligent and informed choice among treatment alternatives .... " Shock, 689 F. Supp. at
1426. Moreover, "[n]o case of lack of informed consent is made out unless the failure to
disclose an 'alternative' to the treatment that the patient chooses to undergo is the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff." Watcher , 689 F. Supp. at 1421.
37. Wachter v. United States (Wachter fl), 877 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1989).
38. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
39. Id. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179.
40. See Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 77, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909) (rejecting the physical impact rule for judging emotional injuries in tort).
41. See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (holding that a plaintiff
can recover for nervous shock and fright absent physical impact so long as they result in
apparent and substantial physical injury); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338
A.2d 48 (1975) (applying the same standard to "mental anguish damages").
42. 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979).
43. Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34.
44. See id. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734.
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Otherjurisdictions have developed special rules governing the recovery in tort for emotional injuries consisting of a present fear of
developing a disease in the future. The prevailing rule requires that,
at a minimum, a claimant prove exposure to a disease-causing agent
for the fear to be considered a legally compensable injury.4 5 The majority of courts that have considered fear of disease cases, however,
have held that exposure to a disease-causing agent alone is not sufficient to state a claim for fear of developing a disease in the future; the
claimant also must show physical injury, such as symptoms of the disease, before the fear is considered compensable.4 6 Prior to Faya,
Maryland courts had not decided whether proof of exposure to a disease-causing agent or resultant physical injury were prerequisites to
recovery for fear of developing a disease.4 7
45. See, e.g., Harper v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 808 F.2d 1139, 1140 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that absent evidence of exposure to potentially harmful chemicals, plaintiff cannot recover for fear of future health hazards posed by exposure) (applying Louisiana law);
Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (D. Kan. 1990) ("In cases claiming
personal injury from exposure to toxic substances, it is essential that the plaintiff demonstrate that she was, in fact, exposed to harmful levels of such substances.") (applying Kansas law); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) (holding that proof that
the plaintiff's anxiety was proximately caused by exposure to asbestos is a prerequisite to
recovery for fear of cancer) (applying Maine law).
46. See, e.g., Adams v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a plaintiff cannot recover for fear of developing cancer in the future absent proof that
he sustained an injury resulting from asbestos exposure) (applying Louisiana law);Jackson
v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 413-14 (5th Cir. 1986) (ruling that the plaintiff's fear of developing cancer in the future, given his asbestosis caused by the inhalation
of asbestos fibers, was a compensable present physical injury) (applying Mississippi law);
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that exposure
to asbestos absent manifest injuries is insufficient to constitute actual loss or damage under
the F.E.L.A.); In re Hawaii Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-70 (D. Haw. 1990)
(holding that a claimant seeking damages for fear of cancer due to asbestos exposure must
show knowledge of functional impairment before the fear is considered reasonable) (applying Hawaii law); Ball v.Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1367 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (holding that mere exposure to toxic substances is not a physical injury upon which emotional
distress damages may be recovered), affid sub nom. Ball v. Joy Technologies, Inc. 958 F.2d
36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 876 (1992); Bubash v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 717
F. Supp. 297, 300 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that in a claim for emotional injuries and fear
of cancer, mere exposure to radiation is not an actionable physical injury) (applying Pennsylvania law); Sypert v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 546-47 (D.D.C. 1983) (ruling that the
plaintiff could not recover mental anguish damages following exposure to active tuberculosis since the plaintiff did not develop the disease and therefore suffered no physical injury)
(applying Virginia law); Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983) (holding
that women who ingested DES but suffered no physical symptoms could not recover for
heightened fear of future medical problems); De Stories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705,
707-08 (Ariz. App. 1987) (holding that absent proof that physical injury occurred or was
likely to occur, exposure to asbestos dust is not a legally compensable injury).
47. Maryland courts have been reluctant to allow recovery for speculative future injuries. See Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026
(1983) ("In Maryland, recovery of damages based on future consequences of an injury may
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The majority of courts that have addressed the issue of whether a
claimant can recover in tort for the fear of developing AIDS have
adopted the rule that recovery is contingent upon proof of actual exposure to HIV.4" Following the majority rule applied in fear of disease
cases outside the AIDS context, some courts have restricted recovery
for fear of AIDS to those cases in which the plaintiff can establish that
exposure to HIV resulted in a physical injury, which may take the
form of an HIV-positive test result. 49 A small minority of courts has
departed from the general rule that, at a minimum, a claimant must
demonstrate actual exposure to the AIDS virus to recover for fear of

be had only if such consequences are reasonably probable or reasonably certain. Such
damages cannot be recovered if future consequences are 'mere possibilities.'").
48. The most frequently cited "AIDS phobia" case is Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F.
Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990). In Burk, a paramedic sustained a needle stick injury, but could
not prove that the needle had come in contact with HIV-infected blood. The Burk court
held that absent proof that the plaintiff was exposed to the AIDS virus, he could not recover for fear of contracting the disease. Id. at 288; accord Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993
WL 228394, at *7 (Idaho Ct. App. June 29, 1993) (noting that "by imposing a standard of
actual exposure, the law ensures that there exists a rational, non-speculative basis for the
fear of developing [a] disease" and holding that a wife's fear of having contracted the AIDS
virus as a result of husband's extra-marital affair was not compensable absent a showing
that husband or husband's partner was infected with the virus); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that a surgeon did not have a
viable claim for fear of having contracted the AIDS virus based on his operating on an HIVinfected patient absent any allegation of an unusual occurrence during the operation);
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding that a wife failed to
state a claim for fear of AIDS in an action based on her husband's failure to disclose that
he had a homosexual relationship, since she made no allegation that she or her husband
actually contracted the disease); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(holding that a hospital employee's fear of AIDS after having been bitten by a patient
rumored to be HIV-positive was not compensable since there was no proof that the patient
was infected with the AIDS virus); Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 889, 894
(W. Va. 1991) (holding that recovery for fear of AIDS requires proof that the plaintiff was
exposed to the AIDS virus as a result of a physical injury and that a police officer bitten by
an HIV-infected person satisfied this requirement); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that the mortician's fear
of developing AIDS as a result of handling an HIV-infected corpse was unreasonable and
not a legally compensable injury in the absence of actual exposure to HIV) (applying West
Virginia law).
49. See, e.g., Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (N.D. Il. 1988)
(ruling that the wife of a hemophiliac was to be denied recovery for fear of AIDS because,
although she was within the "zone of danger," she failed to allege any physical injury or
illness); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that recovery for fear of AIDS would be denied where plaintiff could produce no evidence
of physical injury or harm as a result of exposure to HIV); Petri v. Bank of N.Y., 582
N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) ("Someone who has been exposed to HIV infection
but has not come down with it has not suffered a physical injury for which a recovery in
damages may be allowed.").
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developing AIDS. 50 In these cases, the plaintiff's fear of AIDS "was
tied to a distinct event which could cause a reasonable person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like AIDS," such as a puncture
wound from a hypodermic needle.51
3.

The Court's Reasoning.-

a. Duty to Disclose HIV Status.-Although the trial court did
not address the duty to inform issue, the Court of Appeals examined
the question of duty and stated that it could not rule, as a matter of
law, that "no duty was imposed upon Almaraz to warn the appellants
of his infected condition or to refrain from operating upon them.""
The court cited the foreseeability and seriousness of the potential
harm,5" as well as the professional and ethical guidelines set forth by
the American Medical Association (AMA)," as factors to be considered when evaluating the existence of a legal duty.
50. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
the plaintiff could bring a F.E.L.A. action for fear of AIDS after having been pricked with a
hypodermic needle, the source and contaminants of which were unknown); Castro v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (holding that a janitor who was
pricked by a soiled, discarded hypodermic needle of unknown origin in an insurance company office had a viable cause of action for fear of AIDS); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Servs., No.02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *3-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a plaintiff, who sustained a needle prick from a discarded hypodermic needle in a hospital waste container, stated a viable cause of action for fear of AIDS even
though she could not prove the needle was contaminated with HIV); see also Marriott v.
Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that a seaman could
recover under the Jones Act for fear of contracting AIDS as a result of having been inoculated with a vaccine contaminated with HIV under either the strict exposure rule or the
more lenient minority rule, because he tested HIV-positive and could prove direct exposure to the virus).
51. Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
52. Faya, 329 Md. at 450, 620 A.2d at 334.
53. Id. at 448-49, 620 A.2d at 333.
54. Id. at 450, 620 A.2d at 334. The Court noted that, according to the AMA,
transmission of HIV from an infected physician to a patient has not yet been
reported, but it is a theoretical possibility during invasive procedures. It is a longstanding AMA policy that when the scientific basis for patient protection policy
decisions are unclear, the physician must err on the side of protecting patients ....

HIV-infected physicians ...

should refrain from performing proce-

dures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission or perform these
procedures only with the consent of the patient and the permission of a local
review committee.
Id. (quoting the policy statement of the AMA House of Delegates).
Prior to Faya's and Rossi's surgeries, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) published
recommendations and guidelines for preventing the transmission of HIV (HTLV-III/LAV)
from health care workers (HCWs) to patients, which stated:
[A] risk of transmission of HTLV-III/LAV infection from HCWs to patients would
exist in situations where there is both (1) a high degree of trauma to the patient
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The court first applied its holding in B.N.,55 that foreseeability of
transmission of an infectious disease gives rise to a duty to inform
others of the risk of infection or to refrain from risky contact, to the
allegations in Faya's and Rossi's complaints. 6 In light of the foreseeability standard recognized in B.N., the court stated that it could not
rule, as a matter of law, that Almaraz had no duty to inform Faya and
Rossi of his condition or to refrain from performing surgery since,
based on their allegations, "it was foreseeable that Dr. Almaraz might
transmit the AIDS virus to his patients during invasive surgery."57 The
court also stated that the low probability of transmission of HIV during invasive surgery did not alter its determination.5 8 The court acknowledged that general tort principles, as well as Maryland case law,
recognize that the "seriousness of potential harm ...contributes to a

that would provide a portal of entry for the virus (e.g., during invasive procedures) and (2) access of blood or serous fluid from the infected HCW to the open
tissue of a patient, as could occur if the HCW sustains a needlestick or scalpel
injury during an invasive procedure.... Whether... restrictions are indicated for
HCWs who perform invasive procedures is currently being considered.
Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with
Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type II/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in the Workplace, 34
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 686, 691-95 (1985).
With respect to the management of infected HCWs, subsequent guidelines have
stated:
The question of whether workers infected with HlV-especially those who perform invasive procedures-can adequately and safely be allowed to perform patient-care duties ...must be determined on an individual basis. These decisions

should be made by the health-care worker's personal physician(s) in conjunction
with the medical directors and personnel health service staff of the employing
institution or hospital.
Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in HealthCare Settings, 36 MoRBIDrrv & MORTALrY WEEKLY REP. 1, 1-18S (1987).
55. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
56. Faya, 329 Md. at 448, 620 A.2d at 333.
57. Id. Considerable debate exists within the medical community about the actual risk
of transmission of HIV from an HIV-infected surgeon to patients during invasive surgical

procedures. One comprehensive study estimates the risk to be between 0.3-0.4%. SeeJulie
L. Gerberding & William P. Schecter, Surgery and AIDS: Reducing the Risk, 265 JAMA 1572

(1991). The Faya court noted that research conducted between 1985 and 1989 found no
documented cases of HIV-transfer from a surgeon to a patient and that the risk of HIVtransfer from patients to health care workers has been estimated at 0.3% per exposure.
Faya, 329 Md. at 332 n.3, 620 A.2d at 446 n.3. See generallyJohnson, supra note 31, at 488
(citing research indicating that the emerging consensus in the medical community is that
the risk of physician-to-patient transmission is small, but real). But see Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and AIDS, 48 MD. L. REv. 12 (1989) (arguing that the risk of
HIV transmission is too low to justify systematic screening of health-care workers or
patients).
58. Faya, 329 Md. at 449, 620 A.2d at 333.
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duty to prevent it,"59 and reasoned that "[w] hile it may be unlikely that
an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS virus to a patient during
surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the virus is transmitted."6"
The court did not look to the Sard doctrine when assessing
whether Faya's and Rossi's pleadings on the duty issue were sufficient
to overcome the defendant's motions to dismiss. At the conclusion of
its discussion of legal duty, however, the court noted the patient-oriented standards for measuring a physician's duty to obtain informed
consent set forth in Sard.6 t The court further stated that "negligence
is a relative term, to be decided upon the facts of each particular case,
and consequently, it is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined
by the fact-finder."6 2 Given Faya's and Rossi's factual allegations, the
court concluded that it could not hold, as a matter of law, that "Dr.
Almaraz was not guilty of negligence due to his claimed failure to
communicate that he was HIV-positive.""
b. Recovery for Fear of ContractingAIDS. -The court next examined the trial court's determination that Faya and Rossi failed to
state a legally compensable injury.6 4 Having surveyed the rules governing recovery in fear of disease cases in and out of the AIDS context,65 the court rejected the strict rules of actual exposure adopted by
the trial court. 66 Reasoning that a rule making a plaintiff's recovery
contingent upon proof of actual exposure to the AIDS virus would
"unfairly punish [the plaintiff] for lacking the requisite information to
do so,"6 7 the court held that Faya's and Rossi's fear of contracting

AIDS, without an allegation that they were actually exposed to the
AIDS virus, was not initially unreasonable as a matter of law.6 8
To support its conclusion, the court relied on the rule adopted by
a minority of courts that proof of actual exposure to HIV is not neces59. Id. (citing Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 293C cmt. c (1965); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (5th ed. 1984)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 450 n.6, 620 A.2d at 334 n.6.
62. Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 339.
63. Id. at 459-60, 620 A.2d at 339.
64. Id. at 451, 620 A.2d at 334.
65. See id. at 451-55, 620 A.2d at 335-36 (discussing "AIDS phobia" cases). For further
discussion, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
66. See Faya, 329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 336-37. In particular, the court rejected the
Burk rule, which served as the basis of the trial court's dismissal of Faya's and Rossi's complaints. Id. For further discussion of Burk, see supra note 48.
67. Faya, 329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337.
68. See id.
(SECOND)
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sary for plaintiffs to recover for fear of AIDS.69 In particular, the Faya
court cited the Tennessee intermediate appellate court ruling in Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services.7" In Carroll, the court held
that a genuine factual dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff's fear
of contracting AIDS was reasonable, even though the plaintiff, who
was pricked by a soiled hypodermic needle in a hospital, could not
prove exposure to the AIDS virus or physical injury in the form of an
HIV-positive test result.7" The Carrollcourt limited the plaintiff's recovery for mental anguish associated with fear of AIDS to the period
of time beginning with the needle prick
until the time that "other
7 2
factors ma[de] the fear unreasonable."
Following Carroll, the Faya court also limited the period of time
for which damages relating to one's fear of contracting AIDS may be
recovered. The court stated that "once [Faya and Rossi] learned of
their HIV-negative status more than a year after their respective surgeries, the possibility of their contracting AIDS from Dr. Almaraz became extremely unlikely and thus, as a matter of law, might be
deemed unreasonable."" The court ruled that they may seek recovery for "their fear and its physical manifestations" resulting from Almaraz's alleged negligence only for the time period constituting a
"reasonable window of anxiety-that period between which they
'
learned of Almaraz's illness and received their HIV-negative results."74
The court also discussed the standards under Maryland law for
recovery of emotional injuries in tort. According to the court, Vance
and its precursors set forth the rules that govern recovery for emotional injuries associated with the fear of developing a disease. 75 Following the rule of Vance, Faya and Rossi may recover for emotional
suffering, fear and its physical manifestations proximately caused by
Almaraz's alleged breach of a legal duty owed to them so long as they
can objectively demonstrate the existence of the injuries. 76 In light of
the court's determination in Vance that a deteriorated physical appearance and the inability to sleep or function normally were objective
69. See id. at 453-54, 620 A.2d at 335-36; see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
70. No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing a
lower court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant in an action seeking damages
for fear of contracting AIDS).
71. Id. at *5.
72. Id.
73. Faya, 329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337. The court based its conclusion regarding the
reasonableness of the fear on the scientific evidence that there is a 95% certainty that one
will test HIV-positive within six months of exposure. Id.
74. Id. at 455-56, 620 A.2d at 337.
75. Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39; see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
76. Faya, 329 Md. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39.
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manifestations of legally compensable injuries," the court indicated
that Faya's and Rossi's allegations regarding their fear of contracting
AIDS and accompanying headaches and sleeplessness likewise fall
within the scope of injuries recoverable under existing Maryland tort
78
law.
c. Other Counts.-The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by stating that the trial court erred in not allowing ajury to assess
the reasonableness of Almaraz's and Hopkins's alleged conduct or
79
Faya's and Rossi's alleged emotional response to that conduct.
Since Faya and Rossi alleged the same damages in their other counts,
the court concluded that the trial court's dismissal of all other counts
because of the failure to aver a legally compensable injury was likewise
premature and improper.80 Moreover, the court found that Rossi and
Faya alleged sufficient factual allegations as to Hopkins's representations that Almaraz was its agent to preclude a ruling that the complaints were legally insufficient to aver such an agency relationship.8 1
4. Analysis.a. Duty to Disclose HIV Status.-The court's determination
that it could not rule, as a matter of law, that Almaraz had no duty to
refrain from invasive surgical procedures is consistent with prior Maryland case law and traditional tort principles governing the standard of
a physician's general duty of care.82 The duty owed by a physician to
her patient is, in part, measured by the prevailing customs and norms
of the medical profession.8 3 The practice and ethical guidelines of
the AMA and CDC, for example, advise that a physician refrain from
procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission or perform
such procedures only with the consent of the patient and the permission of a review committee. 84 Furthermore, in B.N., the court imposed a general duty on all persons infected with a serious and
contagious disease to refrain from conduct likely to jeopardize the
77. Id. at 458-59, 620 A.2d at 338 (discussing symptoms of mental states evidencing
physical injuries in Vance).

78. Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338-39.
79. Id., 620 A.2d at 339.
80. Id. at 460-61, 620 A.2d at 339.
81. Id. at 460, 620 A.2d at 339.

82. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing medical negligence standards under Maryland law).
83. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 54 (quoting AMA and CDC practice and ethical guidelines regarding
transmission of HIV from health care workers to patients).

1994]

HEALTH CARE

937

health of others or to warn those at risk of the possibility of infection. 5 Whether Almaraz's activities posed a substantial risk to his patients raises a medical question beyond the expertise of the judiciary.
The Court of Appeals properly refrained from removing the issues of
duty and breach from the trier of fact in this action alleging negligence on the part of a physician.
The wisdom of the court's decision concerning Almaraz's duty to
disclose his HIV status, however, is not so clear.8 6 In concluding that
it would not rule that Almaraz owed no duty to his patients to disclose
his HIV infection before operating on them,8 7 the court has suggested
that a speculative risk 8 resulting from a personal attribute of a physician may be construed as a "material risk" that must be disclosed to a
patient. Insofar as the court's opinion may indicate that a physician
should inform her patients of her HIV infection before performing
surgery, the decision suggests that a physician's duty under Sard is
considerably broader in scope than prior decisions under Maryland
law would indicate.8 9 Under Faya, an assortment of physician specific
information, including the condition of a physician's health as well as
highly speculative risks inherent in the procedure or treatment, may
be construed to fall within the scope of the patient-oriented concept
of "material risk." This possible expansion of the physician's duty to
obtain informed consent may create a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the type of information physicians must disclose.9 °
85. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
87. Faya, 329 Md. at 450, 620 A.2d at 334.
88. See supra note 57.

89. See supra note 36. The court only mentioned Sard in a footnote, however, and did
not expressly state that the trial court's dismissal was improper given a physician's duty to
obtain informed consent. Faya, 329 Md. at 450 n.6, 620 A.2d at 334 n.6.
90. For example, would a surgeon's drug addiction or the fact that she has worked a
continuous double-shift constitute a "material risk"? A hospital's duty is also unclear. Will
a hospital, under the principles of vicarious liability, be required to monitor its physicians'
conduct in order to uncover behavior which may constitute a "material risk"?
Furthermore, an expanded duty to obtain informed consent could significantly increase the cost and complexity of health care administration. If a surgeon is required to
tell her patients that she is a carrier of the AIDS virus, one may argue that other health-care
workers, such as nurses or phlebotomists, pose a similar risk to patients and also should be
required to disclose their HIV status. Once this duty to disclose is imposed upon healthcare workers, the health-care industry may seek protection in the form of mandatory AIDS
testing of all surgical patients. Who will pay for the administration and enforcement of
mandatory testing of patients and health-care workers? Who will control the information
once it is obtained?
Professor Karen Rothenberg has introduced a compromise position taking into account the right of privacy of health-care workers' and patients' right to information. See
Karen H. Rothenberg et al., Comment, The AIDS Project: Creating a Public Health Policy-
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b. Damagesfor Fear of ContractingAJDS.--In Faya, the Court
of Appeals announced the Maryland rule for recovery in tort for the
fear of having contracted the AIDS virus. A plaintiff may recover damages for fear of AIDS without showing actual exposure to the HIV virus until such time that factors, such as negative results of an HIV test,
indicate that the fear is clearly unreasonable. 9 ' Unless the court
chooses to distinguish AIDS from other diseases, the decision also is
likely to set the standard in Maryland for fear of disease cases
generally.
Despite the importance of this holding and the fact that it adopts
a minority rule, the court offered only one justification for its decision: the majority rule making fear of disease damages contingent on
proof of exposure to a toxin or disease-causing agent is unfair to plaintiffs.9" While the court's interest in fairness to those whose health has
been jeopardized by the wrongful acts of others is laudable, it is but
one of the important concerns that should have guided the court in
reaching its decision.
The Faya court did not properly address the main concern raised
by the trial court and by those jurisdictions that have adopted the exposure rule, namely that fear of AIDS absent proof of exposure to HIV
is too speculative to warrant legal compensation." The physical injury
test under VanceP4 and the "reasonable window of anxiety" limitation 9 5
imposed by the Faya court are inadequate to weed out unreasonable
claims. These restrictions merely limit the type and quantity of damages that may be recovered; they provide no guidance for assessing
when the basis for one's fear is irrational or too speculative to merit
judicial consideration. Thus, the Faya court has made it possible for a
claimant to pursue legal remedies, as did Faya and Rossi, for the fear
that she was possibly exposed to a disease-causing substance and may
possibly develop a disease in the future if the initial exposure actually
took place.
Apart from its concern for fairness to plaintiffs, the court offered
no additional justification for adopting the minority rule. This omisRights and Obligations of Health Care Workers, 48 MD. L. REv. 93, 124 (1989). She has stated
that "[i]t may be best to pre-operatively inform each patient that there is a very small risk of
HIV seroconversion from falsely negative blood transfusions and from unknowingly seropositive HCWs who bleed into the operative wound after an inadvertent skin puncture."
Id.
91. See Faya, 329 Md. at 453-54, 455, 620 A.2d at 335-36, 337.
92. Id. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337; see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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sion is especially troublesome since the majority rule rationale-that
to be actionable, the fear of disease "must be based on more than
96
mere possibility of exposure to a disease or disease causing agent"

conforms with Maryland case law. For example, in Pierce v. Johns
Manville Sales Corp.,9 7 the Court of Appeals held that recovery of damages based on future consequences of an injury is permitted only if
such consequences are reasonably probable and not mere possibilities.9" Furthermore, the rationale of Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Services,99 which guided the Faya court, is suspect and offers no
compelling reason for why the exposure rule should be rejected. 0 °
The Faya court also failed to distinguish the facts of Faya from
those cases in which courts have adhered to the minority view. In
both Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co.10 a and Carroll, which were
cited in Faya, the plaintiffs' fear of AIDS developed after they had
been pricked by needles contaminated with unidentified substances."0 2 Unlike Faya and Rossi, these plaintiffs' fear of AIDS was
tied to a distinct event whereby transmission of the HIV virus was possible. Although transmission of HIV from a surgeon to a patient during invasive surgery is possible if a surgical accident occurs, neither
Faya nor Rossi alleged an analogous event, such as a scalpel cut during
surgery, whereby their blood and Almaraz's was allowed to commingle. Based on this distinction, one could argue that because of the
Faya court's decision to permit recovery for fear of contracting AIDS
absent proof of exposure to HIV or of an event whereby transmission
of the virus was made possible, Maryland has adopted the most lenient
standard in this country for recovery for fear of AIDS.
In addition, the court overlooked the unfair burdens on defendants that are likely to result from this decision. Given the Vance
court's broad definition of "physical injury" and the Faya court's rejection of an exposure requirement, Maryland courts are likely to encounter a surge in the number of toxic tort litigants seeking recovery
96. Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 WL 228394, at *7 (Idaho App. June 29, 1993).
97. 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1029 (1983).
98. Id. at 666, 464 A.2d at 1026.
99. No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. App. 1992).
100. In Carroll the court reasoned that the plaintiffs fear of AIDS was reasonable, and
hence, compensable, despite his inability to prove actual exposure to HIV, because it is
"medically presumed" among health-care professionals that all body substances and all instruments have been contaminated with HIV. Id at *4. Both the Carroll and Faya courts
failed to consider that health-care workers presume all instruments and substances are
HIV-contaminated as a safety precaution, not because this presumption accurately reflects
the incidence of HIV contamination.
101. 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
102. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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for fear of developing a disease. As a result of the Faya decision, Maryland may join a handful of courts that
invite claims, and allow recovery, for the fear of AIDS where
the plaintiff had undergone a blood transfusion, for the fear
of developing tuberculosis based on evidence that a person
coughed in the plaintiff's face, or for fear of cancer where
the plaintiff had inhaled or ingested an unknown substance,
all without any proof that a disease-causing agent was
3
present. 10

Not only will the court's ruling impose considerable financial hardships on parties required to defend against these lawsuits, 1°4 but the
decision encourages intolerance and misunderstanding regarding the
manner in which certain diseases are contracted or transmitted. The
possibility alone of encouraging irrational fears of AIDS should have
suggested to the court that further safeguards are needed before fear
of a disease is deemed compensable.
5. Conclusion.-In Faya, the Court of Appeals addressed an interesting question regarding the scope of a physician's duty to obtain
informed consent. More importantly, it failed to give adequate consideration to the effects likely to ensue from its determination that a
plaintiff need not allege actual exposure to HIV in order to state a
viable claim for fear of developing AIDS in the future. The court's
decision is likely to serve as a general rule for recovery in tort for fear
of having contracted a disease. It also is likely to encourage the filing
of lawsuits by parties seeking compensation for irrational fears of developing a disease in the future.
JOANNE

B. JARQUIN

103. Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 WL 228394, at *7 (Idaho App. June 29, 1993).
104. The Fayadecision has already begun to have an impact on "AIDS-phobia" litigation

across the United States. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, No. B065917, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS
883 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1993) (citing Faya in support of the decision to allow recovery
for fear of AIDS absent proof of exposure to HV).
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Automobile Insurance Rates and Older Drivers

In Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO) v. Insurance Commissioner,' the Court of Appeals held that insurance companies violate
article 48A, section 240F of the Insurance Code when they automatically increase premiums for policyholders upon reaching age sixtyfive.2 To reach this conclusion, the court harmonized conflicting provisions of the Insurance Code through principles of statutory
construction.
1. The Case.-In response to complaints that automobile insurance premiums increase when drivers turn sixty-five years of age, the
Insurance Division of the State of Maryland conducted a hearing to
review the rating practices of a number of insurers, including GEICO.3 The purpose of the hearing was to determine if the rate increases complied with two provisions of the Insurance Code,4 sections
240F5 and 242(c) (2).'
The Commissioner found that GEICO based its rates on a
number of factors, including age.' GEICO's rate structure incorporated a number of age categories, two of which grouped drivers aged
fifty to sixty-four and sixty-five to seventy-four.8 Each age category was
assigned a different rating factor, which increased at age sixty-five. 9
The rating factor was multiplied by a base rate set by GEICO, resulting
in higher premiums for a driver who moved from the age fifty to sixtyfour category into the age sixty-five to seventy-four category, regardless
of the driver's record. ° The Commissioner did not dispute the actual. 332 Md. 124, 630 A.2d 713 (1993).
2. See id. at 126, 630 A.2d at 714; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240F (1991).
3. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 127, 630 A.2d at 714-15.
4. See id., 630 A.2d at 715.
5. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240F (1991); see infra text accompanying note 27 (quoting § 240F).
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 242(c) (2) (1991); see infra text accompanying note 17
(quoting pertinent portions of § 242(c)).
7. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 127, 630 A.2d at 715 (quoting the Commissioner's findings).
8. Id.
9. Joint Record Extract at 124. The evidence presented to the Commissioner indicated that the rating factor for drivers aged 50 to 64 in Maryland was 0.73. Id. The effect
of this rating factor was to set actual premiums for drivers in this category at 73% of the
base rate. For Maryland drivers aged 65 to 74, actual premiums were set at 80% of the base
rate because their rating factor was 0.80. Id.
10. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 128, 630 A.2d at 715. The higher rating factor was based on
actuarial computations that reflected a higher rate of accidents among older drivers, as
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rial justification for this practice, but ruled that GEICO violated section 240F by raising the premiums of drivers as they turned sixty-five.'"
Based on this ruling, the Commissioner ordered GEICO to discontinue use of the higher rating factor for drivers aged sixty-five and
older. 12
GEICO appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which
affirmed the Commissioner's decision.1 3 Prior to consideration by the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari' 4
and affirmed the circuit court's ruling.' 5
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Statutory Provisions.--Section 242 of the Insurance Code
contains guidelines by which automobile insurers must set their
rates. 1 6 Relevant parts of this section provide:
(1) Due consideration shall be given to (i) past and prospective loss experience within and outside this state; ... (iii) past

and prospective expenses both countrywide and those specially applicable to this State; ...

(viii) and to all other rele-

vant factors within and outside this State.
(2) Rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly
discriminatory....
(4) Risks may be grouped by classifications for the establishment of rates and minimum premiums. Classification rates
may be modified to produce rates for individual risks in accordance with rating plans which establish standards for
measuring variations in hazards or expense provisions, or
both. The standards may measure any difference among
risks that are demonstrated objectively to the Commissioner
well as a higher amount of claims paid by insurers. See id. at 127 & n.2, 630 A.2d at 715 &
n.2. For Maryland drivers aged 50 to 64, there were 14.93 accidents per 100 drivers, resulting in $1809 in damages for each accident. Joint Record Extract at 124. For drivers aged
65 to 74, the accident frequency increased to 15.08 per 100 drivers, with $1806 in damages
for each accident. Id. This increase in expected total dollar claims for drivers in the age 65
to 74 category resulted in premiums 7% higher for those drivers than for drivers in the age
50 to 64 category. See id.
11. GEICO, 332 Md. at 127-28, 630 A.2d at 715.
12. Id. at 128, 630 A.2d at 715.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 129, 630 A.2d at 715.
15. Id. at 126, 630 A.2d at 714.
16. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 242(a) (1991). The Code exempts certain classes of
insurers, but automobile insurers are not among those exempted. Id. § 242(b).
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to have had
a direct and substantial effect upon losses or
17
expenses.
The purpose of section 242 is to "promote the public welfare by regulating insurance rates to the end that they shall not be excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.""8 A number of states have similar
rating guidelines 9 and nearly identical provisions in their insurance
codes, indicating that this public policy goal is not unique to
Maryland.

2

1

On its face, section 242 appears to sanction the actuarial justification GEICO relied upon in setting rates for its customers aged sixtyfive and older.2 1 In 1972, however, the General Assembly enacted section 240F of the Insurance Code, 22 thereby laying the groundwork for
a judicial challenge to automobile insurers' rating practices with regard to older drivers.23
Section 240F succeeded an earlier statute that focused on the
making of underwriting decisions (whether to insure a driver) on the
basis of a driver's age. 24 The proposed bill underlying the statute prohibited basing underwriting decisions on the advanced age of the in26
sured, 25 which the legislature believed was against public policy.

Today, section 240F provides:
No policy or contract of motor vehicle insurance shall be
cancelled or nonrenewed exclusively for the reason of age of
the holder of the policy or contract, nor shall any premium
therefor be increased exclusively for the reason of age be27
yond 65 years of an insured under the policy or contract.
17. Id. § 242(c).
18. Id. § 241.
19. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-403 (West Supp. 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431:10C-202 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1404 (West 1978).
20. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-403(1) (West Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 431:1OC-202(1) (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1404(2) (West 1978).
21. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 129-30, 630 A.2d at 715.
22. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 394, 1972 Md. Laws 1263.
23. Insurers are required to submit documents relevant to any rate changes to the
Commissioner for review and for public inspection. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 242(d) (1)(6). The Commissioner has the power to disapprove a rate filing before it becomes effective, during a 30-day review period after it becomes effective, or at any later time provided
that a hearing is conducted. Id. § 242(0 (1)-(3). The rating practice found to violate
§ 240F in GEICO was not challenged until GEICO's 1988 rate filing was disapproved in
1992, 20 years after passage of the statute. Joint Record Extract at 51.
24. Act of April 23, 1969, ch. 175, 1969 Md. Laws 618.
25. Id.

26.
(1969).
27.

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF MAYLAND, REPORT TO THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF
MD. ANN. CODE

art. 48A, § 240F (1991).

1969, at 124

944

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:941

Thus, as enacted, section 240F indicates an intent to prevent insurers
from discriminating against drivers over the age of sixty-five in ratesetting practices as well as underwriting decisions.28
Section 240F appears in Subtitle 15 of the Insurance Code, which
is entitled "Unfair Trade Practices." This subtitle includes several
other sections prohibiting discrimination in underwriting and rate-setting.2 9 In contrast to other provisions of subtitle 15, however, section
240F prohibits discrimination even where there is actuarial justification."o The absence of a clause permitting actuarially justified discrimination in section 240F, when such clauses appear in other
sections, indicates the legislature's intent to preclude actuariallyjustified discrimination on the basis of age, but permit it on other bases,
such as sex and physical disability. As well-recognized principles of
statutory construction dictate, courts presume that any such omission
was intentional on the part of the legislature3" and refuse to "insert
...words to make [the] statute express intentions not evident in its
original form.""
The existence of section 240F alongside section 242 seemingly
presents a conflict. An insurer applying section 242(c) might believe
it permissible to raise premiums for a driver at age sixty-five since actuarial calculations support such an increase, while section 240F appears
to prohibit such a measure. 3 To determine how an insurer should set
its rates in the face of these conflicting directives, courts must look to
traditional principles of statutory construction.
b. Statutory Construction: Harmonizing Provisions In Pari
Materia.-As an aid to statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals
has traditionally relied on the long-held, though oft-criticized, canons
of statutory construction. 4 The first canon requires an examination
28. See id.
29. See id. §§ 226(c), 234A, 240F-1.
30. Compare § 240F with § 234A ("Actuarial justification may be considered with respect
to sex") and § 240F-1 ("The premium for... motor vehicle insurance may not be increased
solely because of the physical handicap or disability of the holder.., unless there is actuarial justification.").
31. See American Sec. & Trust Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 246 Md. 36, 41, 227
A.2d 214, 216-17 (1967) (stating that the absence of a term implied it was excluded on

purpose).
32. State v. Patrick A., 312 Md. 482, 487, 540 A.2d 810, 812 (1988); see also Management
Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d 310, 315 (1984).
33. See supra notes 17, 27 and accompanying text.
34. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
("[TJhe canons have long been with us. To a considerable extent they are founded on
both logic and common sense. Indeed, objections to them seem to be based more on the
way in which they have been used, rather than on their content.").
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of the language of the statute. s When, as in GEICO, two statutes may
be read to lead to conflicting results, the rule is to search for the purpose or intent of the legislature.3 6
Sections 242(c) and 240F of the Insurance Code concern the
same subject matter-rate-setting. As statutes in pari materia, they
must be "interpreted with reference to one another and harmonized
to the extent reasonably possible.""7 This rule applies even though
section 240F was enacted long after and makes no reference to section
242(c). 3 8 "It is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full
knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes that affect the
same subject matter to blend into a consistent and harmonious body
of law." 9
If harmonization is impossible,4" the conflict is resolved by again
looking to legislative intent, which "requires that the statute whose
relevant substantive provisions were enacted most recently be held to
have repealed by implication any conflicting provisions of the earlier
statute." 4 Repeal by implication, while sometimes necessary, is not
the solution preferred by the Court of Appeals.4 2 Instead, the court
attempts to reconcile the statutes, noting that "when two statutes, one
statute will
general and one specific, are found to conflict, the specific
41
statute."
general
the
to
exception
an
be regarded as
3. The Court's Reasoning; Analysis.-Although at first glance GEICO appears to implicate public policy issues concerning age discrimination, the court recognized that the sole issue in the case was one of
35. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990) ("When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the wording of the relevant provisions.").
36. See id. ("In the event that ambiguity clouds the precise application of the statute,
the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.");
see also Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 516, 525 A.2d at 633 ("The [legislative] purpose, in short,
determined in light of the statute's context, is the key.").
37. Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 56, 507 A.2d 172, 176
(1986); see also Coerper v. Comptroller of Treasury, 265 Md. 3, 6, 288 A.2d 187, 188 (1972)
("It is a hornbook rule of statutory construction that in ascertaining the intention of the
General Assembly all parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to
any one part, and that all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible.").
38. See Farmers & Merchants Bank, 306 Md. at 56, 507 A.2d at 176 ("This principle applies regardless of whether the statutes were enacted at different times and without reference to one another.").
39. Bricker, 321 Md. at 93, 581 A.2d at 12.
40. See Farmers & Merchants Bank, 306 Md. at 61-62, 507 A.2d at 179 (finding certain
provisions of the Code to be irreconcilable).
41. Id. at 61, 507 A.2d at 178-79.
42. See, e.g., id. at 61, 507 A.2d at 178; White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641,
644 n.2, 387 A.2d 260, 262 n.2 (1978).
43. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 306 Md. at 63, 507 A.2d at 180.
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statutory construction.4 4 Accordingly, the court began with an examination of the statutory language.45 GEICO argued that since its premiums for drivers aged sixty-five and older were actuarially justified,
its rates were never increased "exclusively" on the basis of age.46 It,
therefore, asserted that its rates did not violate section 240F and complied with section 242(c) (2)'s prohibition against "excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" rates.4 7
The Court of Appeals rejected GEICO's argument, reasoning
that section 240F must do more than prohibit rate increases that are
not actuarially justified.48 Since section 242 already prohibited such
rate-setting practices, GEICO's interpretation would mean that section 240F merely echoed section 242(c). 49 The court refused to apply
the interpretation proffered by GEICO since the General Assembly
expressed no such intent in the statute.5 0
Furthermore, by reading section 240F to allow rate increases
based on actuarial justification, GEICO was attempting to add words
to the statute. 5 1 The presence of other antidiscrimination statutes in
the Insurance Code allowing actuarially justified discrimination shows
that the General Assembly knew how to make such exceptions. Thus,
the absence of such an exception in section 240F must be presumed
to have been intentional.5 2
Section 242 generally permits insurers to base their rates on actuarial factors and group risks by classification for the establishment of
premiums.5" While drivers aged sixty-five and oldei are not mentioned, the Court of Appeals recognized that section 242 implicitly
allows insurers to group these drivers and raise their rates if actuarially
justified.5 4 Conversely, section 240F specifically prohibits such rate increases.55 Thus, the court recognized conflict between the two stat44. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 131, 630 A.2d at 717.
45. See id. (citations omitted).
46. See Brief of Petitioners at 9.
47. See GEICO,332 Md. at 133, 630 A.2d at 718; see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text (quoting pertinent portions of § 242(c)).
48. See GEICO, 332 Md. at 133, 630 A.2d at 718.
49. See id. The Court of Appeals disfavors interpretations of statutes that render statutory language meaningless. See, e.g., Management Personnel Servs. v. Sandefur, 300 Md.
332, 341, 478 A.2d 310, 315 (1984); White v. Prince George's County, 282 Md. 641, 644 n.2,
387 A.2d 260, 262 n.2 (1978).
50. GEICO, 332 Md. at 134-35, 630 A.2d at 718-19.
51. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

54. GEICO, 332 Md. at 134-35 & n.7, 630 A.2d at 718-19 & n.7.
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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utes56 and properly looked to the rules of statutory construction to
resolve it.57 The court interpreted the more specific statute, section
240F, as an exception to the general statute, section 242.58 According
to the court's rationale, section 242 enables insurers to raise rates on
the basis of age, if actuariallyjustified, for all drivers except those sixtyfive and older, who are protected by section 240F. 9 The court's reasoning was sound, as any other conclusion would have violated a canon of construction by rendering section 240F meaningless. 60
GEICO also argued that the prohibition against actuarially justified rate increases for drivers sixty-five and over rendered the word
"exclusively" in section 240F meaningless.6 1 The Court of Appeals
convincingly refuted this argument, citing as an example two drivers
with identical driving records, one aged sixty-three and the other aged
sixty-four.6 2 The court noted that upon his next birthday, the second
driver's rates would increase, while the first driver's rates would remain the same.6" Since the second driver's rate, even though justified
actuarially, would not have increased but for his turning sixty-five, the
court reasoned that the increase was based "exclusively" on age.'
As a result of the GEICO court's decision, Maryland insurers can
no longer automatically increase car insurance premiums for insureds
upon their sixty-fifth birthday. Moreover, the court's analysis of the
statutory provisions supports the conclusion that this was precisely the
intent of the General Assembly when it enacted section 240F.6 5
Although properly decided from a legal perspective, the GEICO
decision will arguably confer a windfall upon drivers aged sixty-five
56. GEICO, 332 Md. at 135, 630 A.2d at 719.
57. See id. at 132-33, 630 A.2d at 718 ("Where provisions of one of the statutes deal with
the common subject generally and those of the other do so more specifically, the statutes
may be harmonized by viewing the more specific statute as an exception to the more general one.").
58. Id. at 135, 630 A.2d at 719.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 7.
62. GEICO, 332 Md. at 136, 630 A.2d at 719.

63. Id. GEICO argued that a driver's rates might actually decrease at age 65, but this
depends on a change in other factors. Petitioners' Brief at 9. An example of these other
factors is the driver's retirement at age 65, resulting in fewer miles driven weekly and annually. Id. at 5. The example used by the Court of Appeals, however, is dependent on no
change other than an increase in age from 64 to 65. GEICO, 332 Md. at 136, 630 A.2d at
719.
64. GEICO, 332 Md. at 136-37, 630 A.2d at 719-20. At proceedings before the Insurance Commission, GEICO's counsel conceded this conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals. SeeJoint Record Extract at 65-66.
65. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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and over. For example, insurers may continue to charge drivers
under the age of twenty-five higher premiums because, as a group,
they pose a higher risk of accidents and generate higher total claims,
yet they may not increase rates for drivers over sixty-five even though,
as a group, they also pose a higher risk.6 6 In effect, the GEICO decision allows drivers over sixty-five to pay insurance premiums that do
not cover the expenses they impose on the insurance system.6 7 Thus,
insurers will have to find other ways of covering these expenses. They
could absorb the shortfall themselves, but it is more likely that they
will spread the costs of the shortfall over the entire pool of insured
drivers. Thus, drivers below age sixty-five will not only have to pay the
full cost of the risk posed by their rating group, but also a portion of
the cost posed by drivers over sixty-five. The Court of Appeals, however, correctly interpreted the statute; the anomalies caused by its decision are the result of flaws in the statutory scheme, not the court's
reasoning. As the court noted, only the General Assembly can remedy
the unfair effects of the statutory scheme.68
4. Conclusion.-In GEICO, the Court of Appeals held that section 240F of the Insurance Code prohibits insurers from automatically
raising a driver's automobile insurance premiums upon reaching age
sixty-five. In so holding, the court soundly applied the principles of
statutory construction and properly forwarded the legislative intent to
prevent insurers from setting premiums for older drivers in a discriminatory manner. Unfortunately, the decision may have the effect of
insulating older drivers from paying the full cost of their insurance,
unfairly shifting a greater financial burden onto drivers under the age
of sixty-five.
SHAWN J. SEFRET

B.

New Life for the Claims-Made Liability Policy in Maryland

In T.H.E. Insurance Co. v. P. T.P. Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals modified its decision in St. Paul Fire and MarineInsurance Co. v. Hous? on
the application of Article 48A, section 482 of the Code' to claimsmade liability insurance policies. Adopting the reasoning of the House
66. See Brief of Petitioners app. at 6.
67. This discussion assumes that the insurance system is a closed universe, in which
total premiums exactly cover total expenses imposed by those insured.
68. GEICO, 332 Md. at 137 n.8, 630 A.2d at 720 n.8.
1. 331 Md. 406, 628 A.2d 223 (1993).
2. 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989).
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1991).
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dissent, the court resolved the inherent tension between section 482
and claims-made policies 4 in favor of the insurer in situations where
the insured submits a claim after the policy's termination. 5 In so doing, the court followed the national trend toward continuing the viability of the claims-made form of coverage, 6 a cost-effective
innovation, which, if drafted with reasonable clarity, benefits both insurers and policyholders.
1. The Case.-InApril 1987, P.T.P. Inc. ("P.T.P."), a corporation
operating a waterslide and go-kart track near Ocean City, 7 obtained a
comprehensive general liability policy from T.H.E. Insurance Company ("T.H.E.") through the brokerage of Atlantic Insurance Associates ("Atlantic").' The policy was effective from April 2, 1987,
through April 2, 1988.' It insured against bodily injury and property
damage claims submitted during that year, provided that the "occurrence" occasioning the claim transpired on or after April 2, 1987,10
and the insured reported the occurrence on or before June 1, 1988,
the last day of the policy's sixty-day extended reporting period."
On August 27, 1987, a P.T.P. go-kart in which nine-year-old Lisa
Buckley was a passenger collided with a barrier. 12 Buckley's mother
treated her daughter's injuries at the scene,'" and she and her daughter left the track without further medical assistance.' 4 P.T.P. did not
notify T.H.E. of this occurrence before its original policy with T.H.E.
4. Inherent tension exists between notice-prejudice provisions, which tend to extend
the permissible notice period, and claims-made policies, which strictly limit the notice period to the duration of the policy and cover only claims for which notice is given during
the policy period.
5. TH.E.Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 415-16, 628 A.2d at 224, 227-28.
6. Id. at 416, 628 A.2d at 228.
7. Id. at 408, 628 A.2d at 223; Brief of Appellant at 2.
8. TH.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 628 A.2d at 224.
9. Id.
10. Id. April 2, 1987, was the "retroactive date" for the policy; claims arising from occurrences preceding the retroactive date were not covered. Id.at 408 n.1, 628 A.2d at 224
n.1. Insurance policies commonly include retroactive dates to minimize the set of potential claims. See Sol Kroll, "Claims Made--Industry's Alternative: "Pay as You Go" Products
Liability Insurance, 637 INs. LJ. 63, 69 (1976).
11. TH.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 412, 628 A.2d at 226.
12. Id. at 408, 628 A.2d at 223-24. Buckley's uncle was driving the kart. Brief of Appellant at 4. Interestingly, the T.H.E. policy at issue excluded coverage of accidents involving
karts containing more than one person at a time. Id.at 26-35; Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant at 22-29; Brief of Appellees Atlantic Insurance Associates and Alfred V. Melson at
16-19. Although all parties raised this issue, the Court of Appeals chose not to address it.
13. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 628 A.2d at 224. The injuries consisted of pancreatic damage and a lip laceration. Brief of Appellant at 4.
14. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 628 A.2d at 224.
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expired on April 2, 1988.15 T.H.E. granted P.T.P. a renewal policy for
the period from May 27, 1988 to May 27, 1989.6 The renewal policy,
occurrences that
like the original, only covered claims arising from
17
transpired on or after the first date of coverage.
On June 6, 1988, sixty-five days after the initial policy's expiration
and five days after the end of its extended reporting period, counsel
for Buckley submitted to P.T.P. a written claim for damages arising
from the August 27, 1987 accident. 8 Subsequently, P.T.P. informed
Atlantic, which notified T.H.E. 9 On June 23, 1988, T.H.E. denied
20
coverage of the Buckley claim.
Buckley then filed an initial action, which ultimately was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.2" T.H.E. did not defend in this action.22 On April 18, 1990,
P.T.P. filed a complaint against T.H.E., Atlantic, and Atlantic's president, Alfred Melson, seeking a declaratory judgment on T.H.E.'s obligation to defend and indemnify for the Buckley claim. P.T.P. also
claimed damages for breach of the insurance contract,2 3 and further
alleged negligence against Atlantic and Melson, both of whom crossclaimed against T.H.E.2 4 All parties moved for summary judgment.25
The trial court granted summary judgment for P.T.P., establishing
T.H.E.'s obligation to defend and indemnify and awarding damages.2 6
T.H.E. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. 27 The Court of Appeals, however, granted certiorari on its own motion to resolve the
15. Id.
16. Id. P.T.P. unsuccessfully argued that, because during preliminary negotiations
T.H.E. and Melson designated the policy a "renewal," trade norms demanded continued
coverage of occurrences transpiring after the initialpolicy's retroactive date. Furthermore,
P.T.P. alleged that after T.H.E. received the Buckley claim, it "improperly advanced the
retroactive date" in the renewal policy under negotiation. Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant at 3-5. Appellee Alfred Melson, President of Atlantic, also alleged that T.H.E.'s
underwriter assured Melson that the renewal policy would contain the original policy's
retroactive date and would afford continuous coverage. Brief of Appellees Atlantic Insurance Associates and Alfred V. Melson at 3.
17. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 628 A.2d at 224.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 408-09, 628 A.2d at 224.
21. Id. at 409, 628 A.2d at 224.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. The basis of the negligence claim was failure to place proper insurance coverage. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 409-10, 628 A.2d at 224-25. The trial court based the amount of damages on
P.T.P.'s cost of defense. Id.
27. Id. at 410, 628 A.2d at 225.
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issue of section 482's applicability to claims filed after the expiration
date of claims-made policies.2 8
2. Legal Background.--Section 482 is a notice-prejudice provision
that forbids "any insurer" to deny coverage solely because the insured
has breached the policy by not cooperating with or not giving the requisite notice to the insurer, unless the insurer establishes by a preponderance of affirmative evidence that the noncooperation or
inadequate notification actually prejudiced its interests. 29 Notice-prejudice provisions exist in a majority of states by legislative, administrative, or judicial creation."0 They serve two purposes: to protect
insureds from inequitable forfeitures of purchased coverage on immaterial grounds,"1 and to protect insurers' interests in obtaining reasonon which to base
ably complete and prompt information
2
investigations and construct defenses.1
The General Assembly enacted section 482 in response to the
1963 Court of Appeals decision in Watson v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. 3 1 In Watson, the court applied a strict contractual analysis to the notice provision of an occurrence-type automobile liability
policy and concluded that, as a condition precedent to coverage, the
28. Id.
29. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 482 (1991). Section 482 also applies to persons "claiming the benefits of the policy through the insured." Id.
30. Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin have notice-prejudice statutes or regulations; Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, NewJersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, the Virgin Islands, Washington, and West Virginia have recognized a notice-prejudice rule judicially. Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Requiring Liability Insurer to Show Preudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured's Failure or Delay in
Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in FonvardingSuit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 141 (1984 &
Supp. 1993); see also cases cited infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 873-74 (N.J.
1968) (holding that allowing forfeiture of coverage without prejudice to insurers "would
be unfair to insureds"); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 371 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1977) ("We
are reluctant.., to allow an insurance company to refuse to provide that which it was paid
for unless a sound reason exists for doing so."); see also Daniel W. Whitney, Note, A Legal
Process Analysisfor a Statutory and Contractual Construction of Notice and Proofof Loss Insurance
Disclaimers-Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 38 MD. L. REv. 299, 309-10
(1978) (arguing that permitting insurers to disclaim liability without prejudice creates an
.unjustifiable windfall" for the insurer and an "unreasonable forfeiture" for the insured).
32. See Brakeman, 371 A.2d at 197.
The purpose of a policy provision requiring notice of an accident or loss to be
given within a certain time is to give the insurer an opportunity to acquire,
through an adequate investigation, full information about the circumstances of
the case, on the basis of which, it can proceed to disposition ....
Id
33. 231 Md. 266, 189 A.2d 625 (1963).
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policy required the insured to notify the insurer of an occurrence "as
soon as practicable." 4
Watson involved an accident that occurred on March 5, 1961,
which the insured appellant did not report to the insurer until April
10, 1961. s Although the accident occurred within the policy period,
the insurer preliminarily disclaimed coverage on the basis of late notice. 36 The insurer then sought and received a declaratory judgment
that it had no liability for claims arising from the accident.3 7 In awarding the declaratory judgment, the Court of Appeals disregarded the
appellant's contention that the modern trend was to forbid the insurer to disclaim its obligation on the basis of late notice unless it
showed actual prejudice.3 1 Validating the prompt-notice provision as
a condition precedent to coverage, the Court of Appeals held that the
insurer could deny coverage on the sole basis of late notification with39
out proof that it actually prejudiced its investigation or interests.
To counteract this harsh judicial rule, the General Assembly enacted section 482 in 1964. Like the notice-prejudice rule in many
states, it predated the widespread availability of claims-made insurance
policies, 40 which provide coverage in a manner essentially opposite to
the traditional occurrence policy.4 Because these notice-prejudice
rules were drafted or judicially created in the context of the occurrence form of coverage, they are often in tension with the language
and purpose of claims-made policies.4 2
The occurrence policy represents the traditional form of liability
insurance coverage, in which the event insured against is the actual
34. Id. at 271, 189 A.2d at 627.
35. Id. at 269-70, 189 A.2d at 626.
36. Id. at 270, 189 A.2d at 626-27.
37. Id. at 269, 189 A.2d at 626.
38. Id. at 272, 189 A.2d at 627.
39. See id. at 272-73, 189 A.2d at 627-28.
40. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 416, 628 A.2d at 228. The claims-made form of coverage
did not develop widespread acceptance until the late 1960s or early 1970s. John K. Parker,
The Untimely Demise of the "Claims Made" Insurance Form? A Critique of Stine v. Continental
Casualty Company, I DET. C.L. Rrv. 25, 28-29 (1983); Sol Kroll, The Professional Liability
Policy "Claims Made," 13 FORUM 842, 849-50 (1978).
41. See Parker, supra note 40, at 27. Parker reasoned:

In a sense, these two forms of insurance are opposites. Generally speaking, "occurrence" policies cover liability inducing events occurring during the policy
term, irrespective of when an actual claim is presented. Conversely, "claims
made" . . . policies cover liability inducing events if and when a claim is made
during the policy term, irrespective of when the events occurred.
Id.
42. See supra note 4.
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mishap.43 Once the "occurrence" takes place within the policy period, coverage attaches regardless of whether or when the injured
party officially presents a claim.44 The claims-made policy is a more
recent, less intuitive form of coverage consisting of two subtypes. In a
"pure" claims-made policy, the event insured against is the injured
party's claim against the insured, regardless of whether the injured
party submits that claim to the policyholder or directly to the insurer.4" In a "reporting" claims-made policy, the event insured against
is the insured's report to the insurer of the injured third party's demand for relief.4 6 Under both types, once the claim is presented to
the appropriate party, coverage attaches, regardless
of the date of the
47
occurrence out of which the liability arose.
When applied to occurrence policies, notice-prejudice provisions
merely extend the permissible lapse of time between a covered occurrence and the insured's notice to the insurer. When applied to
claims-made policies, however, notice-prejudice provisions alter the
fundamental terms of the contract. Because notice is the event that
triggers coverage in a claims-made policy, extending the notice period
effectively extends the coverage period, thereby rewriting the contract
to the benefit of the insured and the detriment of the insurer. Thus,

43. See Kroll, supra note 10, at 64.
44. See Kroll, supa note 40, at 843.
45. See Kroll, supra note 10, at 64.
46. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 315 Md. 328, 350-51, 554 A.2d 404, 415
(1989) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). In House, Judge Murphy explained:
There are various types of policies within the claims made category. So-called
'pure" claims made policies generally define 'claims made" as all claims brought
against the insured within the policy period. The claim made against the insured
party is the event which invokes coverage. The policy may also be of a "reporting"
type, defining "claims made" as all claims made against the insurer by the insured
during the policy period. Thus, the claim made against the insurer is the event
invoking coverage in a "reporting" type of claims made policy.
47. Hybrid policies also exist, which more closely resemble claims-made policies but
also incorporate occurrence policy language and concepts. See id. at 351, 554 A.2d at 415
(Murphy, C.J., dissenting) (discussing hybrids in the context of scope of coverage). For
example, policies with retroactive dates cover only those claims made within the policy period and arising from occurrences on or after the retroactive date. Id. Policies with extended reporting periods cover claims made within the policy period and also those
resulting from occurrences reported during the policy period or the extended reporting
period. Id. at 351, 554 A.2d at 415-16. Judicial interpretation of these policies with respect
to notice-prejudice rules is particularly problematic. The insurance policy at issue in
T.H.E. Ins. Co. contained both a retroactive date and an extended reporting period. To
reduce complexities, the majority chose to overlook the policy's hybrid features and designate it a claims-made policy. See T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 408, 628 A.2d at 224.
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many courts have refused to apply notice-prejudice provisions to
claims-made policies.4"
In House, however, the Court of Special Appeals gave section 482
a plain-language reading and concluded that it applied to claimsmade policies and occurrence policies alike. 49 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to determine whether the statute indeed mandated
coverage of a claim presented after the termination date of a claimsmade policy, 0 but postponed resolution of the issue by construing an
ambiguous policy term against the insurance company.5 1 The dissent
52
considered the policy a claims-made policy of the reporting type.
The dissent also addressed the issue of section 482's applicability to
such a policy, and resolved it in favor of the insurer,5" asserting that
"[section] 482 is inapplicable to a 'reporting' type of claims made policy when the claim is made after the expiration of the policy."5 4

48. See, e.g., Sletten v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 780 P.2d 428, 430 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989) ("[A] pplying the late notice/prejudice rule to claims-made policies ...would be to
convert claims-made policies into occurrence policies."); Campbell & Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins.
Co., 820 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) ("To allow an extension of reporting time
where the insurer failed to demonstrate prejudice in a claims-made policy would extend
the coverage the parties contracted for and, in effect, rewrite the contract between the
parties."); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779, 784 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (reasoning that to apply the notice-prejudice rule "would be to convert [the]
claims-made policy into an occurrence policy"); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433
So. 2d 512, 515-16 (Fla. 1983) (ruling that applying a notice-prejudice rule to a claimsmade policy "in effect rewrites the contract between the two parties"); Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 406 (N.J. 1985) ("[A]n extension of the notice
period in a 'claims made' policy constitutes an unbargained-for expansion of coverage.");
Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 774 P.2d 30, 35 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]he noticeprejudice rule does not apply to the claims after [the claims-made policy's] termination
clause because to do so would be to provide coverage the insurer did not intend to provide
and the insured did not contract to receive.").
49. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 73 Md. App. 118, 133-35, 533 A.2d 301,
308-09 (1987), affid on other grounds, 315 Md. 328, 554 A.2d 404 (1989).
50. House, 315 Md. at 330, 554 A.2d at 405.
51. Id. at 333-41, 554 A.2d at 407-11. The policy required that, in order for coverage to
attach, "[t]he claim must... first be made while this agreement is in effect." Id. at 334, 554
A.2d at 407. A patient injured during surgery brought suit against Dr. House during the
policy period, but Dr. House did not forward the claim to St. Paul until after the policy had
expired. Id. at 331, 554 A.2d at 405-06. Dr. House argued that the "claim" was the original
complaint by the patient against the doctor. St. Paul argued that the "claim" was Dr.
House's report of the patient's claim to the insurance company. The court conceded that
"the policy [could] be read as St. Paul contend[ed]," but noted that it also could "just as
easily be read to have afforded coverage when a claim is made, using the ordinary meaning." Id. at 340, 554 A.2d at 410. Finding a "genuine ambiguity," the court construed the
contract against its drafter, St. Paul. Id. at 341, 554 A.2d at 410.
52. Id. at 350-52, 554 A.2d at 415-16 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 355-60, 554 A.2d at 417-20 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 356, 554 A.2d at 418 (Murphy, CJ., dissenting).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-The court began its analysis in T.H.E.
Insurance Co. by identifying the parties' positions. T.H.E.'s argument
hinged on its interpretation of the insurance contract, 55 whereas
P.T.P. based its position on a literal reading of section 482. From the
policy provisions, 6 T.H.E. argued that "[tihe outside time limit within
which either the occurrence of Buckley's accident or a claim asserted
by Buckley was to be reported to the insurer was not later than sixty
days after the end of the policy period."5 7 Because P.T.P. never reported the original occurrence, and did not even receive Buckley's
claim until five days after the end of the extended reporting period,
T.H.E. concluded that no coverage could attach. On the other hand,
P.T.P. argued that under section 482, "any insurer" wishing to disavow
coverage on the basis of late notice must prove actual prejudice. 8 It
asserted that because T.H.E. failed to prove such prejudice, it could
not deny coverage. 5 9 T.H.E. rebutted P.T.P.'s statutory literalism with
a legislative intent argument that "the purpose of [section] 482 is to
55. T.H.E. argued from the following policy provisions:
SECTION I-COVERAGES
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1. Insuring Agreement
b. This insurance applies to 'bodily injury' and 'property damage' only if a
claim for damages because of the 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' is first
made against any insured during the policy period.
(1) A claim by a person or organization seeking damages will be considered to have been made when written notice of such claim is received and recorded by us ....
SECTION TV-COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY CONDITIONS
2. Duties In The Event Of Occurrence, Claim Or Suit
a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an 'occurrence' which may result in a claim ....
b. If a claim is received by any insured you must.., see to it that we receive
written notice of the claim as soon as practicable.
SECTION V-EXTENDED REPORTING PERIODS
2. A Basic Extended Reporting Period is automatically provided without additional charge. This period starts with the end of the policy period and lasts for:
a. Five years for claims arising out of an 'occurrence' reported to us, not
later than 60 days after the end of the policy period, in accordance with paragraph 2.a. of SECTION IV... ;or
b. Sixty days for all other claims.
T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 411-12, 628 A.2d at 225-26.
56. See supra note 55.
57. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 413, 628 A.2d at 226.
58. Id. at 413-14, 628 A.2d at 226.
59. Id.
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prevent forfeitures of coverage that had attached and not to create
coverage that never attached."60
The court next noted that section 482 replaced Watson's condition precedent analysis 6 1 with a two-step breach of covenant analysis.
It explained that for an insurer to deny coverage due to the insured's
deficient notice, "[f]irst, there must be a specified type of breach by
the insured; and second, the insurer must show the materiality of the
breach by demonstrating that the lack of notice or cooperation has
resulted in actual prejudice."6" The court observed that T.H.E. did
not refuse an otherwise valid claim based on P.T.P.'s breach of a policy condition or covenant of prompt notice. Instead, T.H.E. contended that by June 1988 there was no longer any policy to breach;
the policy had terminated
before P.T.P. ever submitted the claim in6
voking its coverage. 3
The court reasoned that such a situation was beyond the purpose
and ambit of section 482: "Section 482 could no more revive the original policy to cover the Buckley claim than [section] 482 could reopen
an occurrence policy to embrace a claim based on an accident that
happened after the end of the policy period."' The court carefully
circumscribed its holding, however, by stating that "[i] t would be an
incorrect oversimplification to express the issue here to be whether
[section] 482 applies at all to claims made policies."6 5 T.H.E. Insurance
Co. established only that section 482 does not extend coverage under
claims-made policies to include claims made after the policy expires.
Surveying the law in other jurisdictions that have addressed the
applicability of notice-prejudice rules to claims-made policies, the
court found its result in accord with "the overwhelming weight of
66
authority, measured both numerically and by persuasiveness."
Arizona,6 7 Arkansas, 68 California,6 9 Florida,7 ° Louisiana, 7 ' Massachu60. Id. at 414, 628 A.2d at 226.
61. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing Watson's condition precedent analysis).
62. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 415, 628 A.2d at 227. To prove actual prejudice, an
insurer must show that the insured's late notice eliminated its opportunity to defend the
insured adequately. Washington v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 60 Md. App. 288, 296-97, 482
A.2d 503, 507, cert. denied, 302 Md. 288, 487 A.2d 292 (1984).
63. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 415, 628 A.2d at 227.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 414 n.7, 628 A.2d at 226 n.7.
66. Id. at 416, 628 A.2d at 228.
67. Sletten v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 780 P.2d 428 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
68. Campbell & Co. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 820 S.W.2d 284 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
69. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 270 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
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setts, 72 Michigan, 73 Missouri,7 NewJersey, 75 and Washington 76 courts

have refused to apply notice-prejudice provisions to claims submitted
77
after the termination of claims-made policies, as have the First,
Third, 78 Sixth,' 9 Eighth,8" and Ninth 8 ' Circuit Courts of Appeals, interpreting the state law of Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Minnesota, and California, respectively.
In closing, the court dismissed Atlantic and Melson's argument
that the General Assembly recently evidenced its intent to apply section 482 to claims-made policies.8 2 Atlantic and Melson based their
contention on the Senate Finance Committee's 1988 consideration
and rejection of Senate Bill 503, which would have amended section
482 to waive the actual prejudice requirement for claims-made policies.8 3 The court found the legislature's failure to act on a proposed
amendment an unconvincing indicator of a specific legislative
8 4
intent.
4. Analysis.--"Pure" and "reporting" claims-made policies are
less costly than traditional occurrence coverage because they define
more narrowly the insurer's period of potential liability. 5 Potential
liability for an insured's negligence during an occurrence policy's effective period extends indefinitely into the future. A third party may
bring a claim at any time in the future if the negligent act or omission
of the insured occurred during the policy period. Inflation, escalating
70. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Dolan, Fertig & Curtis, 433 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1983).
71. Jefferson Guar. Bank v. Westbank-Marrero Cab Co., 570 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App.
1990), cert. denied, 575 So. 2d 391 (La. 1991).
72. Chas. T. Main, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28 (Mass. 1990).
73. Stine v. Continental Casualty Co., 349 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1984).
74. Continental Casualty Co. v. Maxwell, 799 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
75. Zuckerman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985).
76. Safeco Title Ins. Co. v. Gannon, 774 P.2d 30 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 782
P.2d 1069 (Wash. 1989).
77. DiLuglio v. New England Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 355 (1st Cir. 1992).
78. City of Harrisburg v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 954 (M.D.
Pa. 1984), affd, 770 F.2d 1067 (3d Cir. 1985).
79. United States v. A.C. Strip, 868 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1989).
80. Esmailzadeh v. Johnson & Speakman, 869 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1989).
81. Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. TH.E.Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 421-22, 628 A.2d at 230-31.
83. Brief of Appellees Atlantic Insurance Associates and Alfred V. Melson at 8.
84. TH.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 422, 628 A.2d at 231. While Senate Bill 503 was pending,
the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Special
Appeals in House. The legislature might have relegated settlement of the question to the
judiciary by dropping the bill. Brief of Amicus CuriaeScottsdale Insurance Company at 4.
85. See Kroll, supra note 40, at 849; Gerald Kroll, The "Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 UCLA L. REv. 925, 928-29 (1975) [hereinafter G. Kroll].
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damage awards, and expanding notions of tort liability have rendered
liability under these policies unpredictable and potentially great.8 6 Insurers therefore demand compensation in the form of higher premiums for the higher risk associated with occurrence policies.
Claims-made policies, on the other hand, lack the unpredictability and attendant risk of occurrence policies.8 7 The insurer is responsible only for claims submitted during the policy period. Its potential
liability terminates when the policy period expires. Because claimsmade policies limit the duration of the insurer's potential liability and
allow more accurate actuarial calculation of risk, premiums are
lower.

88

Had the court applied section 482 to claims filed after the termination date of claims-made policies, it would have extended indefinitely the time period of potential liability for claims-made policy
issuers in Maryland. The likely result would have been eventual elimination of the claims-made form of liability coverage from the Maryland insurance market.89 Indefinite extension of the insurer's period
of risk would have prompted insurers to raise premiums or discontinue the claims-made form of coverage altogether, as it would have
become essentially duplicative of occurrence coverage. Potential policyholders would have lost a cost-effective alternative to occurrence
coverage and perhaps the possibility of obtaining affordable insurance
at all. 90
T.H.E. Insurance Co., however, was not an unqualified boon to
either insurers or insureds. It addressed only one factual situation
under a rather ambiguous policy,9" leaving important issues unresolved. Variations in factual sequence, or in policy language and
86. Parker, supra note 40, at 71; Kroll, supra note 40, at 846-47; G. Kroll, supra note 85,
at 928.
87. See G. Kroll, supra note 85, at 928.
88. Id. at 929.
89. Appellees P.T.P., Atlantic, and Melson argued that applying section 482 to claimsmade policies would have produced no dire effects on the insurance market. They
pointed to the continuing issuance of claims-made policies in Maryland after the decision
of the Court of Special Appeals in House, which subjected claims-made policies to the operation of section 482. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 17; Brief of Appellees Atlantic Insurance Associates and Alfred V. Melson at 14-15. However, the Court of Appeals's
affirmation of House on other grounds, which postponed definitive resolution of section
482's applicability to claims-made policies, and Chief Judge Murphy's powerful dissent,
probably induced a wary, wait-and-see willingness by insurers to issue new claims-made liability policies. Brief of Amicus Curiae Scottsdale Insurance Company at 3.
90. For example, P.T.P. was unable to obtain affordable coverage for its waterslide attraction until it located and accepted T.H.E.'s claims-made policy. Brief of Appellant at 2.
91. The court's analysis proceeded on the assumption that the policy was a claimsmade policy. The dissent, however, interpreted the policy as a hybrid with significant oc-
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interpretation, could yield quite different conclusions as to the applicability of section 482 in future disputes concerning claims-made or
hybrid policies.
There are four temporal variables in late claim suits involving
claims-made and hybrid policies: the date of the initial occurrence,
the date the insured notifies the insurer of the occurrence, the date
the injured party presents a claim against the insured, and the date
the insured reports the claim to the insurer. T.H.E. Insurance Co.
presented the factual scenario most favorable to the court's conclusion that section 482 did not apply; the accident occurred after the
retroactive date, and neither the insured's report of the occurrence,
nor the injured party's claim against the insured, nor the insured's
report of the claim to the insurer, took place within the policy period.
Section 482's inapplicability to other factual configurations is less
certain. The court acknowledged that section 482 could apply to a
claims-made policy similar to the one at issue in T.H.E. Insurance Co. if
the insured's report of the original occurrence were late or nonexistent, but the injured party's claim and the insured's report to its insurer took place within the policy period.9" In such a case, the insurer
attempting to disclaim coverage would have to prove actual prejudice
from inadequate notice of the original event.9"
Further, if the insured's report of the occurrence took place
before the policy's termination, but the injured person's claim and
the insured's referral of that claim did not, coverage likely would
hinge on whether the policy featured an extended coverage period
for timely-reported occurrences. If so, the insured would not need to
invoke section 482 to secure coverage if the injured person's claim or
the insured's report to the insurer or both took place within the extended coverage period. If not, section 482 would not apply, as this
would convert the claims-made policy into an occurrence policy by
extending the contractual coverage period.
Finally, if the insured's report of the occurrence and the injured
party's claim took place before the policy's termination, but the insured's report of the claim to the insurer did not, coverage likely
would hinge on whether the claims-made policy was of the pure or
reporting type.9 4 Again, the court's interpretation of the policy language would be dispositive. Section 482 would be unnecessary to securrence elements. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 426-27, 628 A.2d at 233 (Eldridge, J.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 414 n.7, 628 A.2d at 226 n.7.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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cure coverage under a pure claims-made policy and unable to extend
coverage of a reporting claims-made policy.
The essential nontemporal variable in coverage disputes over
claims-made policies is the policy's definition of key terms. The dissent's objection in TH.E. Insurance Co. to the majority's acceptance of
the T.H.E. policy's dual definition of "claim" illustrates the importance of this variable.9 5 Section I.A.l.b(1) of the policy stated: "A
claim by a person or organization seeking damages will be considered
to have been made when written notice of such claim is received and
recorded by us ... "96 The majority accepted T.H.E.'s assertion that
the word "claim" encompassed both the victim's claim to the insured
and the insured's report to the insurer and that both must have taken
place within the policy period for coverage to attach. 7 By accepting a
dual definition of "claim," the court recognized the reporting type of
claims-made policy.
The dissent, however, asserted that the standard meaning of
"claim made" is the injured person's claim against the insured, and
that the T.H.E. policy's definition was "contorted."" The dissent insisted that inserting the insured's report to the insurer into the definition of "claim" reintroduced the Watson notion of timely notice to the
insurer as a condition precedent to coverage.9 9 The dissent's concern
was exaggerated, however, because a de facto return to the severity of
Watson is unlikely. Insureds, excusably unaware of the legal resonance
of the undefined term "condition precedent" attached to presection
482 prompt notice provisions, could not justifiably claim ignorance of
the meaning or meanings of "claim" if clearly defined in a policy.
Moreover, any ambiguity of definition would be construed against the
insurer who drafted the contract and in favor of the insured. 10 0
The dissent raised an additional definitional issue with respect to
the term "occurrence." The dissent asserted that, under the majority's
rationale, an insurer could also redefine "occurrence" to mean notice
to the insurer of the event, thus effectively removing occurrence poli95. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 423-25, 628 A.2d at 231-32 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 411-12, 628 A.2d at 225.
97. Id. at 413, 628 A.2d at 226.
98. Id. at 426, 628 A.2d at 233 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 425-26, 628 A.2d at 232-33 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
100. See Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Vollmer, 306 Md. 243, 251, 508 A.2d
130, 134 (1986) ("[T) he rule.., is to resolve ambiguity against the drafter of the policy and
in favor of coverage."); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. DeJames, 256 Md. 717, 720, 261
A.2d 747, 749 (1970) ("[A]mbiguity is to be resolved against the company which prepared
the policy and in favor of the insured.") (citations omitted).
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cies from the reach of section 482."0 Revising the uniformly recognized definition of "occurrence" to the detriment of insureds,
however, would violate not only the protective intent of the noticeprejudice statute but also the public policy of ensuring availability of
adequate coverage. 10 2 A redefinition of "occurrence," therefore, also
would be unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny.
Although the majority defined the T.H.E. policy as a claims-made
policy, the dissent characterized the policy as a hybrid based on the
"occurrence" language in the Basic Extended Reporting Period provision, which confirmed coverage for "[f] ive years for claims arising out
of an 'occurrence' reported to us, not later than 60 days after the end
of the policy period." 0 3 Had P.T.P. filed notice of the August 27,
1987, "occurrence" on or before the last day of the extended reporting period, coverage would have attached for related claims arising
within the next five years. Therefore, the dissent contended, P.T.P.
suffered exactly the sort of unjustifiable forfeiture for late notice that
04
section 482 was intended to prevent.'
The purpose of providing extended reporting periods, however,
is merely to allow insureds administrative breathing room to report
errors and omissions occurring late in the policy period. Applying
section 482 to their occurrence language would indefinitely expand
the extended reporting period and the insurer's potential liability.
The likely result would be removal of these provisions, which are essentially protective of policyholders, from claims-made insurance contracts. Perversely, the application of the notice-prejudice statute in
this situation would operate, in direct contravention of the legislature's intent, to the detriment of insureds. Finally, section 482 does
not apply to denials of coverage based on the insured's failure to submit notice of loss within a policy-specified time limit.'0 5 Therefore,
101. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 426, 628 A.2d at 233 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that "[u]nder such a policy and the majority's rationale, if there were no
notice to the insurer during the policy period, there would be no occurrence for purposes
of coverage and thus no disclaimer of coverage within the meaning of § 482." Id. (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
102. See Vollmer, 306 Md. at 250, 508 A.2d at 133 (noting that literal application of contract terms is the principle of construction in Maryland "[ulnless a statute, regulation, or
public policy would be violated") (emphasis added).
103. T.H.E. Ins. Co., 331 Md. at 427, 628 A.2d at 233 (Eldridge,J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 428, 628 A.2d at 233 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
105. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 278 Md. 548, 551, 366 A.2d 13, 17
(1976) ("We think it clear from the history and language of § 482 that its provisions do not
apply to insurance disclaimers grounded on the insured's failure to submit proof of loss
within the time specified in the policy.") (emphasis added).
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extended reporting periods of policy-specified duration are both valid
and exempt from the operation of section 482.
5. Conclusion.-Although the Court of Appeals restricted the application of a statute enacted to protect insureds in T.H.E. Insurance
Co., its decision ultimately will benefit both consumers and suppliers
of liability insurance by preserving the viability of claims-made and
hybrid coverage. These less costly alternatives to traditional occurrence policies provide increasingly necessary diversity and accessibility
of coverage in the commercial liability insurance market. The court's
careful limitation of its holding to preserve section 482's potential applicability to claims-made and hybrid policies in other factual circumstances further safeguarded the interests of policyholders. The
court's tolerance of T.H.E.'s dual definition of a key policy term implicitly preserved the right of insurers to continue experimental policy
drafting, within limits imposed by precedent. By carefully confining
itself to the facts before it, the court skirted provocative issues that are
unlikely to escape litigation in the long term. In the short term, however, the court prudently interpreted section 482 in the manner best
calculated to protect the legitimate economic interests of both insurers and insureds.
KATHLEEN

E.

WHERTHEY

XI.

A.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Narrowing the Scope of the Rule of Confidentiality

In Harris v. Baltimore Sun Co.,' the Court of Appeals held that
some potential for harm to a client's interests must exist before an
attorney will be considered to have breached rule 1.6 of the Maryland
Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct' for having revealed "information relating to the representation of a client."3 The Harriscourt also
clarified the relationship between the Maryland Public Information
Act (MPIA) 4 and rule 1.6, finding that the MPIA requires the release
of public record-client information that is not otherwise privileged,
unless such disclosure can be shown to be potentially harmful to the
client's interests.5 The Harriscourt essentially rewrote the standard of
1. 330 Md. 595, 625 A-2d 941 (1993).
2. See MD. RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1993). Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm
or in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in
the furtherance of which the lawyer's services were used;
(3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense to a criminal
charge, civil claim, or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved or to respond to allegations in any
proceedings concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
(4) to comply with these Rules, a court order, or other law.
Id.
3. Harris,330 Md. at 608, 625 A.2d at 947.
4. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -628 (1993). Section 10-612 of the Act
provides:
(a) General right to information.-All persons are entitled to have access to
information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.
(b) General construction.-To carry out the right set forth in subsection (a)
of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result, this Part III of this subtitle shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least cost and least delay to the person
or governmental unit that requests inspection.
Id. § 10-612.
5. Harris,330 Md. at 604, 608, 625 A.2d at 945, 947.
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confidentiality for all attorneys in Maryland, but its decision will have
the greatest impact on public agencies subject to the MPIA. In the
future, such agencies will bear the burden of showing "potential for
harm" to a client's interests before they may deny public access to the
client's legal records.
1. The Case.-In February 1992, in the aftermath of the highly
publicized capital murder trial of John Frederick Thanos, The Baltimore Sun Company (The Sun) directed a request to the Office of the
Public Defender (OPD) seeking records of the costs associated with
Thanos's defense. 6 The Sun made the request pursuant to the MPIA
and asked for documentation of the expenses incurred by OPD attorneys defending Thanos and of the fees and expenses paid to four expert witnesses who testified on Thanos's behalf.7
OPD denied The Sun's request, asserting that the records were
privileged and their "disclosure would be contrary to the best interest
of Mr. Thanos."' The Sun then sued in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the release of the expense records.9 The complaint
named as defendant Stephen E. Harris, the Public Defender for the
State of Maryland and the official custodian of the records.'"
After considering the opposing motions for summary judgment
and hearing oral arguments, the circuit court ordered OPD to produce the documents requested by The Sun." In a lengthy and detailed memorandum opinion, the court sought, inter alia, "to evaluate
the boundaries between the exercise of two competing fundamental
rights"' 2-the First Amendment right of a newspaper to access public
documents and the Sixth Amendment right of a defendant to the effective assistance of counsel, which includes protection of the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.' 3 Finding that Thanos's
representation on appeal would not be "affected in any material man-

6. Id. at 598-99, 625 A.2d at 942.
7. Id. at 599, 625 A.2d at 942.
8. Appellant's Brief at E.8 (quoting Letter from Ronald A. Karasic, Deputy Public
Defender, to Glenn Small, Jr., The Baltimore Sun (Mar. 4, 1992)).
9. Harris, 330 Md. at 599, 625 A.2d at 942.
10. Id., 625 A.2d at 942-43.
11. Id., 625 A.2d at 943.
12. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Harris, No. 92-100026, slip op. at 9-10 (Cir. Ct. Bait. CityJuly

14, 1992).
13. Id. at 10-12.
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ner by this disclosure," 14 the circuit court ruled that, in this case, "the
First Amendment right of access prevail[ed] , 5
OPD appealed the ruling to the Court of Special Appeals, 6 maintaining that its attorneys were governed by the same rules of professional conduct as private attorneys and that its clients were owed the
same duty of protection of confidentiality as clients of privately retained lawyers. 7 OPD argued that, had the circuit court correctly applied rule 1.6, it would have found the requested documents to be
confidential information "relating to the representation of a client.""8
As such, they would be protected from disclosure under the required
denial provisions of section 10-615 of the MPIA.19
Before the Court of Special Appeals could hear the case, the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion to hear
the case.2
2. Legal Background.-The Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct have been in effect only seven years,2 1 and the Court
of Appeals has had little occasion to determine the full scope of rule
1.6. When adopted, the phrase "information relating to representation of a client" was understood to significantly broaden the scope of
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id at 42. In reaching this decision, the circuit court used a balancing test set forth
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60,
64 (4th Cir. 1989). Harris, No. 92-100026, slip op. at 42.
16. Harris,330 Md. at 599, 625 A.2d at 943.
17. Appellant's Brief at 5-18.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id. at 8. Section 10-615 of the State Government Article provides in pertinent part
that "[a] custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if:
(1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or (2) the inspection would be
contrary to... the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals .... " MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOv'T § 10-615 (1993).
20. See Harris, 330 Md. at 599, 625 A.2d at 943. At this time, the Sun appealed the
circuit court's denial of attorneys fees. Id. at 611, 625 A.2d at 948. The circuit court refused to award attorney's fees because it found OPD's defense "far from frivolous." Baltimore Sun Co. v. Harris, No. 92-100026, slip op. at 43 (Cir. Ct. Bait. CityJuly 14, 1992).
Arguing that it had "substantially prevailed" in the circuit court, it asserted that it was
entitled to such reimbursement under the MPIA. Appellee's Brief at 16-20. Section 10623(f) of the MPIA provides that "[i]f the court determines that the complainant has substantially prevailed, the court may assess against a defendant governmental unit reasonable
counsel fees and other litigation costs that the complainant reasonably incurred." See MD.
CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-623(f) (1993). Because the Court of Appeals vacated the
judgment of the lower court, it found the issue "premature" and declined to consider the
cross-appeal. Harris,330 Md. at 611, 625 A.2d at 948.
21. The Court of Appeals adopted the rules, which are based on the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, on April 15, 1986. 13 Md. Reg. 3 (May 23, 1986). They went into
effect on January 1, 1987. Id.
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rule 1.6's predecessor under the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 2
Because this change was overshadowed by the intense debate regarding the exceptions to rule 1.6, however, the question of the rule's outermost boundaries received little attention.2 3
Prior to Harris, the Court of Appeals had never considered the
relationship between the confidentiality provisions of rule 1.6 and the
disclosure requirements of the MPIA. The MPIA clearly states, however, that its provisions "shall be construed in favor of permitting in24
spection of a public record, with the least cost and least delay."
Affirming this principle, the Court of Appeals had consistently held
that "the legislative intent [of the MPIA was to ensure] that citizens of
the State of Maryland [were] accorded wide-ranging access to public
information concerning the operation of their government."25 The
MPIA grants no specific exemption for client records of the Public
Defender, and the Public Defender enabling statute does not state
that such records are by definition confidential. 26 Any protection of
OPD client records, therefore, depends on the general exemptions
specified in the MPIA and the confidentiality provisions of rule 1.6.
22. Harris,330 Md. at 612-14, 625 A.2d at 949-50 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only protected client "confidences" and "secrets," which it defined as follows:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the
client.
2 MD. RULES 460 (1986) (repealed 1987).
23. See I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLtm HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODERN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr § 1.6:101-102 (2d ed. Supp.
1991). According to Hazard and Hodes, the disclosure provisions of rule 1.6
were attacked from both sides of a spectrum of concern about lawyer confidentiality. Some objected that Rule 1.6 would permit or require too much disclosure,
and painted frightening pictures of lawyers falling over each other in a mad dash
to 'blow the whistle' on their clients. Others objected that the Model Rules provided for not enough disclosure, allowing lawyers to help their clients cover up
wrongdoing.
Id. § 1.6:10, at 127. In adopting the Rules, the Court of Appeals chose to broaden the
permissible exceptions to confidentiality by adding subparagraphs (b) (2) and (b) (4) to
rule 1.6. See supra note 2. These exceptions had been part of the original proposal by the
Kutak Commission, which drafted the Rules, but had been rejected by the ABA House of
Delegates. HAZARD & HODES, supra, § 1.06:109, at 143.

24. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-612(b) (1993).
25. A.S. Abell Publishing Co. v. Mezzanote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071
(1983); see also Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 771, 481 A.2d 221, 227
(1984) (stating that "[t]he custodian who withholds public documents carries the burden
of justifying nondisclosure").
26. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A (1990).
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Maryland courts that have considered the degree of confidentiality afforded attorney fee information have ruled expressly that such
information is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 27 No
court has determined whether such information falls within the
broader scope of confidential client information, however. Harriswas
in this respect a case of first impression in Maryland.
Like in Maryland, there is little case law regarding the scope of
rule 1.6 in other states that have adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 28 Maryland's position on the confidentiality of fee
information, however, is consistent with that taken by the federal circuits. It is well established among federal courts that information regarding attorney's fees is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 29 For example, in United States v. Suarez,3 the Court of Ap27. See In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. 1, 602 A.2d 1220 (1992). In
this case, the court held that a grand jury subpoena for attorney fee information must be
obeyed because "payment of a fee [is] a nonassertive act ... not intended to communicate
information" and, therefore, is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 10, 602
A.2d at 1224. The court discussed whether rule 1.6 applied in the case and held that it did
not, because subsection (b) (4) requires that attorneys reveal information "to comply with
... other law." Id. at 4-5, 602 A.2d at 1222. The court explained that "[r]ule 1.6 applies to
confidential communications between a client and an attorney in all situations except where
the 'evidence is sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law.' In the latter situation,
only the attorney-client privilege... protects against disclosure." Id. at 5, 602 A.2d at 1222.
Given that rule 1.6 was held inapplicable, the court never determined whether fee information is confidential under the rule.
See also Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 345 A.2d 855 (1975). In Moberly, the
court considered whether, pursuant to a public information request, a municipal hospital
must release information concerning.the fees it paid to its attorneys. Id. at 213, 345 A.2d at
856. Examining only the question of attorney-client privilege, the court concluded that the
fee information must be released because "'[t]he communication by the client to the attorney is privileged, not the fee which the lawyer charges the client.'" Id. at 226, 345 A.2d at
863. In Moberly, there was no need to examine the attorney's duty of confidentiality because "the request was directed to the client, not to the attorney." Harris,330 Md. at 601,
625 A.2d at 944.
28. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules. A
number of the larger states, among them New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, continue
to operate under the Code of Professional Responsibility, with its narrow provisions for
confidentiality. HAzARD & HOIES, supra note 23, app. § 4:101, at 1255. For a contrary
position to that taken by Maryland, see In re Advisory Opinion No. 544 of N.J., 511 A.2d
609 (N.J. 1986). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a legal
services organization, the Community Health Law Project, could be compelled to provide
the identities of its clients to the agencies from which it received funding. The court answered this question in the negative, stating that "a client's identity constitutes information
relating to the representation of a client under the current Rules of Professional Conduct
and is a secret entitled to nondisclosure." Id. at 614.
29. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 926 F.2d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that
"'[the] attorney-client privilege normally does not extend to the payment of attorney's fees
and expenses'") (citation omitted); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-89 (MIA), 899 F.2d
1039, 1044 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that attorney fee information is not privileged unless
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peals for the Second Circuit considered whether there is a broader,
Sixth Amendment protection of fee information. In Suarez, the Hartford Courant newspaper successfully petitioned the federal district
court for defense cost documents,3" and the defendant's court-appointed counsel appealed."2 The determinative issue in the case was
whether release of the cost information would in any way be prejudicial to the defendant. 3 Finding that the newspaper had a "qualified
First Amendment right of access" to documents submitted in connection with a criminal proceeding3 4 and perceiving no violation of appellants' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or
the attorney-client privilege, 5 the Second Circuit
affirmed the deci36
sion to release the defense cost documents.
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Harris,the court began its analysis
by acknowledging that "the requested records [were] public records
within the [MPIA] .'3 The court also affirmed that OPD attorneys owe
their clients the "same duty to maintain confidentiality of information
that all lawyers owe to their clients under [rule] 1.6. " "3 The issue was
whether, as The Sun argued, the MPIA constitutes "compulsion of
law" sufficient to overcome the rule of confidentiality.3 " Focusing on
the limiting effect of section 10-615(1) of the MPIA, which exempts
records which, "by law, [are]... privileged or confidential,"40 the court
concluded that the MPIA does not override rule 1.6 because, "[u] nlike

its disclosure will reveal other, privileged information); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593
(9th Cir. 1983) ("Fee arrangements usually fall outside the scope of the privilege simply
because such information ordinarily reveals no confidential professional communication
between attorney and client . .. ").
30. 880 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1989).
31. Id. at 628.
32. 1&
33. See id. at 631-33. Because the documents were in the custody of the clerk of the
court rather than defense counsel, the attorney's duty of confidentiality to the client was
not an issue in Suarez. See id. at 628.
34. Id. at 631.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 633.
37. Harris, 330 Md. at 599, 625 A.2d at 943; see MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-611
(1993) (defining "public record").
38. Harris, 330 Md. at 600, 625 A.2d at 943; see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
318 (1991) (stating that "[o ] nce a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused,
the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed,
or serving in a legal aid or defender program'") (quoting AMERCAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 4-3.9 (2d ed. 1980)).
39. Harris, 330 Md. at 601, 625 A.2d at 943.
40. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-615 (1993).
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the compulsion of a grand jury subpoena, there is no compulsion
under the Act if the public record is confidential."4 1
While acknowledging that the exception provisions of section 10615 (1) shield confidentialrecords from disclosure, the court refused to
read rule 1.6 as justifying the "[denial of] all requests for production of
public record-client information."42 Such a blanket exclusion, the
court reasoned, would be "contrary to the Act's policy that '[a]ll persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of
government. ... "" The court concluded that "[the MPIA], in relation to [rule] 1.6(a), ... impos[es] an objective, affirmative standard.
The lawyer-custodian of public record-client information must disclose requested information unless, by disclosing, the lawyer would
violate [rule] 1.6(a) and thereby be exposed to professional
discipline."4 4
Having established these basic principles, the court turned to an
examination of the meaning of rule 1.6(a), particularly the scope of
the phrase "information relating to representation of a client."45
Comparing rule 1.6 to its predecessor under the Code of Professional
Responsibility,4 6 the court noted the broader zone of confidentiality
created by the new rule.4 7 It also pointed out, however, that scholarly
commentary has questioned whether rule 1.6 was intended to be read
literally.4" To apply the rule literally would be to hold that a lawyer
who tells his spouse that he "must travel to a distant city overnight to
argue a case for an identified client" has violated rule 1.6." According to the court, such a prohibition would be "senseless .... and, by
41. Harris, 330 Md. at 603, 625 A.2d at 944.
42. Id. at 604, 625 A.2d 945.
43. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-612(a) (1993)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 605, 625 A.2d at 945.
46. See supra note 22.
47. Harris,330 Md. at 606, 625 A.2d 946. Quoting Professor Wolfram, the court explained that "'[t]he definition in MR 1.6 transcends the Code... (1) it includes all information regardless of when it was learned by the lawyer; [and] (2) it includes information
without regard to whether disclosure would embarrass or work to the detriment of a client
." Id. (quoting CHaRuS W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 6.7.2, at 298 (1986)).
48. Id. at 606-08, 625 A.2d at 946-47. The court quoted Professor Hazard, former reporter for the American Bar Association's Kutak Commission that drafted the Model Rules,
who noted that "'read literally and in isolation, the rule is so stringent as to approach the
unworkable and the unrealistic.'" Id. at 606, 625 A.2d at 946 (quoting HAzARD & HODES,
supra note 23, § 1.6:201, at 158). The court also quoted Professor Wolfram's conclusion
that "it is hardly imaginable that [rule] 1.6 should be read literally to prohibit a lawyer from
revealing absolutely any information about a client except in the limited exceptions explicitly provided in the rule." Id. at 607, 625 A.2d at 946-47 (quoting WOLFRAM, supra note 47,
at 301),
49. Id., 625 A.2d at 947 (quoting WoLFRAM, supra note 47, at 301).
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trivializing it, would detract from the soundness of the confidentiality
principle."5" Instead, the court concluded that "[t]here must be the
potential for some harm to the client's interest before an attorney will
be considered to have violated the prohibition of [rule] 1.6(a) and to
be subject to discipline, for having revealed 'information relating to
representation of a client."'' The court ruled that this determination
depends "on the facts and circumstances of the particular case."52
Although the circuit court had conducted a lengthy analysis of
whether the release of the cost information would in any way violate
Thanos's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, 3 the Court of Appeals held that this was not "the confidentiality
analysis required under § 10-615 of the Act."5 4 Therefore, the court
remanded the case for a determination of whether disclosure of the
records would harm Thanos's interests.5 5
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Chasanow asserted that the majority decision "all but repealed Rule 1.6. " 56 He argued that the comment adopted in conjunction with rule 1.6 indicated that the rule
should be read literally, 7 and that by weakening the rule of confiden58
tiality, the majority undermined the attorney-client relationship.
Furthermore, he asserted that the new rule will cause "serious interpretive problems" as future courts attempt to give meaning to the
term "potential for some harm to the client's interest."59
50. Id. at 607-08, 625 A.2d at 947 (quoting Wou'Am, supra note 47, at 301).
51. Id. at 608, 625 A.2d at 947.
52. Id. at 609, 625 A.2d at 947.
53. See id. at 609-10, 625 A.2d at 948.
54. Id. at 610, 625 A.2d at 948.
55. Id. at 610-11, 625 A.2d at 948. The Court of Appeals made two "observations" for
the guidance of the circuit court. First, the court drew attention to the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.
1989), and specifically its statement that "'[wie do not believe that disclosure of the
amounts paid to attorneys and experts on appellants' behalf, or the identity of those who
received them, impinges on appellants' rights.'" Harris, 330 Md. at 610, 625 A.2d at 948
(quoting Suarez, 880 F.2d at 631). Second, the court observed that "the setting aside of
judgments is not unknown" on collateral review and warned that the fact that Thanos's
trial had concluded and his sentence had been affirmed "does not preclude, as a matter of
law, potential harm to Thanos's interests by a disclosure of the requested information to a
newspaper." Id. at 611, 625 A.2d at 948.
56. Harris,330 Md. at 612, 625 A.2d at 949 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 613-14, 625 A.2d at 949-50 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The comment states
that "the confidentiality requirement applies to all information about a client 'relating to
the representation'. . . . It does not require the client to indicate information that is to be
confidential, or permit the lawyer to speculate whether particular information might be
embarrassing or detrimental." MD. RuLEs Or PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1993).
58. Harris,330 Md. at 612, 625 A.2d at 949 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 618, 625 A.2d at 952 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
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4. Analysis.-In Harris, the Court of Appeals essentially rewrote
rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. This change will significantly affect public agencies that maintain client records subject to
request under the MPIA. The effect on private attorneys, in contrast,
will probably not be great in practical terms.
As a result of the court's holding in Harris,rule 1.6(a) in practice
will effectively read as follows:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client, which risks some potentialfor harm to a client's
interest, unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph
(b) of rule 1.6.60
This revised version of the rule represents a shift back toward rule
1.6's predecessor, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which focused on whether disclosure "would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."6 1
Moreover, the Harriscourt's interpretation of the Rule nullified one
of the major innovations intended under rule 1.6-that lawyers would
no longer be permitted "to speculate whether particular information
might be embarrassing or detrimental."6 2
In its interpretation of rule 1.6, the court went beyond the position suggested by Professors Hazard and Hodes, that "the line between permissible and impermissible disclosure should probably be
drawn at the point of [client] anonymity."6" Such an approach, while
allowing for some flexibility in an otherwise rigid rule, could "be harmonized with the strict language of rule 1.6(a), for it may plausibly be
said that when a lawyer discusses a case in strictly hypothetical or abstract terms, she is not disclosing 'information' relating to a real 'client.'" 6 4 Professor Hazard's suggestion was of no help to the Harris
court, however, because the identity of the client in the case was already known.6 5 Therefore, the court adopted Professor Wolfram's

60. For the original text of the rule, see supra note 2.
61. MD.CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSImLiTy DR 4-101 (1986) (repealed 1987). The
Harris court declined to address potential client "embarrassment" under rule 1.6. See Harris,
330 Md. at 605-08, 625 A.2d at 945-47. The omission seems to have been deliberate,
possibly because the court believed "embarrassment" to be too subjective a standard.
62. MD.RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1993).
63. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 1.6:202, at 160.
64. Id.
65. See Harris,330 Md. at 607, 625 A.2d at 946.
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view instead, drawing the line of impermissible disclosure at the point
66
where there is "some risk of harm to the client."
The Harriscourt did not address the issue of whether the explicit
request of a client to maintain a confidence would make information
confidential regardless of whether its disclosure reasonably appeared
to risk potential harm to the client's interests. Under DR 4-101, such
a client request created a protected "secret,"67 but the broader language of rule 1.6 created a presumption of confidentiality that rendered such a provision unnecessary.' The Harriscourt clearly stated,
however, that the presumption of confidentiality must yield to the
MPIA.6 9 It seems that after Harris, therefore, such a client request,
without a showing of potential harm to the client's interests by disclosure, will no longer suffice to protect information from release under
the MPIA. 7 ° Since such information would have been protected from
disclosure under DR 4-101, the court's decision seems to contradict
the intent of the drafters of rule 1.6 to expand the zone of protected
client information.71
The Harrisdecision will significantly affect all organizations subject to the MPIA that provide some form of legal services to clients.72
As a result of the court's ruling, requests for client information under
the MPIA can be denied only if the information falls within one of the
exempted categories in the Act, 73 or if the agency can prove that release of the information would be potentially harmful to the client's
interests.7 ' Given the presumption in favor of the release of informa66. Id. at 608, 625 A.2d at 947.
67. See supra note 22.
68. IbzARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 1.6:201, at 158. Hazard and Hodes explained
that "[r]ule 1.6(a) creates a genuine presumption of confidentiality. It operates automatically, in all cases, without any signal from the client . . . ." Id.
69. See Harris,330 Md. at 604, 625 A.2d at 945.
70. To allow otherwise would permit the OPD to evade the reach of the MPIA simply
by having its clients sign a statement requesting that all information relating to their representation be kept confidential, without regard to any potential for harm from disclosure.
This would be contrary to the intent of the court in Harris.
71. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 23, § 1.6:210, at 158.
72. The Maryland Legal Services Corporation is exempt from the provisions of the
MPIA by virtue of its enabling statute, which declares that " [ e ] xcept as otherwise provided

in this subtitle, the Corporation is not a department, agency or instrumentality of the
State." MD. ANN. CODE art. 10, § 45D(d) (1993). Additionally, many legal services organizations that receive public funding, such as the Legal Aid Bureau, are private, nonprofit
organizations not subject to the MPIA. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-611 (1993);
see also Constitution and By-laws of the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc. (as amended Mar. 23, 1983)
(on file at the Central Office of the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau).
73. See Md. Code Ann., State Gov't §§ 10-615 to -618 (1993).
74. Harris, 330 Md. at 609-10, 625 A.2d at 948.
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tion, 5 the burden is upon agency records custodians to prove such
harm. As Judge Chasanow pointed out, however, the court has left
unclear the "degree of risk or potential for harm [to the client]" that is
test and whether the test is to be applied subrequired under the new
76
jectively or objectively.
The provision in the MPIA allowing for the assessment of fees

against governmental agencies if the plaintiff "substantially prevails"
in court 77 may present a further dilemma for custodians of public record-client information. Out of respect for the client's interests, as well
as to avoid the risk of a law suit by the client if the disclosure turns out
to be harmful, the custodian should refuse to release client information if there is any doubt as to its potential for harm. 71 If the trial
court takes a different view, however, the custodian's "prudence"
might be rewarded by the imposition of attorney's fees.
In contrast to the situation faced by public agency lawyers, the
impact on private attorneys by the new interpretation of rule 1.6 probably will be minimal. As they are not subject to the MPIA, private
attorneys are spared the difficulties that the Act creates for OPD attorneys. Although the Harriscourt qualified rule 1.6 by inserting the potential for harm requirement, it said nothing to reverse the
presumption of confidentiality in the private attorney-client context.
Moreover, the Rules of Professional Conduct provide only the "basis
for invoking the disciplinary process," and are "not designed to be a
basis for civil liability."79 Thus, the new meaning of rule 1.6 should
not have any effect on civil malpractice litigation for violations of
confidentiality."s
75. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-612 (1993).
76. Harris,330 Md. at 618, 625 A.2d at 952 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
77. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-623(f) (1993).
78. The custodian can attempt to contact the client and gain consent for release, but
this may not always be feasible. Additionally, if a client refuses to consent to the release of
the records, there arises the question of whether nonconsent would override the mandate
of the MPIA, in the absence of a showing of harm. In an effort to reduce some of these
difficulties for records custodians at public defenders' offices, some states have explicitly
exempted OPD client information from the reach of their respective public information
acts. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 600.091 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (providing that "[t]he files
maintained by the state public defender office which relate to the handling of any case
shall be considered confidential"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A) (4) (Anderson 1990)
(exempting from the public information act "any record that contains information that is
specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a civil or criminal
action or proceeding"). This is an option for the Maryland legislature if it wishes to spare
OPD from the potential dilemmas it will face as a result of the court's decision in Harris.
79. MD. RULES OF PROESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1993).
80. To avoid misunderstandings concerning confidentiality, however, several authors
have suggested that attorneys should discuss the matter with their clients at the beginning
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Theoretically, the Harrisruling could affect disciplinary proceedings brought by the Attorney Grievance Commission against attorneys
for violations of rule 1.6. It seems unlikely, however, that a client
would initiate a grievance action against his or her attorney for a disclosure that the client felt was harmless."1 If a client in such a situation did complain, the tribunal would still have to take into account
the seriousness of the revelation in determining what, if any, sanctions
to impose.8 " A disclosure in which the client admittedly suffered no
harm would probably be dealt with on a "de minimis" basis.
The Harris decision also should not significantly affect the conflict of interest analysis under rules 1.9 and 1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The focus of rule 1.9"8 is not on whether the
information about the former client is confidential under rule 1.6, but
on whether its use by the attorney in another matter would be "to the
disadvantageof the former client." 4 Such use is prohibited except as
allowed under rule 1.6(b), which was not changed by Harris.
Rule 1.10 concerns the issue of whether, when an attorney in a
law firm has information about a former client that is protected by
rule 1.6, that information is "material to the matter" concerning the
potential new client, and whether the new client's interests are "materially adverse" to those of the former client.8 5 These determinations
of the relationship. See, e.g., Lee A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About the
Limits of Confidentiality, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 441 (1990) (discussing the legal and moral
foundations of the confidentiality rule and concluding that lawyers have an ethical duty to
inform clients of the extent and limits of confidentiality). The importance of such consultation is even greater in Maryland as a result of the Harrisdecision.
81. Rule 1.6 complaints are in fact quite rare. In fiscal year 1993, of the 493 cases
docketed by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, only three were docketed
under rule 1.6. For the first two months of fiscal year 1994, of 102 cases, only one was
docketed under rule 1.6. Letter from Melvin Hirshman, Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance
Commission of Maryland, to the author (Sept. 29, 1993) (on file with the Maryland Law
Review). Since the adoption of the Model Rules, the only reported Maryland decision involving rule 1.6 concerned an attorney who was too protective of his client's interestsrather than not protective enough-to the detriment of his duty of truthfulness to other
persons and the court. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Rohrback, 323 Md. 79, 591 A.2d 488
(1991).
82. MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope Note (1993). "[TIhe Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of
the sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of
the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations." Id.
83. Rule 1.9 states in pertinent part that "[a] lawyer who has formerly represented a
client in a matter shall not thereafter. . . use information relating to the representation to
the disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a
client or when the information has become generally known."
MD.RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1993).
84. Id. Rule 1.9 cmt. (emphasis added).
85. Rule 1.10 states in part:
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require the exercise of discretion by the firm, but it seems inevitable
that if these two conditions are met, then revelation of the information concerning the former client would be potentially harmful to
that client and, therefore, protected under even the Harrisinterpretation of rule 1.6.
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals's decision in Harris to
limit the scope of confidentiality under rule 1.6 to information that, if
disclosed, would potentially harm a client's interests, is a step back in
the direction of rule 1.6's predecessor in the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Harris decision will primarily affect state agencies
subject to the Maryland Public Information Act, such as the Office of
the Public Defender. They will now have to show the potential for
harm to their clients as a justification for not disclosing requested information. The impact on private attorneys will be small, in contrast,
because they are not subject to the MPIA, and malpractice or disciplinary actions against attorneys in the absence of harm to a client's interests are very rare.
One unfortunate consequence of the court's decision in Harrisis
that rule 1.6 has lost much of its simplicity and clarity as a standard to
guide lawyers' conduct. However, no one has suggested that attorneys
did not take seriously their duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility to protect client information.8 6 Any fear that this decision
will lead to less care by attorneys in protecting client confidences
would seem to ignore the traditional reputation of attorneys for
discretion.
JAMES V. MCFAUL

When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly
represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was associated, had previously represented
a client whose interests are materially adverse to that person and about whom the
lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1993).
86. On the contrary, much of the debate preceding the adoption of rule 1.6 was motivated by the belief that attorneys are too protective of their clients' confidences. HAzARD &
HODES, supra note 23, § 1.6:101.

XII.
A.

REAL PROPERTY

Limiting the Scope of PersonalLiability Under the Maryland
Construction Trust Statute

In Ferguson Trenching Co. v. Kiehne,' a case of first impression, the
Court of Appeals construed the Maryland construction trust statute. 2
The statute requires general contractors to hold in trust any moneys
that owners pay them for work performed or materials furnished by
subcontractors. The statute also provides for the personal liability of
corporate officers, directors, and employees who retain or use such
funds with fraudulent intent.3 In Ferguson Trenching, the court held
that mere use of trust funds for purposes other than paying subcontractors did not provide conclusive evidence of an intent to defraud. 4
The court also held that an officer was not a fiduciary with respect to a
party that contracts with the corporation.' The decision limits the
scope of personal liability under the trust statute and weakens the subcontractor's rights to construction payments.
1. The Case.--On August 16, 1989, Advanced Excavation Company, a general contractor, contracted with Triple Brook Partnership
to perform excavation work for one of Triple Brook's real estate devel67
price for this work was $279,380. 7
opment projects.' The contract
One month later, Advanced Excavation executed a $44,549 contract
with Ferguson Trenching Company, a subcontractor, for the installation of a water line on the Triple Brook job.8 Ferguson Trenching
fully performed the installation and billed Advanced Excavation for
the contract price. 9
Advanced Excavation never paid Ferguson Trenching, ° even
though C. Stuart Kiehne, Advanced Excavation's president and sole
shareholder, admitted that Triple Brook paid Advanced Excavation in
full for the work that Ferguson Trenching performed.1 1 Triple Brook
1. 329 Md. 169, 618 A.2d 735 (1993).
2. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-201 to -204 (1988).

3. Id.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742.
See id. at 179, 618 A.2d at 740.
Id. at 172, 618 A.2d at 736.
Id.
Id.
Id

10. Id.
11. Brief for Appellant at 2 (citing Joint Record Extract at 52-53).
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paid $251,000 toward its $279,380 contract with Advanced Excavation. 12 Out of this $251,000, Advanced Excavation paid $78,000 to
subcontractors other than Ferguson Trenching, $82,000 in equipment
costs for the project, $46,000 in direct labor costs, and the remaining
$45,000 to its operating expenses and debts incurred in connection
13
with other construction projects.
Ferguson Trenching obtained a judgment against Advanced Excavation for the contract price1 4 and then brought an action against
Kiehne in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County alleging that he
violated the Maryland construction trust statute.1 5 Ferguson Trenching claimed that Kiehne became personally liable under section 9-202
of the Real Property Article when he used funds held in trust for Ferguson Trenching to pay other debts of Advanced Excavation.16 After
a bench trial, the judge for the circuit court concluded that mere
proof that the funds went to pay other general corporate expenses did
not reveal an intent to defraud and entered judgment against Ferguson Trenching.17 The judge based his conclusion in part on Kiehne's
explanation that he used the trust funds in an attempt to keep the

12. Id.
13. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 172, 618 A.2d at 736.
14. Id.
15. Id. Section 9-201 of the Maryland construction trust statute provides:
Any moneys paid under a contract by an owner to a contractor, or by the owner
or contractor to a subcontractor for work done or materials furnished, or both,
for or about a building by any subcontractor, shall be held in trust by the contractor
or subcontractor, as trustee, for those subcontractors who did work or furnished
materials, or both, for or about the building, for purposes of paying those

subcontractors.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
16. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 173, 618 A.2d at 737. Section 9-202 provides:

Any officer, director, or employee of any contractor or subcontractor, who,
with intent to defraud, retains or uses the moneys held in trust under § 9-201 of this
subtitle, or any part thereof, for any purpose other than to pay those subcontractors for whom the moneys are held in trust, shall be personally liable to any person damaged by the action.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-202 (1988) (emphasis added). Section 9-203 is an evidentiary rule which reads:
The use by a contractor or subcontractor or any officer, director or employee
of a contractor or subcontractor of any moneys held in trust under § 9-201 of this

subtitle, for any other purpose than to pay those subcontractors who did work or
furnished materials, or both, for or about the building, shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud in a civil action.

Id. § 9-203.
17. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 173-74, 618 A.2d at 737.
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corporation solvent."8 The judge also found Advanced Excavation's
operating expenses legitimate. 9
Ferguson Trenching appealed the circuit court's ruling." Before
the case reached the Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals
issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion. 2 1 In a unanimous opinion written by Judge Chasanow, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the circuit court.22
2.

Legal Background.-

a. Mayland.-In 1987, the General Assembly enacted the
construction trust statute "to protect subcontractors from dishonest
practices by general contractors and other subcontractors for whom
they might work."2 ' The statute was enacted in response to concerns
in the construction industry regarding contractors who fail to pay subcontractors, subsequently declare bankruptcy, and then reopen for
business under new names.2 4 The statute imposes personal liability
18. Id. In reaching his decision, the judge noted (1) that when Kiehne purchased
Advanced Excavation, the business "was undergoing financial difficulties," (2) that these
difficulties "were made even more severe by the decline in the development industry from
1989 to the present period," and (3) that Kiehne had "placed large amounts ... of his own
funds into the company in an attempt to keep the corporation solvent." Id.
19. SeeJoint Record Extract at 157-58. The trial judge noted that Kiehne's salary was
not excessive. Id.
20. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 174, 618 A.2d at 737.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 187, 618 A.2d at 744.
23. Id. at 174-75, 618 A.2d at 737; see also David F. Albright, Jr., The Maryland Construction Trust Statute: New PersonalLiability-Its Scope and Federal Bankruptcy Implications, 17 U.
B~AT. L. REv. 482, 494 (1988) (noting that the statute's primary purpose is the imposition
of personal liability on the wrongful diverters of trust funds).
Part of the original draft of the statute read as follows:
For the purpose of establishing a trust relationship for certain moneys paid to a
contractor or subcontractor; providing that certain uses of those moneys considered to be held in trust shall be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud; providing for personal liability for fraudulent use of those moneys considered to be held
in trust ....
Act of July 1, 1987, ch. 345, 1987 Md. Laws 1932. The original bill that the Senate proposed included criminal sanctions for misuse of funds in addition to the civil remedy. Id.
at 1933.
24. Albright, supra note 23, at 484 & n.13. The legislative history expresses concern
regarding the effect of a subcontractor's failure:
A major subcontractor's financial failure precipitates a chain reaction due to the
accumulation of unpaid monies to their subcontractors and suppliers that must
be repaid by the owner or general contractor to free the project from mechanics'
liens.
Virtually every major construction project sees a subcontractor fail financially. To the extent that the retainage is inadequate to cover the unpaid subcontractors and suppliers of the failed subcontractor for work performed, the general
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directly on the nonpaying contractor 2 5 in contrast to the mechanics'
lien statute,2 6 which authorizes subcontractors to assert a lien against
the property for which they provided services.
The construction trust statute created a civil cause of action with
two separate bases of liability. 28 Section 9-201 establishes a trust relationship between the parties to the construction contract.2 9 Section 9202 provides for the personal liability of officers, directors, and employees who retain or use trust funds with an intent to defraud.3" Section 9-203 states an evidentiary rule that makes the use of trust funds
for purposes other than the payment of subcontractors prima facie
evidence of an intent to defraud.3" Prior to Ferguson Trenching, no
Maryland court had reviewed the construction trust statute. 2
b. Generally.-Many states have enacted trust fund statutes
to supplement traditional mechanics' lien remedies.33 Trust fund statutes are often an unpaid subcontractor's sole remedy because, unlike
Maryland's statute, most states' mechanics' lien statutes permit a subcontractor or owner must make up that difference. Usually the failed subcontractor simply reopens business under a new name and continues to plague our
industry.
I& (quoting Letter from Phillip W. Worrall, President, Maryland Society of the American
Institute of Architects, to the Honorable Walter M. Baker (Mar. 10, 1987) (concerning
Senate Bill 374)).
25. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-202 (1988). The statute applies to both public and
private construction contracts, with the exception of single family dwelling contracts or
home improvement contracts. Id § 9-204 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
26. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-101 to -114 (1988).
27. Id. The mechanics' lien statute provides that unpaid contractors and subcontractors can assert a lien against the property for which they provided materials and/or labor.
RI. § 9-102(a). They need not be in contractual privity with the owner to assert a lien. I.
§ 9-105. Furthermore, except in the case of a single family dwelling, the statute imposes no
limitation on the amount that may be claimed by the lienor. See id. § 9-104(f).
28. See Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 175, 619 A.2d at 737.
29. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201 (1988); see supra note 15.
30. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-202 (1988); see supra note 16.
31. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-203 (1988); see supra note 16.
32. The federal bankruptcy court had reviewed the statute in five separate cases. In all
of those cases, the court addressed whether the Maryland construction trust statute creates
a fiduciary relationship for purposes of the nondischargeability provision of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1988). The decisions are divided as to whether the
standards for fraud and fiduciary capacity under the trust statute meet the § 523(a) (4)
requirements of actual fraud and existence of a technical or express trust. See In re Piercy,
140 B.R. 108 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); In re Marino, 139 B.R. 380 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992); In re
Parks, 141 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); In reHolmes, 117 B.R. 848 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990);
In re Marino, 115 B.R. 863 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
33. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 376.070 (Baldwin 1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 570.151-.153 (West 1967); N.Y. LIEN LAw §§ 70-79 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 152-153 (West 1990); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.001-.033 (West
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 779.02(5), 779.16 (West 1981).
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contractor to recover from the property owner only the amount due
the contractor under the prime contract.3 4 Like Maryland, most states
have trust fund statutes providing that contractors must hold funds in
trust for the benefit of subcontractors.3 5 The statutes vary considerably, however, both in terms of the language used and the remedies or
36
sanctions provided.
In contrast to an express trust, which is based on the parties' intent to create a trust relationship, 7 trust fund statutes mandate the
creation of a statutory trust.38 The difference between the two types
of trusts is important in cases in which a beneficiary seeks to hold the
officers of a corporate trustee liable.3 9 Under the traditional express
trust rule, an officer or agent who knowingly breaches an express trust
administered by a corporation is personally liable.4" Whether a legislature intended that the traditional rule apply to its trust statute is a
question of statutory interpretation.4 1 Some states have codified express trust theory in their statutes.4 2 The New York statute, for exam34. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 43-7 (1986); N.Y. LIEN LAW § 4 (McKinney 1966 & Supp.
1993).
35. The Oklahoma statute, for example, prohibits any use of trust funds for other purposes prior to the payment of all lienable claims. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 153(1)
(West 1990); see also Burmeister Woodwork Co. v. Friedel, 222 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Wis. 1974)
("The statute imposes the trust to insure that one who receives money for this purpose uses
it to that end.").
36. For example, some states' statutes impose criminal sanctions for a diversion of construction trust funds. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.202 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-15(a) (1992).
37. See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§ 1, at 11 (2d ed. 1965) (stating that when based upon the expressed intent of the settlor,
trusts are called express).
38. See Howard L. Meyer, Trust Fund Provisions of the New York Mechanics Lien Law, 10
BUFF. L. REv. 314, 324 (1961) (recognizing that lien law trust funds are solely a creature of
the legislature). The Restatement notes only one type of statutory trust-a right of action
for death by wrongful act to an executor, administrator, or other person. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17 cmt. i (1959); see also Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509
(1960) (recognizing a statutory trust); Matter of Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. 413, 417
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating that an inherent feature of a statutory trust is the absence of a
trust agreement).
39. See Meyer, supra note 38, at 322-25 (stating that breach of an express trust will result
in personal liability for the corporate officer whereas the courts are split on whether the
breach of a statutory trust will result in personal liability).
40. 3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1141 (1986).
41. See Meyer, supra note 38, at 324 (stating that the primary question as to whether an
action will lie against a corporate officer is whether a court will find any legislative authority for such an action under the governing statute).
42. See Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
Oklahoma lien trust statute creates an express trust because it clearly defines the trust res
and charges the trustee with affirmative duties in applying trust funds); In re Polidoro, 12
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pie, requires lien law trustees to keep detailed books and records with
respect to each trust.43
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In reaching its decision in Ferguson
Trenching, the Court of Appeals first addressed whether a corporate
officer has a fiduciary duty to a corporate creditor under section 9201."4 The relevant portion of the statute provides that "moneys ...
shall be held in trust by the contractor or subcontractor, as trustee."45
Ferguson Trenching argued that the trial court failed to recognize
Kiehne's status as a fiduciary and thus did not impose the obligations
of a fiduciary on him. 46 The court, however, refused to extend the
trust relationship to corporate officers. Examining the statute's plain
language, the court stated that " [n]othing in the statute makes a corporate officer, director, or employee a fiduciary with respect to a party
that has entered into a contract with the corporation." 47 To bolster its
argument, the court contrasted the Maryland statute with statutes in
two other states that explicitly provide for the general fiduciary liability of officers.4" The court concluded that Kiehne owed no fiduciary
duty to Ferguson Trenching because he was not a party to the contract
between it and Advanced Excavation.4 9
B.R 867, 871 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that the New York courts have made the
liability of managing officers coextensive with that of the corporate contractor).
43. N.Y. LEN LAw § 75 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1993). But see In re Boyle, 819 F.2d
583, 586 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Texas statute "does not create 'red,' 'blue,' and
Iyellow' dollars each of which can only be used for the 'red,' 'blue,' or 'yellow' construction
project").
44. Ferguson Trenching 329 Md. at 177, 618 A.2d at 739.
45. MD.CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-201(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
46. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 174, 618 A.2d at 737. The court did not address the
duties of a party made a trustee by the construction trust statute. See id. at 178, 618 A.2d at
739; see also Green v. Lombard, 28 Md. App. 1, 343 A.2d 905, 909 (1975) (recognizing that
the duty of a fiduciary to "exercise the care and skill of a man of ordinary prudence dealing
with his own property" has long been the standard in Maryland); 2 AUSTIN W. SCOTr, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 172, 174 (3d ed. 1967) (discussing generally the duties of a trustee in
administering a trust).
47. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 177, 618 A.2d at 739.
48. See id. at 179, 618 A.2d at 739. The court contrasted the Maryland statute with the
Oklahoma and Texas construction trust statutes. Id. at 178-79. The Oklahoma statute provides: "If the party receiving any money under Section 152 ...shall be a corporation, such
corporation and its managing officers shall be liable for the proper application of such trust
funds." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 153(3) (West 1990) (emphasis added). The relevant
portion of the Texas statute provides: "A contractor, subcontractor, or owner or an officer,
director, or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or owner, who receives trust funds or who
has control or direction of trust funds, is a trustee of the trust funds." TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 162.002 (West 1984) (emphasis added).
49. See Ferguson Trenching 329 Md. at 179, 618 A.2d at 740.
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The Court of Appeals next addressed whether the trial judge
properly interpreted the trust statute's personal liability provision. 50
The court compared the provision to two now-superseded Maryland
theft statutes 5 1 to illustrate that, by making misuse of trust funds prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud, section 9-203 provides a claimant
with an important evidentiary "boost."52 The court explained that
"proof of the diversion of funds allows a plaintiff's case to reach the
fact finder without the plaintiff otherwise having to prove the defendant's intent to defraud."" Noting that the law of presumptions is
wrought with entanglement, the court explained that it did not need
to determine whether this "boost" signifies a rebuttable presumption
or a permissible inference of intent to defraud.54 The court did conclude, however, that prima facie evidence is not the equivalent of a
conclusive presumption.55
Finally, the court interpreted the term "intent to defraud" for
purposes of section 9-202.56 The court considered several state and
federal court decisions interpreting the meaning of intent to defraud
in various penal provisions.5 7 Based on those decisions, the court determined that intent to defraud generally requires some form of bad
faith or dishonesty.5 8 Applying this definition, the court ruled that
there was sufficient evidence before the circuit court to negate the
prima facie presumption that Kiehne acted with intent to defraud.5 9
The court stated that the trial judge "could have found that Kiehne
genuinely believed Advanced would be able to pay Ferguson what it
was owed ... "60
50. Id. Section 9-203 states that misuse of trust funds is prima facie evidence of intent
to defraud. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-203 (1988).

51. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 140 (false pretenses), 142 (Worthless Check Act) (1992)
(superseded).
52. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 181-83, 618 A.2d at 742.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 182, 618 A.2d at 741. The court stated that it could decide the issue in the
case without becoming entangled in the law of presumptions-previously characterized as
"the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms...." Id. (quoting EDMOND W. CLERY,
MCCORMICK ON EviDENCE § 342, at 965 (3d ed. 1984)).
55. Id. at 182-83, 618 A.2d at 741.
56. Id. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742.
57. Id. at 184-86, 618 A.2d at 74243. See generally United States v. Williams, 728 F.2d
1402 (11th Cir. 1984) (mail fraud prosecution); United States v. Ammons, 464 F.2d 414
(8th Cir.) (mail fraud prosecution), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972); Barghout v. Mayor,
325 Md. 311, 600 A.2d 841 (1992) (Baltimore City ordinance forbidding the representation of nonkosher food as kosher); Roderick v. State, 9 Md. App. 120, 262 A.2d 783 (1970)
(larceny after trust).
58. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 186, 618 A.2d at 743.
59. Id. at 187, 618 A.2d at 744.
60. Id.
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4. Analysis.-In concluding that Kiehne owed no fiduciary duty
to Ferguson Trenching, the Ferguson Trenching court upheld the longestablished principle that statutes should be construed consistent with
their plain meaning.6 1 Moreover, the court's reasoning comports with
the rule that statutes should be read "so that no word, clause, sentence
or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory ...."62 If the General Assembly had intended to apply the traditional rule governing trusts-that a corporate officer's personal
liability is coextensive with the liability of the corporation 63-then it
would not have needed to enact section 9-202. Rather, section 9-202,
which requires that the subcontractor prove the officer's intent to defraud, would have been superfluous.
Although the court's decision comports with traditional notions
of statutory construction, refusing to impose a fiduciary duty on the
corporate officer has rendered the statute virtually meaningless. Because a corporation is merely an artificial entity, its officers necessarily
are charged with administering trusts under the statute. Under the
traditional rule, "[t]he trustee of an express trust may not commingle
trust funds with his general funds. He must treat all beneficiaries of
the same class with strict impartiality. The crime of diversion is com64
Immitted the instant he uses the funds for an improper purpose."

position of this traditional rule undoubtedly would have strengthened
the subcontractor's rights to construction payments.
A technical analysis of the construction trust statute supports the
court's conclusion that the prima facie evidence provision of section
9-203 is not the equivalent of a conclusive presumption of intent to
defraud. 5 The legislature can create a conclusive presumption as to
the validity of a certain fact, but such a provision is essentially an alteration of the substantive law.6 6 If the construction trust statute did not
require proof of intent to defraud to impose personal liability on an
officer, the prima facie evidence rule could be interpreted as creating
a conclusive presumption of intent to defraud. Thus, evidence of mis61. See Management Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d 310,
314 (1984) (stating the rule that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the legislature's intent).
62. Police Comm'r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 419, 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977).
63. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
64. Meyer, supra note 38, at 326; see a/soJoseph H. Bocock, Liens: Mechanic's and Materialmen's Liens: Oklahoma's Trust Fund Provisions, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 199, 201 (1978).
65. See Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 182-83, 618 A.2d at 741.
66. See State v. Lapointe, 123 A. 692, 696 (N.H. 1924) ("Such a statute is not in substance a direction that certain evidence shall have a fixed weight, but that a certain fact
need not be proved; or stated more directly, that the fact no longer enters into the issue.").
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use alone would determine the issue of liability.6 7 As the statute reads
now, however, section 9-203 is merely a rule of evidence. It regulates
the duty to go forward with the production of evidence on the issue of
68

fraudulent intent.

Exactly how the statute regulates this duty is unclear. By refusing
to choose between the two competing views of the meaning of prima
facie evidence,69 the Court of Appeals failed to provide guidelines for

the operation of section 9-203 in practice. Specifically, it is not clear
whether proof of diversion of funds means that the subcontractor has
proven its case when the corporate officer presents no evidence to
rebut a claim of intent to defraud,7 ° or whether proof of diversion
merely signifies that the subcontractor's case will survive a contractor's
motion to dismiss. 7 ' The latter approach would further weaken the
statute's ability to protect subcontractors because it would require a
subcontractor to persuade the court that an officer's misuse of trust
funds is evidence of bad faith.
The Ferguson Trenching court's analysis ignores the purpose of the
legislature in enacting the construction trust statute.72 Under Ferguson
Trenching, the remedy provided by the statute is only a negligible improvement over the common law action for fraud. An action for fraud
requires the injured party to affirmatively establish an intent to defraud without the aid of any presumptions. 7' To give the construction
trust statute some effect, the court should have broadly interpreted
the statute's intent to defraud requirement to mean any intentional

67. Section 9-203 defines misuse as "use... of any moneys held in trust ...

for any

other purpose than to pay those subcontractors who did work...." MD. CODE ANN., REAL

PROP. § 9-203 (1988).
68. See Lapointe, 123 A. at 696 (stating that the rules of prima facie proof merely regulate the duty to go forward with the production of evidence).
69. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
70. See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 301.4, at 231 n.16 (1987) (suggesting that

use of the term "prima facie" is meant to create a true rebuttable presumption).
71. See MCCORMICK, supra note 54, § 342, at 965 n.4 (using "prima facie" to mean evidence that is sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict).
According to Professor Wigmore,
The difference between these two senses of the term is practically of the greatest
consequence, for, in the latter sense [permissible inference], it means merely that
the proponent is safe in having relieved himself of his duty of going forward,
while in the former sense [rebuttable presumption] it signifies that he has further
succeeded in creating it anew for his opponent.
9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2494, at 381 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981).
72. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
73. See Everett v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 307 Md. 286, 300, 513 A.2d 882, 889 (1986)
(setting forth the five elements a party must show to prove fraud).
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use of funds inconsistent with the trust."4 The court then could have
found Kiehne's proof insufficient to rebut the presumption supplied
by section 9-203 and, in so doing, afforded the subcontractor a
remedy.
Under such an interpretation of intent to defraud, a corporate
officer still could assert a valid defense of mistake of fact. For example, an officer could establish that he thought the subcontractor had
already been paid, or that he was not aware of any outstanding balance. On the contrary, neither financial hardship nor an honest intention to pay the subcontractor in the future would properly negate
fraudulent intent. A contractor's financial problems would not remove or alter the statute's limitation on the use of trust funds. 7 ' The
use of trust funds to pay other corporate expenses with knowledge of
a subcontractor's right to payment would satisfy the proof requirement to establish an intent to defraud, regardless of the corporation's
threatened insolvency or the legitimacy of its expenses. 76 Defining an
intent to defraud as an intentional use of funds inconsistent with the
trust would implement the legislature's purpose to protect the subcontractor by 77expanding the scope of the contractor's officer's personal liability.
The Ferguson Trenchingcourt set forth an extremely narrow definition of intent to defraud. As a result of the court's decision, to prevail
on a fraudulent diversion claim, a subcontractor must present evidence that the contractor had no intention to pay the amount owed.
The court stated that "the [construction trust] statute enhances the
personal liability of corporate officers and directors,"7 ' but the court's
narrow view of the statute's prima facie presumption under the statute
will result in more dismissals in the circuit courts.
74. See Owens v. Drywall & Acoustical Supply Corp., 325 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D. Tex.
1971) (stating that within the limitations of the statutory terms, courts should strive for
broad construction to effectuate a statute's protective purposes); see also State v. Barnes,
273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 744 (1974) (noting that statutes designed to redress existing grievances should be construed liberally to "advance the remedy and obviate the
mischief").
75. See Burmeister Woodwork Co. v. Friedel, 222 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Wis. 1974) ("The
fact that the corporation needed funds for other purposes did not change the limitation
on the use of trust funds.... [The statute] is not concerned with the financial problems of

corporations.").
76. See State v. Sobkowiak, 496 N.W.2d 620, 626 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the
"intent establishing the violation is the intent to use moneys subject to a trust for purposes
inconsistent with the trust").
77. Albright has stated that the construction trust statute was designed to complement
Maryland's mechanics' lien statute and "to reinforce the rights and responsibilities of contractors and subcontractors in the construction industry." Albright, supra note 23, at 482.
78. Ferguson Trenching, 329 Md. at 183, 618 A.2d at 742.
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5. Conclusion.-The Ferguson Trenching decision is a product of
the Court of Appeals's struggle to find legislative authority for holding
corporate officers liable for misuse of construction trust funds. Unfortunately for subcontractors in Maryland, the court construed the construction trust statute to limit significantly the scope of personal
liability. The court's decision establishes that when the personal liability of a corporate officer is at issue, the construction trust statute will
be narrowly construed in the officer's favor. Subcontractors can now
recover from corporate officers of the general contractor only by producing the proverbial "smoking gun."
Subcontractors who fail to obtain personal guarantees or secure
bonds for payment still, however, have access to compensation
through a timely filing of a mechanics' lien. Thus, the most significant effect of Ferguson Trenching is that it allows fraudulent diverters of
trust funds to escape largely unscathed. This effect inures to the detriment of owners as well as to subcontractors. The General Assembly
could change the law by amending the statute to codify express trust
theory and thus clarify subcontractors' rights under the statute. Alternatively, the court could reinterpret the statute's intent requirement
to make recovery less burdensome.
JENNIFER

B.

L. CHAPIN

Clarifying Maryland's Statutorily Implied Warranties

In Andrulis v. Levin Construction Corp.,1 the Court of Appeals held
that Maryland's statutorily implied warranties do not apply solely to
work done by builders in or on new homes.' Confronting an issue of
first impression, the Andrulis court held that section 10-203(a) of the
Real Property Article 3 encompasses all work that is "a part of' a private
dwelling unit, including defects to items not immediately attached to
the dwelling unit and defects to fixtures and structures outside the
dwelling unit not necessary for its structural stability.4 In so holding,
the court rejected the argument that the definitional limitations on
"new homes" found in section 10-601 (i) (2)' restrict the definition of
"improvements" in section 10-203(a). 6 The Andrulis decision clarified
1. 331 Md. 354, 628 A.2d 197 (1993).
2. Id. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
3. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-203(a) (1988); see infra note 15 (quoting relevant
portions of § 10-203(a)).
4. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
5. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-601(i)(2) (Supp. 1993).

6. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 365, 628 A.2d at 202.
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Maryland law and expanded the protection available to purchasers of
new homes. This expansion of consumer protection comports with
case law and statutory enactments in other jurisdictions and will serve
to reduce the bargaining disparity between new home builders and
purchasers. 7
1. The Case.-In 1987, the Levin Construction Corporation
(Levin) began building a house in Montgomery County, Maryland.'
In 1988, Levin put the home and lot up for sale and subsequently
entered into a purchase contract with Peter and Marilyn Andrulis.9 At
the December 1988 closing, the parties put $15,748 into an escrow
account to cover unfinished work.1"
The Andrulises moved into their home before Levin completed
construction. 1 Over the next several months, they discovered numerous defects in both the materials and the workmanship in their new
home. 2 Despite the failure to correct these defects, Levin requested
that the escrow agent tender the escrow money. 3
The Andrulises filed a five count complaint in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County.14 At trial, the court held that Levin had
breached the section 10-203 implied warranties applicable to newly
completed improvements' 5 by failing to correct defects both inside
7. See infta note 24.
8. Id. at 356, 628 A.2d at 198.
9. Id. Under the contract, Levin agreed to add certain features to the lot, such as a
swimming pool to be constructed in 1989, and the Andrulises promised to purchase the
land and improvements. Id at 356-57, 628 A.2d at 198. The purchase price of $1,276,900
consisted of $1,241,900 cash at closing and a $35,000 promissory note. Id. at 356-57, 628
A.2d at 198.
10. Id. at 357, 628 A.2d at 198.

11. Levin Constr. Corp. v. Andrulis, No. 92-1502, slip op. at I (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June
10, 1992).
12. Id. The contested items included: west side retaining wall, waterproofing of retaining walls, retaining wall weepholes, sidewalk caulking, garage, timber retaining wall, rear
yard, catch basin and grates, planter drains and tie-ins, pool lights and light covers, patio
slab, front walkway, and fence posts. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 359, 628 A.2d at 199.
13. Levin Constr. Corp., No. 92-1502, slip op. at 1. Even though Levin was aware of the
Andrulises' claim, Levin informed the escrow agent that all items listed in the escrow
agreement had been completed. Id.
14. The Andrulises alleged breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, breach of
express warranties, and negligence and also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at
2. The last two issues were not brought before the Court of Appeals.
15. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-203 (1988). Section 10-203 reads in pertinent
part:
(a) Warranties which are implied.-Except as provided... in every sale, warran-

ties are implied that, at the time of the delivery of the deed to a completed improvement or at the time of completion of an improvement not completed when
the deed is delivered, the improvement is:
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and outside the house.1 6 The court entered judgment against Levin
for $78,616.40.17
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Levin argued that the
trial court erred by extending the section 10-203 warranties to items
beyond the statute's scope." The Court of Special Appeals agreed
and ruled that "the contested items, except the garage and retaining
walls necessary for the house's structural stability, [were] not fixtures or
structures made a part of... [the house] by Levin" and, thus, were not
warranted by section 10-203.1' The court remanded the case for a
20
determination of which retaining walls were structurally necessary.
(1) Free from faulty materials;
(2) Constructed according to sound engineering standards;
(3) Constructed in a workmanlike manner; and
(4) Fit for habitation.
(b) Exception.-The warranties of subsection (a) do not apply to any condition that an inspection of the premises would reveal to a reasonably diligent purchaser at the time the contract is signed.
Id. § 10-203(a), (b).
The definition of improvement is provided in § 10-201 (b): "'Improvements' includes
every newly constructed private dwelling unit, and fixture and structure which is made a
part of a newly constructed private dwelling unit at the time of construction by any building contractor or subcontractor." Id. § 10-201(b).
16. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 358, 628 A.2d at 199.
17. Id. at 357, 628 A.2d at 198. The court explained:
[T]he total allowances are $138,033. The note, with interest, and the interpled
funds with interest, combined, total $59,416.60. The note will be deemed as having been satisfied in these proceedings. The interpled funds will be used, along
with the note, as a deduction, leaving, according to my figures, a total of
$78,616.40.
Levin, No. 92-1502, slip op. at 3. The court found defects including "a patio that had
'settled far beyond the measure of any warranty,'" misplacement of outlets for three of the
home's drains, "no foundation drain on two sides of the house," an improperly installed
heating and air conditioning system, and a cracked retaining wall. Brief of Appellant at 34.
18. Levin Constr. Corp., No. 92-1502, slip op. at 13. Levin also argued that the Home
Owners Warranty Corporation Limited Warranty, which was incorporated into its agreement with the Andrulises, evidenced the parties' intent to exclude certain items from coverage. Id. at 13-15. This provision, if applicable, excluded items such as the swimming
pool, driveway, patios, and retaining walls. Id.
19. Id. at 17. The Court of Special Appeals stated that "the warranty provisions embodied in the contract ma[de] it evident that the parties intended to exclude the disputed
items, except for the garage and the retaining walls necessary for the house's structural
stability, from coverage." Id. at 18. Further, the intermediate court ruled that the list of
exclusions in § 10-601(i)(1)'s definition of "new home" limited the scope of "improvements" as defined in § 10-201(b). Andrulis, 331 Md. at 363, 628 A.2d at 201; see infra note
63 and accompanying text.
20. Id. at 25. Interpreting the Maryland case law discussing § 10-201 (b), the intermediate court held that the disputed items other than the garage and the structurally necessary
retaining walls were not improvements and thus beyond this section's scope.
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The Andrulises petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari,
and Levin cross-petitioned. 2 The court granted both petitions to decide whether the section 10-203 warranties apply to work done by the
22
builder on areas other than those in or on the dwelling house.
2. Legal Background.-At common law, no warranties were implied in the sale of real property.23 Courts and commentators nationwide, however, recognized the disparity in the bargaining positions of
buyers and sellers2 4 and urged a limitation of the doctrine of caveat
emptor through the adoption of implied warranties in the sale of real
property. 25 In 1968, the Court of Appeals expressed its support of this
21. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 357, 628 A.2d at 198.
22. Id. at 356, 628 A.2d at 198.
23. See Leo Bearman, Jr., Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule,

14 VAND. L. REv. 541, 543 (1961) (noting the general rule under English and American
common law that there are no implied warranties in the sale of real estate); Linda S.
Woolf, Comment, Caveat Venditor in Maryland Condominium Sales: Cases and Legislation Imposing Implied Warranties in Sales of Residential Condominiums, 14 U, BALT. L. REv. 116, 117

(1984) (noting that, under English and American common law, the doctrine of caveat
emptor governed the sale of both real and personal property, and sellers made no warranties unless they made them in separate promises).
24. Regardless of whether new home purchasers have the power to shop the real estate
market for the best price, they suffer the serious problem of insufficient information. The
complexity of home construction and the expense of hiring a building expert to survey the
quality of the construction prohibit most buyers from being fully informed. See, e.g.,
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966) (recognizing the injustice of applying the rule of caveat emptor to an inexperienced buyer in favor of a builder who is engaged daily in the business of building); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795,
799 (Mo. 1972) ("The ordinary 'consumer' can determine little about the soundness of
construction but must rely upon the fact that the vendor-builder holds the structure out to
the public as fit for use as a residence, and of being of reasonable quality."); Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 327 (N.J. 1965) (noting that courts have developed an
exception to the rule of caveat emptor in the sale of new homes because homebuyers rely
on builders regarding their skill and the house's fitness for habitation).
25. See, e.g., Bearman, supra note 23, at 343-48 (discussing the limitations on the doctrine of caveat emptor due to the adoption of implied warranties); Paul G. Haskell, The
Casefor an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 648 (1965)

(urging courts to give purchasers of real property protection similar to that given to purchasers of chattels by adopting the implied warranty of merchantability); Ronald 0. Roeser, The Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin the Sale of New Housing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978

S. ILL. U. LJ. 178, 178 & n.1 (1978) (remarking that the law is now filling the void created
by the doctrine of caveat emptor concerning the protection of home buyers through use of

implied warranties); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926A,
810 (3d ed. 1963) (noting that courts have developed exceptions to the rule of caveat
emptor in the sale of new housing where the vendor is also the developer or contractor).
In Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., an English court found implied warranties of
habitability in the sale of a partially completed house. 2 KB. 113, 117 (1931). For an
acknowledgement of this trend by a Maryland court, see Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke,
284 Md. 708, 339 A.2d 883 (1979), in which the Court of Appeals stated that the General
Assembly, in adopting the implied warranties in § 10-203(a), evinced its intent to protect
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view, but determined that such a change in the state's law should be
made by the legislature and not through judicial action.2 6 The General Assembly responded by enacting Chapter 151 of the Acts of 1970,
now sections 10-201 to 10-209 of the Real Property Article. 7
Section 10-201(b) defines "improvements" as "every newly constructed private dwelling unit, and fixture and structure which is made
a part of a newly constructed private dwelling unit at the time of construction . . 21 Section 10-203 (a) provides that, upon either delivery
or completion, an improvement must be (1) free from faulty materials, (2) constructed according to sound engineering standards, (3)
constructed in a workmanlike manner, and (4) fit for habitation.2 9
The legislature made newly completed improvements subject to these
warranties in order to protect new home purchasers from latent defects about which builders necessarily have superior knowledge.3" In
1990, the General Assembly expanded the protections available to
new home purchasers by adding sections 10-601 to 10-610 on new
home warranties.3 1 The purpose of the legislation was to require new
home builders to make certain disclosures to purchasers and owners
of new homes, to require builders to furnish certain information
about new home warranty security plans, and to establish minimum
standards to which new home warranty security plans must conform.3 2
Early on Maryland courts made clear that they would afford full
statutory protection to buyers when the warranty of habitability apinnocent purchasers from latent defects that make a house not fit for habitation. Id. at
718-19, 339 A.2d at 890.
26. Allen v. Wilkinson, 250 Md. 395, 398, 243 A.2d 515, 517 (1968); see also Thomas v.
Cryer, 251 Md. 725, 726-27, 248 A.2d 795, 795-96 (1969) (reiterating the view that until the
General Assembly acts, there are no implied warranties in the sale of a completed
residence).
27. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-201 to -209 (1988).
28. Id. § 10-201(b) (emphasis added). As originally enacted, § 10-201(b) read: "'Improvements' includes all fixtures and structures attached to realty in the nature of private
dwelling units." 1970 Md. Laws 151 (emphasis added). Chapter 694 of the 1971 Acts deleted the phrase "attached to realty in the nature of private dwelling units." 1971 Md. Laws
694.
29. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-203(a) (1988).

30. Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 718-19, 399 A.2d 883, 890 (1979)
(considering whether the lack of an adequate well supply renders a new dwelling not "fit
for habitation"); Krol v. York Terrace Bldg., Inc., 35 Md. App. 321, 329, 370 A.2d 589, 594
(1977) (holding that interpreting § 10-203 warranties to be applicable only upon delivery
of the deed "would deprecate the very purpose of that consumer oriented statute," which
was intended to apply to hidden and latent defects).
31. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-601 to -610 (1988 & Supp. 1992). Subtitle 6 also
extended the expiration period of implied warranties for structural defects. Id. § 10604(a).
32. 1990 Md. Laws 805-06.
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plies, but they did not fully define the meaning of "improvements"
covered by the warranty. For example, in Krol v. York Terrace Building,
Inc.,3 the Court of Special Appeals held the warranty of habitability to
cover the sufficiency of the production of a well supplying water for a
new home. 4 The court stated that a well is "clearly a fixture or structure which is made a part of a newly constructed private dwelling unit
:.

.

sufficient to fit the definition of 'improvements' intended to be

included under the warranties."3 " The scope of the definition of "improvements," however, remained unclear."6 While the court specified
that the Krols's well fell within the statute's coverage, it failed to address the reasons for its decision or to enumerate other items covered
by the warranty.3 7
In Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Service Corp., 8 the Court
of Appeals extended warranty coverage to defects outside individual
condominium units by holding that certain common areas in a condominium complex, including stairways and walls, constitute improvements under section 10-201 (b)." Although intended to clarify the
purchaser's rights under section 10-203(a), because the disputed common areas were attached to the dwelling units in the case, the decision
left doubt as to whether an improvement's attachment to the realty
40
was a prerequisite to protection under the warranty.
33. 35 Md. App. 321, 370 A.2d 589 (1977).
34. Id. at 332, 370 A.2d at 596. Two weeks after the Krols moved into their new home,
the water supply ran out and, for the remainder of the year, they did not have an adequate
water supply. Krol, 35 Md. App. at 322-23, 370 A.2d at 591; see also Loch Hill Constr. Co. v.
Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 716, 399 A.2d 883, 889 (1979) (holding that a new dwelling that is
without an adequate supply of water breaches the implied warranty of habitability under
10-203(a)).
35. Kro/, 35 Md. App. at 330, 370 A.2d at 595.
36. The court's analysis of the breach of the § 10-203(d) warranty concerned whether
the lack of water made the Krols's home uninhabitable. When considering the habitability
of an improvement, courts should interpret "improvements" more expansively because defects that render a new home unlivable must be covered by a warranty. It would be a
strange result if a new home was held not fit for habitation, but the purchaser could not
hold the builder liable for breach of warranty. Thus, Krol left open the scope of"improvements" when the defect does not go to the dwelling's habitability.
37. See Krol, 35 Md. App. at 329-34, 370 A.2d at 594-97. Without clarifying its reasoning,
the court simply concluded "that a new home which does not contain an adequate supply
of useable water is not 'fit for habitation.'" Id. at 332, 370 A.2d at 596.
38. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1982).
39. Id. at 703, 458 A.2d at 810. The court also held that defects in electrical wiring,
roofs, gutters, downspouts, and air conditioning compressors were covered under § 10203(a). Id.
40. The building in question was a garden style condominium complex in which all
areas excluding the individual units constituted common areas. Id. at 702-03, 458 A.2d at
810.
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Other jurisdictions employ a nonrestrictive interpretation of "improvements," extending implied warranty coverage to "items external
to the house or unrelated to its structure." 4 1 In Krawiec v. Black Manor
Development Corp.,42 for example, the Appellate Court of Connecticut
construed a statute almost identical to the Maryland implied warranty
statute 43 and concluded that "the legislature intended that the implied warranties apply to both the newly constructed single-family
dwelling and the lot upon which it sits .... Similarly, in Christensen
v. RID. Sell Construction Co.,45 the Missouri Court of Appeals recognized that the full range of defects that constitute a breach of implied
warranty had not been defined4" and refused to limit coverage to defects such as the cracking of the foundation or the rotting of floors.4 7
Although it acknowledged that driveways and stairs are not "in a pure
engineering sense, part of the 'structure' of the house,"4 ' it extended
the warranty to cover these items as well as "all parts constructed."4 9
The Christensen court stated that limiting the warranty to apply to defects in the stairs and driveway only upon evidence of a structural defect, such as a crack in the foundation, could produce "bizarre" results
in warranty applicability.5" The Andrulis court followed this inclusive
"-4

41. Christensen v. R.D. Sell Constr. Co., 774 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); see
also Meadowbrook Condominium Ass'n v. South Burlington Realty Co., 565 A.2d 238, 240
(Vt. 1989) (holding that peripheral defects do not have to affect the habitability of the
dwelling in order to come under the umbrella of an implied warranty theory).
42. 602 A.2d 1062 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
43. CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-116, 47-118 (West 1958). Section 47-118 reads in pertinent
part:
(a) In every sale of an improvement by a vendor to a purchaser, except as
provided... warranties are implied that the improvement is: (1) Free from faulty
materials; (2) constructed according to sound engineering standards; (3) constructed in a workman-like manner, and (4) fit for habitation, at the time of the
delivery of the deed to a completed improvement, or at the time of completion of
an improvement not completed when the deed is delivered.
Id,§ 47-118(a). Section 47-116 provides definitions: "'Improvement' means any newly
constructed single family dwelling unit ... and any fixture or structure which is made a
part thereof at the time of construction or conversion .... " Id. § 47-116.
44. Krawiec, 602 A.2d at 1064.
45. 774 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
46. Id. at 538. The Christensencourt considered whether the theory of implied warranty
covers defects in the driveway and front stairway of the purchaser's new home. Id. at 537.
47. ld.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The court noted that if the warranty were limited to structural defects, the
driveway could drop 40 feet or the stairs could pull away from the house and no liability
would occur. Id.
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approach toward defining the scope of "improvements" under section
10-201 (b). 5 1
3. The Court's Reasoning.-Prior to its decision in Andrulis, the
Court of Appeals had not determined the full range of defects that
constitute a breach of the implied warranties provided for under section 10-203.52 Relying primarily on principles of statutory construction, the Andrulis court held that the section 10-203 warranties extend
to fixtures and structures that are not immediately attached to the
house itself.5 3 In so holding, the court broadened the protection
available to home purchasers under the statute.5 4
In declaring section 10-203 the controlling statute,55 the Andrulis
court rejected the argument that its applicability was limited either by
Montgomery County law56 or by section 10-601 of the Real Property
article. 57 Levin argued that the New Home Warranty Security Plan,
offered pursuant to section 8.1 of Montgomery County Executive Regulation No. 22-86,"8 excluded certain relevant items from warranty
coverage.5 9 In rejecting that argument, the court explained that the
local regulations of Maryland's chartered counties do not restrict the
51. See Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364, 628 A.2d at 202.
52. See, e.g., Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 295 Md. 693, 703,
458 A.2d 805, 810 (1982) (holding that the common areas of a condominium complex,
including stairways and walls, are subject to the § 10-203(a) warranties); Loch Hill Constr.
Co., Inc. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 715, 399 A.2d 883, 888 (1979) ("In determining whether
an existing condition relating to a new dwelling renders it uninhabitable under section 10203(a) (4), the test is one of reasonableness."); Krol v. York Terrace Bldg., Inc., 35 Md.
App. 321, 329-34, 370 A.2d 589, 594-97 (1977) (holding that a defect in water well constituted a breach of the implied warranty provided by § 10-203, but not enumerating the full
range of defects constituting such a breach).
53. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
54. The Court of Special Appeals restricted the warranties to items attached to the
dwelling unit or necessary for its structural stability. Levin Constr. Corp. v. Andrulis, No.
92-1502, slip op. at 1, 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 10, 1992). The Court of Appeals refused
to follow this interpretation. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
55. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 363, 628 A.2d at 201.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 364, 628 A.2d at 202. Section 10-601 provides a list of exclusions from new
home warranty coverage. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 10-601(i)(2) (1988 & Supp.
1992); see infra note 63.
58. MONTGOMERY COuNTY, MD., ExEc. REG. No. 22-86 § 8.1. Section 8.1 permits a
builder to use a "private Alternate New Home Warranty Security Plan" if approved by the
County. Id.
59. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 362-63, 628 A.2d at 201. In compliance with § 8.1, Levin furnished the Andrulises with an alternate home warranty document. Id. at 362, 628 A.2d at
201. It excluded from warranty coverage "[d]efects in outbuildings including... detached
garages and detached carports ... ; site located swimming pools and other recreational
facilities; driveways; walkways; patios; boundary walls; retaining walls; ... or any other improvements not a part of the Home itself." Id.
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operation of any of the State's general law.6" The court further noted
that subtitle 6 of the Real Property Article does not apply to new home
warranties offered in Montgomery County.6"
The court then turned to the issue of what constitutes "improvements" covered by the section 10-203 warranties. Looking first to the
definition of "improvements" in section 10-201 (b), the court determined that it included no restrictive language.6 2 The court rejected
appellant's contention that it should incorporate the specific exclusions found in section 10-601 (i) (2) into the section 10-201 (b) definition of "improvements. "63 Levin argued that, under the general rules
of statutory construction, two statutes pertaining to the same general
subject matter "must be construed together and harmonized to the
fullest extent possible." 64 Speaking for the court, Judge Rodowsky responded that "the 1990 enactment of Subtitle 6 ha[d] the opposite
effect from that for which Levin contends." 65 Although the definition
of "new home" in subtitle 666 is nearly identical to the definition of
"improvement" in subtitle 2,67 the court held that the specific exclusions found in section 10-601 (i) (2) could not be added to section 10201(b) by judicial fiat.6"
60. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 363, 628 A.2d at 201; see MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 3 ("In the case
of any conflict between said local law and any Public General Law now or hereafter enacted the Public General Law shall control.").
61. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 363, 628 A.2d at 201 (citing MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10610 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
62. Id. at 364, 628 A.2d at 202.
63. Id. at 365, 628 A.2d at 202-03. Among the § 10-601 (i) (2) exclusions are the following: outbuildings, driveways, walkways, patios, boundary walls, retaining walls, and landscaping. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-601(i)(2) (Supp. 1993). The Court of Special
Appeals read the excluded items from the § 10-601(i) (2) definition of "new home" into
the definition of "improvements" in § 10-201 (b), thereby excluding those items from implied warranty coverage. Levin Constr. Corp. v. Andrulis, No. 92-1502, slip op. at 1, 18-19
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 10, 1992).
64. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364, 628 A.2d at 202 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 24). In
making its argument, Levin relied on Hope v. Baltimore County, 288 Md. 656, 421 A.2d
576 (1980). Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364, 628 A.2d at 202. In Hope, the court stated, "[w]e have
said many times that where two statutes deal with the same subject matter they must be
construed together if they are not inconsistent with one another; that, to the extent possible, full effect should be given to each." Hope, 288 Md. at 666, 421 A.2d at 581.
65. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 365, 628 A.2d at 202.
66. See Mo. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-601(i) (Supp. 1993).
67. See id. § 10-201(b).
68. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 365, 628 A.2d at 202; accordJennings v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 358-59, 488 A.2d 166, 169 (1985) (stating that generally the
court will not insert exclusions from statutory coverage beyond those expressly provided
for by the legislature); State v. Magliano, 7 Md. App. 286, 297, 255 A.2d 470, 476 (1969)
(holding that courts cannot read into statutes exceptions that are not specifically set forth
therein); O'Boyles Ice Cream Island, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 605 A.2d 1301, 1302 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) ("Where the legislature includes specific language in one section of a
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The court also looked to the relevant case law in the jurisdiction.
Citing Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Service Corp.,69 the court
held that the section 10-203 warranties are not limited "to the dwelling unit per se, [n]or to fixtures or structures immediately attached to
the dwelling unit per se. Nor.. . to fixtures or structures outside the
walls of the dwelling unit that might be necessary for the structural
stability of the dwelling unit."7 ° Thus, the court concluded that all of
the contested items in the case7 1 were a part of the Andrulises' newly
constructed private dwelling and, thus, were covered under section
10-203.72
4. Analysis.-In Andrulis, the Court of Appeals refused to limit
the application of Maryland's statutorily implied warranties to items
73
attached to the dwelling unit or necessary for its structural stability.

Although the court employed somewhat specious reasoning to arrive
at its decision, the holding in the case comports with both the national trend toward affording broader protection to purchasers of new
homes 74 and the intent of the Maryland legislature. 75 The decision
clarified the scope of the section 10-203 implied warranties, but also
left open several questions regarding the extent of the statute's
applicability.
The Andrulis court supported its interpretation of "improvements" in 10-201(b) with little more than a conclusory statement. It
determined simply that a "reading that attempts to limit § 10-203 implied warranties to the dwelling unit per se has no support in the lanstatute and excludes the language from another, the language should not be implied
where excluded.").
69. 295 Md. 693, 458 A.2d 805 (1982).
70. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
71. See supra note 12.
72. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 365, 628 A.2d at 202. The court summarily dismissed the intermediate court's holding that the terms of the real estate contract evidenced the parties'
intent to abrogate the statutorily imposed warranties. Id. The court noted that the contract itself stated that Levin would provide applicable warranties as required by the state, id.
at 365-66, 628 A.2d at 202-03, and that, even if the parties had intended to exclude certain
items, they had not complied with section 10-203(d). Id. at 366, 628 A.2d at 203. Section
10-203(d) provides: "Neither words in the contract of sale, nor the deed, nor merger of
the contract of sale into the deed is effective to exclude or modify any implied warranty.... [A]n implied warranty may be excluded or modified wholly or partially by a
written instrument, signed by the purchaser setting forth in detail the warranty to be excluded or modified .... " Id; see also Woolf, supra note 23, at 133 ("Disclaimers of warranty
liability have been disfavored and will be found ineffective if not in strict compliance with
section 10-203(d) of the Real Property Code.").
73. Andrulis, 331 Md. 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
74. See supra notes 24-25, 41-50 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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guage employed in the statute.
It purported to base its
interpretation of the term "improvements" on the plain meaning of
the statute,7 7 but the meaning it assigned the term was not, in fact, the
only possible reasonable interpretation. As the Court of Special Appeals's decision demonstrated, the statute also could be read to restrict the definition of improvements.78 While the Court of Appeals's
interpretation was not clearly wrong, citing additional support for the
holding, especially in light of the other reasonable interpretations of
the statute, would have significantly strengthened the opinion.7"
Although the Andrulis court supported its decision with conclusory logic, the holding itself was not without merit. The court's
liberal interpretation of Maryland's consumer protection legislation
accords with other jurisdictions that have decreased the disparity of
information available to the builders and purchasers in the sale of new
homes.8s Additionally, the Andrulis decision is appealing on an emotive level. In the absence of broadly construed warranties, new home
purchasers would be without any assurance as to the quality of their
new property outside the dwelling unit itself. Home builders sell their
houses and lots as a package, not as distinct items."s Thus, new home
76. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 364, 628 A-2d at 202.
77. Id.
78. Levin Constr. Corp. v. Andrulis, No. 92-1502, slip op. at 17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
June 10, 1992).
79. Id. at 22. The Court of Special Appeals stated that "[t]he plain language of § 10201 (b) mentions that the dwelling unit and any structure and fixture which is made part of
that structure is encompassed within the scope of the definition." Id In the Court of
Special Appeals's opinion, the statute did not cover the items in dispute. Id.

For a contrary proposition, see Christensen v. R.D. Sell Constr. Co., 774 S.W.2d 535,
538 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989), which acknowledges that in the pure engineering sense, driveways and stairs are not part of the "structure" of a house.
80. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text; see also Hesson v. Walmsley Constr.
Co., 422 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing a tendency in recent years
for courts to hold developers who sell real property responsible for the quality of their
products); WILLISTON, supra note 25, § 926A, at 802 ("Over the years, the number of cases
which apply the rule of caveat emptor strictly appears to be diminishing.... ."); Woolf, supra
note 23, at 133-34 ("Developers should consider the consumer-oriented approach that the
General Assembly and Maryland courts have taken in regard to sale of consumer goods for
it is likely that they will be held to a similar standard."). See generally Bearman, supra note
23 (discussing the rise of implied warranties in the sale of real property).
81. See Hesson, 422 So. 2d at 945 ("We agree with the rationale of these decisions extending the doctrine of implied warranty to a builder-vendor of a new house and lot sold as
a package to the original purchaser. As noted, the builder-vendor is in a better position
than the buyer to investigate the quality of the land to support the house."); Briarcliffe
West Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 454 N.E.2d 363, 365 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983) (holding no real distinction should be recognized between buildings and lots in the
application of public policy protecting new home purchasers).
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purchasers have a reasonable expectation that their lots will be free
from latent defects.

82

Another source of support for the Andrulis decision can be found
in the legislative intent of section 10-203. The warranties of section
10-203(a) were a legislative response to a series of court decisions that
refrained from judicially implying warranties in the sale of completed
residences."3 The General Assembly enacted the statute to protect
new home purchasers and reduce the disparity in information available in the sale of new homes.8 4 The Andrulis court simply acted on
that intent.
The legislature's intent with regard to section 10-201, however, is
less clear. As originally enacted, section 10-201(b) included "all fixtures and structures attached to realty" in the definition of improvement. 5 The General Assembly deleted the phrase "attached to realty"
in the 1971 enactment.8 6 While the deletion may appear to reflect the
legislature's desire to remove the requirement that structures be attached to the dwelling unit in order to activate the section 10-203 warranties, the Revisor's Note to the section indicates that upon revision
"the only changes to subsection (b) '[were] in style.' 8 7 The Andrulis
decision controverts that statement by indicating that it is no longer
necessary for a fixture or structure to be attached to the realty to be
covered by the section 10-203 warranties.8 8
Uncertainty over the precise scope of Maryland's implied warranties will persist until a legislative proclamation ends the debate.
Although Andrulis makes clear that coverage of section 10-203(a) extends beyond the dwelling house itself, questions may persist concerning whether Maryland's implied warranties encompass items such as
landscaping defects 9 or soil imperfections.9" Also, section 10-203 im82. Bearman, supra note 23, at 541 ("[T]he consumer, not without some justification,
logically expects that the law will protect him with equal vigor in a purchase as significant
(to his status, his every-day life, and his wallet) as a new home.").
83. See supra note 26-27 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
85. Act of April 15, 1990, ch. 151, 1990 Md. Laws 421 (emphasis added).
86. Act of May 24, 1971, ch. 694, 1971 Md. Laws 1484.
87. Andrulis, 331 Md. at 361, 628 A.2d at 200.
88. Id. at 364-65, 628 A.2d at 202.
89. See Carlson Homes, Inc. v. Messmer, 307 N.W.2d 564, 567 (N.D. 1981) (holding
that a home purchaser's allegation that landscaping was done in an unworkmanlike manner adequately outlined a cause of action based on warranty theory).
90. See House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199, 203 (Wash. 1969) (extending the implied
warranty of habitability to a shifting of foundation caused by the instability of the terrain
upon which the dwelling was built).
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plied warranties apply only to new homes,9 1 leaving all subsequent
purchasers without its protections. As the courts and legislature
broaden the protections available to purchasers of realty, this distinction may become outdated as well. Whatever the legislative response
to these concerns, the Andrulis decision adheres to the intent of the
Maryland legislature: to reduce the information gap between builders
and purchasers of new homes.9 2
5. Conclusion.-In Andrulis, the Court of Appeals rejected a restrictive reading of the applicability of the section 10-203 warranties.
In so holding, the court followed the trend of restricting the doctrine
of caveat emptor in the sale of newly completed residences. Although
the court did not clearly define the limits of Maryland's implied warranties, the Andrulis decision clarified the scope of section 10-203(a)
and increased the protections available to new home purchasers.
JONATHAN

M.

GOODMAN

91. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 10-201(b), 10-203 (1988).
92. See Loch Hill Constr. Co. v. Fricke, 284 Md. 708, 718-19, 399 A.2d 883, 890 (1979).
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The Inapplicability of the Cap on Noneconomic Damages to Wrongful
Death Actions

In United States v. Streidel,' the Court of Appeals held that Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases
does not apply to wrongful death actions.2 The court examined the
language, context, and legislative history of the statute,3 as well as case
law interpreting the term "personal injury,"4 before determining that
the legislature did not intend to include wrongful death actions in the
cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury cases.5 In so ruling,
the court specifically overruled the Court of Special Appeals's holding
in PotomacElectric Power Co. v. Smith.6
1. The Case.-Like many a curious child before him, six year old
Marc Streidel wondered where the letters dropped into a mailbox
went. 7 When he tried to look into an unsecured mailbox in order to
solve this mystery, the mailbox fell on him and killed him.' Pursuant
to the Federal Tort Claims Act,9 Marc's parents filed a wrongful death
action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland."0 The United States conceded liability."
Each parent was awarded $500,000 as compensation for
noneconomic damages. 2 Each award was then reduced to $350,000
pursuant to section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 3 The United States appealed, arguing that the total award to
1. 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
2. Id.at 537, 620 A.2d at 907.
3. Id., 620 A.2d at 908 (examining MD. CODE

ANN.,

CTrS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b)

(1989)).
4. Id. at 540 n.7, 620 A.2d at 910 n.7.
5. Id. at 544, 620 A.2d at 911.
6. 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989),
overruled by United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
7. Streide/, 329 Md. at 535 n.2, 620 A.2d at 906 n.2.
8. Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Streide4 329 Md. at 535, 620 A.2d at 906.
11. Id.

12. Id.
13. Section 11-108(b) of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article provides that"[i]n
any action for damages for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after
July 1, 1986, an award for noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000." MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1989).
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both parents should not exceed the $350,000 statutory cap. 4 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified to the Maryland
Court of Appeals the question of "[w]hether the Maryland solatium
cap of $350,000 is applicable to each claimant of solatium, or is [it] a
comprehensive overall solatium maximum applicable only once, no
matter how many claimants there are."' 5
As a threshold matter, the United States argued that based on the
Court of Special Appeals's holding in Potomac Electric Power Co. v.
Smith, 6 section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
applied to wrongful death actions." It contended that the damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action are for the "personal injuries"
suffered by the survivors and that, therefore, the cap should apply to
wrongful death actions." Finally, it argued that the cap should be
applied in the aggregate to all the claimants in a wrongful death
action. 19
The plaintiffs maintained that the cap should not apply at all in
wrongful death actions. 2 ° They based their argument on the theory
that the statutory phrase "personal injury" does not include the sort of
harms suffered by claimants in a wrongful death action. 2 ' The plaintiffs also argued that the Wrongful Death Act 2 provides for damages
that differ from those available in an action for personal injury.2" In
an argument the court found persuasive, the plaintiffs pointed out
that section 11-109 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article requires juries to itemize the award of damages, 4 but that such itemization is not necessary in wrongful death actions. 5 Consequently, the
plaintiffs reasoned that the legislature must not have intended for the
14. Streidel, 329 Md. at 535, 620 A.2d at 907.
15. Id., 620 A.2d at 906.
16. 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989),
overruled by United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
17. Streide/, 329 Md. at 535, 620 A.2d at 907.
18. Id. at 536, 620 A.2d at 907.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-901 to -903 (1989).
23. Streide/, 329 Md. at 536, 620 A.2d at 907. See generally Stewart v. United Elec. Co.,
104 Md. 332, 339-40, 65 A. 49, 52 (1906) (discussing the difference between wrongful
death actions and survival actions and noting that "[u]nder the Act of 1852 the damages
recoverable are such as the equitable plaintiffs have sustained by the death of the party injured; under sec. 103 the damages recoverable are only such as the deceased sustained in
his lifetime and consequently exclude those which result to other persons from his
death").
24. Streide, 329 Md. at 536, 620 A.2d at 907.
25. Id.
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cap on noneconomic damages to apply to wrongful death actions. 2 6
The plaintiffs also argued that, even if the court were to determine
that Maryland's cap on noneconomic damages did apply to wrongful
death actions, it should apply the cap to each claimant individually,
27
and not in the aggregate.
The court chose not to answer the certified question, holding the
damages cap in section 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article inapplicable to wrongful death actions.2 ' Resolving this issue,
the court believed, rendered the certified question
29
nondeterminative.
2. Legal Background.-In 1986, the General Assembly adopted
$350,000 as the maximum amount recoverable for noneconomic damages in personal injury actions."0 It also created a procedure for itemizing such awards.3 1 The reasons for "capping" the amount
recoverable in such cases included a desire to make damages predictable and to encourage the provision of insurance to Maryland consumers.32 Reacting to a generally perceived "insurance crisis, " 3 3
Maryland's lawmakers sought to limit the area of damages perceived
to be most resistant to objective valuation and the most susceptible to
emotion. 4
Courts have applied this statute in a number of cases. In Franklin
v. Mazda Motor Corp.,3 5 for example, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland held that the statutory cap did not violate
the right to ajury trial36 or the separation of powers doctrine.3 7 The
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 537, 620 A.2d at 907.
29. Id. at 537 n.3, 620 A.2d at 907 n.3.
30. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (1989).
31. "As part of the verdict in any action for damages for personal injury... the trier of
fact shall itemize the award to reflect the monetary amount intended for: (1) Past medical
expenses; (2) Future medical expenses; (3) Past loss of earnings; (4) Future loss of earnings; (5) Noneconomic damages; and (6) Other damages." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD.
PROC. § 11-109(b) (1989).
32. See Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (D. Md. 1989) (noting
that the Governor's Task Force to Study Liability on Medical Malpractice Insurance reported that a "ceiling on noneconomic damages will ... lend greater stability to the insurance market and make it more attractive to underwriters").
33. Streide4 329 Md. at 549, 620 A.2d at 913.
34. See Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1328.
35. 704 F. Supp. 1325 (1989).
36. Id. at 1334. The Franklin plaintiffs argued that because the issue of damages for
pain and suffering was a question of fact for the jury, the legislature's enactment of § 11108 impinged upon the constitutional right to ajury trial. Id. at 1329.
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court applied the rational basis test in determining that the cap was
not unconstitutional.3 8
In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Smith,3 the Court of Special Appeals also applied the rational basis test' ° in ruling that the cap did
not violate the right to equal protection,4 1 the right to trial by jury,42
or the right to due process.4" Potomac Electric involved a wrongful
death action brought by the parents of a child who was electrocuted
and killed when she came into contact with an improperly maintained
power line.44 The Court of Special Appeals based its holding that the
noneconomic damages cap applied to this wrongful death action on
the fact that the Wrongful Death Act was amended in 1969 to include
nonpecuniary damages.4 5 The court further noted that most of the
parents' damages were noneconomic damages.4 6 Stating that "[t] hese
damages are those that are traditionally associated with personal injury actions,"4 7 the court reasoned that "[t]he fact that such injuries
are sustained by beneficiaries who have not sustained bodily injury is
not decisive." 48 Relying on a definition from Black's Law Dictionary,
the Potomac court interpreted the phrase "personal injury" broadly, as
it believed the General Assembly intended.4"
37. Id. at 1336. The plaintiffs also argued that by determining the amount of damages
for pain and suffering, the legislature had usurped a judicial function and violated the
doctrine of separation of powers. Id.
38. Id. at 1337. The court concluded that "imposing an economic limitation on damages ... is reasonably related" to the legislative goals of reducing uncertainty in damage
awards and increasing the availability of insurance in Maryland. Id.
39. 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989),
overru/ed by United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
40. See id. at 632 n.12, 558 A.2d at 789 n.12.
41. Id. at 633-35, 558 A.2d at 789-90.
42. Id. at 628, 558 A.2d at 787.
43. Id. at 630, 558 A.2d at 789.
44. Id. at 597, 558 A.2d at 771.
45. Id. at 620, 558 A.2d at 783.
46. Id. at 620-21, 558 A.2d at 783.
47. Id. at 621, 558 A.2d at 783.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 621-22, 588 A.2d at 783-84. Black's Law Dictionary defines personal injury as,
[i]n a narrow sense, a hurt or damage done to a man's person, such as a cut or
bruise, a broken limb, or the like, as distinguished from an injury to his property
or his reputation. The phrase is chiefly used in this connection with actions of
tort for negligence and under workers' compensation statutes. But the term is
also used (chiefly in statutes) in a much wider sense, and as including any injury
which is an invasion of personal right, and in this signification it may include such
injuries to the person as libel or slander, criminal conversations, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and mental suffering.
BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 707 (5th ed. 1979).
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In 1990, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in Simms v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,5 ° agreed that Maryland's cap on
noneconomic damages should apply to wrongful death actions.5 1 In
addition, it held that Maryland courts would apply the cap to wrongful
death actions such that the total amount recoverable by all parties
would be limited to $350,000.52
In Bartucco v. Wright,53 however, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland ruled that the cap applied individually to
each plaintiff in a wrongful death action. 54 Bartucco was a wrongful
death action brought by the parents of the deceased in which each
parent was awarded $300,000 in noneconomic damages.5 5 The court
based its denial of the defendants' motion to reduce the jury verdict
pursuant to Maryland's cap on noneconomic damages on a number
of factors, including the difficulty of having ajury consider each plaintiff's injury separately. 6 The court also noted that the two statutesthe wrongful death statute and the damage cap statute-allow for different types of damages to be awarded.5 7
One year later, in United States v. Searle,5 8 the Court of Appeals
first evidenced a reluctance to answer the question of whether the cap
applied in the aggregate to wrongful death claimants. The cause of
action in Searle arose prior to the adoption of the cap. 59 The court
reviewed an unpublished decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the case,' which held that the cap
50. 746 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1990).
51. Id. at 597.
52. Id.
53. 746 F. Supp. 604 (D. Md. 1990).
54. Id. at 612.
55. Id. at 605.
56. Id. at 608.
57. Id. at 607-08. The court stated:
The two statutes contain different descriptions of the damages involved. In the
damage cap statute, the term "noneconomic damages" is defined to include
"pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecuniary injury." These are the types of damages typically
sustained by a party who, himself or herself, has been directly injured by a defendant. On the other hand, in a wrongful death action, the plaintiffs may recover for
"mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship,
comfort, protection, care, attention, advice, counsel, training, or guidance."
These are the types of damages typically sustained by a plaintiff due to a defendant's wrongfully causing the death of a family member.
Id. (citations omitted).
58. 322 Md. 1, 584 A.2d 1263 (1991).
59. Id. at 4, 584 A.2d at 1264.
60. Searle v. United States, No. 88-2975, 1990 WL 33947 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1990).
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should be applied in the aggregate.6" Noting that the statute specifically stated that it applied "[i]n any action for damages for personal
injury in which the cause of action [arose] on or after July 1, 1986, "6"
however, the Court of Appeals held that the statute applied prospectively, not retroactively, and refused to reach the issue of whether the
63
cap applied in the aggregate or to each claimant.
Most recently, in Murphy v. Edmonds, 64 the Court of Appeals applied the rational basis test to find that the statutory cap did not violate the Maryland or United States constitutions.6 5 Judge Chasanow,
however, wrote a strong dissent, sounding a number of themes which
he would later echo in his concurring opinion in StreideL6 6 Judge Bell
noted in Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia,67 that Murphy represented part
of a trend to limit the recovery available to Maryland tort victims.6"
3. The Court's Reasoning.-The Streidel court began by examining
the language of sections 11-108 and 11-109 of the cap statute. 6' The
court placed particular emphasis on the meaning of the term "personal injury."7" Although it admitted that "[t]he death of a victim as a
result of a 'personal injury' or 'injury' is, of course, the ultimate injury
to that victim,"" the court interpreted "personal injury" as not including the injuries suffered by the claimants in a wrongful death action.7 2
Noting that the damages recoverable in a survival action for personal
injuries differ from those available in an action for wrongful death,7 3
61. See Searle, 322 Md. at 4, 584 A.2d at 1264.
62. Id. at 5, 584 A.2d at 1265 (quoting § 11-108(b) of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article).
63. Id. at 6, 584 A.2d at 1265.
64. 325 Md. 342, 601 A.2d 102 (1992). See generally Lynn A. Dymond, Note, The Constitutionality of Mayyland's Non-economic Damage Cap, 52 Mo. L. REv. 545 (1993) (reviewing the
court's decision in Murphy).
65. Murphy, 325 Md. at 361-62, 601 A.2d at 111-12.
66. See id. at 378-79, 601 A.2d at 120 (Chasanow, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the right
to recover full and fair compensation from a tortfeasor is an important personal right" that
should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny and that, except in cases of medical malpractice, would not survive such scrutiny).
67. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992). See generally Eric B. Bruce, Note, "Fixing"Punitive Damages and the Advent of State-of-the-Art Knowledge in Maryland, 52 MD. L. REv. 821
(1993) (discussing Zenobia and the history of punitive damages in Maryland).
68. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 484 n.5, 601 A.2d at 665 n.5 (Bell, J., concurring and

dissenting).
69. See Streide4 329 Md. at 537-39, 620 A.2d at 907-08.
70. See id. at 539, 620 A.2d at 909.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 539-40, 620 A.2d at 909. Historically, Maryland courts have held that the
causes of action for personal injury and wrongful death are separate and distinct. While a
survival action compensates for the victim's own anguish, damages in a wrongful death
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the court found that "unless the context indicates otherwise, damages
for an 'injury' or a 'personal injury' or a 'bodily injury' do not include
those damages recoverable in a wrongful death action." 74 The court
reviewed other legislation and found that when the legislature wished
to affect the damages recoverable in both personal injury and wrongful death actions, it had used language such as "personal injury,
death" or "personal injury, or death" or "personal injury, including
death," rather than relying upon the phrase "personal injury" to encompass both meanings. 7 5 For support, the court cited a number of
cases which examined the use of similar language.' 6 Noting that the
General Assembly was clearly familiar with the more inclusive phrases,
the court relied upon the legislature's use of the less inclusive language, "any action for damages for personal injury," to find that the
phrase did not include actions for wrongful death."
Maintaining that "[c ] ourts ordinarily construe the terms 'personal
injury' or 'bodily injury' or 'injury' as not including a wrongful death
action, "781hthe Court of Appeals went on to examine several instances
in which the court had interpreted the phrase "bodily injury" to in79
clude wrongful death actions and distinguished those from Streidel.
For example, in Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, ° the Court of Appeals
interpreted the Insurance Code's"1 use of the term "bodily injuries
sustained in the accident"8 2 to include actions for wrongful death.8 3
The court examined the context of the entire statute in which that
phrase occurred and noted that, in a number of places, the statute
action are intended to compensate the victim's survivors. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light
& Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 338-39, 65 A. 49, 52 (1906) (distinguishing survival actions from
wrongful death actions).
74. Streide4 329 Md. at 540, 620 A.2d at 909.

75. Id. at 541-42, 620 A.2d at 909-10.
76. See id. at 540 n.7, 620 A.2d at 909 n.7 (citing Pacific Indem. v. Interstate Fire & Cas.,
302 Md. 383, 488 A.2d 486 (1985); Perkins v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 962 P.2d 670
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); In re Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 156 So. 447 (La. 1934);
Gaines v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 32 So. 2d 633 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 8 A.2d 750 (N.H. 1939); Brustein v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 174
N.E. 304 (N.Y. 1931); Valdez v. Interinsurance Exch., 54 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1966); Holtz v.
Mutual Serv. Cas. Co., 117 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1962); Napier v. Banks, 224 N.E.2d 158
(Ohio Ct. App. 1967); Bernat v. Socke, 118 A.2d 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955)).
77. Id. at 542-45, 620 A.2d at 910-12.
78. Id. at 542, 620 A.2d at 910.
79. See id. at 543-44, 620 A.2d at 910-11.
80. 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991).
81. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c) (2) (1991).
82. Id.

83. Forbes, 322 Md. at 700, 589 A.2d at 948.
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spoke of "the bodily injury or death of the insured."8 4 Additionally,
the Streidel court acknowledged that in section 9-101 of the Labor and
Employment Article, the state's Workers' Compensation Act, the term
"accidental injury" is read to include wrongful death. 5 Again examining the context in which that term appears, the court noted that the
Act always included a section providing for compensation in the case
86
of the worker's death.
When the court examined the context of the entire cap statute, it
found convincing the plaintiffs' argument that the General Assembly
did not intend to include wrongful death actions in the cap it placed
on the amount recoverable in actions for personal injury.8 7 The court
noted that the noneconomic damages subject to the cap are of the
type normally awarded to the person injured, not to her survivors.88
Some of the harms mentioned in the statutory cap on noneconomic
damages, such as inconvenience, physical impairment, and loss of
consortium, are not recoverable in a wrongful death action.8 9
According to the Streidel court, the strongest argument against inclusion of wrongful death actions in the cap on personal injury damages is section 11-109's requirement that juries itemize awards to
indicate how much has been allocated for past and future medical
expenses, past lost earnings, future loss of earnings, noneconomic
damages, and other damages.9" The court again emphasized that
these damages are not available in an action for wrongful death.9"
The emphasis in section 11-109 on future payments to compensate
the victim for items such as future medical bills and future lost earn-

84. Id. at 699, 589 A.2d at 948-49. Although not relied on by the Streidel court, the
Forbes court also placed heavy emphasis on the policy reasons behind the uninsured motorist provision in the Code-to provide recovery to those harmed. Id. at 697, 589 A.2d at
948.
85. Streide4 329 Md. at 543-44, 620 A.2d at 911.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 544, 620 A.2d at 911.
88. Id. The court noted that
noneconomic damages that are subject to the cap are defined as "pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other
nonpecuniary injury." . . . These types of damages are associated with personal
injury and are awarded to compensate the person injured. They are not designed
to compensate the party entitled to damages in a wrongful death case for the loss
of the deceased.
Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 544-45, 620 A.2d at 911.
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ings9 2 further convinced the court that the cap statute was "inconsistent with a [sic] award of damages in an action for wrongful death."9"
Having examined the language and context of the cap statute,
the court turned its attention to the legislative history and available
indications of legislative intent. 4 It noted that although an extensive
legislative history of the cap statute is available, nowhere in the history
is there any mention of wrongful death actions. 95 It also noted that
the task force reports upon which the legislation was based do not
mention wrongful death actions.96
The Court of Appeals also found no basis in the legislative history
to support the contention of the United States and the Court of Special Appeals that the final version of the statute represented a "broadening" of the proposed legislation and that the General Assembly
therefore intended the cap to be applied more expansively. 97 The
Court of Appeals traced the legislative history of the cap98 and rejected the defendant's argument that the legislative purpose of the
statute would be thwarted by any interpretation that failed to include
wrongful death actions within the provisions of the cap.9 9 The court
identified "a legislatively perceived crisis concerning the availability
and cost of liability insurance in this State"' ° as the underlying reason
for the cap on noneconomic damages.' 0 ' The court pointed out that
the General Assembly rejected a number of proposals that might have
effectively achieved its goal of "limit[ing] the rising cost of [insurance]
and ... ensur [ing] the availability of liability insurance. "102 The court
then invoked the time honored principle "that legislative bodies need
not and do not 'attack all aspects of a problem at the same time. The
legislative body may select one phase of a problem and apply a remedy
03
there, neglecting for the moment other phases of the problem.""
In what may be read as an invitation to the General Assembly, the

92. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-109(c)-(d).

93. Streide4 329 Md. at 545, 620 A.2d at 911.
94. See id., 620 A.2d at 912.
95. Id. at 546, 620 A.2d at 912.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 546-47, 620 A.2d at 912.
98. See id. at 546-49, 620 A.2d at 912-13.

99. Id. at 549, 620 A.2d at 913.
100. Id (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 550, 620 A.2d at 914 (quoting Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 241,
335 A.2d 679, 686 (1975)).
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Streidel court stated that "[a] mending the statute... is not the function
of the judiciary."" 4
The court also reiterated the difficulties that would arise in providing juries with a procedure for itemizing awards in wrongful death
actions105 and pointed out that, on a number of occasions, it had refused to expand the types of damages available in wrongful death actions. 10 6 Just as it had refused to expand wrongful death damages
without specific authorization from the legislature, the Court of Appeals refused to limit noneconomic damages in wrongful death ac0 7
tions absent specific legislative direction.1
Judge Chasanow added a concurring opinion that reads much
like a dissent. 0t ' He reprimanded the court for its use of the rational
basis test in Murphy,'0 9 reasserting his position that "the right to recover full and fair compensation from a tortfeasor is an important
personal right, and any limitation on that right should be subject to
'heightened' or 'intermediate' scrutiny."" 0 Judge Chasanow also
pointed out that if Marc Streidel had survived his investigation of the
mailbox, no matter how disabled and disfigured he may have been,
and regardless of how many years of painful suffering he would have
had to endure, he could have recovered no more than $350,000 in
noneconomic damages.1 1 ' Simply because Marc's encounter with the
mailbox was fatal, Judge Chasanow explained, the majority imposed
no limits on the amount of damages that his parents may recover to
compensate them for his death."1 Finding such a result illogical,
104. Id.
105. See id. at 551-52, 620 A.2d at 915.
106. Id. (citing Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 158-59, 297 A.2d 721, 72627 (1972) (finding that exemplary damages are not available in a wrongful death action),
overruled ly Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); Baltimore &
Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 280 (1866) (finding that punitive damages were not
available in wrongful death actions); Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md. App. 83, 101-02, 406 A.2d
1046, 1055-56 (1983) (finding that punitive damages were not reasonable under the
wrongful death statute)).
107. Streidel, 329 Md. at 552, 620 A.2d at 915.
108. See id. at 553, 620 A.2d at 915 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Judge Chasanow has
consistently opposed the cap because it denies full recovery to those most seriously injured
by a tortfeasor. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 378-85, 601 A.2d 102, 120-23 (1992)
(Chasanow, J., dissenting); United States v. Searle, 322 Md. 1, 584 A.2d 1263 (1991) (majority opinion by Judge Chasanow refusing to give "deference" to cap statute).
109. See Streidel, 329 Md. at 553, 620 A.2d at 915 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Chasanow, J., concurring) (quoting Murphy, 325 Md. at 379, 601 A.2d at 120
(Chasanow, J., dissenting)).
111. Id., 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 553-54, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
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Judge Chasanow repeated his contention that the cap statute denies
equal protection of the law to seriously injured tort victims.11 3
Judge Chasanow also indicated that the General Assembly meant
11 4
the phrase "personal injury" to include actions for wrongful death.
He asserted that since a number of cases have held the cap applicable
to wrongful death actions, 5 the legislature had "acquiesced" to the
holdings of those cases by its inaction.' 16 Judge Chasanow concluded
by stating that:
[t]he majority's holding that the cap statute limits recovery
for the pain, anguish, and suffering of primary tort victims,
but permits unlimited recovery for the pain and anguish of
secondary tort victims, only reinforces my view that, except
in medical malpractice cases, the cap statute denies severely
injured tort victims equal protection of law." 7
4. Analysis.-In Streidel, the Court of Appeals engaged in classic
statutory construction to determine that the cap on noneconomic
damages for personal injuries does not apply in wrongful death actions. Key to the court's decision were two factors: the different types
of damages available in actions for personal injury and actions for
wrongful death,"' and the difficulty of having the jury in a wrongful
death case itemize the award as called for in the cap statute."'
The Streidel court overruled the Court of Special Appeals's deciThe Potomac Electric court
sion in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Smith.'
interpreted the phrase "personal injury" broadly.' 2 ' As the Streidel
court pointed out, however, the General Assembly could have used
113. Id. at 554, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
114. Id. (Chasanow, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 554-55, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring); see Searle v. United States,
No. 88-2975, 1990 WL 33947 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1990) (unpublished opinion); Bartucco v.
Wright, 746 F. Supp. 596 (D. Md. 1990); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Smith, 79 Md. App.
591, 619-23, 558 A.2d 768, 783-85, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989), overruled
by United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993). But see Streidel, 329 Md. at
]
550 n.12, 620 A.2d at 914 n.12 (noting that "[t he statutory construction principle relied on
by Judge Chasanow... has little or no applicability when the judicial construction of the
statute is not by the highest court of the jurisdiction involved" and pointing out that none
of the cases cited by Judge Chasanow were decided by the Court of Appeals).
116. Streide, 329 Md. at 555, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
117. Id., 620 A.2d at 917 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
118. See id. at 544, 620 A.2d at 911; see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
119. See Streide4 329 Md. at 551-52, 620 A.2d at 915; see supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
120. 79 Md. App. 591, 558 A.2d 768, cert. denied, 317 Md. 393, 564 A.2d 407 (1989),
overruled by United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 620 A.2d 905 (1993).
121. See id. at 622, 558 A.2d at 784.
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language that would have clearly indicated an intent to include wrongful death actions within the cap. 2 2 Its use of a more restrictive phrase
is persuasive evidence that the legislature never intended the broad
application that the Court of Special Appeals employed.
In Potomac Electric, the court grappled unsuccessfully with the very
problem that convinced the Court of Appeals to find the cap inapplicable to wrongful death actions-the difficulty of itemizing damages.1 23 If the cap were held to apply in the aggregate in Streidel, the
court would have had to determine a procedure for itemizing the total amount of damages. The Court of Special Appeals was able to
avoid that issue in Potomac Electric because the plaintiffs there agreed
to a lump sum jury verdict before trial.1 24 Thus, the issue of whether
the cap applied in the aggregate had not been properly preserved for
appeal. 125 The issue would not have remained unresolved for long,
however. Sooner or later, Maryland courts would have had to determine how to itemize and allocate a capped wrongful death award for
noneconomic damages among several claimants. When the mother
of several children is killed in a car accident, do her children suffer
any less than an only child of a deceased mother? There is no clear
answer to such a question, and the Streidel court wisely avoided the
folly of attempting to provide one.
Although Judge Chasanow's point concerning the somewhat
anomalous results to which the application of this decision might
lead 26 is noteworthy, the Court of Appeals's decision is well supported by legislative history as well as logic. Moreover, as the court
pointed out, it is not the function of the judiciary to amend the laws to
ensure that they are completely effective or consistent.1 27 Rather, the
General Assembly, if still concerned with the "insurance crisis," may
elect to place a cap on the amount recoverable in noneconomic damages in wrongful death actions. If it does, however, it should indicate
whether and how it wishes judges and juries to itemize such awards,
and whether or not the cap applies in the aggregate or to each claim122. Streide, 329 Md. at 541-42, 620 A.2d at 909-10.
123. See PotomacElec., 79 Md. App. at 625, 558 A.2d at 785 (noting the difficulty of determining the individual breakdown of the jury award). Damages would have been particularly difficult to itemize in PotomacElectric because the decedent's parents were not married
and decedent lived with her mother. See id. at 625 n.18, 558 A.2d at 785 n.18; see also
Streide 329 Md. at 551-52, 620 A.2d at 915 (discussing the difficulty of itemizing damages
in a wrongful death action).
124. Potomac Elec., 79 Md. App. at 624, 558 A.2d at 785.

125. Id.
126. See Streide4 329 Md. at 553-54, 620 A.2d at 916 (Chasanow,J., concurring); see supra
notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
127. Streidel, 329 Md. at 550, 620 A.2d at 914.
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ant individually.12 A per person cap might, even at the cost of predictability, prove more workable and less open to speculation and
emotion than an aggregate cap. 1 29 A per person cap also would avoid
the injustice of reducing the award of a wrongful death claimant simply because other claimants exist.' ° Although it may be rational to
limit the amount of damages available for harm such as noneconomic
injuries, which are difficult to value,"'1 it hardly seems just to decrease
compensation simply because others have suffered a similar loss.
5. Conclusion.-The Streidel court chose to avoid the question
certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit-whether Maryland's statutory cap on noneconomic damages
in personal injury cases is to be applied to each individual claimant or
in the aggregate. Instead, the court held that the cap does not apply
to wrongful death cases. Although this decision may lead to the
strange results set forth in Judge Chasanow's concurring opinion, the

Court of Appeals correctly left any necessary adjustment for the
legislature.
CATHERINE

M.

GIOVANNONI

128. See id. at 537, 620 A-2d at 907; United States v. Searle, 322 Md. 1, 6, 584 A.2d 1263,
1265 (1991) (both declining to answer the question of whether the cap should be applied
in the aggregate).
129. See generallyFranklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (D. Md. 1989),
in which the court noted that
[t] he translation of [noneconomic] losses into dollar amounts is an extremely subjective process as these claims are not easily amenable to accurate, or even approximate, monetary valuation. There is a common belief that these awards are
the primary source of overly generous and arbitrary liability claim payments.
They vary substantially from person to person, even when applied to similar cases
or similar injuries, and can be fabricated with relative ease.
Id. See also Bartucco v. Wright, 746 F. Supp. 604, 609 n.11 (D. Md. 1990) ("[T]his Court
understands the legislature's motivation to have been to foster predictability, not simply to
limit recovery.... [P] redictability per se is fostered equally well by a single cap or individual
caps.").
130. See Bartucco, 746 F.2d at 610 (noting that if the cap were applied in the aggregate,
the recovery of a plaintiff "would be affected fortuitously by circumstances relating solely to
the cause of action of another person").
131. See Franklin, 704 F. Supp. at 1328 (finding that a cap on noneconomic damages
"will help contain rewards within realistic limits, reduce the exposure of defendants to
unlimited damages for pain and suffering, lend to more settlements, and enable insurance
carriers to set more accurate rates because of greater predictability of the size of
judgments").
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Clarifying the FairReport Privilege

In Rosenberg v. Helinski,1 the Court of Appeals considered whether
expert witnesses may lawfully repeat their defamatory in-court testimony to the public. The court held that participants or witnesses in
judicial proceedings enjoy a qualified immunity to report their observances to others outside the courtroom.2 In reaching this conclusion,
the court reaffirmed and clarified Maryland's common law fair report
privilege to defame, thereby upholding the Constitution's First
3
Amendment guarantees.
1. The Case.--On July 26, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Helinski attended
a custody hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to determine visitation rights for their child.4 At the proceeding, Mrs. Helinski opposed her husband's request for unsupervised visits with the
couple's two-year-old daughterJackie on the grounds that Mr. Helinski had sexually abused the child.5 Dr. Charles Shubin, a pediatrician
at Mercy Hospital, testified in support of Mrs. Helinski, revealing that
he had discovered a scar on Jackie's genitalia when examining her.6
He linked this type of injury to past sexual abuse. 7 The trial court,
however, found no decisive evidence linking Mr. Helinski to the sexual injury and awarded him unsupervised visitation rights.'
On August 20, 1985, the court convened to reconsider the
mother's claim that her husband should be denied unsupervised visits
with their child.9 At this hearing, Dr. Leon Rosenberg, Ph.D., a child
psychologist at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, testified on
Mrs. Helinski's behalf thatJackie had expressed fear of her father because he had molested her.1 ° Based on Dr. Rosenberg's testimony,
1. 328 Md. 664, 616 A.2d 866 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993).
2. Id. at 677, 687,616 A.2d at 872, 877.

3. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Helinski, 328 Md. at 668, 616 A.2d at 868.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 668-69, 616 A.2d at 868. After the July 26th hearing, Mrs. Helinski petitioned
the court to revise its decision allowing her husband unsupervised visits with their daughter. Id. at 668, 616 A.2d at 868. She also refused to comply with the July 26th order. Id.
Mr. Helinski then filed a motion for the court to find his wife in contempt. Id.
10. Id. at 669, 616 A.2d at 868. Dr. Rosenberg examined the child three times-once
alone and twice in the presence of Mrs. Helinski. Id. After observing the child's spontaneous behavior and drawings, Dr. Rosenberg concluded that the evidence of child abuse
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the trial court ordered psychiatric evaluations of the Helinskis and suspended judgment on the custody issue until the examination results
could be assessed."
Immediately after the hearing, WJZ, a local television station,
filmed an interview with Dr. Rosenberg on the courthouse steps.1 2 In
response to questions from the station's reporter, the doctor repeated
his courtroom testimony.1 " That night, WJZ's six o'clock news report
aired a story about the trial, interspersing three of the doctor's statements from the filmed interview: (1) "'The child talked very directly
about being hurt by her father and she talked about being hurt by her
father in the genital area'"; (2) "'And when she finally talked about
being hurt, she expressed real fear, real anxiety, and two-and-a-half
year old child[ren] cannot playact that well. It's beyond them"'; and
(3) "'Whatever did occur was frightening, but it looked like it was
time-limited and I think we have a very good chance of, ah, overcoming any negative effects."' 14 The eleven o'clock news ran an edited
version of the six o'clock story, which only included the doctor's first
statement about the child's admission that her father had molested
her.15
Mr. Helinski then filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City, alleging that Dr. Rosenberg had defamed him by repeating his
in-court testimony to the television reporter. 6 In response, Dr. Rosenberg moved for summary judgment under rule 2-501.17 At a motions hearing on December 13, 1990, circuit courtJudge John Carroll
Byrnes granted the doctor's motion for dismissal, reasoning that the
doctor's comments were privileged because they only repeated his incourt testimony.1 The judge refused to admit testimony from Helinski's expert witness, Dr. Shapiro, about the proper standard of care for
from her father was "'extremely clear.'" Id. The doctor's conclusion also was based on a
family history provided by Mrs. Helinski, Dr. Shubin's findings, and telephone conversations with Dr. Shubin and a social worker who had examined the child. Id., 616 A.2d at
869. The social worker, after observingJackie's play with lifelike dolls, had concluded that
Jackie had been abused by Mr. Helsinki. Id. Before conducting his evaluation, Dr. Rosenberg was also aware of the court's July 26th ruling. Id. at 670, 616 A.2d at 869.
11. Id. at 670, 616 A.2d at 869.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 671, 616 A.2d at 869.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 672, 616 A.2d at 870; see MD. R. 2-501 (governing motions for summary
judgment).
18. Helinsk, 328 Md. at 672, 616 A.2d at 870. Judge Byrnes explained that Rosenberg
was "'merely recounting what he had already said in a public, and privileged, forum. What
he recounted was not false ....
[His] evaluation . . . could not be made false, merely
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psychiatric evaluations."9 Thus, the court found no evidence that Dr.
Rosenberg had acted with negligence, ill-will, or "actual malice"2" in
evaluating the child or in repeating his testimony.21
The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's dismis22
sal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
In his opinion, Judge Alpert first concluded that the circuit court
erred in failing to admit Dr. Shapiro's testimony regarding Rosenberg's alleged negligence. 23 Judge Alpert further reasoned that the
fair report privilege extends to any individuals who offer defamatory
in-court testimony and later repeat that testimony outside the courtroom. 24 Using section 611 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as a

guide, 5 the court held that to maintain the fair report privilege, an
individual must (1) give a fair and accurate report and (2) refrain
from deliberately misusing the privilege in order to harm another person.2 6 Therefore, the intermediate court implicitly directed the trial
court to assess, on remand, whether Dr. Rosenberg abused this conditional privilege when he spoke to the WJZ reporter.2 7
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether Dr.
Rosenberg's statements outside the courtroom were protected by the
fair report privilege.

2

1

because Judge Jacobson was not convinced in a judicial tribunal, that Mr. Helinski did not
do what he was accused of doing.'" Id.
19. Id. at 673, 616 A.2d 870. Helinski argued that Rosenberg's evaluation ofJackie was
not thorough enough to warrant a conclusion that her father had sexually abused her. Id.
Judge Byrnes declined to hear Shapiro's testimony because Shapiro was not trained in the
field of child sexual abuse. Id.
20. See infta note 42-44 and accompanying text.
21. Helinski, 328 Md. at 672-73, 616 A.2d at 670.
22. Helinski v. Rosenberg, 90 Md. App. 158, 600 A.2d 882, rev'd, 328 Md. 664, 616 A.2d
866 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993).
23. Id. at 170, 600 A.2d at 888.
24. Id. at 175, 600 A.2d at 891.
25. Section 611 of the Restatement states: "The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the
public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and
complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 611 (1977).
26. Helinski, 90 Md. App. at 175, 600 A.2d at 891.
27. Helinshi, 328 Md. at 673-74, 616 A.2d at 870.
28. Id. at 674, 616 A.2d at 871.
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2. Legal Background.a. The Tort of Defamation.(1) At Common Law.-The tort of defamation2 9 safeguards
individuals' interests in their reputations. 30 At common law, actionable defamation resulted from "falsehoods communicated (published)
by the actor about another (the victim of the defamation) to one or1
more third persons, tending to injure the reputation of the Victi.

3

Once plaintiffs established the defamatory nature of the comments,
they did not need to prove resulting damage; rather, courts presumed
injury to reputation from defamatory statements.3 2 Accordingly,
courts allowed plaintiffs to recover presumed damages if they could
demonstrate that the comments at issue were (1) untrue, (2) defama3
tory, and (3) published.

3

29. Defamation encompasses both libel and slander. Libel is traditionally written or
visible, and slander is generally oral or communicated to a small number of people.
Kathryn D. Sowle, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: The Casefor a ConstitutionalPrivilege of
FairReport, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,471 n.1 (1979). See also REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 568, cmt. b (1977), which provides:
It is impossible to define and difficult to describe with precision the two forms of
defamation, slander and libel. Oral defamation is tortious if the words spoken fall
within a limited class of cases in which the words are actionable per se, or if they
cause special damages. Written defamation is actionable per se. For two centuries and a half the common law has treated the tort of defamation in two different
ways on a basis of mere form. Yet no respectable authority has ever attempted to
justify the distinction on principle; and in the modem times, many courts have
condemned the distinction as harsh and unjust.
Id.
30. 2 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 24 (2d ed. 1986); see also
LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3, at 4 (1978) ("In many cases the
primary, if not the sole, purpose of an action for defamation is vindication of the plaintiff's
good name.").
31. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5, at 3.
32. Id. Once a libelous statement was found to be defamatory, state courts did not
require plaintiffs to prove damage from the falsehoods. Id. § 5.9, at 78. Rather, damages
were presumed because the subtle nature of libel's effect made it difficult for a plaintiff to
show a causal connection between the damaged reputation and the defamatory comments.
See id. § 5.30, at 253. On the other hand, under slander law, presumed damages were
awarded only for comments that were slanderous per se-comments alleging that someone
had (1) committed criminal acts, (2) contracted a venereal or vile communicable disease,
(3) engaged in unprofessional conduct, or (4) in the case of women, acted unchastely. Id.
§ 5.9, at 79; see Leese v. Baltimore County, 64 Md. App. 442, 497 A.2d 159, cert. denied, 305
Md. 106, 501 A.2d 845 (1985) (noting that comments imputing criminal or unprofessional
activity to the plaintiff are defamatory per se); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621 (1938).
All other slanderous comments were actionable only if the plaintiffs could prove special damages-material or pecuniary loss-beyond injury to reputation or emotional distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 & cmt. b (1977).
33. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5.0, at 3.
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Defendants had little hope of defending themselves against allegations of defamation. Even individuals who merely repeated defamatory comments could not escape liability; publishers and republishers
alike risked suit.3 4 In fact, regardless of the particular circumstances

of the case or the intent of the defending parties, courts held actors
strictly liable unless they proved the truth of their statements or possessed a privilege to defame. 5
(2) ConstitutionalOverlay.-The common law tort of defamation necessarily limited the guarantees afforded by the First Amendment.3 6 Individuals and the press were free to exercise their rights to
free speech only so long as they did not impermissibly impugn another's reputation. 7 Concerned that common law defamation unduly restricted the Constitution by causing the media and private
individuals to engage in self-censorship, thereby inhibiting the free
exchange of ideas in society, 8 the Supreme Court began in 1964 to
evaluate and revise the required elements of common law defamation
and to negotiate the proper balance between individuals' interests in
protecting their reputations and First Amendment rights.3 9
The Court first altered the common law by introducing the constitutional malice standard. In New York Times v. Sullivan,4 ° a public
official sued the New York Times for defamatory statements regarding
actions that he had taken in his official capacity.4 The Supreme
Court held that to prevail in a defamation action, a public official
must demonstrate that "the statement was made with 'actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."4 2 In Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts,43 the
34. See Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. DowJones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988) ("The common law of libel has long held that one who republishes a defamatory statement 'adopts' it as his own, and is liable in equal measure to the
original defamer.") (citations omitted)).
35. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5.0, at 3.
36. Id. § 5.1, at 26.
37. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
38. See Gooch v. Maryland Mechanical Sys., Inc., 81 Md. App. 376, 388, 567 A.2d 954,
960, cert. denied, 319 Md. 484, 573 A.2d 807 (1990) (explaining that in revising state defamation law, the Supreme Court "extoll[ed] our national commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues and express[ed] its fear that the (state] law would result in
overextensive media self-censorship").
39. Sowle, supra note 29, at 488. The Court felt that imposing liability despite good
faith intentions impermissibly limited the freedoms of speech and the press. Id.

40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Id. at 256.
42. Id. at 279-80; see also Harte-Hanks Communication, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 666 n.7, 667 (1989) (asserting that "'actual malice' . . . has noting to do with bad

motive or ill will" but instead constitutes "a reckless disregard for the truth"); St. Amant v.
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Court extended the "actual malice" standard to public figures.4 4 It
supported its abandonment of the strict liability standard for falsehoods concerning the professional conduct of public officials and
public figures by declaring that the First Amendment protects the free
debate about public issues and ideas that is necessarily a part of a democratic society. 45 As the Court stated, "speech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self" 46
government.

The Supreme Court also reformulated the standards applicable
to private party plaintiffs. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 47 the Court
established that as long as states did not choose strict liability, they
could decide individually upon the proper standard of liability for
communications of defamatory comments against private citizens.4"
The Court, however, restricted awards to actual damages, mandating
that in order to collect presumed and punitive damages, plaintiffs
must demonstrate constitutional malice. 49 The Court regarded its deThompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (defining reckless disregard as "serious doubts as to
the truth"). The Sullivan standard represented a balance between the state's interest in
protecting public figures from defamation and First Amendment concerns. Cf Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-47 (1974) (adjusting the standard to balance the
interests of private individuals in defamation suits).
43. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
44. See id. at 164. The Court explained that public figures are individuals who are

.nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by

reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large." Id.
45. See Sullivan, 379 U.S. at 270 ("The First Amendment

. .

. 'presupposes that right

conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection.'") (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
46. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). The Court has acknowledged that
some erroneous statements of fact must be tolerated to promote dissemination of information about the government. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-75.
47. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. Id. at 346-47. Because the Court ruled out the possibility of fault-free liability, the
Gertz decision left states with a choice between a negligence standard and the more demanding constitutional malice requirement described in Sullivan. See supra note 42 and
accompanying text (describing the malice requirement).
The Court's decision in Gertz also rejected the premise underlying the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1970). In Rosenbloom, the Court formulated a "public or general interest" test requiring private individuals to prove constitutional
malice if the defamatory communications contained material relating to a public concern.
Id. at 52. The Gertz Court reasoned that private individuals deserve more protection than
public persons because private individuals have less access to the media and, therefore,
have fewer opportunities to refute any allegations against them. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. In
addition, the Court noted that public officials and public figures tacitly consent to the risk
of defamation when they enter into the public forum. Id. at 345.
49. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. The Court did not define actual damage, but indicated that
it encompassed more than monetary loss, defining it as "the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood includ[ing] impairment of reputation and
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cision as a balance because "[i] t recognize [d] the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful
injury to reputation, yet shield[ed] the press and broadcast media
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation."5"
(3) Maryland Law.-In light of the Supreme Court's constitutional mandates, the Court of Appeals revised Maryland's defamation law inJacronSales Co. v. Sindorf.5 1 Extending the Gertz rationale to
nonmedia contexts,5 2 the court held that a negligence standard applies in cases "brought by private persons regardless of whether the
subject matter of the defamation is one of public or general interest.""3 To recover compensatory damages under the so-called "Jacron
Rule," a private plaintiff must prove that the publication was (1) defamatory, (2) false, (3) caused by the defendant's negligence, and (4)
harmful to the plaintiff.5 4 The court further explained that since
plaintiffs have to prove falsity in order to establish negligence, defendants no longer need to prove truth as an affirmative defense.5 5
b. The FairReport Privilege.-While the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations of defamation law obviated the defendant's
need to demonstrate veracity,5 6 the common law privileges associated
with defamation remained intact.5 7 The privilege defense arose from
the basic tort notion that "although sound policy requires that certain
general types of conduct be made the basis for legal liability, there are
exceptional circumstances where persons engaging in such conduct
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id.
at 350.
50. Id. at 348.
51. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
52. Id. at 590-92, 350 A.2d at 694-95.
53. Id. at 590, 350 A.2d at 694. In defining the standard, the Jacron court adopted
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 (1977). Id. at 596, 350 A.2d 688. The Restatement
states:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely
private matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is
subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) Knows that the statement is false and that it defames another,
(b) Acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) Acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) (emphasis added).
54. Jacron, 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A.2d at 697-98; see also Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297
Md. 112, 122-23, 466 A.2d 486, 491 (1983) (diagramming the revised elements of
defamation).
55. Jacron, 276 Md. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
56. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5, at 3-5.
57. See generally id. § 5.21 (discussing the privilege defense).
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should be protected.""8 Accordingly, defamation law refuses to grant
relief for harm to reputation in instances where society's interests
override individuals' interests in receiving redress.5 9 Courts recognize
two classifications of privileges: (1) absolute privileges, which grant
unqualified immunity, and (2) qualified privileges, which provide lim60
ited protection to the defamer.
In Maryland, courts recognize an absolute privilege for judges,
attorneys, parties, and witnesses who communicate defamatory testimony during the course of a judicial proceeding. 61 These persons
cannot be held liable for their defamatory communications as long as
they confine these comments to the bounds of the privileged forum.6 2
This immunity from liability derives from the notion that certain people should not be subject to suit because of their status or position.63
Witnesses, in particular, are afforded immunity from suit regardless of
their intentions because truthful testimony is essential "to the proper
administration of justice"' and fear of a lawsuit may inhibit witnesses
from telling the full truth.65 Indeed, "the court's judgment is based
on [witnesses'] testimony and they are given every encouragement to
make a full disclosure to all pertinent information within their knowledge."6 6 Thus, society's interest in maintaining a judicial system that
rules on all relevant facts almost always outweighs individuals' interests in their reputations.
Conditional privileges, on the other hand, do not afford unlimited immunity to those accused of defamation. 67 Instead, these quali58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. § 5.21, at 177.
Id.
Id. § 5.21, at 178.
See, e.g., Odyniec v. Schneider, 322 Md. 520, 526-27, 588 A.2d 786, 789 (1991);

Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1, 3, 415 A.2d 292, 293 (1980).
62. See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1962). In Kennedy, the defendant's attorney commented on the plaintiff's sexual behavior while explaining to a newspaper his client's strategy for an upcoming rape trial. Id. at 98, 182 A.2d at 55-56. The rape
victim sued the attorney for defamation, and the Court of Appeals refused to grant the
lawyer an absolute privilege. Id. at 99, 182 A.2d at 58. The court held that his immunity
was limited to "communications such as those made between an attorney and his client, or
in the examination of witnesses by counsel, or in statements made by counsel to the court
or jury." Id. at 98, 182 A.2d at 58.
63. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5.21, at 178.
64. McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 24, 561 A.2d 1038, 1044 (1989).
65. 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5.21, at 180.
66. Id. § 5.21, at 187. Even if witnesses tell the truth, they may fear liability because of
the difficulty of proving the truth of their allegations. Id.
67. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at

816 (5th ed. 1984) ("If it has relatively less weight from a social point of view, the immunity
may be qualified, and conditioned upon good motives and reasonable behavior.").
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fied privileges are lost if abused.6' In particular, courts afford a
unique type of qualified privilege to reports of statements made in
governmental and judicial proceedings.69 This fair report privilege is
"Can exception to the common law rule that one who repeats or republishes a defamation uttered by another "adopts" it as his own.'"o
(1) Rationale of the FairReport Privilege.-Two basic rationales
underlie the fair report privilege. The "agency rationale" recognizes
that busy citizens cannot attend all official and governmental proceedings and that, therefore, they must rely on the press to provide informative accounts of these proceedings.7 1 In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v.
Cohn,72 the Supreme Court explained that "[w] ithout the information
provided by the press most of us and many of our representatives
would be unable to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally."7 3
The second premise underlying the fair report privilege, the "supervisory rationale," recognizes that reporters often provide members
of the public their only avenue of overseeing the operations of government officials and ensuring that public servants promote the public's
welfare." As then Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes stated in Cowley v.
Pulsfer,7 5 the fair report privilege exists "because it is of the highest
moment that those who administerjustice should always act under the
sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to

68. Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 167, 498 A.2d 269, 270 (1985); see KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 67, § 114, at 816 (explaining that "[t]he defendant's belief in the truth of what
he says, the purpose for which he says it, and the manner of publication" affect whether
the defendant's comments will be actionable).
69. KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 115, at 836.
70. Helinski v. Rosenberg, 90 Md. App. 158, 164-65, 600 A.2d 882, 885 (quoting Dameron v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986)), rev'd, 328 Md. 664, 616 A.2d 866 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3041 (1993);
see also Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 712 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2814 (1991) (asserting the need for this exception "because of the open relationship we seek to share with our own government"); Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981) (noting the "chilling effect" of the republication
rule on the freedom of the press).
71. Reuber, 925 F.2d at 713; see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492
(1975) ("[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon
the press to bring to him in convenient form the facts of those operations."); see also DAVID
A. ELDER, THE FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE § 1, at 3 (1988).
72.
73.
74.
75.

420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Id. at 492.
ELDER, supra note 71, § 1, at 3; see also Reuber, 925 F.2d at 713.
137 Mass. 392 (1884).
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satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty
is performed."76
(2) Conditions of the Fair Report Privilege.-While Maryland
courts have consistently recognized society's strong interest in receiving comprehensive accounts of government proceedings, they have
recognized the fair report privilege only when three conditions were
met. First, although the Restatement (Second) of Torts disregards the defamer's intent,7 7 Maryland courts have held that reporters cannot repeat derogatory comments made with constitutional malice 78 or an
intention to harm another. 79 Second, the qualified privilege is destroyed if the reporter renders an inaccurate account.8 0 In McBee v.
Fulton,"' the Court of Appeals explained that "[t]he reports, though
they need not be verbatim, must be substantially correct and not garbled or partial" in order to sustain the qualified fair report privilege. 2
Finally, the repeated comments must be "fair, bona fide and impartial." 3 Although Maryland courts have not elucidated the fairness
standard since McBee, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states, and federal courts in Maryland have agreed, that reports are unfair if they
delete or distort important material in an effort to mislead the
public.8 4
76. Id. at 394. A third "information rationale" has also been advanced as support for
the fair report privilege, but it is more logically subsumed within the other two rationales
because both the agency and supervisory rationales depend on a need for information. See
ELDER, supra note 71, § 1, at 3-4 (explaining that because the public's ability to supervise
the government depends on its access to information, courts often view the supervisory

and information rationales as intertwined).
77. The Restatement states that "the privilege exists even though the publisher himself
does not believe the defamatory words he reports to be true and even when he knows them
to be false." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. a (1977).
78. See, e.g., Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 733, 602 A.2d 1191, 1215 (1992); Marchesi
v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 138, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1978).
79. See, e.g., Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 611, 141 A. 416, 419 (1928)
(implying that the fair report privilege is lost if the plaintiff is "moved by any hostility,
hatred, or ill will toward the [plaintiff] in publishing the news item complained of"); McBee
v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 427 (1878) (holding that a defendant who acted with "express malice or ill-will to the plaintiff' could not claim the fair report privilege).
80. McBee, 47 Md. at 426.
81. 47 Md. 403 (1878).
82. Id. at 426; see also Evening News Co., 154 Md. at 611, 141 A. at 419.

83. McBee, 47 Md. at 417.
84. The Restatement explains that:
Even a report that is accurate so far as it goes may be so edited and deleted as to
misrepresent the proceeding and thus be misleading. Thus, although it is unnecessary that the report be exhaustive and complete, it is necessary that nothing be
omitted or misplaced in such a manner as to convey an erroneous impression to
those who hear or read it.
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Maryland courts have never articulated an additional restriction
of the fair report privilege for persons who, like Dr. Rosenberg, repeat
their own defamatory comments beyond the privileged forum. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, however, contains a "self-reported statement exception" to the fair report privilege, which provides that "[a]
person cannot confer this privilege upon himself by making the original defamatory publication himself and then reporting to other people what he . . . stated.""5 Before 1992, Maryland courts had never

addressed this Restatement commentary, but commentators and most
state courts that have considered this language have refused to adopt
a literal interpretation. Instead, they have asserted that the self-reported statement exception is directed at individuals who intentionally initiate judicial proceedings for the purpose of obtaining
immunity to defame others outside the privileged forum.8 6
3. The Court's Reasoning. -In Helinski, the Court of Appeals held
that witnesses in judicial proceedings possess a narrow privilege to report their in-court testimony outside court.8 7 Writing for the court,
Chief Judge Murphy first concluded that Dr. Rosenberg's statements
to the WJZ reporter were defamatory because they accused Helinski of
child molestation, "an act reviled by society, which also constitutes a
felony." 8 The court also assumed, for purposes of summary judgment,8 9 that the doctor's comments to the reporter were false, unproRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt f. (1977); see also Pulvermann v. A.S. Abell

Co., 228 F.2d 797, 803 (4th Cir. 1956) (holding that the defendants did not exhibit malice
by not publishing the exact language of General Eisenhower's speech, since "[t]he variance
...
[was] such as might reasonably be expected in abbreviation"); Seymour v. A.S. Abell
Co., 557 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Md. 1983) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of "fairness").
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611, cmt. c (1977).
86. See 2 HARPER ET AL., supra note 30, § 5.24, at 207-08 ("[T]he privilege [should not]
be recognized for the reporting of statements that were made in spurious circumstances,
devised primarily to provide a pretext for the claim of the privilege."); see also Green Acres
Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 626 (Ariz. 1984) ("The privilege does not sanction selfserving re-publication."); Stover v. Journal Pub. Co., 731 P.2d 1335, 1339 (N.M. Ct. App.
1985), cet. denied, 484 U.S. 897 (1987) (explaining that the self-reported comment exception is aimed toward those who instigate lawsuits in order to obtain immunity to repeat
defamatory in-court testimony outside of the courtroom); Williams v. Williams, 246 N.E.2d
333, 337 (N.Y. 1969) (concluding that the state's statutory fair report privilege was not
intended to protect those who "maliciously institute a judicial proceeding alleging ...
defamatory charges, and then ...

circulate a [report] ...

based thereon").

87. Helinski, 328 Md. at 675, 616 A.2d at 871. The court declined to address whether
Helinski was a public figure or whether the alleged abuse of his daughter constituted a
public concern. Id.
88. Id.
89. Summary judgment requires that the reviewing court "consider whether or not a
factual issue exists, and in so doing ... resolve all inferences against the party making the
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fessionally formulated, negligently communicated, and injurious to
Helinski.9 0 The court, nevertheless, dismissed the action against Dr.
Rosenberg, finding that he possessed the fair report privilege, which
afforded him a legal privilege to defame." The court pointed out,
however, that in contrast to Dr. Rosenberg's in-court testimony, which
was absolutely privileged, the doctor's statements outside the courtroom were subject merely to a qualified privilege immunizing him
2
from suit.

9

The court advanced three reasons for extending the fair report
privilege to Rosenberg. First, the court found that by repeating his
testimony to the media, the doctor fulfilled a needed role in society by
acting as an agent for members of the public who could not attend
the hearing.9 3 Second, even though only journalists traditionally have
invoked the fair report privilege as a defense, the court recognized
that neither Maryland authority, federal cases, nor the Restatement has
limited the fair report privilege to the media and found that the privilege should be extended to witnesses in judicial proceedings.9 4 Specifically, the court determined that Supreme Court as well as
Maryland courts require treating media and nonmedia persons
alike.95 Finally, the court refused to read the Restatement's self-reported statement exception9 6 literally as preventing persons who have
given privileged testimony from repeating their comments beyond the
original forum.9 7 In accord with the weight of authority regarding
this commentary, the court found that it was directed to persons who
deliberately instigate lawsuits to gain legal immunity to defame
others.9 8 Moreover, the court noted that it would be illogical to exmotion." McDermott v. Hughley, 317 Md. 12, 22, 561 A.2d 1038, 1043 (1989); Beard v.
American Agency, 314 Md. 235, 246, 550 A.2d 677, 682 (1988).
90. Helinski, 328 Md. at 675, 616 A.2d at 871.
91. Id. at 674, 616 A.2d at 871.
92. Id. at 676-77, 616 A.2d at 872.
93. Id. at 680, 616 A.2d at 873. Acknowledging that the agency rationale applied to the
facts, the court declined to comment upon whether the supervisory rationale applied as
well. Id.; see also supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing these rationales).
94. Helinski, 328 Md. at 680, 616 A.2d at 874.
95. Id.; see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985)
(White,J., concurring) (explaining that the "First Amendment gives no more protection to
the press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising their freedom of speech");
id. at 784 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (writing that "the rights of the institutional media are
no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in
the same activities"); Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 177 (1883) (concluding that "the liberty of the press guaranteed by the Constitution is a right belonging to every one [sic]").
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs § 611 cmt. c (1977); see supra note 85 and accompanying text (quoting the Restatement).
97. Helinski, 328 Md. at 686, 616 A.2d at 877.
98. Id. at 684-86, 616 A.2d at 876-77.
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tend the fair report privilege to any attendee of the proceeding, but to
deny it to a witness. 99
After establishing that Dr. Rosenberg could invoke the fair report
privilege, the court assessed whether he acted to preserve his immunity from liability. The court set out both Maryland's view-that actual malice can defeat the fair report privilege, and the Restatement's
view-that the intent of the reporter is irrelevant so long as the report
is "fair and substantially correct," and concluded that Dr. Rosenberg's
report qualified under both.10 0 The court first noted that no evidence
indicated that Dr. Rosenberg acted with actual malice. 1 ' Instead, the
court found that Dr. Rosenberg honestly believed the truth of his incourt testimony.1 0 2 Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that the
trial court's July 26th refusal to link Helinski to his child's sexual injury did not make the doctor's professional opinion false.1 03 Rather,
testimony demonstrated
the trial court's acceptance of the doctor's
10 4
that the issue of abuse was still open.
The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Rosenberg retained his
immunity because his report met the requisite standards for accuracy
and fairness.10 5 Rosenberg's report was of his in-court testimony; it
was accurate because he essentially repeated his in-court testimony to
the television reporter.10 6 In assessing the fairness of his report to the
media, the court noted that Dr. Rosenberg was not required to comment on collateral matters 0 7 at the proceeding because his testimony
constituted the most essential and relevant part of the hearing.'
Thus, a more comprehensive account of the hearing would not have
99. Id. at 686, 616 A.2d at 877.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

677-79, 616 A.2d at 871-73.
678, 616 A.2d at 873.
678-79, 616 A.2d at 873.
679, 616 A.2d at 873.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 681-84, 616 A.2d at 874-76.
106. See id. at 680-81, 616 A.2d at 874. The court observed that Rosenberg had used
similar verbiage and expressions on the witness stand. Id. at 681, 616 A.2d at 874. It added
that, "[i]f anything, parts of his witness testimony were phrased somewhat more emphatically in connecting Helinski to sexual abuse of the child." Id.
107. Mr. Helinski argued that Dr. Rosenberg's report was unfair because it did not include references to the fact that the trial court found Mrs. Helinski in contempt, ordered
psychological examinations for both parties, and originally considered Mr. Helinski innocent of the child abuse charges. Id. The court remarked that comments about the contempt of court finding and the order for psychological testing could have 'multiplied the
damage to Helinski's reputation." Id. at 682-83, 616 A.2d at 875. In addition, Rosenberg
was not required to report that the court did not find Helinski innocent of child molestation because the issue was still pending before the court. Id. at 682, 616 A.2d at 875.
108. Id. at 682-83, 616 A.2d at 875.
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conveyed a less defamatory message about Mr. Helinski to the
public." °9
4. Analysis.a. Persons Entitled to Invoke the FairReport Privilege.-In Helinski, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its commitment to the common
law fair report privilege and clarified its parameters. Specifically, the
court revisited the fair report privilege in the context of judicial proceedings. Not only did it formulate clearer standards for invoking this
qualified immunity, but by adhering to common law principles, it implicitly adopted the Supreme Court's balancing of individuals' rights
to receive redress for injuries and First Amendment concerns.
The Helinski court settled the question of who is entitled to claim
the protection of the fair report privilege. Prior to Helinski, the court
established that newspapers possess immunity to repeat defamatory
comments," 0 but left open the question of whether nonmedia persons can invoke the fair report privilege. In McBee, the court stated
that a qualified privilege extends to two kinds of reports: "newspaper
and other reports of the proceedings of Courts ofjustice.""' It did not,
however, explain who might qualify as the authors of the second class
of reports. By extending the fair report privilege in Helinski to witnesses who repeat their testimony outside the courtroom, the court
explicitly ruled for the first time that nonmedia individuals may invoke the privilege in connection with their reports." 2
The decision was by no means radical. Both the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland" and the Restatement'1 4
have extended the fair report privilege beyond the media. In addition, the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals both have held
that media defendants do not have greater First Amendment rights
than average citizens." 5 In addition, the rationale for granting immunity to reporters applies to individuals." 6 Like the media, individuals
provide accounts of judicial proceedings as agents for the public, disseminating information necessary for citizens to participate in a de109. Id.
110. See Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 611, 141 A. 416, 419 (1928); McBee v.

Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 427 (1878).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

McBee, 47 Md. at 417.
See Helinski, 328 Md. at 680, 616 A.2d at 874.
See Seymour v. A.S. Abell Co., 557 F. Supp. 951 (D. Md. 1983).
See REsTATEM r (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmL c (1977).
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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mocracy. Moreover, nonmedia actors serve as a conduit between the
government and the public, allowing citizens to supervise official
actions.
Finally, by granting witnesses in judicial proceedings conditional
immunity to repeat their in-court testimony outside the courtroom,
the Helinski decision reduced the likelihood that potential witnesses in
future cases might hesitate to testify because of a fear of liability.
Although Maryland courts already grant witnesses absolute immunity
for their defamatory in-court testimony," ' witnesses might be reluctant to take the stand if they fear possible liability for intentionally or
inadvertently repeating their comments outside the courtroom. Thus,
although the decision in Helinski did not hinge on the absolute privilege afforded in-court testimony, the holding furthered the goal of
finding the truth in judicial proceedings by encouraging witnesses to
reveal all relevant information.
The Helinski decision also clarified who may invoke the fair report
privilege by discussing the relevance of the Restatement's self-reported
comment exception. Based on decisions in sister states and commentary from scholars, the court wisely held that this exception was aimed
at those who set out to defame and avoid liability by manipulating the
justice system."' As Judge Murphy stated, "to deny the privilege to a
witness reporting his own testimony, while the privilege is available to
any other court spectator later recounting that same testimony, would
defy logic."" 9 Thus, by explicitly stating its interpretation of the Restatement language, the court prevented future confusion regarding
whether witnesses can repeat their testimony outside the courtroom.
b. Conditions of the Fair Report Privilege.-In Helinski, the
court also clarified the fair and accurate standard required to maintain the fair report privilege. It did not elaborate on the accuracy
requirement because it had already offered sufficient guidance on this
point in McBee by stating that accounts need not be replicas of the
original comments. 2 ° The court did, however, elucidate the meaning
and relevance of the fairness requirement as it applies to repeated
testimony. In essence, the court adopted the approach of the Restatement-that reporters may edit certain segments of the proceeding, but
21
may not present the information in a misleading manner.1
117. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.

118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
Helinski, 328 Md. at 686, 616 A.2d at 877.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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By adhering to the McBee definition of accuracy and adopting the
Restatement's definition of fairness, the court created a workable standard that balances the rights of individuals against the needs of society. Under Helinski, the interests of individuals in maintaining their
reputations will be sufficiently protected under the fairness requirement because out-of-court reports must not stray from or misrepresent the original proceedings. At the same time, the flexibility the
court upheld with regard to accuracy will make it more likely that the
public will receive information. The court recognized that "the importance of educating the public promptly and succinctly about governmental action .

.

. demands a large measure of tolerance ....

The court left open the question of whether the intent of the
reporter is relevant to the use of the fair report privilege. The court's
failure to choose between the view of its prior case law and the more
modern view of the Restatement indicated that it may not uphold the
status quo in future cases.1 23 In fact, the Helinski court may have abstained from judgment on this issue in an effort to await a case in
which the facts warrant removal of the intent requirement
safeguard.

1 24

Moreover, consideration of the reporter's state of mind is inconsistent with the First Amendment and the purpose of the fair report
privilege. In the Restatement, the American Law Institute excluded its
original proposition that harmful intentions will defeat the reporter's
immunity.1 25 In addition, the drafters predicted that the Supreme
Court would reject an intent requirement because it would not want
to limit the public's access to information.1 2 6 Courts afford reporters
qualified immunity to promote the dissemination of information to
122. BRUCE

W.

SANFORD,

LIBEL

AND

PRIVACY

§ 10.3.1,

at

387

(Supp.

1987).

"[N] ewspaper accounts of legislative or other official proceedings must be accorded some
degree of liberality. When determining whether an article constitutes a "fair and true"
report, the language used therein should not be dissected and analyzed with a lexicographer's precision.'" Id. at 387-88 (quoting Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World
Christianity v. New York Times, 399 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (N.Y. 1979)).
123. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
124. In the instant case, the court did not need to decide whether the intent of the
reporter would destroy the reporter's immunity because there was no evidence that Dr.
Rosenberg believed his testimony was false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth.
Helinski, 328 Md. at 678-79, 616 A.2d at 873.
125. SANFORD, supra note 122, § 10.3.3, at 392. The Restatement of Torts provides that
"accurate and fair reports ... are protected by a privilege which is qualified only to the
extent that protection is lost if the report is published solely for the purpose of defaming
the other and not for the purpose of informing the public." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 611

cmt. a (1938).
126. See SANFORD, supra note 122, § 10.3.3, at 392; ELDREDCE, supra note 30, § 79, at 422.
However, Eldredge argues that the concerns of the Restatement (Second) drafter's were un-
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citizens, who depend on these reports to participate in and supervise
the government. 1 7 As long as reports are fair and accurate in the
sense that they do not distort or manipulate the original privileged
statements, the privilege serves its purpose of informing the public.
"The editor's belief in the truth or falsity of such statements should
2s
not matter; the point is that the statements were made."1
c. First Amendment Implications of the Fair Report Privilege.The Helinski court's reaffirmation of the fair report privilege struck a
balance between individuals' interests in maintaining their good
names and the First Amendment guarantees afforded by the Constitution. Its refusal to grant absolute immunity for all defamatory accounts and the requirement that all reports be conveyed in a fair and
accurate manner ensured that societal needs will not categorically be
permitted to subordinate individuals' interests in protecting their reputations. Although common law courts did not directly consider constitutional guarantees in creating the fair report privilege, the
immunity provided by the privilege reflects the Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence by promoting the free flow of information
in a democratic society. As the Court stated in New York Times v. Sullivan,'2 9 the First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."'
5. Conclusion.-In Helinski, the Court of Appeals broadened the
scope of Maryland's fair report privilege. The court increased the applicability and usefulness of the privilege by extending conditional immunity to nonmedia defendants and clearly defining the standards
necessary to invoke the protection. This general expansion of the
privilege will maintain the balance between protecting the interests of
individuals in their reputations and furthering the constitutional
rights of all citizens to be informed about events that affect them.
KiMBERLY

L.

ROSENSTOCK

founded because there is no indication that the Supreme Court will grant immunity to a
reporter who knew or suspected that the commentary was false. Id. § 79, at 422-26.
127. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
128. SANFoRD, supra note 122, § 10.4.1, at 393; see alsoSowLE, supra note 29, at 542 ("The
public has a right to learn of reports of public, nongovernmental statements and proceedings relating to matters of public interest, regardless of the reporter's view of the sound-

ness of the statement.").
129. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130. Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

XiV.

A.

WORKERS'

COMPENSATION

"Mental-Mental"Claims Under the Maryland Workers' Compensation
Act

In Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals
held that an employee's mental injuries are compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act,2 even when the employee suffers no related physical injury.3 The court reached its holding by importing the
concept of "physical injury"' used in negligence law into the Maryland
workers' compensation statutory definition of "accidental personal injury."5 The court limited its holding by excluding mental injuries incapable of "objective determination"' and not the result of "an
unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently."7
On a first reading, the Belcher court appears to have significantly expanded the meaning of accidental personal injury under the Act by
making "mental-mental" claims8 compensable. The court's two exceptions9 to its holding, however, will provide courts an opportunity to
1. 329 Md. 709, 621 A.2d 872 (1993).
2. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 9-101 to -1201 (1991).
3. Belcher, 329 Md. at 745, 621 A.2d at 890.
4. The "physical injury" standard in tort includes mental injuries "capable of objective
determination." Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 734 (1979) (finding
evidence of a wife's emotional reaction to her husband's misrepresentation of his marital
status at time of their marriage sufficient to establish physical injury).
5. Belcher, 329 Md. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
6. Id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890.
7. Id.at 740, 621 A.2d at 887 (quoting Sparks v. Tulane Med. Ctr. Hosp. & Clinic, 546
So. 2d 138, 147 (La. 1989)).
8. Mental-mental claims are claims based on mental injuries not accompanied by
physical manifestations. The initial impact of the injuring event on the claimant is purely
mental (i.e. the event is seen, not physically felt) and the resulting injury is purely mental.
Marc A. Antonetti, Labor Law: Workers' Compensation Statutes and the Recovery of Emotional
DistressDamages in the Absence of PhysicalInjury, 2 ANN.SURV. AM. L. 671, 672 n.9 (1990). An
example of a mental-mental claim is a claim for the emotional distress that results from
witnessing a particularly horrific accident in the work place. Mental-mental claims are also
referred to by courts and commentators as "stress claims," "nervous injuries," and "emotional injuries." See ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 42.23,
42.25(a) (1991).
Mental-mental claims are distinguished from other types of claims involving mental
injuries. Antonetti, supra, at 672 n.9. "Physical-mental" claims are claims for mental injuries that result from some physical impact on the body. Id. An example of a physicalmental injury is the fright and emotional shock resulting from a car accident in which
one's body is struck. "Mental-physical" claims are claims for physical injuries that result
from a purely mental or emotional impact. Id. An example of a mental-physical claim is a
claim for a heart attack brought on by fright in a "near miss" of a car accident.
9. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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interpret Belchernarrowly, such that it will have little practical effect on
Maryland's workers' compensation law.
1. The Case.-Carol Belcher worked as a secretary for T. Rowe
Price in its downtown Baltimore office.' On April 11, 1991, a threeton steel beam broke loose from a construction crane at work on a
neighboring building and crashed through the roof into Belcher's office." l Though she was not touched by the falling beam, Belcher suffered severe emotional trauma as a result of the accident. 2 She
endured "sleep disturbances, nightmares, heart palpitations, chest
pain, and headaches."'" She visited a psychiatrist twenty-two times; 4
the psychiatrist diagnosed her condition as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and found that, as a result of the accident, she suffered a forty
percent psychiatric disability. 5 No evidence was presented that
Belcher received treatment for the physical effects of the incident.' 6
Belcher sought compensation for her injuries under the Workers'
Compensation Act.' 7 After her claim was denied by the Workers'
Compensation Commission following a plenary hearing,'.' she appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and again was denied
compensation. 9 She then appealed to the Court of Special Ap10. Belcher, 329 Md. at 713, 621 A.2d at 874.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id,
14. Id.
15. Id. at 714-15, 621 A.2d at 875.
16. Id. at 715, 621 A.2d at 875.
17. Id. at 712, 621 A.2d at 873. The Workers' Compensation Act gives covered employees injured by a third party a choice of proceeding against the employer under the Act,
against the third party in tort, or against both the employer and the third party in tort if
they are joint tortfeasors. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-901 (1991).
18. Belcher, 329 Md. at 712, 621 A.2d at 873. The Commission held a hearing on two
issues: (1) whether Belcher sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in
the course of employment; and (2) whether Belcher's disability was the result of such an
accidental personal injury. Id. at 715, 621 A.2d at 875. The Commission found against
Belcher on both questions. Id.
19. Id. at 712, 621 A.2d at 873-74. The Circuit Court judge defined the issue in the case
as whether a purely mental condition is compensable under the Workers' Compensation
Act when no physical injury is present. Id. at 715, 621 A.2d at 875. Relying on the Court of
Special Appeals's decision in Le v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d
42 (1989), affd on othergrounds, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991), thejudge denied compensation. In Le, an employee sought damages against an employer for false arrest, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42. The
Court of Special Appeals held that because the employee's claims did not involve physical
or mental injury, they were outside the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 9293, 560 A.2d at 43. This finding allowed the employee in Le to avoid the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act and pursue an independent tort action against his
employer. Id. at 93, 560 A.2d at 43; see MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509(b) (1991)
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peals,2" but the Court of Appeals intervened and sought review of the
case on its own motion. 2 '

2. Legal Background.-Workers' compensation statutes arose in
Europe in the late nineteenth century in response to common law
doctrines that allowed employers to escape liability in negligence for
employees' work-related injuries.2 2 As industrialization increased the
number of injured workers and their dependents, society sought ways
to prevent the economic destitution of families caused by a family
member's debilitating injury at work.23 In exchange for assured recovery for on-the-job injuries under workers' compensation statutes,
workers relinquished their right to bring actions against employers in
tort.24 In 1902, Maryland created the Employers' and Employees' Co-

operative Insurance Fund and became the 5first American jurisdiction
2
to enact a workers' compensation statute.
a. Accidental Personal Injury Under the Workers' Compensation
Act.-The Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to provide
compensation to any covered employee 26 who suffers an accidental
personal injury. 27 Accidental personal injuries are of three types:
(1) an accidental injury that arises out of and in the
course of employment;
(2) an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of a
third person directed against a covered employee in the
course of the employment... ; or
(3) a disease or infection that naturally results from an
accidental injury that arises out of and in the course of employment .... 28
("Except as otherwise provided... compensation provided under this tile... is in place of
any right of action against any person.").
20. Belcher, 329 Md. at 712, 621 A.2d at 874.
21. Id.
22. See RICHARD P. GILBERT, MARYLAND WORKERS' COMPENSATION HANDBOOK § 1.2
(1993); Arthur Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
206 (1952). The common law doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
and fellow-servant made it difficult for employees to recover in negligence actions. GILBERT, supra, §§ 1.1-1 to -3.
23. See GILBERT, supra note 22, § 1.2.
24. See Antonetti, supra note 8, at 671.
25. GILBERT, supra note 22, § 1.2 (citing 1902 Md. Laws 139).
26. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-202(a) (1991). An employee is covered "while in
the service of an employer under an express or implied contract ... of hire." Id.
27. Id. § 9-501.
28. Id. § 9-101.
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Maryland courts have long held mental-physical claims, that is,
claims for mental distress that result in physiological injury,2 9 compensable under the workers' compensation laws so long as the mental injury results in a substantial physical injury.
More recently, courts
have granted recovery for mental injuries that result in a substantial
physical change in the body."' Courts also have held physical-mental
claims 3 2 compensable if the emotional trauma for which compensa-

tion is sought forms an "unbroken chain of proximate cause" with the
initial physical injury.13 Mental-mental claims, 3 4 however, had not
been held compensable under the Act prior to the Court of Appeals's
35
holding in Belcher
b. Mental Injury in Negligence Actions.-Early Maryland common law found tortfeasors liable for "all direct injur[ies] resulting
from their wrongful act[s] ....,"Mbut barred recovery for "mere fright
or mental suffering" that occurred apart from physical impact or injury." Recovery was possible, however, for "material physical injury"
38
that resulted from fright caused by a tortfeasor's act.
Later case law expanded the availability of tort recovery for
mental injuries. Plaintiffs could sustain a cause of action for damages
for nervous shock without physical impact so long as that nervous con29. See supra note 8.
30. SeeJ. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165, 190 A. 836 (1937) (granting
recovery for paralysis resulting from a cerebral hemorrhage caused by an employee truck
driver's shock at running into a coworker). "[A]n accidental personal injury takes place if
the injury be a nervous shock that produces not a mere emotional impulse but a physiological injury . . . ." Id. at 171, 190 A. at 836.
31. See Sargent v. Board of Educ. of Baltimore County, 49 Md. App. 577, 584, 433 A.2d
1209, 1213 (1981) (granting recovery for nervous shock caused by claustrophobia because
the employee's "blackout" was a sufficient physiological change to make the mental injury
compensable under the Act).
32. See supra note 8.
33. See Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 303 Md. 182, 193, 492 A.2d 1270,
1275 (1985) (finding that emotional distress and a suicide attempt were proximately
caused by a workplace assault and were therefore fully compensable under the Act). The
Young decision suggests that to be compensable, physical-mental claims must involve a substantial physical injury and a resulting mental injury. See id&Mere physical impact without
physical injury could not sustain a claim for compensation. See GILBERT, supra note 22,
§ 5.2 ("[T] he occurrence of [a physical] accident is never to be considered prima facie evidence of injury.").
34. See supra note 8.
35. Belcher, 329 Md. at 721, 621 A.2d at 878.
36. Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74, 81 (1883).
37. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 107 Md. 600, 607, 69 A. 422, 424 (1908).
38. Green v. Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 77, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909) (finding ajury question
as to whether nervous prostration resulting from repeated exposure to rock blasting satisfies the requirement for "material physical injury").
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dition resulted in some "clearly apparent and substantial physical injury, as manifested by an external condition or by symptoms clearly
indicative of a resultant pathological, physiological, or mental state." 39
Subsequently, the "physical" element required for recovery was interpreted by courts to include simply any evidence of a mental injury
"capable of objective determination."40
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Belcher, the court held that employers are liable under the Workers' Compensation Act for mental injuries to their employees caused by accidents not involving physical
injury.4 1 The court expressly adopted the concept of "physical injury"
used in tort law to define the term "accidental personal injury" in the
Workers' Compensation Act.4 2 The court limited its holding by excluding mental injuries incapable of "objective determination"4 3 and
mental injuries related merely to the "general conditions" of employment." Rather, to be compensable, the court held that a mental injury must be "demonstrable"4 5 and the result of "an unexpected and
unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently."4 6
Writing for the majority, Judge Orth first found that in denying
Belcher's claim, the trial court had relied on a mistaken reading of
the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Le v. Federated Department
Stores.4 7 In Le, an employee sought to escape the exclusivity provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act and pursue an independent tort
action for false imprisonment, defamation, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.4" The Belcher trial court read the Le opinion as
holding that, because the tortious acts in question were not physical,
they fell outside the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act. 9 The
Court of Appeals, however, had affirmed Le on other grounds, finding
that because the Workers' Compensation Act provided employees the
39. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (emphasis added)
(permitting recovery for a father's fright resulting from witnessing a truck accident threatening his two young sons). The Bowman court read Shoemaker and its progeny as permitting
recovery for fright manifested by an "external condition" or "symptom." lId

40. Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 500, 408 A.2d 728, 733-34 (1979). Vance expanded
the rule in Shoemaker and Bowman by permitting recovery on a showing of mere physical
evidence of a mental state. Id.
41. Belcher, 329 Md. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890.
44. Id at 739-40, 621 A.2d at 887.
45. Id. at 734, 738, 621 A.2d at 884, 886.
46. Id. at 740, 621 A.2d at 887.
47. 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989); see supra note 19.
48. Le, 80 Md. App. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42.
49. Belcher, 329 Md. at 717, 621 A.2d at 876.
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option to pursue actions in tort for intentional injuries, 50 it need not
reach the question of whether purely mental injuries are compensable
under the Act.5 1 Consequently, the Court of Appeals in Belcher found
that, after Le, "the status of [mental] trauma under the Act was left in
limbo.

5 2

The Belcher court next turned to the meaning of "accidental personal injury" in the Workers' Compensation Act.5 3 Finding both the
General Assembly's legislative intent and Maryland case law inconclusive on the question of whether the term "accidental personal injury"
includes purely psychological injuries, 4 the court turned to the concept of "physical injury" in Maryland tort law. 5 It found that the concept of "physical injury" in tort actions had come to include emotional
injuries "capable of objective determination."56 The court held that
though the meaning of personal injury in workers' compensation law
had not developed along the expansive lines of the physical injury
concept in tort law, "modern times" required the court to adopt the
tort definition of physical injury for use in workers' compensation
law.57 The court wrote,
The provisions of the Act do not prohibit it; expediency has
not proved to be a deterrent; the advances in medical science make it feasible; logic supports it; the needs of society
require it. We have come to appreciate that a mind may be
injured as well as a body maimed.5"
The court reasoned that because the Workers' Compensation Act
was intended to prevent workers from becoming indigent and dependent on the State as a result of work-related injuries, workers should
be compensated for any work-related debilitating injuries that society
generally finds legitimate. 9 Noting that the inclusion of mental injuries in tort claims for physical injury indicated that society considered
them legitimate, the court found no reason for them not to be in50. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Le, 324 Md. 71, 80, 595 A.2d 1067, 1071 (1991)
(quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 1990)). "If injury... results
from the deliberate intention of his employer.., the employee... shall have the privilege
either to take under this article or have cause of action against such employer, as if this
article had not been passed." Id.
51. Id
52. Belcher, 329 Md. at 719, 621 A.2d at 877.
53. Id
54. Id. at 722, 621 A.2d at 878.
55. Id
56. Id at 734, 621 A.2d at 884.
57. Id. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 737-38, 621 A.2d at 886.
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cluded within the definition of accidental personal injury in the Workers' Compensation Act.6 0 The court remanded the case to the
Workers' Compensation Commission with direction to conduct a
hearing pursuant to its finding that mental injuries without accompanying physical harm are compensable under the Act.61
Judge Rodowsky, joined by Judges McAuliffe and Chasanow, concurred in the court's judgment, but wrote separately to argue that the
62
majority's rationale was "so expansive as to be legally incorrect."
The concurrence argued that the evidence in Belcher's case created a
factual question as to whether her injury satisfied the requirement
under the Workers' Compensation Act that any psychological injury
be accompanied by physiological change.6" Rather than presenting a
mental-mental claim, the concurrence argued that Belcher's physical
reactions to the event (i.e., involuntary shaking, chest and shoulder
pain, headaches, panic attacks, sleeplessness, and nightmares) suggested that her claim was of the type already compensable under the
Act.' Furthermore, the concurrence found evidence in the recodification of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act that the legislature intended mental-mental claims not to be compensable.6 5 Finally,
the concurrence argued that because the expansion of the Act to
cover mental-mental claims may significantly impact the cost of workers' compensation to businesses and the Maryland economy in general, the majority's holding was inappropriate given that the question

60. Id. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
61. Id. at 746, 621 A.2d at 890.
62. Id. (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 748, 621 A.2d at 891 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
64. Id (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 750-51, 621 A.2d at 892-93 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). The original recodification of the Act introduced as House Bill I on January 9, 1991, used the term "accidental
injury" rather than "accidental personal injury." Id. at 750, 621 A.2d at 892 (Rodowsky, J.,
concurring). In response to a letter from the chair of the Workers' Compensation Committee of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce opposing this change, the General Assembly submitted amendments to the bill that resulted in use of the term "accidental personal
injury." Id. at 751, 621 A.2d at 893 (Rodowsky, J., concurring). The Committee had argued that use of the term "accidental injury" would create a "potential problem ... if the
Maryland Court of Appeals were to interpret the term 'accidental injury' to include other
than physical injuries." Brief of Amici Curiae at app. 1 (citing Letter from Rudolph L.
Rose, Chairman, Workers' Compensation Committee, Maryland Chamber of Commerce,
to the Honorable Casper R. Taylor, Jr., Delegate, Maryland General Assembly 2 (Jan. 16,
1991)). The concurrence argued that the General Assembly's introduction of amendments to the original recodification demonstrated an intent to "prevent ajudicial interpretation of 'accidental injury' that included 'other than physical injuries.'" Belcher, 329 Md.
at 752, 621 A.2d at 894 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).
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of the compensability of mental-mental claims was not clearly before
the court.6 6
4. Analysis.-In Belcher, the Court of Appeals held that claims
for mental injury without physical injury are compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act, 67 but limited its holding to mental injuries that are objectively demonstrable 68 and not merely the result of
the general conditions of employment. 69 These two limitations will
allow courts to read Belcher narrowly as permitting recovery for mental
injuries only if they are accidental and are accompanied by physiological change in the body. Moreover, the General Assembly may respond to the Belcherholding by clarifying the language of the Workers'
Compensation Act to expressly exclude mental-mental injuries.
a. Objective Demonstration.-As an answer to the "very real
problem" that mental injuries may be easily faked, the court adopted
the position that mental injuries will be compensable only if they are
capable of objective determination. 7' The court maintained that a
mental injury is objectively demonstrable if the "cause and effect of psychological harm are established"7M and endorsed the view that no valid
line can be drawn between mental and physical injuries. 7 ' The court
was silent, however, as to what effect of psychological harm, other than
a physical effect, could possibly satisfy the objective demonstration standard. Given the court's insistence that the human mind and body are
of one piece, its call for objective demonstration may cause courts to
continue to require a showing of physiological change before granting recovery for mental injuries under the Workers' Compensation
Act. 74 Since mental injuries that result in physiological change are
already compensable under the Act, 75 courts may determine that

Belcher did not in fact create a new category of compensable injuries.
66. Belcher, 329 Md. at 754, 621 A.2d at 894-95 (Rodowsky, J., concurring).

67. Id. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
68. Id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890.
69. Id. at 739-40, 621 A.2d at 887.
70. Id. at 745-46, 621 A.2d at 890.
71. Id. at 734, 621 A.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 739, 621 A.2d at 887 ("'[T] here is no really valid distinction between physical
and "nervous" injury.'") (quoting favorably LARSON, supra note 8, § 42.23, at 7-906).
73. See id. at 738, 621 A.2d at 887.
74. The concurrence in Belcher noted an analogous point. Citing Belcher's involuntary
shaking, chest and shoulder pain, headaches, panic attacks, sleeplessness, and nightmares,
the concurrence argued that Belcher's claim presented a factual question as to whether
she suffered a physiological injury as a result of the accident. Id. at 748, 621 A.2d at 891.
75. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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b. General Conditions of Employment.-The Belcher court also
held that mental injuries related to the "general conditions of employment, "76 and therefore not caused by sudden, unforeseen events, are
not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.77 Presuma-

bly, the court adopted this rule to limit workers' compensation claims
for mental stress resulting from ordinary job pressures or the work
environment. The majority of courts that have adopted rules relating
to mental-mental workers' compensation claims, however, have not
adopted a sudden event requirement. 78 While such a requirement
may help limit the number of claims, its logic relative to the existing
Maryland statute and to the majority's focus on the aims of worker's
compensation law is unclear.
Prior to Belcher, injuries were compensable under the Workers'
Compensation Act regardless of whether they were precipitated by a
sudden event or a gradual stimulus, provided they met the "accidental" test of the Maryland statute.7 9 Consequently, claims related to the
general conditions of employment-whether for mental or physical
injuries-would likely not be covered because they did not result from
some accident or unusual condition of employment.8 0 Moreover, the
court's adoption of the sudden event requirement conflicts with the
general principle that all legitimate work-related injuries should be
recoverable if they are accidental.8 "
76. The court did not define "general conditions of employment." See Belcher, 329 Md.
at 739, 621 A.2d at 887. However, this phrase, which the court borrowed from Sparks v.
Tulane Med. Ctr. Hosp. & Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989), was elaborated upon by the
Sparks court:
While the sudden onset of physical injury may qualify as the compensable "accident" in some cases... an employee's subjective assertion that he had a sudden
onset of symptoms of mental injury, such as depression or anxiety, is not alone
sufficient to show that an accident occurred. The employee must be able to point
to a discernible employment-related event which caused the mental injury, an
event separate and apart from the onset of the symptoms of that mental injury.
Id. at 147 n.7. The most commonly alleged workers' compensation claims for mental injury are those related to job pressures or harassment. See LA.RsoN, supra note 8, § 42.25 (a),
at 7-958. Typical mental stress claims are "characterized by absence of physical injury, little
time off work, low medical treatment costs, [and] insignificant retraining costs. . . ." Id
77. Belcher, 329 Md. at 739-40, 621 A.2d at 887.
78. Lm.sON, supra note 8, § 42.23(b) n.1.
79. See Foble v. Knefely, 176 Md. 474, 6 A.2d 48 (1939) (holding a seamstress's injury
caused by a faulty adjustment of the knee press of a sewing machine compensable).
An injury is "accidental" if it results from "some unusual strain, exertion or condition
in the employment." Sargent v. Board of Educ. of Baltimore County, 49 Md. App. 577,
580-81, 433 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) (quoting Stancliffv. H.B. Davis Co., 208 Md. 191, 198,
117 A.2d 577, 591 (1955)).
80. Sargent, 49 Md. App. at 580-81, 433 A.2d at 1211 (citing Stancliff v. H.B. Davis Co.,
208 Md. 191, 198, 117 A.2d 577, 591 (1955)).
81. See Belcher, 329 Md. at 737, 621 A.2d at 886.
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c. The Legislature's Role in Workers' Compensation.-In Belcher,
the court imported the concept of "physical injury" from negligence
law into the definition of "accidental personal injury" under the Workers' Compensation Act.8" With the court's decision to allow recovery
for mental-mental claims, Maryland joined the trend in a majority of
states.83 However, of the twenty-eight states that allow some recovery
for mental-mental claims as part of their workers' compensation
schemes, only six have statutory language similar to that in the Maryland Act.8 4 Moreover, only four of the ten states that use statutory
language similar to that in the Maryland Act prohibit recovery for
mental-mental claims in all circumstances."5 In sum, courts of states
with statutory language similar to Maryland's are rather evenly split as
to whether mental-mental injuries are compensable: six states permit
some recovery;86 four states prohibit it entirely.8 7
82. Id. at 738, 621 A.2d at 886.
83. See LARSON, supra note 8, § 42.23, at 7-876.
84. See id. § 42.23; Antonetti, supra note 8, at 675 n.33. Definitions of "injury" in state
workers' compensation statutes are of four types: (1) injury as relating to "the physical
structure of the body," (2) injury involving "any harmful change in the human organism,"
(3) injury that expressly includes mental injury under limited circumstances, and (4) injury described imprecisely such as in statutes that define it as "accidental injury arising out
of and in the course of employment." Id. at 674-76. The Maryland Workers' Compensation statute is of the final type. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-101 (1991).
Ten states have statutes similar to the Maryland Act. These states are Arkansas (Apic
CODE ANN. § 11-9-102 (Michie 1987)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1(4) (Michie 1992 &
Supp. 1993)); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.2 (Smith-Hurd 1986)); Indiana
(IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-6-1(e) (Burns 1992 & Supp. 1993)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.011 (16) (West 1993)); NewJersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-1 (West 1988)); New York
(N.Y. WORK.COMp. LAw § 2(7) (McKinney 1992)); Oklahoma (Ov. STAT. ANN. tit. 85,
§ 3(7) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 62-1-1(7)
(1993)); and Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-102(5) (1992 & Supp. 1992)).
Of these states, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, NewJersey, New York, and Tennessee permit recovery for mental-mental injuries. See infra note 86.
85. The four states that prohibit recovery are Minnesota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Georgia. See infra note 87.
86. See Owens v. National Health Labs., Inc., 648 S.W.2d 829, 830 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that "[there is] no reason why harm to the body of a worker should be limited to
visible physical injury to the bones and muscles and should exclude work related trauma
which results in an injury of the mind"); Board of Educ. of Chicago v. Industrial Comm'n,
538 N.E.2d 830, 833 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (holding claims for mental distress compensable if
they aise from an "uncommon or unusual stress situation" when "viewed objectively");
Hansen v. Von Duprin, Inc., 507 N.E.2d 573, 576 (Ind. 1987) (holding that "whether the
injury is mental or physical, the determinative standard should be .. .whether the injury
arose out of and in the course of employment"); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 95 A.2d
446, 450 (N.J. 1953) (stating that there is nothing in the law that excludes compensation
for "psychic trauma" without physical injury); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 330
N.E.2d 603, 606 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that "psychological or nervous injury precipitated by
psychic trauma is compensable to the same extent as physical injury "); Jose v. Equifax,
Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977) (holding that "mental stimulus, such as fright, shock
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States that prohibit compensation for mental-mental claims
under statutes with language comparable to the Maryland Act do so
out of deference to the policy-making role of the legislature. For example, in Lockwood v. Independent School District No. 877,88 the Minnesota Supreme Court refrained from expanding the reach of a workers'
compensation statute that covered only "injury arising out of and in
the course of employment." 9 The court held that "the issue raised
...involves a policy determination which ...

should be presented to

the legislature as the appropriate policy-making body."9"
The expansion of workers' compensation benefits has a far-reaching impact on a state's economy. For example, the California Workers' Compensation Institute (CWCI) recently reported that in
California stress claims increased 540 percent between 1979 and 1988,
even though the overall number of claims for disabling work injuries
decreased by 8 percent.9 1 CWCI estimated that stress claims may have
cost the state as much as $383 million in 1987 alone. 2 Thus, any decision regarding the reach of a statute's compensation scheme would
benefit from analysis of its impact on the state's business environment
as a whole. State legislatures are in a better position to determine
compensation categories because they are more sensitive to the economic and social pressures that should inform decisions about workers' compensation policy. Unlike the judiciary, which is guided only
by the specific facts involved in the resolution of individual disputes,
the legislature has access to and responsibility for broad-based data to
inform its decisionmaking. It remains to be seen whether the Maryor even excessive, unexpected anxiety could amount to an 'accident' sufficient to justify an
award for a resulting mental or nervous disorder").
87. See W.W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 385 S.E.2d 106, 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a "discernable physical occurrence" is required to support compensation for
mental injuries); Lockwood v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 877, 312 N.W.2d 924, 927
(Minn. 1981) (holding that in the absence of clear legislative intent to find mental injuries
compensable, such claims are not covered by the Act); Fenwick v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 792 P.2d 60, 63 (Okla. 1990) (reiterating a long-held rule that mental disability not
accompanied by a physical injury is not covered by workers' compensation); Lather v. Huron College, 413 N.W.2d 369, 371 (S.D. 1987) (holding that mental disability produced
solely by mental stimuli is not compensable).
88. 312 N.W.2d 924 (Minn. 1981).
89. Id. at 926, 927 (citing MiNN. STAT. § 176.011(16) (1980)).
90. Id. at 927.
91. Brief of Amici Curiae at app. 2. California is recognized as permitting liberal recovery for mental injuries, requiring neither "physical manifestation" nor "sudden event." See
LARSON, supra note 8, § 43.25(a). The CWCI argues that the total number of stress claims
may be three times as great as its initial report suggests. Brief of Amici Curiae at app. 2.
This preliminary statistic suggests that the more moderate Maryland rule may nonetheless
lead to a significant increase in mental-mental claims.
92. Brief of Amici Curiae at app. 2.
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land General Assembly will respond to the court's decision by clarifying the statutory definition of "accidental personal injury," as have
many state legislatures where judicial gloss has expanded recovery for
93
mental-mental claims under Workers' Compensation.
5. Conclusion.-In Belcher v. T. Rowe Price, the Court of Appeals
held that mental injuries without accompanying physical injuries are
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.9 4 Given the
court's two limits on its holding-that injuries must be capable of objective demonstration and not result from the general conditions of
employment-it is unclear whether the decision actually departs from
the court's prior rulings finding mental injuries that result in physiological change compensable under the Act.
TERESA

93. Antonetti, supra note 8, at 673.
94. Belcher, 329 Md. at 745, 621 A.2d at 890.
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